f 


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,.;.:- 


■ilE  UNIVERStTY  UTOAW 
HWERSfTY  OF  CALIFORNIA, " 

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ENGLISH  PHILOSOPHERS 


Sir  William  Hamilton 


BY 

W.  H.  S.  MONCK,  M.A. 

PROFESSOR   OF   MORAL   PHILOSOPHY    IN   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF   DUBLIN 


NEW  YORK 
P.    PUTNAM'S    SONS 
27  and  29  W.  23D  Street 

1  88  1 


*? 


SIR  WILLIAM   HAMILTON. 


PEBFACE 


THE  EDITOR. 


The  appearance  or  the  first  instalment  of  the  Series  of 
English  Philosophers  affords  the  Editor  an  opportunity  of 
defining1  the  position  and  aim  of  this  and  the  succeeding 
volumes  We  live  in  an  age  of  series  :  Art,  Science, 
Letters,  are  each  represented  by  one  or  more ;  it  is  the 
object  of  the  present  Series  to  add  Philosophy  to  the  list  of 
subjects  which  are  daily  becoming  more  and  more  popular. 
Had  it  been  our  aim  to  produce  a  History  of  Philosophy  in 
the  interests  of  any  one  school  of  thought,  co-operation  would 
have  been  well-nigh  impracticable.  Such,  however,  is  not 
our  object.  We  seek  to  lay  before  the  reader  what  each 
English  Philosopher  thought  and  wrote  about  the  problems 
with  which  he  dealt,  not  what  we  may  think  he  ought  to 
have  thought  and  written.  Criticism  will  be  suggested 
rather  than  indulged  in,  and  these  volumes  will  be  exposi- 
tions rather  than  reviews.  The  size  and  number  of  the 
volumes  compiled  by  each  leading  Philosopher  are  chiefly  due 
to   the   necessitj',  which    Philosophers   have    generally    con- 


vi  PREFACE. 

sidered  imperative,  of  demolishing"  all  previous  systems  of 
Philosophy  before  they  commence  the  work  of  constructing 
their  own.  Of  this  work  of  destruction  little  will  be  found 
in  these  volumes;  we  propose  to  lay  stress  on  what  a  Philo- 
sopher did  rather  than  on  what  he  undid.  In  the  summary 
will  be  found  a  general  survey  of  the  main  criticisms  that 
have  been  passed  upon  the  views  of  the  Philosopher  who 
forms  the  subject  of  the  work,  and  in  the  bibliographic 
appendix  the  reader  will  be  directed  to  sources  of  more 
detailed  criticism  than  the  size  and  nature  of  the  volumes  in 
the  Series  would  permit.  The  lives  of  Philosophers  are  not, 
as  a  rule,  eventful,  the  biographies  will  consequently  be 
brief.  It  is  hoped  that  the  Series,  when  complete,  will 
supply  a  comprehensive  History  of  English  Philosophy.  It 
will  include  an  Introduction  to  the  Study  of  Philosophy,  by 
Professor  H.  Sidgwick. 

Oxfobd,  Nov.,  1880. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

PAOB 

Biographical  and  Introductory        1 

CHAPTER  II. 
The  External  World — Natural  Realism        .        .        .        .15 

CHAPTER  III. 
Necessary  Truths — The  Law  of  the  Conditioned        .        .     4.8 

CHAPTER  IV. 
The  Law  of  Causation 61 

CHAPTER  V. 

The  Infinite  and  Absolute — The  Law  of  Substancb  .        .    81 

CHAPTER  VI. 
The  General  Psychology  of  Hamilton 102 

CHAPTER  VII. 
Logic     ....  141 

APPENDIX. 
Hamiltonian  Literature 165 

Glossary   of  Philosophical  Terms    ....••  168 


SIB    WILLIAM   HAMILTON. 


CHAPTER  I. 

BIOGRAPHICAL  AND  INTRODUCTORY. 

Sir  William  Hamilton  was  born  at  Glasgow  in  the  year 
1788.       His    birth    took    place    in    the    College    where    his 
father,  Dr.  William  Hamilton,  filled  the  chair  of  Anatomy 
and    Botany,    which    had    formerly    been    occupied    by    his 
grandfather,  Dr.   Thomas  Hamilton.     He  received  the  names 
of  William   Stirling,   the   latter  being    his    mother's  family 
name ;  but    he  dropped  the    Stirling    soon    after  coming  ot 
age,  and  it  appears  for  the    last  time  when  he    passed    his 
final  examination  at  Oxford  in  1810.     He  was  only  two  years 
old   when  his  father   died   at  the    early    age    of  thirty-two, 
leaving  his  widow  and  two  children — the  future  philosopher, 
and  a  younger  brother  named  Thomas,  who  afterwards  entered 
the  army  and  attained  some  distinction  in  the  department  of 
literature.      Dr.   Hamilton   appears  to   have   left  his   family 
sufficiently  (though  probably  not  handsomely)  provided  for, 
and     Sir    William    and    his  brother    received    an    excellent 
education.     He   succeeded   to  the  family  baronetcy  in   1799, 
but  no  estate  accompanied  the  title,  his  right  to  which  was 
only  proved  (with  considerable  trouble  and  expense)  thirteen 
or  fourteen  years  later ;  so  that  during  his  school  and  college 
days  he   was  known  as  plain  William  Hamilton.     He  con- 

B 


SIR    WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 


tinued  to  reside  in  Glasgow  after  his  father's  death  until  the 
year  1S01,  when  he  was  sent  to  school  in  England,  having 
previously  it  seems  attended  the  Junior  Greek  and  Latin 
classes  of  the  University  at  the  age  of  twelve.  The  figure  of 
the  venerable  Reid,  whose  works  he  was  destined  to  edit  long 
afterwards,  was  no  doubt  familiar  to  him  during  early  child- 
hood, but  the  philosophy  of  Reid  and  Stewart  appears  to  have 
been  little  studied  at  Glasgow  until  after  he  left  that 
University.  Notwithstanding  his  attendance  at  the  classes 
mentioned,  he  does  not  appear  to  have  entered  the  University 
of  Glasgow  until  after  his  return  from  England  in  1803.  He 
then  distinguished  himself  in  the  department  of  Logic  and 
Moral  Philosophy,  and  it  is  worth  noticing  that  Reid's 
successor — Professor  Mylne — under  whom  he  studied,  was  a 
Sensationalist  in  Psychology  and  an  Utilitarian  in  Ethics. 
Hamilton's  subsequent  hostility  to  these  theories  cannot 
therefore  be  ascribed  to  early  training,  and  judging  from  the 
fact  that  he  records  the  purchase  of  Reid's  works  in  one  of 
his  letters  while  at  Oxford,  it  would  appear  that  he  was  not 
previously  acquainted  with  that  author.  Being  intended  for  the 
medical  profession  like  his  father  and  grandfather,  his  studies 
were  naturally  directed  to  that  object,  and  in  particular  he 
devoted  a  good  deal  of  time  to  Chemistry,  the  only  physical 
science  (except  Physiology)  with  which  he  seems  to  have  had 
much  acquaintance,  and  which  undoubtedly  coloured  (among 
other  things)  his  theory  of  causation.  After  going  to  Edin- 
burgh to  pursue  his  medical  studies,  his  mother  decided  to 
send  him  to  Oxford,  and  he  entered  that  University  as  a 
student  of  Balliol  College  in  1807.  He  obtained  a  Snell 
Exhibition — a  prize  instituted  by  a  Scotchman  for  the  pur- 
pose of  assisting  deserving  youths  of  his  own  country  to  take 
Degrees  at  the  leading  English  University — and  by  refraining 
from    any    considerable    expenditure,    except    on    books,    his 


BIOGRA PHICA L  AND  INTR OD UCTOR  Y.      3 

University  career  did  not  prove  an  expensive  one.  He  does 
not  seem  to  have  become  acquainted  with  many  of  the  Oxford 
students  (then  unusually  numerous)  who  made  names  for  them- 
selves in  after-life,  and  except  his  countryman  Lockhart,  the 
names  of  his  associates  mentioned  by  his  biographer  call  for 
no  remark.  As  in  one  of  his  letters,  however,  he  takes  up  the 
cause  of  Mr.  Copleston  rather  warmly  in  his  controversy  with 
the  Edinburgh  Review,  we  may  perhaps  assume  that  he  came 
to  a  certain  extent  under  the  influence  of  the  man  to  whom  the 
revival  of  Logic  as  a  study  at  Oxford  has  chiefly  been  ascribed. 
He  was  undoubtedly  a  hard  reader,  and  the  number  of  books 
which  he  took  up  for  his  final  examination  in  Literis  Humani- 
oribus  was  regarded  as  unprecedented.  They  were  mainly 
philosophical,  and  included  almost  all  the  writings  of  Aristotle, 
together  with  the  philosophical  works  of  Cicero ;  but  his 
books  were  certainly  more  numerous  than  his  authors.  His 
name  appears  in  the  First  Class  :  but  as  the  names  in  that 
class  are  printed  alphabetically  and  not  in  order  of  merit, 
we  are  unable  to  ascertain  the  precise  position  which  he 
occupied  as  regards  his  contemporaries,  none  of  whom  sub- 
sequently attained  any  remarkable  distinction.  He  was  not 
elected  to  a  Fellowship  at  Balliol  College,  but  that  may  have 
been  owing  to  the  disfavour  with  which  Scotchmen  were  re- 
garded at  the  time.  He  evidently  acquired  a  high  reputation 
at  Oxford  as  a  student  of  philosophy,  but  his  attainments  in 
that  department  were  only  tested  indirectly  by  means  of  an 
examination  in  Greek  and  Latin  philosophical  works — the 
former  limited  to  Aristotle  and  the  latter  to  Cicero. 

Leaving  Oxford  in  1811  (except  for  occasional  visits)  Sir 
William  Hamilton  changed  his  intended  profession,  and  be- 
came an  Advocate  in  the  year  1818.  His  success  at  the 
Scottish  bar  was  not  brilliant,  but  there  seems  no  reason  to 
doubt   that  if  he  had  devoted  his  attention  to  his  profession 

b  2 


SIR    WIL  L I  A  M  HA  MIL  TON. 


■&>  > 


he  would  have  earned  a  respectable  livelihood.  Reading 
however,  seems  to  have  been  his  chief  occupation,  and  in  this 
respect  the  Advocates'  Library  had  great  attractions  for  him. 
He  had  become  a  book  collector  at  a  very  early  age,  and  his 
private  library  was  already  attaining  considerable  dimensions. 
In  1820  the  Professorship  of  Moral  Philosophy  in  the  Uni- 
versity of  Edinburgh  became  vacant  by  the  death  of  Dr. 
Brown,  who  had  latterly  been  the  colleague  of  Stewart. 
Hamilton  does  not  appear  to  have  been  acquainted  with 
Brown,  though  he  had  resided  in  Edinburgh  since  his  call  to 
the  bar,  and  it  seems  to  have  been  on  the  occasion  of  his 
present  candidature  that  he  first  met  Stewart.  The  appoint- 
ment rested  with  the  Town  Council  of  Edinburgh.  Mr. 
MacVey  Napier,  afterwards  editor  of  the  Edinburgh  Review, 
was  at  first  a  candidate  with  the  support  of  Stewart,  but  does 
not  seem  to  have  persevered  in  his  canvass :  and  the  contest 
lay  between  Hamilton  and  John  Wilson,  better  known  in  the 
literary  world  as  Christopher  North.  Hamilton  was  a  Whig, 
and  Wilson  was  a  Tory  ;  and  as  the  latter  party  pi'eponderated 
in  the  Town  Council,  Wilson  proved  the  successful  com- 
petitor. That  the  world  would  have  gained  much  by  the 
election  of  Hamilton  cannot  be  doubted,  but  I  think  the 
Town  Council  has  been  unduly  censured  for  its  choice. 
Hamilton  had  hitherto  published  nothing.  His  prize  at 
Glasgow  sixteen  years  before  had  been  awarded  by  his  fellow- 
students  to  a  boy  in  his  teens,  while  his  Oxford  distinction 
had  been  mainly  won  by  his  classical  knowledge.  He  had 
been  for  several  years  a  practising  Advocate,  and  there  was 
nothing  to  show  (so  far  as  I  am  aware)  that  during  that 
period  he  had  been  an  active  student  of  philosophy.  Wilson's 
philosophical  credentials  were  probably  not  of  a  high  order, 
hut,  he  was  a  man  of  undoubted  ability.  The  selection  was 
certainly  not    the    worst    instance    of   party-spirit   that    has 


BIOGRAPHICAL  AND  INTRODUCTORY.      5 

occurred  with  respect  to  such  appointments,  nor  perhaps  are 
thev  much  purer  in  the  hands  of  the  Government  than  of  a 
Town  Council.  Hamilton  and  Wilson  were  friends,  and  the 
incident  did  not  interrupt  their  friendship ;  while  many  years 
afterwards  Sir  William  took  an  opportunity  of  making  a  com- 
plimentary allusion  to  Wilson  in  his  own  Lectures.1 

Soon  after  this,  Hamilton  was  appointed  to  the  chair  of 
History  in  the  University  of  Edinburgh,  the  emoluments  of 
which  post  only  amounted  to  100^.  a  year,  and  he  also  received 
a  small  law  appointment  as  Solicitor  of  Teinds.  He  appears 
to  have  abandoned  his  practice  at  the  bar  and  lived  with  his 
mother  and  his  cousin,  Miss  Marshall,  reading  and  making  addi- 
tions to  his  library,  and  occasionally  astonishing  casual  visitors 
by  the  extent  of  his  erudition.  Phrenology  had  at  this  period 
become  fashionable  in  Edinburgh  under  the  auspices  of  Mr. 
George  Combe.  Hamilton  made  a  great  number  of  researches 
on  the  skulls  of  men  and  other  animals  (including  some  expe- 
riments on  live  animals)  with  the  view  of  testing  its  pretensions, 
and  afterwards  published  the  result  of  his  inquiries,  which 
were  decidedly  adverse  to  the  theories  of  Gall  and  Spurzheim. 
A'  summary  of  these  researches  appears  in  an  appendix  to  the 
first  volume  of  his  Lectures,  and  if  we  may  judge  by  them 
Hamilton  would  have  proved  a  successful  student  of  Physio- 
logy had  he  been  able  to  devote  more  time  to  that  science. 
He  retained  his  interest  in  it  undiminished  up  to  the  last; 
and  while  his  investigations  possess  the  interest  of  being  his 
earliest  publication,  I  am  not  aware  that  his  results  have  ever 
been  displaced. 

During  the  period  subsequent  to  18:20,  Hamilton  seems  to  have 
become  better  acquainted  with  Stewart,  and  in  a  letter  of  the  lat- 
ter which  is  extant  he  acknowledges  his  indebtedness  to  Hamil- 

1  Lect.  ii.  p.  382.  This  passage,  if  not  this  whole  Lecture,  must  have 
been  written  as  late  as  1854. 


6  SIR    WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 

ton  for  "  much  curious  and  valuable  information  about  the  later 
philosophers  of  Germany,  whose  merits  and  defects  he  seems 
to  me  to  have  appreciated  with  great  candour  and  discrimina- 
tion. "  If,  however,  this  "curious  and  valuable  information'" 
was  that  which  Stewart  published  a  few  years  afterwards  in  his 
Dissertation  on  the  Progress  of  Philosophy,  the  incident 
does  not  redound  very  much  to  Hamilton's  credit.  Stewart, 
however,  in  the  course  of  that  Dissertation,  only  refers  to  him 
on  one  occasion  when  alluding  to  Eschenbach,  who  unmis- 
takably anticipated  Sir  William  Hamilton's  subsequent  doc- 
trine of  Natural  Realism,  though  Hamilton  himself  ascribes  it 
to  no  modern  philosopher  except  Poiret  and  Reid  (with  the 
possible  addition  of  Sergeant).1  This  doctrine  evidently 
puzzled  Stewart,  who  could  not  make  up  his  mind  as  to  whether 
Eschenbach  was  <f  right  or  wrong.'''  I  may  here  remark  that 
Professor  Veitch,  in  his  Memoir,  tells  us  that  it  appears  from 
Hamilton's  Common  Place  Book,  that  he  had  adopted  the 
doctrine  of  Natural  Realism,  in  all  its  essentials,  as  early  as 
1823,  and  therefore  previous  to  the  publication  of  Stewart's 
Dissertation  ;  but  Stewart  refers  to  him  merely  as  the  source 
of  a  curious  piece  of  literary  information  and  not  as  an  autho- 
rity on  philosophy. 

Sir  William  Hamilton's  mother  died  in  the  year  1827,  and 
two  years  later  the  future  philosopher  married  Miss  Marshall, 
the  cousin  who  had  resided  with  him  and  his  mother  for  several 
yeai-s  before  her  death.  The  union  proved  a  happy  one,  though 
many  ladies  would  have  objected  to  the  continual  work  as  her 
husband's  amanuensis,  which  Lady  Hamilton  cheerfully  under- 
went. That  she  had  much  to  do  with  his  subsequent  distinc- 
tions seems  to  be  admitted,  and  I  suspect  it  was  in  no  small 
degree  owing  to  her  influence  that  the  recluse  student  became 
an  author  for  substantially  the  first  time,  six  months  after  his 
1  Stewart's  Works,  i.  pp.  681-5.     Hamilton's  Edition. 


BIOGRAPHICAL  AND  INTRODUCTORY.      7 

marriage,  and  when  he  had  passed   his   fortieth   year.     The 
immediate  cause  of  his  coming  before  the  public,  however,  was 
the  appointment  of  his  friend,  Mr.  MacVey  Napier,  as  editor 
of  the   Edinburgh   Review  in    succession  to  Lord   Jeffrey,    in 
1829.     Napier  insisted   on   Hamilton's   supplying  an  article 
for  the  first  number  of  the  Review  which  came  out  under  his 
auspices,  and  the  result  was  his  famous  Discussion  on  the  Un- 
conditioned, which  revealed  to  Continental  thinkers  the  unsus- 
pected existence  in  this  country  of  a  great  philosopher,  who 
could  look  beyond  the  narrow  confines  of  Great  Britain.     M. 
Cousin,  against  whom  the  article  was  chiefly  directed,  con- 
ceived the  warmest  feelings  of  admiration  and  respect  for  its 
author,  with  whom  he  soon  after  entered  into  correspondence, 
and  in  whose  behalf  he  exerted  himself  to  the  utmost  when  the 
Chair  of  Logic  in  the  University  of  Edinburgh  became  vacant. 
The  friendship  of  the  two  philosophers,    indeed,   lasted  up  to 
Hamilton's  death.     This  Discussion  was  followed  by  another 
on  the  Theory  of  Perception  in  1830,  and  a  third  on  Logic  in 
1833;  and  Hamilton  likewise  contributed  a  large  number  of 
articles  on  other  subjects  to  the  Edinburgh  Review  from  1829 
to  1836,  in  which  he  showed  himself  particularly  zealous  in 
the  cause  of  University  Reform,  and  the  admission  of  Dissen- 
ters  to   the   Universities.     It  may    here  be    remarked    that 
Hamilton  was  an  attached  member  of  the  Church  of  Scotland, 
in  whose  subsequent  troubles  he  took  much  interest,   and  was 
always  a  sincere  and  consistent  believer  in  Christianity.     In 
politics  he  was  a  Liberal,  and  he  adhered  to  his  political  views 
with  such  firmness  as  to  estrange   some  of  the  most  intimate 
of  his  early  friends — for  instance  Lockhart.     With  Wilson, 
however,  he  always  continued  on  good  terms,  although  they 
were  rival  candidates  for  a  chair  of  philosophy,  which  seems 
to   have  been  in   a  great  measure    disposed    of  on  political 
grounds. 


8  SIR    WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 

Hamilton  had  completed  his  forty-eighth  year  before  his 
appointment  to  a  chair  of  philosophy,  and  even  then  three  of 
four  articles  in  the  Edinburgh  Review  were  the  only  contribu- 
tions to  that  science  to  which  he  could  point  as  credentials. 
How  much  more  he  might  have  accomplished  if  he  had 
received  the  appointment  earlier,  it  is  vain  to  speculate;  but 
it  is  perhaps  the  prevailing  fault  of  all  Academical  patrons  to 
select  a  middle-aged  or  elderly  man  who  has  already  made  a 
reputation,  rather  than  a  young  man  who  gives  every  indi- 
cation that  he  is  prepared  to  make  one  whenever  an  opening 
presents  itself.  We  cannot  regret  that  such  a  choice  was 
ultimately  made  in  Hamilton's  case ;  but  the  result  was  that 
the  real  scope  of  his  philosophical  activity  was  limited  to  a 
period  of  eight  years,  and  after  that  period  the  paralytic  man, 
who  tottered  down  to  read  the  lectures  which  he  had  written 
years  before,  would,  if  those  eight  years  had  proved  less 
fruitful,  have  almost  afforded  a  caution  against  such  appoint- 
ments for  the  future.  Dr.  Ritchie  resigned  the  chair  of  Logic 
in  the  University  of  Edinburgh  in  I806.  Hamilton's  prin- 
cipal opponent  was  Mr.  Isaac  Taylor  of  Ongar,  who,  like 
Wilson,  had  displayed  great  ability  in  other  departments,  but 
had  no  special  qualifications  for  the  vacant  professorship. 
Hamilton  was  elected  by  eighteen  votes  to  fourteen  ;  but  he 
received  the  chair,  which  was  not  a  very  valuable  one,  subject 
to  the  condition  of  paying  Dr.  Ritchie  100/.  a  year  for  the 
rest  of  his  life — a  serious  deduction  to  one  whose  family  was 
rapidly  increasing.  During  the  first  session  Hamilton  wrote 
bis  Lectures  on  Metaphysics  almost  in  the  form  in  which 
they  were  published  after  his  death.  He  had  contracted  that 
habit  of  procrastination  which  often  accompanies  the  con- 
sciousness of  unusual  power,  and  many  of  these  lectures  only 
received  the  author's  final  corrections  ami  alterations  imme- 
diately before  they  were  delivered.      He  often  sat  up  almost 


BIOGRAPHICAL  AND  INTRODUCTORY.      9 

the  whole  of  the  preceding-  night,  busied  in  preparation,  Lady 
Hamilton  sitting  up  with  him,  and  acting  as  his  amanuensis. 
Written  under  such  circumstances,  the  Lectures  can  hardly 
be  regarded  as  finished  expositions  of  his  philosophical  views ; 
yet,  from  the  fact  that  they  were  delivered  almost  unaltered 
for  nearly  twenty  years,  we  may  conclude  that  they  contain 
a  reliable  statement  of  the  substance  of  the  Hamiltonian 
doctrine.  The  Lectures  on  Logic  were  composed  during  the 
next  session.  The  author  considered  them  much  more 
finished,  as  well  as  more  valuable  than  those  on  Metaphysics, 
but  posterity  will,  I  think,  reverse  the  verdict.  They  were 
in  many  instances  prepared  under  the  same  pressure  as  their 
predecessors,  and  translations  from  Krug  and  Esser  were 
often  used  to  supply  the  unfinished  portions  of  the  author's 
sketches.  He  seems  to  have  become  aware  at  an  early  period 
that  anything  more  recondite  than  these  lectures  would  not 
be  intelligible  to  his  audience,  and  consequently  to  have  re- 
solved on  bringing  a  detailed  exposition  of  his  system  before 
the  public  in  a  different  form.  For  this  purpose  he  chose  an 
edition  of  the  works  of  Reid — a  philosopher  to  whom,  on  the 
whole,  he  paid  more  deference  than  any  other,  with  the  pos- 
sible exception  of  Aristotle.  The  selection  of  such  a  form  of 
exposition  was  unfortunate,  and  circumstances  aggravated  the 
evil.  First,  he  quarrelled  with  his  intended  publisher,  and 
not  having  selected  another,  he  got  the  work  stereotyped  as 
far  as  it  had  then  been  printed — thus  precluding  all  correc- 
tion, or  reconciliation  of  his  earlier  and  later  views.  Then 
followed  a  quarrel  with  the  Town  Council  of  Edinburgh  about 
his  lectures,  which  occupied  much  of  his  time,  and  prevented 
him  fiom  delivering  a  second  and  more  advanced  course  of 
lectures.  Then  came  the  death  of  his  brother,  to  whom  he 
was  greatly  attached,  and  the  threatened  disruption  of  the 
Scottish    Church,  which    he   laboured    hard    to    avert;    and, 


I  o  SIR   J  VI L 1 1  A  M  HA  MIL  TON. 

finally,  when  the  work  was  still  incomplete,  a  paralytic  stroke 
almost  deprived  him  of  the  use  of  his  right  side  for  the  rest 
of  his  life.     This  calamity  overtook  him  in  the  year  1844. 

Hamilton's  mental  faculties  were  still  unimpaired,  hut  he 
evidently  lacked  his  former  energy  after  his  partial  recovery, 
and,  moreover,  we  hear  of  repeated  illnesses  from  this  period 
until  his  death,  whereas  he  had  formerly  heen  remarkable  for 
strength  and  activity,  as  well  as  for  general  good  health.     In 
1846  he  published  his  unfinished  edition  of  the  works  of  Reid, 
one  of  his  supplementary  dissertations    breaking  off  in  the 
middle  of  a  sentence.     It  was   never   completed ;    and    the 
materials  which  his  editors  collected  and  published  after  his 
death  probably  form  but  a  small  portion  of  what  before  his 
illness  he  intended  to  add.     The  work,  however,  even  as  it 
stands,  is  one  of  marvellous  labour  and  research,  and  though 
not  always  containing  the  author's   latest  views,  is  that  to 
which  his  disciples  usually  refer  as  the  best  exposition  of  his 
system.     All  idea  of  revising  or  altering  his   lectures,  except 
by  occasional  oral  interpolations,   was    now    abandoned,   and 
neither  of  the  works  which  he  announced   as   preparing  for 
publication  at  the  end  of  this  edition  of  Reid  ever  appeared. 
How  much  of  what  he  subsequently  published  was  written 
before  1844,  it  is  difficult  to  ascertain;  but  his  later  publica- 
tions, in  any  event,  were  not  extensive.     In  1852  he  repub- 
lished   his    Discussions    from    the    Edinburgh    litview,    with 
additions  and   alterations,  and   shortly  before    his    death    he 
published  an  edition  of  the  works  of  Stewart,  in  bringing  out 
which,  however,  he  confined  himself  to  the  task  of  an  editor, 
and    added    very    few    philosophical    annotations.       He    still 
lectured  to  full  classes,  using  his  old   lectures,  and  the  effort 
of  delivery  having  become  painful,  these  were  not  unfrequently 
icad  by  an  assistant.      He  died  very  shortly  after  the  close  of 
the  Academical  Session  of  1856,  after  a  brief  illness;  but  his 


BIOGRAPHICAL  AND  INTRODUCTORY,     u 

health  appears  to  have  been  continually  becoming'  worse  since 
his  terrible  attack  in  1844.  Latterly  he  enjoyed  a  small  pen- 
sion from  the  Civil  List ;  but  he  was  never  in  affluent  circum- 
stances, and  it  required  great  care  on  the  part  of  himself  and 
Lady  Hamilton  to  bring-  up  his  family  respectably,  while 
making  the  additions  to  his  library,  which  formed  almost  his 
sole  personal  expenditure.  His  eldest  son  entered  the  army 
some  years  before  his  death,  and  the  philosopher  seems  to 
have  watched  over  him  with  almost  more  than  parental 
solicitude. 

Hamilton  was   much   loved  by  his  pupils,  and  to  all  who 
came  to  him  for  information  he  was  kind  and    condescend- 
ing.    His  temper,  however,  was  imperious.     He  was  impa- 
tient of  opposition,   and  being  an  ardent  reformer,  was  pretty 
often    opposed ;  but  he  was    more    frequently    engaged  in  a 
quarrel   with   some  public    body  than    with    private    indivi- 
duals.    He  had  all  the  waywardness  of  genius,  and  such  were 
his  eccentricities  in  connexion  with  his  famous  articles  in  the 
Edinburgh  Review,   that  his  connexion  with    that  periodical 
would   probably  have   terminated   even  independently  of  his 
appointment  to  the  chair  of  Logic.     He  would  at  the  last 
moment  send  in  an   article  far  exceeding  the  limits  agreed 
upon,  thus  compelling  the  editor  to  exclude  something  else  to 
make  room  for  it,  while  from  the  time  of  its   arrival  it  was 
impossible  to  modify  its  language  where  the  editor  deemed  it 
too  strong.     Afterwards,  under  the  pressure  of  his  infirmity 
(which   he  otherwise  bore  with  great  fortitude),  his  temper 
seems    to    have    become    more  acrimonious,    and  those    who 
ventured  to  enter  into  controversy  with  him  had  no  pleasant 
time  of  it.     He  was,  however,  always  a  strictly  honourable, 
and  sometimes  even  a  generous  opponent,  and  he  enjoyed  the 
respect  and  esteem  not  only  of  his  friends,  but  of  the  public 
up  to  the  last;  and  if 


12  SIR    WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 

"  He  can't  be  wrong  whose  life  is  in  the  right," 
we  have  a  strong-  testimony  to  the  correctness  of  the  Hamil- 
tonian  theory. 

Something'  has  been  already  said  of  the  extent  of  Hamil- 
ton's reading.  He  was  from  his  early  years  an  ardent  student 
of  classical  literature,  and  his  subsequent  speculations  were  no 
doubt  largely  influenced  by  this  fact,  and  by  his  having  been 
sent  to  complete  his  education  at  the  University  of  Oxford, 
where  the  writings  of  Aristotle  were  then  held  in  high 
esteem.  Hamilton's  studies,  however,  soon  extended  far 
beyond  the  limits  of  the  Oxford  curriculum.  Not  content 
with  the  works  of  the  ancient  Greek  and  Roman  philo- 
sophers, he  turned  with  avidity  to  those  of  the  Schoolmen, 
and  thence  to  those  of  the  modern  Continental  philosophers. 
The  Scottish  School  had  hitherto  attached  too  little  impor- 
tance to  the  writings  of  its  predecessors  and  foreign  contem- 
poraries. Hamilton  undoubtedly  went  into  the  opposite 
extreme.  In  turning  over  his  pages  we  might  frequently 
imagine  that  we  were  reading  some  curious  volume  of  anti- 
quarian research,  rather  than  a  treatise  on  a  science  by  a 
professed  expositor.  His  philosophical  erudition  has  probably 
never  been  equalled,  but  it  was  far  too  vast  to  be  accurate.  It 
would  be  difficult  to  name  a  philosophical  author  whose  system 
he  had  thoroughly  mastered,  with  two  exceptions — Aristotle 
and  Beid.  If  he  erred  in  any  respect  in  his  exposition  of  these 
writers,  it  was  not  from  want  of  acquaintance  with  their 
works,  but  from  his  desire  to  assimilate  their  systems  to  his 
own.  But  even  as  regards  Stewart,  I  think  he  cannot  always 
be  acquitted  of  errors  of  another  kind. 

His  great  erudition  had  another  ill  effect.  When  about  to 
write  on  any  subject,  he  consulted  so  many  authors,  and  made 
so  many  extracts,  that  the  work  soon  extended  beyond  all 
reasonable  dimensions,  and  unless  compelled  by  the  pressure 


BIOGRAPHICAL  AND  INTRODUCTORY.     13 

of  necessity  (as  in  the  case  of  his  lectures)  to  give  the  results 
to  the  world,  he  ultimately  became  disheartened,  and  aban- 
doned the  effort  in  despair.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  if  he 
had  read  less  he  would  have  produced  more,  and  with  his 
powerful  intellect  I  doubt  if  his  productions  would  even  have 
bee.i  deteriorated  in  quality.  I  venture  to  suggest  one  more 
bad  consequence  arising  from  the  peculiar  bent  of  his  studies. 
His  wonderful  acquaintance  with  Formal  Logic  led  him  almost 
invariably  to  seek  for  some  logical  fallacy  in  an  opponent's 
argument,  and  when  he  hit  upon  a  careless  expression  (arising, 
perhaps,  from  a  studied  disregard  of  the  technicalities  of 
Logic),  he  imagined  he  had  found  it,  whereas  a  more  careful 
examination  would  have  shown  him  that  all  appearance  of 
logical  irregularity  could  have  been  got  rid  of  while  leaving 
the  argument  intact.  The  truth  is  that  investigators  very 
seldom  really  fall  into  any  logical  fallacy,  though  disputants 
often  do  so. 

Hamilton's  latest  philosophical  writings  published  in  his 
life-time  are  to  be  found  in  the  Appendices  to  the  last  edition 
of  his  Discussions.  After  his  death  his  editors  published  all 
the  materials  for  his  edition  of  Reid  which  they  could  collect, 
and  also  his  Lectures ;  and  some  of  his  very  latest  contribu- 
tions to  philosophy — found  on  his  desk  after  his  death — are 
printed  as  Appendices  to  the  latter.  The  Lectures  are  the 
only  part  of  his  works  that  can  be  regarded  as  in  any  sense 
complete,  and  even  they  obviously  fall  short  of  his  original 
design — partly  owing,  no  doubt,  to  his  quarrel  with  the 
Town  Council.  Most  of  his  logical  theories,  too,  occurred  to 
him  after  the  Lectures  on  Logic  were  written.  He  has  left 
no  systematic  exposition  of  his  philosophy,  and  his  readers 
must  be  satisfied  to  make  the  most  of  the  materials  he  has 
left.  But  the  imperfect  is  often  more  suggestive  than  the 
complete,  and  the  real  student  of  philosophy  will  not,  perhaps, 


14  SIR   WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 

regard  the  state  in  which  Hamilton's  works  have  come  down 
to  us  with  unmingled  regret. 

The  fundamental  principles  of  the  Hamiltonian  Philosophy 
may,  I  think,  he  thus  enumerated : — 1st,  His  theory  of  Ex- 
ternal Perception,  or  Natural  Realism  ;  2nd,  His  doctrine  of 
Native,  Necessary  or  a  priori  Truths,  and  the  tests  by  which 
they  can  be  discovered;  3rd,  His  law  of  the  Conditioned, 
including  its  application  to  the  Principle  of  Causality ;  and, 
4th,  His  consequent  views  concerning  the  impossibility  of 
knowing  the  Absolute  and  the  Infinite.  I  do  not  include 
his  doctrine  of  the  Relativity  of  Human  Knowledge,1  of 
which  so  much  has  been  said.  So  much  of  that  doctrine 
as  is  relevant  and  characteristic  of  Hamilton  falls,  in  my 
opinion,  under  the  remaining  heads,  as  is  also  the  case  with 
his  polemic  against  the  Association  Psychology. 

1  But  surely  it  is  competent  to  a  philosopher  to  maintain  the  relativity 
of  our  knowledge  of  the  external  world  without  limiting  himself  to  the 
"one  special  relation"  of  cause  and  effect  which  Mr.  Mill  insists  oil. 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE  EKTERNAL  WORLD — NATURAL  REALISM. 

It  is  perhaps  by  his  solution  of  the  problem  of  the  existence 
of  Matter — by  his  Natural  Realism — that  Sir  William 
Hamilton  is  best  known.  The  question  had  long  previously 
attracted  the  attention  of  Philosophers. 

All  men  naturally  believe  in  an  external  world ;  but  when 
the  reasons  of  this  belief  came  to  be  inquired  into,  the  answers 
given  have  often  been  very  unsatisfactory.  All  men,  it  has 
been  alleged,  naturally  believed  that  the  sun,  moon,  aud  stars, 
went  round  the  earth  every  twenty-four  hours ;  but  when  the 
grounds  of  this  belief  came  to  be  examiued,  it  was  found  to  be 
an  illusion  arising  from  the  rotation  of  the  earth  upon  its  own 
axis.  Many  philosophers  arrived  at  the  conclusion  that  the 
belief  in  an  external  world  is  a  similar  illusion.  Nothing 
existed,  they  said,  but  minds  and  their  various  states  of 
feeling.  Sensations  and  other  feelings  succeeded  each  other 
according  to  certain  laws,  but  these  laws  did  not  imply  the 
existence  of  anything  but  minds,  and  we  had  no  reason  to 
believe  that  anything  else  existed.  The  best  known  advocate 
of  this  doctrine  in  modern  times  was  Berkeley,  and  his 
denial  of  the  external  world  was  the  source  of  almost  all 
modern  speculation  on  the  subject.  Hume  carried  Berkeley's 
theory  farther,  and  applied  it  to  subvert  the  substantial 
reality  of  Mind  as   well  of  Matter.     Reid,  startled  by  the 


16  SIR   WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 


deductions  of  Hume,  abandoned  the  doctrine  of  Berkeley 
which  he  had  at  one  time  accepted,  and  ai'gued  strenuously  in 
favour  of  an  external  world.  He  was  followed  by  Stewart, 
but  vigorously  assailed  by  Brown,  who,  however,  continued  to 
declare  his  belief  in  an  external  world,  while  rejecting  almost 
all  his  master's  arguments  in  its  favour.  Meanwhile  Hume 
had  roused  Kant  to  speculation  in  Germany,  and  was  perhaps 
the  true  originator  of  the  English  School  of  Philosophers 
which  seeks  to  explain  the  belief  in  an  external  world  as  a 
natural  illusion  arising  from  the  operation  of  the  principle  of 
Association  of  Ideas  on  original  sensations — sensations  which 
they  describe  as  mental  feelings  and  nothing  more.  In  this 
state  Sir  W.  Hamilton  found  the  controversy,  and  with  the 
ardour  of  a  true  philosopher  he  resolved,  if  possible,  to  clear 
up  the  point  in  dispute, 

I  am  using  the  phrase  External  World  in  the  vulgar  sense. 
The  vulgar  believe  that  the  external  world  is  something  real, 
which  exists  independent  of  me  or  of  any  other  mind  (except 
possibly  that  of  the  Creator),  and  which  would  equally  con- 
tinue to  exist  if  all  finite  minds  were  annihilated.  They  also 
believe  that  this  world  exists  in  space,  and  that  the  space 
which  contains  it,  and  which  it  occupies,  is  equally  in- 
dependent of  my  own,  or  of  any  other  mind.  No  man  who 
has  not  been  instructed  in  philosophy  believes  that  space,  as 
it  exists  in  bodies,  is  nothing  but  the  unknown  cause  of 
certain  sensations  in  us,  and  that  space,  as  we  perceive  or 
represent  it,  is  purely  and  exclusively  mental.  This  preface 
is  necessary,  because  it  has  lately  become  fashionable  with 
Idealists,  instead  of  denying  the  existence  of  an  external 
world,  to  admit  that  in  a  certain  sense  it  exists,  and  then  to 
give  an  explanation  which  denies  its  existence  in  the  only 
senst  which  the  vulgar  attach  to  it.  But  the  question  is 
further  perplexed   by  the  introduction  of  ambiguous  and  in- 


NATURAL  REALISM.  17 

definite  language,  which  is  perhaps  understood  in  one  meaning 
by  the  writer,  and  in  another  by  the  reader.  Thus  we  are 
told  that  Matter  is  admitted  to  exist  in  the  sense  of  a  Per- 
manent Possibility,  or  Potentiality,  of  Sensations.  This  ex- 
pression is  susceptible  of  two  contrasted  meanings.  It  may 
signify  a  thing  which  renders  sensations  permanently  possible 
'—a  thing  that  causes  sensations — which  is  probably  what 
the  casual  reader  would  understand  by  it;  or  it  may  mean 
only  that  it  is  permanently  possible  for  my  mind  (or  some 
other  mind)  to  feel  certain  sensations  when  certain  conditions 
(these  conditions  being  purely  mental)  are  supplied.  It  may, 
in  short,  mean  either  Permanent  Possibility  of  producing  the 
sensations,  or  a  Permanent  Possibility  of  feeling  them.  In  the 
latter  sense  it  can  exist  nowhere  but  in  a  mind,  and  its  existence 
there  was  probably  never  disputed  by  any  Idealist.  The 
vulgar  belief  undoubtedly  goes  beyond  this.  But  if  it  be 
asked  whether  the  external  world  in  which  the  vulgar  believe 
is  substance  or  attribute,  the  answer  is  not  so  clear.  The 
distinction  of  substance  and  attribute  is  one  about  which  the 
vulgar  give  themselves  little  concern,  and  if  an  external 
world  be  conceded  to  them,  they  would  not  perhaps  care  very 
much  whether  it  was  called  a  substance,  or  a  collection  of 
qualities  or  attributes — always  assuming  that  these  attributes 
or  qualities  are  admitted  to  exist  independently  of  the  pei- 
eeiving  mind. 

It  was  a  common  practice  with  the  earlier  philosophers,  as, 
for  instance,  with  Locke,  to  say  that  we  knew  material  objects 
by  means  of  our  ideas  of  them.  These  ideas,  it  was  said, 
truly  rep  resettled  the  objects,  and  Locke  even  carelessly  wrote 
that  our  ideas  of  the  primary  qualities  of  matter  were 
"  resemblances  "  of  these  qualities.  Locke  defined  an  idea  as 
"  the  immediate  object  of  our  minds  in  thought/''  or  in  "  think- 
ing;5' but  then  he  described  sensation    as  one  of  the  modes 

c 


i8  SIR    WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 

of  thinking,  and  he  usually  employed  the  phrases  " sensation/' 
"  idea  of  sensation/'  and  "  sensitive  idea/'  in  the  same  sig- 
nification. Dr.  Reid,  however,  interpreted  the  word  idea  as 
used  by  Locke  and  a  great  number  of  other  philosophers,  as 
meaning-  not  a  mere  mental  state,  but  a  thing  in  the  mind, 
or  even  in  the  brain;  and  he  understood  them  as  maintaining 
that  it  was  this  thing,  and  not  the  real  external  thing,  which 
was  immediately  perceived,  or  known,  in  every  exercise  of  the 
senses.  The  idea  was  thus  (as  Reid  interpreted  his  pre- 
decessors) a  third  thing — an  intermediate — interposed  between 
the  mind  and  the  external  world,  and  was  the  immediate 
object  of  perception,  while  the  real  external  world  could 
only  be  perceived  mediately  and  through  it.  How  far  Reid 
correctly  understood  his  predecessors,  I  need  not  now  inquire. 
There  is  no  doubt  that,  with  regard  to  some  of  them,  he  was 
mistaken ;  and  it  is  also  certain  that,  since  his  time,  no  one 
has  ventured  to  advocate  the  theory  of  ideas  in  the  shape  in 
which  he  opposed  it.  It  is  easy  to  see  that  this  theory  of 
ideas  (or  ideal  theory)  was  fatal  to  the  external  world.  Ac- 
cording to  it,  the  external  world  was  not  perceived  at  all. 
Nothing  was  perceived  but  the  idea.  How,  then,  were  we 
justified  in  believing  that  anything  existed  except  the  idea 
which  alone  was  perceived  ?  Or  if  an  external  world  existed, 
how  could  we  know  that  it  resembled  the  idea?  The  idea  was 
alleged  to  be  a  picture,  but  we  could  never  get  the  original  to 
compare  it  with.  We  could  not,  therefore,  tell  whether  it  was 
:t  good  <a-  a  bad  likeness,  or  whether  it  was  a  likeness  at  all. 
Nay,  we  could  not  know  that  there  was  any  original.  We 
perceived  (lie  idea  and  nothing  else.  Why,  then,  should  we 
assume  that  there  was  anything  else  to  be  perceived? 

Reid  easily  saw  that  the  Ideal  Theory,  as  he  understood  it, 
destroyed  the  proof  of  the  external  world,  and  finding  that 
Berkeley  had  founded  his  Idealism  on  Locke's  admission  that 


NATURAL  REALISM.  19 

we  perceive  not  the  external  thing's  themselves,  but  only  our 
ideas  of  them,  he  was  naturally  led  to  deny  the  existence  or" 
ideas  and  to  maintain  that  we  perceive  external  objects  im- 
mediately and  not  through  the  medium  of  these  supposed  ideas. 
He  extended  this  doctrine  to  memory  and  imagination.  There 
was  there  also  no  third  thing — no  separate  entity — between 
the  mind  and  the  object  which  we  remembered  or  imagined. 
There  was  no  intervening  idea,  and  our  knowledge  was  in  these 
cases  also  immediate.  It  is  surprising-,  when  Reid  had  got  so 
far  as  this,  that  he  did  not  see  that  whether  he  had  refuted 
Berkeley  or  not,  the  problem  of  the  external  world  was  still 
unsolved.  Memory  sometimes  deceives  us.  Imagination  often 
does.  Why  then  should  not  perception  deceive  us  also,  since 
all  three  are  on  a  level  as  immediate  cognitions?  Reid 
appealed  to  our  natural  belief  in  the  external  world.  But 
what  he  was  called  upon  to  do,  was  to  justify  this  belief,  to 
point  out  its  grounds,  and'  to  defend  it  against  objections ; 
and  it  can  hardly  be  said  that  this  was  done,  either  by  Reid 
himself  or  by  his  successor  Stewart. 

In  the  meantime  Hume  had  attached  a  new  meaning  to 
the  word  "  idea  "  which  his  disciples  appear  disposed  to  ascribe 
to  earlier  philosophers  to  whose  systems  it  is  quite  alien.1 
Hume  did  not  believe  in  the  idea  as  a  separate  entity — an 
intermediate  thing — existing  in  the  mind  or  in  the  brain ; 
but  he  distinguished  between  the  sensation  or  original  feeling 
and  its  subsequent  representation  in  the  imagination," to  which 
latter  alone  he  gave  the  name  idea.  When  the  term  idea  had 
got  this  meaning,  the  doctrine  of  perception  by  means  of 
ideas  got  a  new  meaning  also.  It  no  longer  meant  perception 
by  means  of  intermediate  things — separate  entities — but  per- 

1  Mr.  Mill,  lor  instance,  more  than  once  criticizes  Locke  on  the  assump- 
tion that  that  philosopher  used  the  term  "idea''  in  the  same  sense  as 
Hume  and  James  Mill.     This  is  not  the  case,  as  already  remarked. 

c  2 


20  SIR   WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 

ception  by  means  of  states  of  mind  which,  ho\vever;  belonged 
to  reproductive  or  representative,  rather  than  to  original  or 
presentative,  consciousness.  Now  it  could  not  be  doubted  that 
there  were  such  states  of  mind.  I  can  call  up,  for  instance,  a 
mental  representation  of  a  house,  abridge,  or  a  man  that  I  saw 
yesterday  or  the  day  before.  Consequently  Reid's  assertion, 
that  there  were  no  ideas,  would  not  apply  to  this  new  form  of 
the  theory.  But  it  was  evident  that  the  external  world  fared 
no  better  on  this  theory  than  on  the  former  one.  If  my 
mental  state  when  I  looked  at  St.  Paul's  cathedral  was  of  the 
same  nature  with  my  mental  state  when,  after  leaving  London, 
I  merely  imagined  it,  and  if  the  former  state  only  differed 
from  the  latter  by  being  more  vivid,  or  more  clear  and  distinct, 
the  one  could  no  more  prove  the  existence  of  the  cathedral 
than  the  other.  Men  can  imagine  things  that  never  existed 
and  never  will  exist ;  and  if  perception  is  a  mental  state  similar 
in  all  its  essentials  to  imagination,  why  may  we  not  also  per- 
ceive things  that  never  existed  and  never  will  exist  ?  When 
I  am  said  to  be  looking  at  St.  Paul's  cathedral,  I  have,  on 
this  theory,  the  representation  of  the  cathedral  in  my  mind  ; 
but  how  can  I  know  whether  it  is  like  or  unlike  the  original, 
or  whether  there  is  any  original  ?  I  know  nothing  but  the 
representation,  and  the  representation  is  purely  and  exclu- 
sively mental.  How  can  I  get  beyond  it  to  reach  any 
external  world  ?  The  philosophy  of  Reid  can  here  afford  us 
but  little  assistance. 

In  this  exigency  the  majority  of  philosophers  seem  to  have 
fallen  back  on  the  Principle  of  Causality.  This  principle  has 
been  variously  understood.  With  some  it  affirms  nothing 
more  than  certain  uniformities  of  succession  in  our  mental 
states.  Such  a  principle  is  here  useless.  The  antecedent 
state  would  always  be  as  strictly  and  exclusively  mental  as  its 
successor,      ll  miffht    indeed   be  a  mental   state   which  we  did 


NATURAL  REALISM.  21 

not  actually  experience,  but  then  the  statement  that  it  was  an 
antecedent  would  only  mean  that  some  one  else  experienced 
it  or  that  we  would  have  experienced  it  under  other  circum- 
stances— circumstances  purely  mental.  Pursuing  trains  of  ante- 
cedents and  consequents  in  our  mental  states  can  never  lead  us 
to  anj'thing  that  is  not  a  mental  state,  any  more  than  tracing" 
the  terms  of  arithmetical  series  could  lead  to  the  discovery  of 
a  new  chemical  substance.  But  more  usually  the  principle 
seems  to  have  been  understood  as  asserting"  that  everything 
that  begins  to  exist  has  an  efficient  cause — a  cause  which  has 
produced  it  by  an  exertion  of  power.  Our  sensations,  then,  it 
was  alleged,  had  causes,  and  we  inferred  the  existence  of  matter 
or  of  the  external  world,  as  the  (otherwise  unknown)  cause  of 
our  sensations.  But  then  the  question  revived  in  this  form  : 
How  do  I  know  that  this  unknown  cause  of  my  sensations 
may  not  be  another  mind — God,  for  instance,  as  Berkeley 
maintained  ?  Or,  how  do  I  know  that  my  own  mind  may  not 
unconsciously  produce  these  sensations,  as  it  seems  to  do,  for 
instance,  in  dreaming  ?  Or  even  assuming  that  the  unknown 
cause  is  not  a  mind,  how  am  I  justified  in  ascribing  any  of  the 
properties  of  the  effect  to  it  ?  The  cause  of  my  feeling  of 
extension  may  not  be  extended  :  the  cause  of  my  feeling  of 
solidity  may  not  be  solid  :  the  cause  of  my  feeling  of  figure 
may  not  be  figured.  Causes  are  by  no  means  invariably 
similar  to  their  effects  :  and,  indeed,  if  the  cause  of  my  sensa- 
tions resembles  these  sensations,  seeing  that  the  sensations 
are  wholly  mental,  must  not  their  cause  be  wholly  mental 
also? 

The  problem  would  here  seem  to  be  reduced  to  the  following 
question  :  Do  we  know  the  external  world  otherwise  than  as 
the  cause  of  our  (mental)  sensations  ?  This  is  the  form  in  which 
Hamilton  has  grappled  with  it,  and  this  is  the  question  which 
he  has  answered  in  the  affirmative.    His  discussion  has,  indeed, 


22  SIR   WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 

suffered  from  his  having'  treated  the  subject  too  exclusively  in 
its  historical  connexion  with  Reid  and  Brown  ;  but  his  solution 
of  the  problem  is  nevertheless  sufficiently  clear,  and  it  appears 
to  be  the  only  one  on  which  the  existence  of  a  veritable 
external  world  is  likely  to  be  maintained  for  the  future. 

It  would  be  foreign  to  the  purpose  of  the  present  work  to 
enter  into  a  discussion  of  the  historical  questions  in  dispute  at 
any  considerable  length.  Brown  understood  Reid  as  merely 
denying  the  existence  of  the  idea  in  the  sense  of  a  separate 
entity  or  intermediate  thing,  and  asserting  that  the  perception 
of  matter  takes  place  without  the  intervention  of  any  such 
medium.  Understanding  Reid  in  this  sense,  Brown  contended 
first  that  very  few  philosophers  ever  believed  in  the  inter- 
mediate idea  or  separate  entity  ;  and,  secondly,  that  Reid's  own 
theory  left  the  existence  of  the  external  world  open  to  all  the 
same  objections  as  before.  Hamilton  controverted  both  of  these 
assertions,  and  retorted  that  Brown's  own  theory  subverted 
the  existence  of  the  external  world  altogether.  That  Hamil- 
ton was  right  in  the  main  portion  of  his  argument  is  practi- 
cally admitted  by  Mr.  Mill  in  the  last  edition  of  his  Examina- 
tion of  Sir  William  Hamilton's  P/tilosoj)//j/.  He  there  con- 
fesses that  the  Cosmothetic  Idealists  (the  class  of  philosophers 
to  which  Brown  admittedly  belonged)  cannot  make  good  their 
case  against  Berkeley,  which  was,  in  fact,  the  substance  of 
Hamilton's  contention  against  them ;  while  he  allows  that 
Hamilton  escapes  from  Berkeley's  argument  by  his  doctrine 
that  matter,  with  its  primary  and  secundo-primary  qualities, 
is  directly  and  immediately  perceived.1  Again,  he  grants  that 
l!i  id,  like  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  affirmed,  while  Brown  denied, 
that  we  have  a  direct  intuition  of  the  primary  qualities  of 
bodies;9    and,    as    will    be    seen    presently,    the    controversy 

1  Examination  of  Hamilton,  p.  207,  note  (4th  Edition). 
•  Id.  p. 223  (4th  Edition). 


NATURAL  RHALISM.  23 

related  to  the  perception  of  material  qualities  only,  no  philo- 
sopher having1  been  bold  enough  to  maintain  that  we  have  a 
direct  intuition  of  material  substance.  Granting  therefore  to 
Reid  his  premisses,  he  was,  by  Mr.  Mill's  admission,  in  a 
position  to  resist  Berkeleianism.  Granting  to  Brown  his 
premisses,  Mr.  Mill  equally  concedes  that  he  only  reached  the 
external  world  by  a  paralogism.  Hamilton  is  therefore 
triumphant  in  this  branch  of  the  controversy. 

Hamilton's  doctrine,  which  he  designates  Natural  Realism, 
asserts  that  we  have  a  direct  and  immediate  consciousness  of 
the  external  world  as  really  existing,  and  are  not  left  to  infer 
its  existence  from  the  sensations  which  it  is  supposed  to 
produce,  or  from  the  ideas  which  are  supposed  to  resemble  (or 
represent)  it,  or  even  from  a  blind  faith  in  its  existence,  which 
says  "  I  believe,"  but  can  give  no  reason  for  believing.  I 
believe  that  it  exists,  says  Hamilton,  because  I  know  it — I 
feel  it — I  perceive  it — as  existing.  It  becomes  necessary, 
however,  to  examine  with  care  what  external  world,  according 
to  him,  we  perceive,  and  on  this  point  his  works  are  not 
in  complete  harmony  with  each  other.  He  everywhere, 
indeed,  repudiates  a  direct  perception  of  material  substance, 
but  then  the  mental  substance  is  according  to  him  equally 
unknown.  One  of  the  strongest  passages  to  this  effect  occurs  in 
the  eighth  of  his  Lcctui-es  on  Metaphysics,  where  he  expounds 
the  axiom  that  all  human  knowledge  is  only  of  the  relative 
and  phaenomenal.  "Our  knowledge,v  says  he,  "  is  either  of 
matter  or  of  mind.  Now  what  is  matter  ?  What  do  we  know 
of  matter  ?  Matter  or  body  is  to  us  the  name  either  of  some- 
thing known,  or  of  something  unknown.  In  so  far  as  matter 
is  a  name  for  something  known,  it  means  that  which  appears 
to  us  under  the  forms  of  extension,  solidity,  divisibility, 
figure,  motion,  roughness,  smoothness,  colour,  heat,  cold,  &c. ; 
in  short,  it  is  a  common  name  for  a  certain  series  or  aggre- 


24  SIR    WILLIAM  HAMIL  TON. 

gate  or  complement  of  appearances  or  phenomena,  manifested 
in  co-existence. 

"  But  as  these  phenomena  appear  only  in  conjunction,  we 
are  compelled,  by  the  constitution  of  our  nature,  to  think 
them  conjoined  in  and  by  something,  and  as  they  are  pheno- 
mena we  cannot  think  them  the  phenomena  of  nothing,  but 
must  regard  them  as  the  properties  or  qualities  of  something 
that  is  extended,  solid,  figured,  &c.  But  this  something 
absolutely,  and  in  itself — i.  e.  considered  apart  from  its  pheno- 
mena— is  to  us  as  zero.  It  is  only  in  its  qualities,  only  in  its 
effects,  in  its  relative  or  phenomenal  existence,  that  it  is 
cognizable  or  conceivable  ;  and  it  is  only  by  a  law  of  thought 
which  compels  us  to  think  something  absolute  and  unknown 
as  the  basis  or  condition  of  the  relative  and  known,  that  this 
something  obtains  a  kind  of  incomprehensible  reality  to  us. 
Now  that  which  manifests  its  qualities — in  other  words,  that 
in  which  the  appearing  causes  inhere — that  to  which  they 
belong — is  called  their  subject,  or  substance,  or  substratum. 
To  this  subject  of  the  phenomena  of  extension,  solidity,  &c, 
the  term  waiter  or  material  substance  is  commonly  given, 
and  therefore  as  contradistinguished  from  these  qualities  it  is 
the  name  of  something  unknown  and  inconceivable. 

"The  same  is  true  in  regard  to  the  term  mind.  In  so  far 
as  mind  is  the  common  name  for  the  states  of  knowing, 
willing,  feeling,  desiring,  &c,  of  which  I  am  conscious,  it  is 
only  the  name  for  a  certain  series  of  connected  phenomena  or 
qualities,  and  consequently  expresses  only  what  is  known. 
Hut  in  so  far  as  it  denotes  that  subject  or  substance  in  which 
the  phenomena  of  knowing,  willing,  &c,  inhere — something 
behind  or  under  these  phenomena — it  expresses  what  in  itself, 
or  in  its  absolute  existence,  is  unknown. 

"  Thus  mind  and  mailer,  as  known  or  knowable,  are  only 
two   different  series  of  phenomena   or  qualities;    mind   and 


NATURAL  REALISM.  25 

matter,  as  unknown  and  unknowable,  are  the  two  substances  in 
which  these  two  different  series  of  phenomena  or  qualities  are 
supposed  to  inhere.  The  existence  of  an  unknown  substance 
is  only  an  inference  we  are  compelled  to  make  from  the  exis- 
tence of  known  phenomena  ;  and  the  distinction  of  the  two 
substances  is  only  inferred  from  the  seeming-  incompatibility  of 
the  two  series  of  phsenomena  to  coinhere  in  one  "  [substance].1 

To  this  doctrine  Hamilton  steadily  adhered  throughout  his 
writing's ;  and  therefore  a  theory  of  the  external  world,  which 
merely  seeks  to  explain  the  origin  of  our  idea  of  material 
substance  does  not  necessarily  conflict  with  our  author's 
Natural  Realism.  No  doubt  he  believed  that  the  notion  of 
substance  and  the  principle  which  leads  us  to  refer  every 
phenomenon  to  a  substance,  are  both  a  priori  and  incapable 
of  being  explained  by  experience  or  association  of  ideas.  But 
his  theory  of  substance  formed  no  element  in  the  doctrine  of 
Natural  Realism,  which  he  bequeathed  to  the  world  as,  per- 
haps, his  most  valuable  contribution  to  philosophy.  That 
doctrine  relates  to  material  attributes  or  phsenomena  only„ 
And  it  maybe  remarked  that  Hamilton  uses  the  term  pheno- 
menon in  the  meaning  of  attribute,  property,  or  quality,  as 
opposed  to  substance,  and  not  in  the  Kantian  sense  as  opposed 
to  thing  per  se,  or  Noumenon.  That  we  perceive  qualities, 
not  substances,  is  certainly  the  leading  element  in  his  doctrine 
of  relativity.  He  then  adds  that  things  may  have  a  great 
many  qualities  which  we  do  not  perceive,  but  which  we  would 
perceive  if  we  had  additional  senses;  and  though  these  two 
heads  can  hardly  be  said  to  exhaust  the  whole  of  his  doctrine 
of  relativity,  they  go  very  far  towards  doing  so. 

We  have  then,  according  to  Hamiltori  a  direct  intuitive  per- 
ception of  the  qualities,  attributes,  or  phenomena  of  matter, 
just  as  as  we  have  of  the  qualities,  attributes,  or  phenomena 
1  Lectures,  i.  pp.  137-8. 


26  SIR    WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 

of  mind,  the  substances  in  both  cases  being-  equally  unknown. 
But  have  we  this  knowledge  of  some  of  the  properties  or 
qualities  of  matter,  only  or  of  all  of  them  ?  And  do  we  per- 
ceive these  qualities  in  all  matter  alike,  or  in  so  much  of  it 
as  comes  in  contact  with  our  bodily  organism,  or  only  in  our 
material  organism  itself?  In  dealing  with  the  first  of  these 
questions,  it  is  to  be  observed  that  Hamilton  in  some  places 
makes  a  distinction  between  primary  and  secondary  qualities 
of  matter,  while  in  others  he  enumerates  three  classes, 
primary,  secundo-primary,  and  secondary ;  and  in  some 
passages  he  has  been  understood  as  excluding  at  least  the 
secondary  qualities  from  his  Natural  Realism.  Thus,  for  in- 
stance, we  find  him  saying  :  "  Under  the  primary  [qualities] 
we  apprehend  modes  of  the  non-ego :  under  the  secundo- 
primary  we  apprehend  modes  both  of  the  ego  and  of  the 
non-ego  :  under  the  secondary  we  apprehend  modes  of  the 
ego,  and  infer  modes  of  the  non-ego.  The  primary  are 
apprehended  as  they  are  in  bodies ;  the  secondary  as  they  are 
in  us ;  the  secundo-primary  as  they  are  in  bodies  and  as  they 
are  in  us."  *  Again:  "We  are  conscious  as  objects  in  the 
primary  qualities  of  the  modes  of  a  not-self;  in  the  secondary 
of  the  modes  of  self;  in  the  secundo-primary  of  the  modes  of 
self  and  of  a  not-self  at  once." 2  The  secondary  qualities  it  would 
thus  seem  are  not  perceived,  but  inferred  from  our  sensations. 
The  colour  of  the  tree  before  me,  for  instance,  is  not  an  object 
of  direct  perception,  but  is  merely  an  unknown  something  that 
produces  in  me  the  sensation  of  colour,  and  this  sensation  is 
all  that  I  am  really  conscious  of.  But  Hamilton's  doctrine  on 
the  subject  of  secondary  qualities  must  not  be  confounded 
with  that  commonly  held  by  his  predecessors.  For  Hamilton's 
ego  or  self  does  not  consist  of  the  mind  to  the  exclusion  of 
the  body,  nor  is  sensation  with  him  a  mere  mental  feeling. 
1   Reid,  p.  857  (a)  (Hamilton's  Edition).  2  Reid,  p.  858  (a). 


NATURAL  REALISM.  27 

The  secondary  qualities,  as  they  exist  in  external  or  extra- 
organic  bodies,  are -indeed  (in  his  opinion)  unknown,  and  are 
only  inferred  as  causes  of  our  sensations  ;  but  it  is  otherwise 
as  regards  our  bodily  organism  itself.  In  a  note  appended 
to  the  last  passage  I  have  cited,  he  says  :  "  Our  nervous 
organism,  in  contrast  to  all  exterior  to  itself,  appertains  to 
the  concrete  human  ego,  and  in  this  respect  is  subjective, 
infernal;  whereas,  in  contrast  to  the  abstract  immaterial  ego 
— the  pure  mind — it  belongs  to  the  non-ego,  and  in  this  re- 
spect is  objective,  external." l  And  he  then  goes  on  to  point  out 
that,  even  within  this  animated  organism,  a  further  distinction 
is  admissible,  and  that  some  of  its  affections  may  be  regarded 
as  in  a  special  sense  affections  of  the  ego,  while  others  are  in 
a  special  sense  affections  of  the  non-ego ;  the  former  cor- 
responding to  the  secondary,  and  the  latter  to  the  primary 
qualities  of  matter.  A  very  similar  note  occurs  at  p.  880 
of  his  edition  of  Reid,  where  the  same  subject  is  discussed  in 
connexion  with  the  distinction  between  Sensation  and  Per- 
ception, and  where  in  the  text  he  says  :  "  The  organism  is 
the  field  of  apprehension  both  to  Sensation  proper  and  Per- 
ception proper ;  but  with  this  difference,  that  the  former 
views  it  as  of  the  ego,  the  latter  as  of  the  non-ego."  We  are 
conscious,  according  to  Hamilton,  in  every  act  of  sensation, 
not  merely  of  the  mind  as  affected,  but  of  an  "  organic  affec- 
tion," which  he  thinks  is  always  attended  with  some  reference 
to  "  locality."  "  I  hold,"  says  he,  "  with  Aristotle— indeed 
with  philosophers  in  general — that  sensation  is  an  affection 
neither  of  the  body  alone  nor  of  the  mind  alone,  but  of  the 
composite  of  which  each  is  a  constituent."2  And  as  the 
secondary  qualities  are  apprehended  as  they  exist  in  our  own 
organism  (though  not  as  they  exist  in  extra-organic  bodies), 
Hamilton  proposes  to  employ  the  phrase  "  secondary  quality  " 
1  Reid,  p.  858  (a)  note.  2  Keid,  p.  884  (a). 


28  SIR    WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 

only  in  reference  to  that  which  is  immediately  known,  and 
not  in  relation  to  its  unknown  cause.  "  I  shall  employ/' 
says  he,  "  the  expression  secondary  qualities  to  denote  those 
phsenomenal  affections  determined  in  our  sentient  organism 
by  the  agency  of  external  bodies,  and  not  (unless  when  other- 
wise stated)  tne  occult  powers  themselves  from  which  that 
agency  proceeds. 'M  As  thus  understood,  secondary  qualities 
are  as  much  the  object  of  direct  apprehension2  as  the  primary 
or  secundo-primary,  and  they  are  perceived  as  modes  of 
matter  no  less  than  of  mind.  They  reveal  to  us  states  of  our 
own  organized  bodies,  but  not  of  the  extra-organic  world. 
If  the  tree  I  look  at  is  not  coloured,  but  merely  produces  in 
me  the  sensation  of  colour,  it  is  otherwise  with  the  organism 
of  my  eye.  Colour  is  a  real  affection  of  that  organism,  and 
the  retina  may  be  truly  said  to  be  coloured,  though  the  tree  is 
not.  Such  is  Sir  William  Hamilton's  doctrine  of  secondary 
qualities. 

Hamilton  attached  perhaps  an  exaggerated  importance  to 
the  scholastic  axiom  that  a  thing  can  only  act  where  it  is, 
and  hence  concluded  that  the  only  extra-organic  matter  which 
we  can  immediately  perceive  is  that  which  is  in  immediate 
contact  with  our  bodily  organism.  The  mind,  according  to 
his  view,  is  not  located  merely  in  the  brain,  but  is  vitally 
united  with  the  nervous  organism  in  its  whole  extent,  and 
therefore  whatever  comes  in  contact  with  the  organism  at  any 
part  of  the  body  is  capable  of  being  directly  and  immediately 
perceived.  Whenever  he  comes  to  deal  formally  with  the 
question,  he  denies  the  possibility  of  an  immediate  perception 
of  the  distant,  though  in  some  casual  illustrations  he  speaks 
as  if  the  distant  object  was  immediately  perceived.  Once,  too, 
he  appears  to  have  been  shaken  in  this  theory  of  contact  by  the 
indications  of  an  immediate  perception  of  distance  afforded  by 
i  Reid,  p.  854  (b).  2  See  Reid,  p.  810  (b). 


NATURAL  REALISM.  29 

the  actions  of  some  of  the  lower  animals; '  but  no  trace  of  this, 
doubt  appears  elsewhere  in  his  works.  All  the  senses  are,  he 
maintains,  modifications  of  the  sense  of  touch —absolute  con- 
tact between  the  external  object  and  the  sensitive  organ  being 
alike  requisite  to  the  exercise  of  each.  But  while  absolute  contact 
is  thus  necessary  in  order  to  produce  the  sensorial  affection,  the 
question  remains  whether  what  we  perceive  is  merely  the  sen- 
sorial affection  thus  produced,  or  also  the  extra-organic  body 
whose  contact  produces  it.  There  are  some  ambiguities  and  in- 
consistencies in  Hamilton's  language  on  this  subject.  When  he 
speaks,  for  instance,  of  the  rays  of  light  in  contact  with  the  re- 
tina as  the  object  of  vision,  the  word  "  object  "  may  be  taken  to 
mean  either  that  which  is  perceived,  or  that  which  immediately 
causes  the  perception.  In  the  Dissertations  appended  to  his 
edition  of  Reid,  he  states  unequivocally  that  the  primary  quali- 
ties of  matter  are  perceived  in  our  organism  only,  and  that  it  is 
by  induction  and  inference  that  we  learn  the  existence  of  similar 
properties  in  extra-organic  bodies;2  but  in  an  earlier  note  to 
the  same  work  he  had  affirmed  that  in  vision  we  have  a  direct 
cognition  of  the  direction  in  which  the  rays  fall  upon  the 
retina,3  which  seems  to  imply  (as  do  also  other  expressions  in 
the  same  note)  that  we  have  an  immediate  cognition  of  the 
rays  themselves  as  well  as  of  the  sensorial  affection  produced 
by  them.  Again,  he  speaks  of  "  outness "  (though  not 
distance)  as  a  direct  perception  of  sight,  and  insists  that 
Cheselden's  patient  enjoyed  this  natural  perception  from  the 
first,  and  that  what  he  was  conscious  of  was  not  "  a  mere 
affection  of  the  organ."4  More  than  once,  too,  he  speaks  as 
if  the  object  of  perception  was  a  sort  of  composite  made  up 
of  the  sensitive  organism  and  the  extra-organic  object  in  con- 
tact  with  it,  as   will    be  seen   in  one  of  the  notes  already 

1  Lect.  ii.  p.  181,  seq.  2  Reid,  p.  881  (b). 

*  Reid,  p.  160,  note.  4  Reid,  p.  177,  note. 


3o  SIR    WIL  LI  AM  HA  MIL  TON. 

referred  to.  But  his  maturer  doctrine  would  seem  to  be  that 
iu  the  perception  of  the  primary,  no  less  than  of  the  secondary 
qualities  of  matter,  we  are  conscious  of  affections  of  our  own 
organism  only,  and  not  of  anything1  outside  or  beyond  it.  The 
primary  qualities  are  affections  of  that  organism  as  material  or 
extended — as  a  part  of  the  non-ego  :  the  secondary  qualities 
are  affections  of  it  as  animated,  and  regarded  as  a  part  of  the 
ego.1     In  neither  case  do  we  get  out  of  our  own  organism.2 

Hamilton  even  thought  it  possible  that  what  we  imme- 
diately perceive  is  not  the  whole  nervous  organism  as  affected, 
but  onlv  the  nerve-extremities  which  terminate  in  the  brain. 
If  we  had  a  direct  perception  of  matter  in  any  shape,  he 
seemed  to  regard  it  as  sufficient  for  his  purpose.  Allow  him 
any  hold,  however  small,  on  the  external  world,  and  he 
believed  he  could  show  how  the  rest  "might  be  reached;  but 
unless  some  portion  of  it  could  be  attained  directly,  we  could 
obtain  no  sine  foothold  outside  of  what  he  designates  "the 
pure  immaterial  ego/'  "  It  makes  no  essential  difference  in 
this  doctrine/'  says  he,  "  whether  the  mind  be  supposed 
proximately  conscious  of  the  reciprocal  outness  of  sensations 
at  the  central  extremity  of  the  nerves  in  an  extended  sensor  inm 
commune,  where  each  distinct  nervous  filament  has  its  separate 
locality,  or  at  the  peripheral  extremity  of  the  nerves  in  the 
places  themselves  where  sensations  are  excited,  and  to  which 
tiny  are  referred.     From  many  pathological  phenomena,"  he 

'  See  Eteid,  p.  858,  note. 

-  This  view  was  probably  suggested  to  Hamilton  by  the  difficulty  of 
obtaining  any  instance  in  which  there  is  an  absolute  contact  between 
the  extra-organic  body  and  the  nervous  organism  with  which  the  mind  is 
■opposed  l"  !»■  vitally  united.  In  most,  cases  the  skin  at  least  intervenes 
between  the  outward  body  and  (lie  sensitive  nerve.  In  his  last  fragment 
on  the  subject,  however,  Hamilton  seems  disposed  to  revert  to  his  original 
view,  t.li at.  we  have  a  direct  perception  of  so  much  of  the  extra-organic 
body  as  is  iii  contact  with  our  organism  (Lect.  ii.  pp.  522-:5). 


NATURAL  REALISM.  31 


adds,  "  the  former  alternative  might  appear  the  more  pro- 
bable." '  Such  a  theory  would  of  course  not  only  exclude  the 
perception  of  extra-organic  matter  in  sensation,  but  limit  oui 
perception  of  organic  extension  to  the  brain.  Hamilton  does 
not  positively  adopt  it,  but  regards  it  as  fairly  admissible. 

His  mode  of  reaching  the  extra-organic  world  was  through 
the  locomotive  faculty,  or  the  power  of  muscular  effort.  This 
must  be  distinguished  from  the  muscular  sense  (or  the  sensa- 
tions accompanying  our  muscular  motions),  which  is,  in  his 
opinion,  as  incapable  of  attaining  anything  outside  our  or- 
ganism as  the  other  senses  are.  But  it  is  different,  he  thinks, 
with  the  active  effort  to  move.  This,  when  resisted,  makes 
us  aware  not  only  of  the  feeling  of  resistance,  but  of  a  some- 
thing that  resists  us ;  and  this  something  is  not  merely 
inferred  as  the  unknown  cause  of  the  resistance  which  we 
feel,  but  is  perceived  with  the  same  directness  and  immediate- 
ness  as  that  resistance  itself.  So  at  least  I  understand  his 
doctrine,  which  may  perhaps  be  gathered  from  the  following 
passages  :  "  How  is  this  resistance  perceived  ?  I  have  fre- 
quently asserted  that  in  perception  we  are  conscious  of  the 
external  object  immediately  and  in  itself.  This  is  the  doctrine 
of  Natural  Realism.  But  in  saying  that  a  thing  is  known  in 
itself  I  do  not  mean  that  this  object  is  known  in  its  absolute 
existence — that  is,  out  of  relation  to  us.  This  is  impossible, 
for  our  knowledge  is  only  of  the  relative.  To  know  a  thing 
in  itself,  or  immediately,  is  an  expression  I  use  merely  in 
contrast  to  the  knowledge  of  a  thing  in  a  representation  or 
mediately.  On  this  doctrine  an  external  quality  is  said  to  be 
known  in  itself  when  it  is  known  as  the  immediate  and  neces- 
sary correlative  of  an  internal  quality  of  which  I  am  conscious. 
Thus  when  I  am  conscious  of  the  exertion  of  an  enorganic  voli- 
tion to  move,  and  aware  that  the  muscles  are  obedient  to  my 

1  Reid,  p.  861,  note. 


32  SIR   WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 

will,  but  at  the  same  time  aware  that  my  limb  is  arrested  in 
its  motion  by  some  external  impediment — in  this  case  I  can- 
not be  conscious  of  myself  as  the  resisted  relative,  without  at 
the  same  time  being"  conscious — being  immediately  percipient 
— of  a  not-self  as  the  resisting-  correlative.  In  this  cognition 
there  is  no  sensation — no  subjectivo-organic  affection.  I 
simply  know  myself  as  a  force  in  energy,  the  not-self  as  a 
counter-force  in  energy."  '  This  resistance  in  its  several 
modes  constitutes  what  Hamilton  designates  the  secundo- 
primary  qualities  of  matter,  which  alone,  according*  to  him, 
reveal  to  us  the  extra-organic  world.  "  The  existence  of  an 
extra-organic  world/'  says  he,  "  is  apprehended  not  as  a  per- 
ception of  the  primary  qualities,  but  in  a  perception  of  the 
quasi-primary  phasis  of  the  secundo-primary "  [qualities]; 
"  that  is,  in  the  consciousness  that  our  locomotive  energy  is 
resisted,  and  not  resisted  by  aught  in  our  organism  itself. 
For,  in  the  consciousness  of  being  thus  resisted,  is  involved  as 
a  correlative,  the  consciousness  of  a  resisting  something  ex- 
ternal to  our  organism.  Both  are,  therefore,  conjunctly  ap- 
prehended.-" 2 

This  volition  which  is  resisted  is  a  volition  to  move  our 
bodies,  and  consequently  Hamilton  immediately  adds : — 
"This  experience  presupposes,  indeed, a  possession  of  the  notions 
of  space  and  motion  in  space."  And  if  the  space,  in  which 
our  bodies  are  supposed  to  be  moving,  is  a  purely  mental  form 
which  has  no  existence  out  of  the  ego,  as  Kant  maintained, 
the  motion  of  our  bodies  through  space,  and  the  resistance  to 
tli.it  motion  which  we  experience,  must  be  regarded  as  not 
less  subjective  and  mental  than  space  itself.  But  Hamilton 
adopted  the  Kantian  doctrine,  so  far  as  to  maintain  that  space 
is  a  native,  or  //  priori  notion  a  mental  form  derived  from 
the  very  constitution  of  the  mind  itself,  and  which  it  would 
'   Eteid,  p.  866,  note.  a  Reid,  p.  882. 


NATURAL  REALISM.  ^ 

have  equally  possessed  if  there  was  no  external  world.  A  new 
difficulty  was  thus  placed  in  the  way  of  Natural  Realism. 
How  can  the  external  world  be  real,  if  the  space  which 
contains  it,  and  which  it  fills  and  occupies,  is  ideal  ? 

Hamilton's  reply  to  this  question  was  that  Space  (and  Time 
also)  is  not  purely  mental  or  ideal.  Space  and  Time  are 
not  merely  forms  of  thought.  They  are  also  "  conditions  of 
things ;"  and  besides  our  a  priori  knowledge  of  space  as  a 
mental  form,  we  have  an  a  posteriori  knowledge  of  it  as  ax 
element  of  existence.1  This  doctrine  has  been  censured  as 
unphilosophical ;  but  while  many  writers  have  put  forward 
strong  grounds  for  maintaining  that  our  idea  of  space  is 
native  or  a  priori,  it  must  be  confessed  that  Hamilton  has 
likewise  assigned  good  reasons  for  regarding  it  as  a  direct 
apprehension  of  our  sensible  experience.  And,  indeed,  Platner 
appears  to  have  advocated  a  doctrine  similar  to  that  of  Hamil- 
ton on  very  similar  grounds.2  Hamilton's  principal  argument 
that  space  or  extension  is  directly  attained  by  the  sense  of 
sight  is  as  follows : — "  We  have  by  sight  a  perception  of 
colours,  consequently  a  perception  of  the  difference  of  colours. 
But  a  perception  of  the  distinction  of  colours  necessarily  in- 
volves the  perception  of  a  discriminating  line;  for  if  one 
colour  be  laid  beside  or  upon  another,  we  only  distinguish 
them  as  different  by  perceiving  that  they  limit  each  other, 
which  limitation  necessarily  affords  a  breadthless  line — a  line 
of  demarcation.  One  colour  laid  upon  another,  in  fact,  gives 
a  line  returning  upon  itself,  that  is  a  figure.  But  a  line  and 
a  figure  are  modifications  of  extension.     The  perception  of 

1  Lect.  i.  403;  ii.  114.  Reid,  126,  note;  841(a),  882  (b).  It  is  strange 
that  in  the  face  of  all  these  passages  (see  especially  841  (a) )  the  late  Dean 
Mansel  should  have  apparently  regarded  Hamilton's  doctrine  of  space  as 
identical  with  his  own. 

2  Lect.  ii.  173. 

D 


34  SIR    WILLI  AM  HAMILTON. 

extension  is,  therefore,  necessarily  given  in  the  perception  of 
colours."  '  The  space-perceptions  of  the  lower  animals  also 
come  in  to  prove  the  empirical  perception  of  space,  and 
Hamilton  insists  on  another  principle,  viz.  that  the  imagina- 
tion, in  representing  any  sensible  object,  makes  use  of  the 
organ  of  sense,  by  which  that  object  was  originally  perceived  ; 
whence  he  contends  that  since  we  always  represent  space  in 
imagination  as  coloured,  the  perception  of  space  must  have  been 
arrived  at  through  the  sense  of  sight.2  Platner  had  gone  farther, 
and  maintained,  as  a  result  of  his  own  observations  on  a  man 
born  blind,  that  those  who  have  always  been  destitute  of  the 
sense  of  sight  are  likewise  destitute  of  the  perception  of  space  or 
extension  ; 3  but  his  observations  are  not  wholly  satisfactory, 
and  Hamilton,  in  quoting  the  passage,  does  not  express  his 
complete  concurrence  in  Platner's  conclusion.  Indeed,  he  else- 
where expresses  an  opinion  that  there  is  some  perception  of 
space  -  at  all  events,  of  locality — in  the  every  exercise  of  any 
of  our  senses;  but  his  arguments  in  favour  of  an  empirical 
cognition  of  space  are  mainly  derived  from  the  sense  of  sight. 
Sir  William  Hamilton's  arguments  in  favour  of  this  theory 
of  Natural  Realism  are  two-fold,  positive  and  negative.  The 
positive  argument  consists  of  a  direct  appeal  to  consciousness 
— that  is,  not  merely  to  the  consciousness  of  the  individual, 
but  to  the  general  consciousness  of  mankind,  as  attested  by 
their  expressions  and  actions.  This  latter  argument  is  what 
is  known  as  appealing  to  Common  Sense.     "  To  say  that  all 

1  Lect.  ii.  105.  Hamilton  takes  no  notice  of  the  motions  of  the  eye 
and  the  muscular  sensations  which  accompany  them  :  but  there  are  strong 
reasons  lor  believing,  1st,  that  we  can  perceive  extension  when  the  eye  is 
at  rest;  and  2n<ily,  that  the  motions  (if  the  eye  mainly  act  by  altering  the 
optical  or  visual  impressions  themselves,  rather  than  by  associating  those 
impressions  with  muscular  sensations,  or  muscular  movements,  of  our  arms 
or  legs. 

3  Lect.  ii.  1G8-9.  3  Lect.  ii.  174. 


NATURAL  REALISM.  35 

men  naturally  believe  in  such  a  knowledge/'  says  Hamilton, 
"  is  only,  in  other  words,  to  say  that  they  believe  it  upon  the 
authority  of  consciousness.  A  fact  of  consciousness,  and  a 
fact  of  the  common  sense  of  mankind,  are  only  various  ex- 
pressions of  the  same  import.'" '  But  no  philosopher  can 
consistently  reject  any  portion  of  the  testimony  of  conscious- 
ness; and  as  it  testifies  to  our  immediate  perception  or  cogni- 
tion of  the  external  world,  every  philosopher  is  bound  to 
accept  this  testimony  as  an  ultimate  truth.  We  do  not  rind 
in  consciousness  a  mere  belief  that  the  external  world  exists  ; 
we  find  there  a  belief  that  we  perceive  it — know  it — as  exist- 
ing. Convince  me,  says  Hamilton,  that  I  am  wrong  in 
thinking  that  I  perceive  the  external  world,  and  I  will  readily 
grant  that  I  am  also  wrong  in  believing  in  its  existence.  My 
only  reason  for  believing  that  it  exists,  is  my  belief  that  T 
perceive  it,  and  if  the  latter  belief  is  to  be  abandoned  or 
declared  an  illusion,  the  former  must  fall  along  with  it, 
Hamilton  would,  in  some  passages,  appear,  like  Reid,  to  be 
the  advocate  of  the  popular  belief  in  its  entirety  ;  but,  taking 
his  writings  as  a  whole,  it  seems  clear  that  his  object  was 
rather  to  point  out  the  element  of  truth  on  which  the  popular 
belief  reposed — to  show  that  it  was  not  a  total  error,  a  mere 
delusion — and  that  though  we  did  not  immediately  perceive 
so  large  a  portion  of  the  external  world  as  the  vulgar  sup- 
posed, we  had  an  immediate  perception  of  some  of  it,  and  that 
from  the  portion  which  we  perceived,  the  remainder  could  be 
inferred  by  a  simple  and  legitimate  process.2  "The  first 
problem  of  philosophy,"  he  tells  us,  is  "  to  seek  out,  purify,  and 

1  Lett.  i.  292. 

2  Accordingly  we  find  Hamilton  saying,  "  It  is  sufficient  to  establish 
the  simple  fact  that  we  are  competent,  as  consciousness  assures  us,  to 
apprehend,  through  sense,  the  non-ego  in  certain  limited  relations;  and  it 
is  of  no  consequence  whatever,  either  to  our  certainty  of  the  reality  of 

D    2 


S/R    WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 


establish,  by  intellectual  analysis  and  criticism,  the  elementary 
feelings  or  beliefs,  in  which  are  given  the  elementary  truths, 
of  which  all  are  in  possession ;  and  the  argument  from 
Common  Sense  being  the  allegation  of  these  feelings,  as  ex- 
plicated and  ascertained,  in  proof  of  the  relative  truths  and 
their  necessary  consequences,  this  argument  is  manifestly 
dependent  on  philosophy  as  an  art  — as  an  acquired  dexterity — 
and  cannot,  notwithstanding  the  errors  they  have  so  frequently 
committed,  be  taken  out  of  the  hands  of  the  philosophers. 
Common  Sense  is  like  Common  Law.  Each  may  be  laid 
down  as  the  general  rule  of  decision,  but  in  the  one  ease  it 
must  be  left  to  the  jurist,  in  the  other  to  the  philosopher,  to 
ascertain  what  are  the  contents  of  the  rule  ;  and  though  in 
both  instances  the  common  man  may  be  cited  as  a  witness  for 
the  custom  or  the  fact,  in  neither  can  he  be  allowed  to  officiate 
as  advocate  or  as  judge  •"  !  and  he  immediately  afterwards  pro- 
ceeds to  blame  some  of  the  Scottish  philosophers  for  not  pro- 
claiming that  the  argument  from  Common  Sense  was  "  no 
appeal  to  the  undeveloped  beliefs  of  the  unreflective  many," 
and  for  not  inculcating  that  it  "presupposed  a  critical  analysis 
of  these  beliefs  by  the  philosophers  themselves."  When  the 
original  facts  of  consciousness  are  thus  separated  by  analysis 
from  the  portions  of  our  acquired  knowledge,  which  in  the 
vulgar  mind  is  intimately  connected  with  them,  the  philo- 
sopher can  appeal  to  the  vulgar  in  support  of  his  theory. 
Perhaps  the  most  remarkable  instance  of  a  vulgar  error  that 
history  records  is  the  popular  belief  prior  to  the  time  of 
Copernicus,  that  the  heavenly  bodies  revolved  round  the  earth 
every  twenty-four  hours.     The  Copernican  theory  was  at  first 

a  material  world,  or  to  our  ultimate  knowledge  of  its  properties,  whether 
by  this  primary  apprehension  we  lay  hold,  in  the  first  instance,  of  a 
larger  or  a  lesser  portion,  of  its  contents."  (Reid,  p.  814  (a).) 
'    Beid,  7.">2  (a).  ' 


NATURAL  REALISM.  37 

regarded  as  a  strange  paradox,  but  its  advocates  were  able  to 
point  out  many  instances  in  which  our  own  motions  produced 
the  same  sensible  effects  as  those  of  external  bodies — in  which, 
when  we  ourselves  moved,  the  body  we  were  looking  at  ap- 
peared to  do  so.  There  was  thus  an  element  of  truth  in  the 
popular  belief.  There  was  a  motion  and  a  motion  of  revolu- 
tion, though  not  that  which  mankind  in  general  supposed. 
Now  if  a  controversy  had  afterwards  arisen  between  the 
Copernicans,  and  another  school  of  philosophers  who  denied 
that  there  was  any  motion  at  all  in  the  case  and  explained 
the  whole  appearance  as  an  illusion,  the  Copernicans  would 
have  been  justified  in  appealing  to  the  popular  belief  of  man- 
kind in  proof  that  there  was  really  some  motion  or  other,  and 
a  motion  which  produced  similar  effects  on  the  senses  to  that 
which  the  vulgar  believed  in.  This  example  will  illustrate 
the  position  of  Sir  William  Hamilton  in  relation  to  the 
Idealists.  He  admits  that  when  the  vulgar  believe  in  the 
immediate  perception  of  a  non-ego  outside  of,  and  at  a  dis- 
tance from,  our  bodily  organism,  they  are  in  error ;  and  yet 
he  appeals  to  their  belief  as  a  proof  that  some  external  non- 
ego  is  perceived,  and  that  the  idealistic  theory  which  explains 
this  non-ego  and  its  externality  as  a  total  delusion,  is  erroneous. 
But  Hamilton  goes  beyond  this,  and  maintains  that  even  the 
philosophers  who  denied  that  we  have  an  immediate  perception 
of  the  external  world  are  compelled  to  admit  that  conscious- 
ness attests  the  contrary,  and  to  allege  that  consciousness  is 
in  this  respect  mistaken.1  It  would  be  impossible  here  to 
examine  these  quotations  in  detail,  but  it  may  be  remarked 
that  according  to  many  philosophers  our  original  conscious- 
ness becomes  largely  modified  by  experience  and  association, 
and  the  additions  thus  made  to  it  acquire  all  the  appearance 

1  Reid,  pp.  747-8.     Lect.  i.  289-92.     See,  however,  as  to  Descartes, 
Reid,  964  (b),  and  as  to  Brown  and  others,  Lect.  ii.  106. 


38  SIR   WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 

of  originality,  and,  in  fact,  become  inseparable  from  the  parts 
which  are  really  original.  Consciousness  thus  very  soon 
arrives  at  a  stage  at  which  its  original  deliverances  are  not  to 
be  distinguished  from  subsequent  acquisitions  by  any  effort  of 
reflexion,  or,  to  use  Mr.  Mill's  phrase,  of  introspection  ;  and 
a  philosopher  who  entertains  this  opinion  may  admit  that 
our  present  consciousness  testifies  to  the  (apparently)  imme- 
diate perception  of  an  external  world,  while  denying  that  our 
original  consciousness  did  so.  He  may  thus  deny  that  the 
perception  of  the  external  world  is  really  immediate,  while 
admitting'  the  veracity  of  all  the  original  deliverances  of  con- 
sciousness. Hamilton  does  not  appear  to  have  paid  sufficient 
attention  to  the  views  of  these  philosophers,  which,  if  accepted, 
would  very  much  weaken  the  force  of  his  appeals  to  popular 
belief  and  to  the  confessions  of  adversaries,  as  well  as  to  the 
individual  consciousness  of  his  reader  or  hearer.  He  believed, 
however,  that  he  had  reliable  tests  for  distinguishing  between 
the  original  and  acquired  elements  of  consciousness,  the  most 
prominent  of  these  being  the  test  of  necessity.  When  I 
pressed  my  hand  against  the  table,  for  instance,  the  convic- 
tion that  the  table  was  there,  and  that  I  perceived  it,  forced 
itself  upon  me  with  an  irresistible  necessity  that  proved  the 
original  and  intuitive  character  of  the  perception.  The  value 
of  this  test  will  be  touched  on  hereafter.  It  is  enough  for 
the  present  to  say  that  many  philosophers  maintain  that  such 
a  necessity  may  be  generated  by  association  of  ideas  in  cases 
where  there  was  no  original  necessity,  and  consequently  the 
positive  portion  of  Hamilton's  argument  cannot  at  present  be 
accepted  as  conclusive.  The  question  would  probably  have 
been  dealt  with  more  fully  if  Hamilton  had  lived  to  complete 
Ins  system,  lor  In  his  sketch  of  a  preface  to  liis  edition  to 
lleid,     he    writes  :     "  An     element    of    thought    being    found 

necessary,  there  remains  :i  further  process  to  ascertain  whether 


NATURAL  REALISM.  39 


it  be,  1st,  by  nature  or  education;  2nd,  ultimately  or  deriva- 
tively necessary ;  3rd,  positive  or  negative/' '  But  it  cannot  be 
said  that  such  an  inquiry  actually  carried  out  is  to  be  met  with 
in  his  writing's,  except  as  regards  the  third  of  these  questions. 
Hamilton  also  argues  that  a  consciousness  of  a  mental  opera- 
tion involves  a  consciousness  of  its  object,  and  that  since  we  are 
conscious  of  the  act  of  perception,  we  must  be  conscious  of  the 
object  of  that  act ; 2  and  that,  in  fact,  since  the  consciousness 
of  a  relative  involves  that  of  its  correlative,  the  consciousness 
of  the  ego  (as  such)  implies  a  consciousness  of  the  non-ego.3 
This  argument,  however,  must  be  taken  in  connexion  with 
his  distinction  between  immediate  and  mediate  knowledge, 
which  on  more  than  one  occasions  he  developes  at  considerable 
length,  but  which  is  briefly  given  in  his  definitions  of  them. 
"They  are,"  says  he,  "thus  defined.  Intuitive  or  immediate 
knowledge  is  that  in  which  thei*e  is  only  one  object,  and  in 
which  that  object  is  known  in  itself,  or  as  existing.  Repre- 
sentative or  mediate  knowledge,  on  the  contrary,  is  that  in 
which  there  are  two  objects — an  immediate  object  and 
a  mediate  object — the  immediate  object,  or  that  known 
in  itself,  being  a  mere  subjective  or  mental  mode,  relative 
to  and  representing  a  reality  beyond  the  sphere  of  con- 
sciousness— the  mediate  object  is  that  reality  thus  supposed 
and  represented.'" 4  It  is  plain  from  this  extract,  as  well  as 
many  other  passages,  that  when  the  doctrine  that  con- 
sciousness of  the  operation  implies  consciousness  of  its  object 

1  Reid,  p.  xviii.  2  Lect.  i.  211,  seq. 

3  Lect.  i.  225.  This  was  the  argument  by  which  Cousin  sought  to 
prove  that  we  are  conscious  of  the  Infinite.  We  are  admittedly  con- 
scious of  the  finite,  but  cannot  be  conscious  of  one  relative  without  the 
other.  This  reasoning,  however,  Hamilton  there  rejects.  (Discussions, 
p.  18.)  But  the  non-ego  is  not,  in  Hamilton's  opinion,  a  mere  negative 
like  the  Infinite. 

4  Lect.  ii.  87-8. 


4o  SIR    WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 

is  applied  to  our  mediate  or  representative  knowledge,  where 
there  are  two  objects,  it  must  be  understood  of  one  of  these 
objects  only — namely,  of  what  Hamilton  calls  the  immediate 
object,  to  the  exclusion  of  what  he  terms  the  mediate 
object.  But  in  applying-  it  to  our  immediate  knowledge, 
where  there  is  but  a  single  object,  no  such  difficulty  or 
ambiguity  arises.  The  correct  mode  of  expressing  the  doc- 
trine would,  in  fact,  be  that  the  consciousness  of  an  operation 
implies  the  consciousness  of  its  immediate  object.1  As  thus 
explained,  however,  Hamilton's  argument  seems  to  beg  the 
question,  for  the  Cosmothetic  Idealist  would  deny  that  the 
external  object  is  the  immediate  object  of  the  mental  opera- 
tion known  as  perception.  But  Hamilton,  in  the  passages 
referred  to,  is  merely  engaged  in  refuting  Reid  and  Stewart. 
These  philosophers  had  denied  that  we  are  conscious  of  the 

1  Mr.  Mill  understands  Hamilton  as  applying  this  doctrine  to  the 
mediate  object  of  our  representative  or  mediate  knowledge,  or  rather  he 
seems  to  take  it  for  granted  that  this  is  the  only  thing  that  Hamilton 
could  have  meant  by  the  term  "  object,"  when  used  in  connexion  with 
mediate  or  representative  knowledge.  He  has,  of  course,  no  difficulty  in 
showing  that  the  doctrine,  so  understood,  is  erroneous.  [Examination  of 
Hamilton,  p.  150,  seq  )  The  doctrine  in  question  was  no  doubt  intended 
by  Hamilton  to  apply  to  belief  as  well  as  to  knowledge ;  but  in  mediate 
belief,  as  in  mediate  knowledge,  the  only  object  of  which  we  are  conscious 
is  the  immediate  object — the  subject-object.  This  non-recognition  of 
the  distinction  between  the  immediate  and  the  mediate  object — the 
Bubject-object  and  the  object-object — has  led  Mr.  Mill  in  an  other  error. 
He  alleges  (Examination,  pp.  223-4)  that  Hamilton  confessed  that  the 
distinction  which  consciousness  draws  between  the  ego  and  the  non-ego 
is  sometimes  a  mistake,  and  cites  a  passage  in  which  Hamilton  states 
thai  in  all  cognition  there  is  an  object  (Lect.  ii.  '132),  as  an  assertion 
tli.it  we  sometimes  regard  modes  of  self  "as  external  and  a  non-ego." 
The  very  words  quoted  by  Mr.  Mill  oughl  to  have  shown  him  that  Hamilton 
was  only  Bpeaking  of  the  subject-object — of  a  mode  of  the  ego  which 
iousness  distinguishes  "as  an  accident,  from  the  ego  as  the  subject  oi 
accident.*' 


NATURAL  REALISM.  41 


externa]  object,  while  at  the  same  time  they  seem  to  have 
admitted  that  the  external  object  is  the  immediate  object  of  the 
act  of  perception.  If  so,  the  argument  is  good  as  against 
them,  and  it  was  not  perhaps  intended  to  be  applied  generally. 
The  negative  portion  of  Hamilton's  argument  is  mainly- 
directed  against  the  class  of  philosophers  whom  he  designates 
Hypothetical  Realists,  or  Cosmothetic  Idealists — namely, 
those  who  affirmed  the  existence  of  the  external  world,  while 
denying  the  immediate  perception  of  it — a  class  in  which, 
among  others,  Dr.  Brown  must  undoubtedly  be  placed.  The 
main  scope  of  Hamilton's  argument  against  these  philosophers 
is  to  prove  that  they  had  no  right  to  believe  in  an  external 
world  at  all,  and  this  I  think  he  must  be  regarded  as  having 
established.  Some  of  his  reasonings  are,  no  doubt,  open  to 
exception.  He  assumes  that  they  all  admitted  that  conscious- 
ness testified  that  our  perception  of  the  external  world  was 
immediate  or  intuitive,  but  denied  that  this  testimony  was 
veracious;  and  he  enlarges  at  considerable  length  on  the 
absurdity  of  denying  the  veracity  of  consciousness,  or  of 
alleging  that  some  of  its  utterances  are  true  and  others  false, 
and  endeavouring  to  discriminate  between  them.  Against 
Brown,  he  insists  on  the  special  absurdity  of  which  that 
philosopher  was  guilty  in  accepting  the  existence  of  the 
external  world  merely  on  account  of  our  natural  belief  in  its 
existence,  while  denying  the  truth  of  our  natural  belief  in  the 
immediate  perception  of  it — which  perception,  or  supposed 
perception,  is  in  reality  our  only  reason  for  believing  that  it 
exists.  Again,  since  the  Cosmothetic  Idealists  deny  that  we 
have  an  immediate  or  intuitive  knowledge  of  matter,  they  are 
bound  to  maintain  that  our  knowledge  of  it  is  mediate  or 
representative;  but  in  opposing  this  doctrine  Hamilton  seems 
to  me  sometimes  to  play  on  the  words  "  representative  "  and 
"  representation ; "   as,    for    instance,   when    he    calls  on  the 


42  SIR   WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 

Cosmothetic  Idealists  to  prove  that  their  representation  is  Uke 
the  object — that  it  truly  represents  it.  This  argument  is 
hardly  applicable,  at  all  events,  to  philosophers  who  main- 
tained, with  Brown,  that  the  only  relation  between  the  (so- 
called)  representation  and  the  object  is  that  of  cause  and 
effect,  the  object  being  the  unknown  cause  of  the  represen- 
tation, or  rather  mental  modification;  and  on  this  ground 
Mr.  Mill  vindicates  Brown  against  a  considerable  part  of 
Hamilton's  criticism.  With  more  force  Hamilton  insists  that 
all  representation  presupposes  a  presentation  — that  all  mediate 
knowledge  presupposes  an  immediate  knowledge  upon  which 
it  rests — but  that,  as  perception  is  the  faculty  by  which  we 
acquire  our  first  knowledge  of  the  external  world,  it  cannot 
suppose  a  previous  knowledge  as  its  condition.1  But  even 
here  Brown  could  reply  that  the  so-called  perception  of  the 
external  world  consisted  in  nothing  but  inferring  a  catise  for 
our  sensations,  and  that  the  idea  of  cause  being  either  a 
priori  or  attainable  by  means  of  internal  consciousness,  no 
special  faculty  of  External  Perception  was  necessary  in  order 
to  acquire  it.  If,  however,  Hamilton  has  not  dealt  with  this 
doctrine  of  Perception  by  means  of  the  Principle  of  Causality 
as  fully  as  we  might  have  expected,  he  has  left  us  in  no  doubt 
of  his  opinions  upon  the  subject.  As  already  remarked,  even 
assuming  that  the  cause  of  our  sensations  cannot  be  our  own 

1  Lect  ii.  106.  The  passage  is  strangely  misunderstood  by  Mr.  Mill 
(Examination  of  Hamilton,  p.  204,  4th  edit.).  He  understands  Hamilton 
;is  stating,  that  we  cannot  recognize  a  mental  modification  as  representa- 
tive of  something  else,  unless  we  have  a,  present  knowledge  of  that  some- 
thing  else  Otherwise  obtained;  which  is,  of  course,  inconsistent  with  the 
facl  "I'  memory  as  well  as  with  Sir  William  Hamilton's  description  of  it. 
Bui  Hamilton's  doctrine  is  not  that  I  cannot  know  a  picture  to  be  like  the 
original,  unlesa  I  have  a  present  knowledge  of  the  original  otherwise 
acquired,  bnt  merely  that  1  could  not  recognize  the  likeness  unless  I  had 
,il  tome  time  or  other  seen  the  original.  This  seems  almost  a  truism. — See 
farther,  Reid,  811  (a). 


NATURAL  REALISM.  43 


minds,  it  may  be  God  or  some  other  spirit ;  '  and  therefore  this 
Principle  of  Causality  (assuming  its  validity)  leads  to  no 
external  world.  Nor  is  the  matter  much  mended  by  em- 
ploying- the  phrase  the  external  cause  of  our  sensations.  It 
by  "  external "  in  this  phrase  is  only  meant  independent  of 
our  own  minds,  God  or  any  other  spirit  is  external  in  this 
sense.  If  by  "  external  cause "  is  meant  the  cause  of  my 
feeling*  or  perception  of  externality,  there  is  no  reason  why 
that  particular  feeling  or  perception  should  not  be  produced 
in  me  by  the  agency  of  God  or  of  some  other  mind,  as  well  as 
any  other  feeling.  But  if  by  u  external  cause"  is  meant  a 
cause  existing  in  space,  the  question  whether  such  a  cause 
constitutes  a  veritable  external  world  will  depend  on  the  view 
which  we  take  of  the  nature  of  space.  If  space  is  purely 
mental — if  it  is  a  mere  feeling  or  state  of  the  mind  which 
perceives  or  represents  it — a  cause  existing  in  space  is  merely 
a  cause  existing  in  the  mind  or  minds  wherein  the  idea  or 
representation  of  space  is  found ;  while,  if  space  is  something 
independent  of  my  own  or  of  any  other  mind,  a  cause  of  my 
sensations  existing  in  space  must  be  regarded  as  likewise 
independent  of  them.  But  the  Principle  of  Causality,  which 
merely  refers  our  sensations  to  some  cause  or  other,  cannot  in- 
form us  whether  this  unknown  cause  exists  in  space  or  not. 
For  that  purpose  we  require  some  further  evidence,  and  it  is 
not  easy  to  see  what  that  other  evidence  can  be,  unless  we  are 
in  some  manner  informed  of  the  fact  by  direct  perception. 

It  is,  perhaps,  too  early  to  form  a  correct  estimate  of  the 
value  of  the  doctrine  of  Natural  Realism  which  Sir  William 
Hamilton  has  thus  bequeathed  to  philosophy;  but  it  will,  I 
believe,  be  confessed  by  the  most  competent  judges  that  he  has 

1  He  even  asserts  in  one  passage  that  it  must  be  God  or  some 
other  spirit  (Lect.  ii.  142) ;  but  a  few  pages  earlier  (Lect.  ii.  120),  be 
admitted  the  contrary. 


44  SIR   WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 

logical^  extinguished  Cosmothetic  Idealism,  and  established 
that,  in  his  own  language,  "  Natural  Realism  and  Absolute 
Idealism  are  the  only  systems  worthy  of  a  philosopher/'' l 
He  recognizes,  however,  certain  other  Theories  of  Perception 
of  which  it  may  be  desirable  to  give  a  short  account.  There 
is  first  Nihilism,  which  denies  the  absolute  or  independent 
existence  either  of  mind  or  of  matter.  If  this  theory  merely 
denies  that  either  mind  or  matter  exist  as  substances,  it  is 
hardly  correct  to  call  it  a  theory  of  perception  ;  for  Hamilton 
admits  that  in  perception  we  do  not  cognize  the  substances 
either  of  mind  or  of  matter,  but  only  their  attributes  or 
phenomena  Nihilism  is  indeed  a  theory  concerning  the 
nature  of  the  thing  or  things  perceived,  but  it  is  not  a  theory 
as  to  what  is  revealed  in  the  act  of  perception,  and  therefore 
should  not,  I  think,  be  classed  with  Natural  Realism  and 
Absolute  Idealism  as  a  theory  of  perception.  A  similar 
observation  applies  to  the  next  system  in  Hamilton's  list — - 
that  of  Absolute  Identity.  This  system  maintains  that  the 
ego  and  the  non-ego  which  we  cognize  in  every  act  of  per- 
ception, are  both  modifications  of  the  same  ultimate  substance, 
which  is  not  properly  designated  either  mind  or  matter. 
The  advocates  of  this  theory  can  hardly  maintain  that  this 
identity  of  the  two  substances  is  revealed  in  the  act  of  per- 
ception itself,  and  therefore  this  theory,  like  Nihilism,  relates 
to  the  conclusions  which  we  form  concerning  the  nature  of  the 
ego  and  the  non-ego  on  some  other  ground  than  the  mere 
act  of  sensitive  perception.2  Lastly,  there  is  Materialism. 
Here   I   should    slate  that  Natural    Realism,   as   Sir  William 

1  Beid,  817,note. 

2  Cousin  is  mentioned  by  Hamilton  as  one  of  the  ablest  advocates  of 
this  view.  Hut  he  arrives  at  the  external  world  by  the  operation  of 
the  Principle  of  Causality  in  referring  our  sensations  to  unknown  causes, 
and  is  therefore,  so  far  as  the  process  of  perception  is  concerned,  a  Cos- 
mo! In)  ic   Idealist. 


NATURAL  REALISM.  45 


Hamilton  propounded  it,  asserts  something  more  than  the 
direct  intuitive  perception  of  the  external  world.  It  also 
asserts  that  the  material  ohject  thus  immediately  perceived  is 
distinct  from,  and  independent  of,  the  mind  or  ego  ;  for  which 
reason  he  sometimes  calls  his  system  Natural  Dualism,  be- 
cause it  asserts  at  least  two  ultimate  existences— mind  and 
matter — ego  and  non-ego.  Hence  a  materialist  who  be- 
lieves in  an  immediate  perception  of  the  external  world  is 
not  regarded  by  Sir  William  Hamilton  as  a  Natural  Realist, 
but  placed  in  a  separate  class.  It  would,  perhaps,  have  been 
better  to  have  extended  the  meaning  of  the  phrase  Natural 
Realist  so  as  to  include  all  who  believe  in  an  immediate  per- 
ception of  the  external  world  (in  the  sense  already  explained), 
whether  Materialists  or  Spiritualists.  Matter  is  not  one 
thing,  but  a  number  of  things  in  many  respects  dissimilar  to 
each  other  in  their  properties,  and  if  the  perceived  non-ego 
be  matter,  its  distinction  from  the  ego  seems  sufficiently 
preserved,  provided  the  ego  is  regarded  as  other  matter.  In 
the  same  way  the  Idealist  can  preserve  the  distinction  be- 
tween the  ego  and  the  non-ego  intact  by  maintaining  that 
the  non-ego  is  another  mind.  Materialists  who  believe  in 
an  immediate  perception  of  the  external  world  would  thus 
seem  to  be  in  truth  Natural  Realists,  while  those  Materialists 
who  deny  that  immediate  perception  should  be  classed  as 
Cosmothetic  Idealists.  Cosmothetic  Idealism  again  has,  ac- 
cording to  Hamilton,  two  principal  forms  (which  he  sometimes 
expands  to  three),  viz.  that  which  holds  that  the  representa- 
tive object — which  on  that  theory  is  the  object  immediately 
known  in  perception  -  is  a  modification  of  mind,  and  that 
which  denies  it  to  be  so.  But  those  philosophers  who  held 
that  the  representative  object  was  not  a  modification  of  mind, 
maintained  that  it  was  a  modification  of  matter,  situated  in  the 
brain  or  other  sensorium.     Such  a  doctrine  belongs   not  to 


46  SIR    WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 

Cosmothetie  Idealism,  but  to  Natural  Realism  ;  for  Hamilton 
himself,  as  we  have  seen,  thinks  it  sufficient  if  we  have  an 
immediate  perception  of  the  nerve-extremities  which  terminate 
in  the  brain,  and  holds  that,  if  we  have  a  direct  consciousness 
of  any  portion  of  the  material  world,  it  is  of  no  consequence 
whether  that  portion  is  larger  or  smaller.1  The  philosophers 
in  question  may  have  been  mistaken  in  holding-  that  the 
objects  in  the  brain  which  were  thus  immediately  perceived 
were  like  the  objects  in  the  extra-organic  world,  and  that  it 
was  by  means  of  this  likeness  that  we  were  enabled  to  pass 
from  the  one  to  the  other.  But  an  erroneous  or  defective 
form  of  Natural  Realism  is  one  thing",  and  Cosmothetie 
[dealism  is  another.  It  may  be  added,  that  the  philosophers 
to  whom  I  now  refer — Democritus,  Epicurus,  and  Sir  Kenelm 
Digby,  for  instance  —  were  confessedly  Materialists;  a  fact 
which  indicates  that  the  several  Theories  of  Perception 
enumerated  by  Sir  William  Hamilton  are  not  really  distinct 
from  each  other.2  Natural  Realism  is,  when  considered  by 
itself,  much  more  akin  to  Empiricism  than  to  Intellectualism  ; 
and  but  for  the  other  principles  inculcated  in  Hamilton's 
philosophy,  we  might  have  expected  that  his  disciples  would 
have  belonged  to  the  a  posteriori  rather  than  the  a  priori 
school  of  philosophers.  It  is  only  by  the  assumption  of  a 
two-fold  apprehension  of  space  or  extension — the  one  priori, 
and  the  other  empirical — that  Hamilton  succeeds  in  reconciling 
his  Natural  Realism  with  his  Intellectualism.  The  doctrine 
of  Natural  Realism,  however,  is  attended  with  other  difficulties 

1  Possibly,  however,  Hamilton  thought  it  essential  to  Natural  Realism, 
that  consciousness  should  directly  attain  to  a  larger  or  smaller  portion  of 
the  extra-organic  world.  It' so,  the  advocates  of  what  he  calls  "the 
cruder  form  of  the  representative  hypothesis,"  were  not  Natural  Realists. 

2  Accordingly,  in  an  Appendix  to  his  Lectures,  Hamilton  gives  an 
explanation  of  tin1  adoption  of  the  representative  theory  by  materialists. 
Lect.  L521. 


NATURAL  REALISM.  47 

which  Hamilton's  followers  do  not  seem  hitherto  to  have 
effected  much  towards  removing.  Some  of  those  relating-  to 
the  immediate  perception  of  our  own  organism  as  extended, 
are  mentioned  by  Hamilton  himself  in  the  note  to  Reid,  p. 
817,  already  referred  to ;  and  indeed,  if  we  have  an  immediate 
perception  of  our  own  extended  nervous  organism,  it  is  not 
easy  to  explain  how  there  can  be  any  doubt  as  to  the  limits 
and  locality  of  the  extension  which  we  immediately  perceive. 
Again,  when  we  endeavour  to  pass  to  the  extra-organic  world, 
the  question  arises  whether  our  locomotive  faculty,  or  locomo- 
tive energy,  is  known  to  us  as  such  in  the  absence  of  all 
sensation  ?  And  even  assuming  that  it  is,  and  also  that 
we  are  conscious  that  our  locomotive  energy  is  resisted,  and 
not  resisted  by  anything  in  our  own  organism,  does  the  pro- 
cess which  follows  involve  anything  more  than  inferring  an 
unknown  cause  for  the  resistance  which  we  feel  ?  If  we  have 
a  direct  perception  not  merely  of  the  resistance  but  of  the 
thing  that  resists,  this  perception  ought  to  give  us  some  in- 
formation as  to  the  nature  of  the  thing  in  question;  but 
Hamilton  describes  the  extra-organic  world  as  merely  revealed 
to  us  in  its  character  of  something  that  resists  and  seems  to 
think  that  all  its  other  qualities  are  arrived  at  by  inference 
rather  than  by  direct  apprehension.  I  am  far  from  implying 
that  these  difficulties  are  insuperable,  but  they  seem  to  me  to 
be  worthy  of  more  attention  than  they  have  yet  received  at 
the  hands  of  his  disciples.1 

1  With  regard  to  the  extra-organic  world  I  may  remark,  that  parts 
of  our  organism  may  be  regarded  as  an  extra-organic  world  relatively  to 
other  parts  of  it.  When  the  motion  of  my  arm  is  arrested  by  bringing 
it  against  my  leg,  it  is  resisted  by  something  outside*  the  moving  portion 
of  my  organism,  though  not  outside  my  organism  taken  as  a  whole :  and 
here,  on  principles  of  Natural  Realism,  I  may  be  conscious  both  of  the 
moving  arm  and  of  the  leg  that  resists  its  motion.  This  may,  perhaps, 
facilitate  the  passage  from  our  organism  to  the  extra-organic  world. 


48  SIP   WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 


CHAPTER  III. 

NECESSARY   TRUTHS — THE    LAW   OF    THE    CONDITIONED. 

I  now  pass  to  Hamilton's  doctrine  of  Native,  Necessary,  or 
a  priori  Truths,  which  also  is  one  on  which  the  scientific 
world  is  at  present  divided.  He  was  a  firm  believer  in  such 
truths,  and  gives  us  several  tests  or  characteristics,  by  which 
they  can  be  distinguished  from  the  products  of  experience  or 
association.  In  his  edition  of  Reid  he  specifies  four  of  these 
tests,  viz.  1.  Incomprehensibility.  2.  Simplicity.  3.  Neces- 
sity and  Absolute  Universality.  4.  Comparative  Evidence 
and  Certainty.1  The  first  of  these  characteristics  would 
perhaps  be  better  described  as  Inexplicableness,  and  the  chief 
use  both  of  it  and  of  the  second  test  is  to  distinguish  the 
ultimate  principles  from  those  derived  from  them.  This,  how- 
ever, is  mainly  a  question  of  classification.  If  there  are  any 
first  principles  which  are  known  a  priori,  and  possess  perfect 
certainty, whatever  can  be  logically  deduced  from  them  will  also 
be  perfectly  certain  and  independent  of  all  experience.  Hamil- 
ton sometimes  expresses  the  first  of  these  tests  or  characteristics 
by  saving  that  first  principles  are  given  to  us  with  a  mere 
belief  in  their  truth,2  or  that  they  arc  given  to  us  rather  in  the 
form  of  beliefs  than  of  cognitions  ;:t  lor  by  belief  he  does  not 
here  mean  a  conviction  which  falls  short  of  certainty,  but  a 
conviction  which  rests  upon  itself,  and  cannot  be  deduced  from 

1   Reid,  7-VI,  (a).  *  Lect.  i.  270.  '   Discussions,  p.  86. 


NECESSARY  TRUTHS.  49 

any  other   portion  of  our   knowledge.1      What   is    ultimate, 
simple,  inexplicable,  must,  in  this  sense  of  the  word,  always 
depend  upon  mere  belief  or  faith.     I  am  certain — that  is,  I 
feel  certain — but   I  can   give   no  reason   for    my  conviction, 
except  that  conviction  itself.     It  is,  of  course,  practically  as 
well  as  theoretically,  of  importance  to  distinguish   between 
original    and  derivative    principles ;    for    Intellectualists  will 
generally  admit  that  the  vulgar,  and  even  philosophers,  have 
often  ascribed  absolute  certainty  to  principles  which  were  not 
logically  deduced  from  ultimate  truths,  but  also  depended  in 
part  on  the  teachings  of  experience.     But  the  main  question 
at  the  present  day  being  whether  there  are  any  principles  whose 
truth  is  known  to  us  independent  of  experience,  we  may  pass 
over  the  first  two  of  Hamilton's  tests  and  proceed  to  the  con- 
sideration of  the  third  and  fourth.      The  fourth  resolves  itself 
into  the  third.     What  is  universally  and  necessarily  believed 
must  appear  to  us  to  be  more  certain  and  evident  than  anything 
in  which  our  belief  is  not  universal  and  necessary,  and  thus 
universality  and  necessity  come  to  be  the  final  tests  by  which 
alone  a  priori  truths  can  be   detected.       Hamilton,   indeed, 
on  one  0     two    occasions  seems  disposed  to  make  use   of  a 
Kantian  test,  namely,  that  any  notion  or  principle  is  a  priori, 
if  experience — by  which  Kant  did  not  mean  sensations,  but 
empirical  knowledge — would  be  impossible  without  it.     Thus, 
according  to   Kant,  the    idea  of   cause   is   a  priori,   because 
without   it  we  could  not  distinguish   between  sensible  expe- 
rience and   the  illusions  of  the   imagination.      If  Hamilton 
recognized  this  test,  however,  he  makes  but  a  very  sparing 
use  of  it.     His  main  reliance  is  on  universality  and  necessity. 
These  tests  are  applicable  both  to  ideas  and  to  judgments. 

1  I  do  not  mean  to  imply  that  Hamilton  invariably  employs  the  word 
belief  in  this  signification.  The  context  is  usually  the  he.-t  guide  to  hia 
use  of  it.     Sec  however  Lect.  iv.  70. 

E 


50  SIR    WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 

In  one  sense,  indeed,  our  empirical  ideas,  when  once  acquired, 
become  necessary,  for  we  cannot  completely  obliterate  them 
by  any  effort  of  the  will.  But  though  I  cannot  thus  finally 
obliterate  the  idea  of  fire,  for  instance,  from  my  mind,  I  can 
imagine  all  the  fires  in  the  universe  extinguished.  On  the 
other  hand  I  cannot  imagine  all  the  space  in  the  universe  (or, 
indeed,  any  part  of  it)  annihilated.  The  idea  of  space  thus 
possesses  a  necessity  which  the  idea  of  fire  does  not ;  and  this 
necessity,  according  to  Sir  William  Hamilton,  affords  a  proof 
of  its  a  'priori  origin,  though,  as  we  have  seen,  he  was  of 
opinion  that  it  could  also  be  derived  from  experience.  Again, 
there  are  probably  some  persons  in  the  world  who  have  no 
idea  of  fire,  while  there  are  none  who  have  not  the  idea  of 
space;1  and  we  can  suppose  fire  to  be  absent  from  certain 
parts  of  the  world,  while  we  cannot  suppose  a  similar  absence 
of  space.  The  idea  of  space  is  thus  univei'sal  in  two  senses. 
It  is  found  in  every  man,  and  we  cannot  avoid  supposing  it 
to  exist  throughout  the  entire  universe.  It  is  therefore, 
according  to  Sir  William  Hamilton,  a  priori.  Universality 
and  necessity,  indeed,  imply  each  other.  A  necessary  idea, 
or  principle,  does  not  mean  one  which  some  individual  feels 
to  be  necessary,  but  one  which  all  men  feel  to  be  necessary; 
and  that  which  is  strictly  and  absolutely  universal — to  which 
we  cannot  discover  any  exception,  not  only  in  our  expe- 
rience but  even  in  imagination — is  necessary.  If  we  could 
imagine  an  exception,  it  seems  almost  certain  that,  by  giving 
free  scope  to  our  imagination,  we  would  do  so.  Therefore  if 
in  fact  we  never  imagine  an  exception,  it  may  fairly  be 
assumed  that  we  cannot. 

The  tests  are,  however,  still   more  obviously  applicable  to 
judgments  or  principles.     Take,  for  instance,  the  judgment, 

1  This,  of  coarse,  is  intended  as  an  exposition  of  Sir  William  Hamilton's 
views,  and  not  an  expression  of  my  own  opinion. 


NECESSARY  TRUTHS.  51 

Two  right  lines  cannot  enclose  a  space.  All  men,  perhaps, 
do  not  form  this  judgment,  but  all  men  who  put  together  the 
requisite  ideas,  believe  that  the  proposition  or  judgment  is 
true.  It  is  thus  universally  believed  in  this  sense  that  all 
men  to  whose  minds  the  proposition  is  present  believe  it. 
There  is,  at  all  events,  no  one  who  ^believes  it.  Again,  it 
is  universal  in  the  second  sense.  We  believe  it  to  be  true  of 
erery  pair  of  right  lines,  without  any  exception.  And  it  is 
necessary ;  for  we  cannot,  by  the  utmost  effort  we  are  capable 
of,  imagine  two  right  lines  enclosing  a  space.  The  proposi- 
tion in  question,  being  thus  universal  and  necessary,  is  a  priori, 
according  to  Sir  William  Hamilton. 

How  far  this  necessity,  and  consequent  a  priori  origin  of 
ideas  and  of  judgments  coincides,  Hamilton  has  neglected  to 
inquire.  In  his  discussion  on  causality,  he  seems  to  assume 
that  if  the  idea  of  cause  is  not  a  priori,  the  proposition  or 
judgment  that  whatever  begins  to  exist  has  a  cause  (which  is 
known  as  the  Principle  of  Causality),  cannot  be  so.  It  does 
not  seem  to  have  occurred  to  him  that  if  this  assumption  was 
true,  the  Principle  of  Causality  could  not  be  a  priori  unless 
the  other  notion  involved  in  it — that  of  a  beginning  of  exis- 
tence— was  a  priori  also.  Hamilton,  indeed,  though  aware 
of  the  Kantian  distinction  between  Analytical  and  Synthetical 
(or  Explicative  and  Ampliative)  judgments,  would  sometimes 
seem  to  have  adopted  an  opposite  view  himself,  and  to  have 
regarded  judgments  or  propositions  as  mere  analyses  of  our  ideas 
or  notions.1  The  Principle  of  Causality  would  from  this  point 
of  view  be  regarded  as  a  mere  analysis  of  the  notion  of  cause, 
and  the  a  priori  character  of  both  Idea  and  Principle  would 
rest  on  the   same  footing.2     Indeed,   in   Hamilton's  Tabular 

1  See  Chapter  VI. 

2  In    this   very    discussion,    however,   he   describes   the    Principle   of 
Causality  as  synthetical,  and  says  that  it  cannot  be  derived  from  the 

E   2 


5  2  SIR   WIL  L I  A  M  HA  MIL  TON. 

Conspectus  of  the  various  Theories  of  Causation,  we  must 
understand  his  phrase  "judgment  of  causality/"  as  sometimes 
meaning-  the  Idea  of  Cause,  and  sometimes  the  Principle  of 
Causality;  and  the  systems  of  those  philosophers  who  did 
not  identify  the  two  will  fall  under  at  least  two  of  the  heads 
in  Hamilton's  table.  Thus,  the  system  of  Reid  falls  under 
the  second  head  as  regards  the  Idea  of  Cause,  and  under  the 
fifth  as  regards  the  Principle  of  Causality. 

The  value  of  these  tests  of  universality  and  necessity  has 
since  been  the  subject  of  much  controversy.  Some  philo- 
sophers have  maintained  that  constant  experience  and  asso- 
ciation of  ideas  is  sufficient  to  produce  both,  while  others  have 
denied  that  any  ideas  or  propositions  are  in  reality  universal 
and  necessary.  To  enter  into  this  controversy  would  be  foreign 
to  the  scope  of  the  present  work.  I  will  only  say  that  Sir 
William  Hamilton  does  not  seem  to  have  paid  much  atten- 
tion to  the  Association  Psychology,  and  that  those  who  expect 
to  find  in  his  writings  a  formal  refutation  of  its  later  deve- 
lopments will  be  disappointed.  The  tests  of  universality  and 
necessity  had  long  passed  current  with  the  greater  part  of  the 
philosophical  world  before  Sir  William  Hamilton  employed 
them  ;  and  the  Associationists  themselves  are  equally  ready  to 
appeal  to  theories  which  have  long  passed  current,  though 
aware  that  they  are  disputed  by  some — to  appeal,  for  in- 
stance, to  the  acquired  perceptions  of  sight,  as  defined  by 
Berkeley's  Theory  of  Vision,  and  the  secondary  desires  as 
described  by  Hutcheson.  Both  sides  are  indeed  too  much  in- 
clined to  accept  disputable  facts  which  accord  with  their  own 
views  as  established  scientific  truths,  and  to  expound  them  as 

Principle  of  Contradiction    for    this    reason    (Lect.    ii.    396).      His   own 
derivation  of  it,  from  the  law  of  the  Conditioned  also  implies  its  synthetical 
character,     Parts  of  this  Lecture,  however,  were  written  as  late  as  1854. 
1  Lect.  ii.  887;    Discussions,  613. 


NECESSARY  TRUTHS.  53 

such  to  their  readers  or  hearers — especially  if  they  have 
in  general  met  with  a  favourable  reception  at  the  hands  of 
philosophers. 

But  Hamilton's  mode  of  employing-  the  tests  of  univer- 
sality and  necessity  involves  something"  peculiar  to  himself, 
and  to  which  he  attached  no  slight  importance.  He  divides 
mental  facts  which  involve  this  necessity  upon  two  distinct 
principles.  "  There  is  one  necessity,"  says  he,  "  when  we 
cannot  construe  it  to  our  minds  as  possible  that  the  deliverance 
of  consciousness  should  not  be  true.  This  logical  impossibility 
occurs  in  the  case  of  what  are  called  necessary  truths — truths 
of  reason  or  intelligence — as  in  the  law  of  Causality,  the  law 
of  Substance,  and  still  more  in  the  laws  of  Identity,  Contradic- 
tion, and  Excluded  Middle.  There  is  another  necessity  when 
it  is  not  unthinkable  that  the  deliverance  of  consciousness 
may  possibly  be  false,  but  at  the  same  time  when  we  cannot 
but  admit  that  this  deliverance  is  of  such  or  such  a  purport. 
This  is  seen  in  the  case  of  what  are  called  contingent  truths, 
or  truths  of  fact.  Thus,  for  example,  1  can  theoretically  sup- 
pose that  the  external  object  I  am  conscious  of  in  per- 
ception may  be  in  reality  nothing  but  a  mode  of  mind,  or 
self.  I  am  unable,  however,  to  think  that  it  does  not  appear 
to  me — that  consciousness  does  not  compel  me  to  regard  it — 
as  external,  as  a  mode  of  matter,  or  not-self.  And,  such 
being  the  case,  I  cannot  practically  believe  the  supposition  I 
am  able  speculatively  to  maintain."1  Hamilton  thus  in 
one  sense  rests  our  a  posteriori  or  empirical  knowledge, 
no  less  than  our  a  priori  knowledge,  on  the  necessity 
of  believing  it,  just  as  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer  rests  it  on  the 
inconceivableness    of  the   opposite.2      The    necessity    of    the 

1  Reid,  754  (b). 

8  Hamilton's    test  must  be  regarded  as  superior  to  Mr.  Spencer's  by 


54  SIR   WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 

belief  is  what  distinguishes  my  perception  of  the  external 
world  from  my  imagination  of  it  when  my  senses  are  inactive. 
I  can  represent  to  myself  that  this  perception  is  an  illusion, 
and  that  the  entire  phenomenon  is  a  mere  dream ;  but 
though  I  can  make  this  supposition,  and  maintain  it  in 
speculation,  I  cannot  practically  believe  it.  This  kind  of 
necessity  is  a  test  of  an  original  fact  of  consciousness — that  is 
to  say,  an  immediate  or  direct  deliverance  of  consciousness — 
but  it  does  not  prove  that  the  fact  is  a  priori,  and  arises  from 
the  constitution  of  the  mind  itself.  It  rather  proves  the  con- 
trary :  for  whatever  is  necessitated  by  the  very  constitution  of 
the  thinking  faculty  must  be  irreversible  in  thought. 

But  of  the  necessary  truths  proper — truths  of  intelligence, 
or  those  which  are  irreversible  in  thought — another  division 
has  to  be  made,  and  one  which  Sir  William  Hamilton  regards 
as  of  such  importance  that  its  recognition  determines  a  new 
era  in  philosophy.1  For  the  necessity  of  some  principles  is  of 
a  positive,  and  of  others  of  a  negative,  character;  and  while 
the  former  kind  of  necessity  is  a  test  of  truth,  the  latter  is  far 
from  being  so.  When  a  proposition  or  judgment  is  positively 
necessary  it  is  conceivable,  while  its  contradictory  opposite 
is  inconceivable.  When  the  necessity  is  negative,  the  judg- 
ment or  proposition,  and  its  contradictory  opposite,  are  both 
equally  inconceivable.  Hence  the  inconceivableness  of  the 
opposite  of  any  proposition  is  no  test  of  its  truth  ;  for  in  all  cases 
where  the  necessity  is  negative  there  are  two  contradictory 
propositions,  both  of  which  are  inconceivable,  but  one  or  other 

all  who  admit  his  distinction  between  positive  and  negative  necessity. 
Otherwise  the  two  tests  coincide. 

1  Lect.  ii.  52G-7.  See  also  Lect.  ii.  366;  Keid,  p.  972.  Discussions, 
H'Xi.  Notwithstanding  llic  great  importance  attached  by  Sir  William 
Hamilton,  to  this  distinction,  it  is  quite  overlooked  by  Mr.  Mill  in  his 
criticism,  and  some  groundless  charges  of  inconsistency  are  brought 
against  Hamilton  in  consequence. 


THE  LA  IV  OF  THE  CONDITIONED.         55 

of  which,  on  the  Principle  of  Excluded  Middle,  must  be  true. 
Thus  we  are  unable  to  conceive  that  all  space  is  limited,  while 
at  the  same  time  infinite  space  is  equally  inconceivable.  But 
space,  taken  as  a  whole,  must  be  either  finite  or  infinite,  and, 
consequently,  one  or  other  of  those  inconceivable  alternatives 
must  be  true.  The  test  or  criterion  of  the  truth  of  an  a,  priori 
principle  is  thus  its  own  (positive)  necessity,  and  not  merely 
the  inconceivableness  of  its  opposite.  "  The  criterion  of  truth 
is  the  "  [positive]  "  necessity  determined  by  the  laws  which 
govern  our  faculties  of  knowledge,  and  the  consciousness  of 
this  necessity  is  certainty/' '  In  such  a  case,  I  am  conscious 
of  the  thought  as  "an  act  of  power — an  act  of  intellectual 
force  ;"  whereas,  when  both  alternatives  are  alike  inconceivable, 
I  merely  feel  a  "  powerlessness,"  an  "impotence,"  an  "imbe- 
cility." To  this  class  of  positively  necessary  data  of  intelligence 
Hamilton  would  refer  "  the  notion  of  Existence  and  its  modi- 
fications, the  principles  of  Identity  and  Contradiction  and 
Excluded  Middle,  and  the  intuitions  of  Space  and  Time/'2 
but,  as  he  adds  an  "  etc.,"  these  are  rather  to  be  taken  as 
instances  than  as  an  attempt  at  a  complete  enumeration.  The 
"  positive  necessity  of  so  thinking  never  illudes — is  never 
even  the  occasion  of  deception  ;  but  the  negative  necessity  of 
not  so  thinking  is  even  naturally  the  source  of  deception," 3 
inasmuch  as  in  our  recoil  from  one  inconceivable  extreme  we 
are  apt  to  fall  into  the  other,  which  is  equally  inconceivable. 

All  negatively  necessary  principles  appear  to  be  summed  up 
in  the  single  Law  of  the  Conditioned  which  Hamilton  thus 
enounces  :  "  All  positive  thought  lies  between  two  extremes 
neither  of  which  we  can  conceive  as  possible,  yet  as  mutual 
contradictories  the  one  or  the  other  we  must  recognize  as 
necessary." 4     Inconceivableness  here,   of  course,    affords   no 

1  Lect.  iv.  69.  -  Lect.  ii.  367.  3  Reid,  972  (b). 

4  Reid,  911.     Similar  statements  occur  elsewhere. 


56  SJR    WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 

test  of  truth  since  both  the  opposed  propositions  are  equally 
inconceivable  ;  but  we  may,  notwithstanding-,  have  reasons  for 
believing-  in  the  one  alternative  and  rejecting  the  other.  Thus 
a  free  action  is  inconceivable,  but  it  is  equally  inconceivable 
that  all  actions  that  have  ever  taken  place  (whether  of  God  or 
man)  were  necessarily  determined,  which  they  must  have  been 
if  there  never  was  a  free  action.  In  this  exigency  the  Moral 
Faculty  comes  to  our  aid  and  turns  the  scale  in  favour  of  free- 
dom. Hamilton  gives  numerous  examples  of  the  Law  of  the 
Conditioned.  Thus  space  must  be  either  finite  or  infinite,  but 
neither  alternative  is  conceivable.  It  must  be  either  finite  y 
or  infinitely  divisible,  but  neither  alternative  is  conceivable. 
It  is  the  same  thing  with  time.  Existence,  too,  must  either 
have  had  an  absolute  commencement  or  something  must  have 
existed  from  eternity  a  parte  ante  ;  but  neither  of  these  alter- 
natives is  conceivable.  God — the  ultimate  being — must  be 
either  in  His  own  nature  absolute  (that  is,  finished,  perfected, 
completed),  or  He  must  be  infinite;  but  it  is  impossible  to  con- 
ceive either.  These,  moreover,  are  only  examples,  and  must 
not  be  regarded  as  exhausting  the  law  among  them. 

This  Law  of  the  Conditioned  has  been  assailed  on  various 
grounds.  Sir  William  Hamilton's  opponents,  indeed,  have 
rather  dealt  with  his  examples  of  the  law  than  with  the  law 
itself;  but  a  law  couched  in  such  general  terms  can  hardly  be 
discussed  otherwise  than  through  these  examples,  and  any  ob- 
jections which  apply  to  all  the  examples  alike  may  be  fairly  re- 
garded as  objections  to  the  law  itself  rather  than  to  the  author's 
illustrations  of  it.  On  the  other  hand,  the  fact  that  Hamilton 
had  given  one  or  two  bad  examples  would  not  militate  against 
the  truth  of  the  law,  if  it  was  sufficiently  vindicated  in  other 
instances.  The  objections  referred  to  maj,  I  think,  be  thus 
summarized  : — 1st.  The  alleged  contradictory  opposites  are  not 
K,.lly   contradictory;    since   a    third    alternative   is   admissible 


THE  LA  W  OF  THE  CONDITIONED.         57 


They  may  therefore  be,  and,  in  fact,  both  of  them  are,  false. 
This  is  in  substance  Kant's  solution  of  the  problems  of  the 
finitude  or  infinity  of  the  universe,  of  the  finite  or  infinite 
divisibility  of  matter,  and  of  freedom  and  necessity,  at  least 
when  that  problem  is  propounded  in  its  crudest  form.  But  the 
Kantian  solution  assumes  the  idealistic  basis  on  which  the 
critical  philosophy  rests,  and  is  not  open  to  a  Natural  Realist. 
The  question  at  issue  between  Kant  and  Hamilton  must  there- 
fore be  decided  on  other  grounds.  2ndly.  It  has  been  denied 
that  the  two  contradictory  opposites  are  both  inconceivable,  or 
at  least  that  they  are  both  inconceivable  in  the  same  sense. 
Thus  Mr.  Mill  thinks  it  possible  to  conceive  both  the  finite 
and  the  infinite  divisibility  of  space;  and  contends  that,  though 
we  cannot  conceive  all  space  as  finite,  we  can  conceive  it  as 
infinite.  Here  the  controversy  turns  to  a  great  extent  on  the 
meaning  which  we  attach  to  the  word  "  conceive/''  and  to  the 
corresponding  term  "  inconceivable."  That  we  cannot  imagine 
an  infinite  space  must,  I  think,  be  conceded  ;  and  it  seems 
equally  impossible  to  picture  to  ourselves  all  space  as  finite. 
When  I  imagine  a  finite  space  I  am,  in  fact,  comj^elled,  as  Mr. 
Mill  says,  to  imagine  other  space  beyond  it — I  cannot  imagine 
it  as  constituting  the  whole  of  space.  Both  alternatives, 
therefore,  would  here  seem  to  be  unimaginable  ;  and  yet  if 
space  is  anything  real  (which  the  Natural  Realist  must  hold 
it  to  be)  the  conclusion  that  it  must  be  either  finite  or  infinite 
seems  to  be  inevitable.  As  regards  infinite  divisibility,  Mr. 
MilTs  idea  of  it  is  that  of  smallness  without  limit — of  a  thing 
smaller  than  any  finite  object.  I  doubt  if  any  such  thing  is 
capable  of  being  imagined ;  and,  indeed,  it  may  be  fairly  con- 
tended that  our  only  idea  of  a  smaller  than  any  finite  is  that 
of  pure  nothing,  which  is  clearly  unimaginable.  On  the  other 
hand,  when  dealing  with  the  conceivableness  of  a  limit  to  the 
divisibility  of  space,  Mr.  Mill   rather  attempts  to  show  that, 


5  3  SIR    WILL  I A M  HA  MIL  TON. 

with    a   different    experience,    it    might    become    conceivable 
than  that  it  actually   is  so.     No  one,    I  believe,   can  really 
imagine  an  indivisible  part  of  space,  whether  of  finite  magni- 
tude or  infinitely  small,  and   therefore   both  alternatives  are 
here  also  inconceivable — that  is,  unimaginable.  3rdly.  Mr.  Mill 
objects  to  Hamilton's  statement,  that  all  that  we  can  posi- 
tively conceive  lies  in  the  mean  between  the  two  inconceivable 
extremes.     This,  however,  is  at  best  an  objection  to  the  lan- 
guage in  which  Hamilton  expresses  the  law  rather  than  to  the 
law  itself.     Space  or  extension  is  a  thing  of  which  we  have  in 
some  sense  a  positive  conception,  for  we  can  positively  conceive 
a  right  line,   a  square,   and  a  circle.     But,  notwithstanding 
this  positive  character  of  the  notion   of  space,   we  are  unable 
to  conceive  it  either  as  finite  or  as  infinite,  and  yet  it  must  be 
either  one  or  the  other.     This  is  the  substance  of  Hamilton's 
doctrine  concerning  space,  and  he  extends  it  to  everything  of 
which  we  have  a  positive  notion.  However  positive  our  notion 
of  a  thing  may  be,  we  shall,  when  we  endeavour  to  carry  our 
speculations   concerning  that  thing  to  the  utmost  limit,  find 
ourselves  placed  betwixt  two  contradictory  alternatives,  both  of 
which  are  unthinkable,  but  one  or  other  of  which  must  be  true. 
This  doctrine,  I  think,   Mr.  Mill   can  hardly  be  said  to  have 
shaken.     When,  indeed,  he  seeks  to  derive  some  of  the  incon- 
ceivabilities insisted  on   by  Sir  William   Hamilton   from  in- 
separable association,  and  not  from  any  original  powerlessness 
or  imbecility  of  the  mind,  his  argument  goes  to  prove  that  the 
Law  of  the  Conditioned  is  not  an  ultimate  mental  law ;   but 
this  part  of  the  discussion  leads  us  back  to  a  question  which  I 
have  declined  to  discuss,  viz.  whether  experience   and  associa- 
tion can  give  rise  to   necessity,  and,  consequently,  whether 
necessity  can   be   relied  on   as   a  test  of  ultimate  or  a  priori 
truths  ' 

1  On  this  whole  question  sec  the  bth  Chapter  of  Mill's  Examination  of 


THE  LA  W  OF  THE  CONDITIONED.         59 

It  is  to  be  observed  that  it  is  no  part  of  this  theory 
of  the  Conditioned  that  either  of  the  inconceivable  alter- 
natives should  be  self-contradictory,  but  rather  the  reverse. 
The  highest  kind  of  positive  necessity,  in  fact,  is  that 
which  arises  when  the  opposite  alternative  is  self-contra- 
dictory. If  one  alternative  was  self-contradictory,  we  could 
not  doubt  that  the  other  was  the  true  one;  and  if  both 
were  self-contradictory,  it  would  be  equally  clear  that  they 
were  not  really  alternatives — that  they  were  not  mutually  con- 
tradictory propositions,  one  or  other  of  which  must  be  true. 
On  the  contrary,  both  would  evidently  be  false,  and  there 
would  of  necessity  be  a  third  possible  contingency  in  which 
alone  the  truth  was  to  be  found.  When,  therefore,  Hamilton 
speaks,  for  instance,  of  the  Absolute  and  the  Infinite  as  two 
contradictory  opposites,  both  of  which  are  inconceivable,  he 
does  not  mean  that  either  of  these  opposites  is  self-contradic- 
tory;  he  rather  implies  that  neither  of  them  is  so,  for  other- 
wise they  would  not  come  under  his  Law  of  the  Conditioned  at 
all.  But  while  a  positive  notion  is  very  easily  distinguished 
from  its  contradictory  opposite,  the  distinction  is  not  so  easily 
seen  when  the  notion  is  negative — that  is,  inconceivable.  In 
such  cases  men  have  sometimes  assumed  that  two  notions  are 
compatible  when  they  are  really  incompatible,  and  have  en- 
deavoured to  get  over  the  difficulty  of  two  inconceivable 
opposites,  one  or  other  of  which  must  be  true,  by  forming  a 
complex  notion  composed  of  both.  This  complex  notion  is,  of 
course,  in  reality  self-contradictory  ;  but  since  both  of  the  con- 
tradictory elements  are  inconceivable,  the  contradiction  may 
for  a  considerable   time  escape  detection.     Thus  neither  the 

Hamilton.  In  that  work,  I  may  observe,  the  order  in  which  the  different 
portions  of  Hamilton ian  philosophy  is  discussed  is  often  objectionable, 
and  seems  to  betray  a  misapprehension  as  to  the  connexion  between  the 
parts  of  the  system. 


60  SIR   WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 

Infinite  nor  the  Absolute,  as  defined  by  Hamilton,  are  self- 
contradictory  notions,  though  both  are  inconceivable.  But 
many  philosophers  have  applied  to  their  Deity  or  Ultimate 
Being-  a  notion  composed  of  the  two ;  and  this  notion  is  self- 
contradictory  because  the  notion  of  the  Infinite  is  contra- 
dictory to  that  of  the  Absolute.  But  since  both  the  Infinite 
and  the  Absolute  are  inconceivable,  the  self-contradictory 
character  of  the  notion  which  includes  the  two  is  often  over- 
looked.1 This  remark  may  be  useful  in  correcting1  misappre- 
hensions as  to  the  nature  of  the  Law  of  the  Conditioned. 
In  a  future  chapter  Hamilton's  doctrine  of  the  Unconditioned 
will  be  more  fully  explained. 

1  This  complex  notion  has  no  special  name,  and  therefore  different  philo- 
sophers have  described  it  as  the  Infinite,  as  the  Absolute,  and  even 
as  the  Unconditioned.  It  is  not,  however,  to  be  confounded  with 
the  Unconditioned  of  Hamilton,  which  is  not  a  complex  notion  made 
up  of  the  Infinite  and  the  Absolute,  but  a  higher  and  more  general 
notion  including  both  under  it.  Both  are  contained  in  its  extension  but 
not  in  its  comprehension.  Hamilton  no  doubt,  in  one  passage,  speaks  of 
the  Unconditioned  as  "  self-contradictory  "  on  the  ground  that  it  includes 
the  two  contradictory  opposites,  Absolute  and  Infinite  (Discussions,  p.  17) ; 
but  he  is  evidently  speaking  of  the  Unconditioned  of  his  opponents  and 
not  of  the  Unconditioned  as  defined  by  himself.  On  this  whole  subject 
see  Chapter  V. 


CHAPTER  IV. 


THE    LAW    OF    CAUSATION. 


One  of  the  best  known  applications  which  Hamilton  has 
made  of  the  law  of  the  Conditioned  is  to  explain  the  Principle 
of  Causality  already  referred  to.  This  principle  he  derives 
from  our  inability  to  conceive  an  absolute  commencement. 
But  experience  apparently  presents  us  with  such  absolute 
commencements.  The  dew  which  is  deposited  on  the  grass  on 
a  fine  evening-  seems  to  have  started  suddenly  into  existence, 
for  no  visible  wet  of  any  kind  was  previously  falling.  But  I 
eannot  conceive  it  to  have  absolutely  commenced,  and  there- 
fore I  am  driven  to  conceive  it  as  a  thing  that  previously 
existed  in  some  other  form ;  for  I  have  the  evidence  of  my 
senses  that  it  did  not  previously  exist  in  the  form  in  which  I 
now  see  it.  Accordingly,  I  find  that,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  it 
previously  existed  in  the  form  of  aqueous  vapour  diffused 
through  the  air ;  and  this  aqueous  vapour  would  thus  seem  to 
be  the  cause  of  the  dew,  though,  as  we  shall  presently  see,  Sir 
William  Hamilton  did  not  regard  it  as  constituting  the  whole 
cause.  The  principle,  however,  has  a  second  branch,  which 
does  not  seem  to  have  met  with  a  formal  expression  at  the 
hands  of  any  preceding  philosopher.  If  it  is  impossible  to 
conceive  an  absolute  commencement  of  existence,  it  is  equally 
impossible  to  conceive  an  absolute  termination.  The  dew 
insensibly  disappears  in  the  sunshine  of  the  following  day  ; 
but  I  cannot  conceive  that  it  has  absolutely  ceased  to  exist. 
I  am  therefore  driven  to  suppose  that  it  continues  to  exist, 


62  SIR    WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 

though  of  course  in  a  different  form ;  and  as  a  matter  of  fact  I 
find  that  it  still  exists  in  the  shape  ot  aqueous  vapour  diffused 
through  the  surrounding  ah-,  and  perhaps  partially  in  the  sap 
or  juices  of  the  grass.  It  has  thus  produced  an  effect,  and 
this  part  of  the  principle  may  perhaps  be  expressed — What- 
ever (apparently)  ceases  to  exist  has  an  effect. 

As  thus  understood,  and  limited  to  the  material  world,  the 
Principle  of  Causality  would  appear  to  assert  nothing  more 
than  the  permanence  or  indestructibility  of  matter.  No 
particle  of  matter  ever  begins  or  ceases  to  "exist  in  our  expe- 
rience, and  when  we  meet  with  an  apparent  commencement  or 
apparent  termination  of  the  existence  of  any  material  object, 
we  conclude  that  it  is  apparent,  not  real.  But  Hamilton 
distinguishes  the  two  principles  thus.  The  principle  of  the 
indestructibility  of  matter  depends  on  the  impossibility  of 
conceiving  an  absolute  commencement  or  termination  of 
existence  in  Space  ;  the  Principle  of  Causality  on  the  impos- 
sibility of  conceiving  an  absolute  commencement  or  termi- 
nation of  existence  in  Time.  The  former  he  designates  the 
Law  of  Ultimate  Incompressibility,  because  it  asserts  that, 
though  bodies  can  be  compressed  into  a  smaller  space  than 
they  originally  occupied,  it  is  impossible  to  compress  them 
into  no  space  at  all — to  extrude  them,  as  Hamilton  says,  from 
space.  The  phrase  Ultimate  Incompressibility  is  not  perhaps 
well  chosen ;  for  the  Principle  asserts  that  a  thing  which 
occupies  space  can  never  cease  to  occupy  space  (although  the 
space  occupied  may  become  greater  or  less),  and  has  thus  no 
special  reference  to  compression.  And,  like  the  Principle  of 
Causality,  it  has  a  second  branch,  namely,  that  a  thing  which 
now  occupies  space  must  have  done  so  at  every  previous 
instant  of  time.  Solidity,  or  occupation  of  space,  is  thus  an 
essential  attribute  of  body,  which  we  are  enabled  to  ascribe  to 
it  independently  of  all  experience.     It  is  not  merely  that  the 


THE  LAW  OF  CA  USA  TION.  63 

thing*  would  not  be  called  body  if  it  ceased  to  occupy  space  ; 
but  that,  in  fact,  it  can  never  cease — or,  rather,  can  never  be 
conceived  as  ceasing — to  occupy  it.1 

As  the  Law  of  Ultimate  Incompressibility  affirms  the 
impossibility  of  extruding  from  space  a  thing  that  once 
occupies  space,  so  the  Law  of  Causation  affirms  the  impos- 
sibility cf  extruding  from  time  a  thing  which  once  appears 
in  time.  But,  while  matter  only  appears  in  space,  both  mind 
and  matter  appear  in  time,  and  thus  the  Principle  of  Causality, 
or  Law  of  Causation,  applies  to  mind  and  matter  alike.  But, 
notwithstanding  this  greater  extension  of  the  Principle  of 
Causality,  it  may  be  asked  whether  the  two  principles  do  not 
coincide  in  their  application  to  matter.  Would  not  the 
impossibility  of  extruding  the  dew  from  space,  for  instance,, 
be  sufficient  to  induce  us  to  look  for  it  in  the  vapour  and  sap, 
after  it  had  dried  off  the  grass,  without  calling  in  the  Prin- 
ciple of  Causality  to  our  aid  ?  and,  in  fact,  if  it  was  extruded 
from  space,  would  it  not  at  the  same  instant  have  had  its 
absolute  termination  in  time  ?  Here,  then,  it  is  to  be  observed 
that  the  vapour  is  not  the  sole  cause  of  the  dew,  nor  is  the 
dew  the  sole  cause  of  the  subsequent  vapour.  Cooling  was 
necessary,  in  the  first  case,  to  turn  the  vapour  into  dew ;  and 
heating,  in  the  second  case,  to  reconvert  the  dew  into  vapour. 

1  But  this  principle,  resting  on  the  inconceivableness  of  an  absolute 
commencement  or  absolute  termination,  and  an  infinite  non-commencement 
or  non-termination  being  equally  inconceivable,  we  cannot  regard  it  as 
possessing  complete  certainty  or  absolute  truth.  An  absolute  commence- 
ment of  material  existence  may  be  possible,  though  we  cannot  conceive  it  : 
and  whether  existence  has  absolutely  commenced  or  not,  cannot  be  deter- 
mined on  a  priori  grounds.  Hamilton,  however,  has  never  applied  the 
Law  of  Ultimate  Incompressibility  to  the  commencement  of  material 
existence,  nor  indeed  to  its  termination  otherwise  than  by  means  of  com- 
pression. The  observations  in  the  text,  wherever  they  go  beyond  this, 
are  my  own  deductions.  See  also  note,  p.  81,  of  the  present  work,  where 
another  view  of  the  law  in  question  is  suggested. 


64  SIR   WILLIAM  HAMIL  TON. 

But  heat  and  cold  are  not  supposed  to  be  material  objects  or 
substances,  to  which  the  Law  of  Ultimate  Incompressibility 
is  applicable;  and  therefore  that  law  alone  cannot  explain  how 
the  dew  first  comes  to  be  deposited,  and  afterwards  dries 
away.  It  explains  the  constancy  of  the  matter,  but  not  the 
change  of  form.  But  then,  it  will  be  asked,  Can  the  cold  in 
the  one  case  and  the  heat  in  the  other  be  regarded  as  forms 
under  which  the  dew  or  the  vapour  previously  existed  ? 
Hamilton  thinks  they  can.  Everything  in  the  preceding 
instant  of  time  that  contributed  to  the  existence  of  the 
(apparently)  new  phenomenon  in  the  subsequent  instant  is 
regarded  by  him  as  one  of  the  forms  under  which  that 
phenomenon  previously  existed ;  and  since  the  cold  as  well  as 
the  vapour  was  present  at  the  instant  before  the  dew  was 
deposited,  and  since  the  dew  would  not  have  been  deposited 
unless  both  had  then  co-existed,  he  regards  both  the  cold  and 
the  vapour  as  forms  in  which  the  dew  had  previously  existed. 
Both  occupied  the  preceding  instant  of  time,  though  the 
vapour  only  can  be  said  to  have  occupied  space ;  for  heat  and 
cold,  though  they  act  in  space,  are  not  regarded  as  occupying 
it.  If  we  take  the  state  of  the  entire  Universe,  mental  as 
well  as  material,  at  any  two  successive  moments,  we  shall  find 
a  great  many  phenomena  common  to  both  instants,  but  also 
some  peculiar  to  each.  The  phenomena  peculiar  to  the  former 
moment  appear  to  have  absolutely  terminated ;  those  peculiar 
to  the  latter  moment  appear  to  have  absolutely  commenced. 
The  impossibility  of  conceiving  an  absolute  commencement  or 
an  absolute  termination  compels  us  to  regard  both  these  appear- 
ances as  deceptive,  and  we  conclude  that  the  phenomena  pecu- 
liar to  flic  latter  moment  previously  existed,  and  that  the  phe- 
nomena peculiar  to  the  former  momenf  still  continue  to  exist — in 
ol  her  words,  that  the  phenomena  peculiar  to  the  former  moment 
are  the  causes  of  the  phenomena   peculiar  to  the  latter.      The 


THE  LAW  OF  CA  USA  Tl ON.  65 

Principle  of  Causality,  as  I  understand  it,  only  applies  to  the 
aggregate  of  peculiar  phenomena  in  these  two  successive 
moments.  To  analyze  this  aggregate  into  parts,  and  to 
pronounce  that  so  much,  of  the  peculiar  phenomena  of  the 
former  moment  is  the  cause  of  so  much  of  the  peculiar 
phenomena  of  the  latter*,  is  the  work  of  experience.  Expe- 
rience alone  can  inform  us  of  the  particular  causes  of  particular 
effects;  but  that  every  event  has  a  cause,  or  rather  causes,  is 
known  a  priori.1 

Thus  as  the  Law  of  Ultimate  Incompressibility  asserts  the 
constancy  of  the  quantity  of  Matter,  the  Law  of  Causation 
asserts  the  constancy  of  the  quantity  of  Existence — which 
Existence  may  be  either  material  or  mental.  It  is  consistent 
with  the  transformation  of  mental  into  material  existence, 
and  vice  versa,  the  former  being  our  notion  of  creation,  and 
the  latter  our  notion  of  annihilation.  <(  Form  to  yourselves," 
says  Sir  William  Hamilton,  "  a  notion  of  the  universe.  Now 
can  you  conceive  that  the  quantity  of  existence,  of  which  that 
universe  is  the  sum,  is  either  amplified  or  diminished  ?  You 
can  conceive  the  creation  of  a  world  as  lightly  as  you  can 
conceive  the  creation  of  an  atom.2  But  what  is  a  creation  ? 
It  is  not  the  springing  of  nothing  into  something.  Far  from 
it.  It  is  conceived,  and  is  by  us  conceivable,  merely  as  the 
evolution  of  a  new  form  of  existence  by  the  fiat  of  the  Deity. 
Let  us  suppose  the  very  crisis  of  creation.  Can  we  realize  it 
to  ourselves  in  thought  that  the  moment  after  the  universe 
came  into  manifested  being,  there  was  a  larger  complement  of 
existence  in  the  universe  and  its  author  together  than  there 
was  the  moment  before  in  the  Deity  himself  alone  ?     This  we 

1  Lect.  ii.  408—9. 

2  This  passage  seems  to  imply  that  Hamilton  did  not  regard  the  Law 
of  Ultimate  Incompressibility,  as  asserting  the  constancy  of  the  quantity 
<>['  matter  in  the  Universe.     See  note,  p.  81. 

F 


66  SIR    WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 


cannot  imagine.  What  I  have  now  said  of  our  conceptions  of 
creation  holds  true  of  our  conceptions  of  annihilation.  We 
can  conceive  no  real  annihilation  — no  absolute  sinking1  of  some- 
thing' into  nothing.  But  as  creation  is  cogitable  by  us  only  as 
an  exertion  of  Divine  power,  so  annihilation  is  only  to  be  con- 
ceived by  us  as  a  withdrawal  of  the  Divine  support.  All  that 
there  is  now  actually  of  existence  in  the  universe,  we  conceive 
as  having  virtually  existed,  prior  to  creation,  in  the  creator ; 
and  in  imagining  the  universe  to  be  annihilated  by  its 
author,  we  can  only  imagine  this  as  the  retraction  of  an  out- 
ward energy  into  power.  All  this  shows  how  impossible  it  is 
for  the  human  mind  to  think  aught  that  it  thinks,  as  non- 
existent, either  in  time  past  or  in  time  future.'''' '  Ex  nihilo 
nihil  in  nihilum  nil  posse  reverti  expresses,  according  to  Hamil- 
ton, "  in  its  purest  form  the  whole  intellectual  phenomenon  of 
causality.''''2  "There  is  thus  conceived,"  he  adds,  "an  abso- 
lute tautology  between  the  effect  and  its  causes.  We  think 
the  causes  to  contain  all  that  is  contained  in  the  effect ;  the 
effect  to  contain  nothing  which  was  not  contained  in  the 
causes. " 3  And  after  illustrating  this  by  the  instances  of  a 
neutral  salt  and  of  gunpowder,  he  continues  : — "  This,  then,  is 
the  mental  phenomenon  of  causality — that  we  necessarily 
deny  in  thought  that  the  object  which  apparently  begins  to 
be,  really  so  begins;  and  that  we  necessarily  identify  its 
present  with  its  past  existence."4  Again,  "An  object  is 
presented  to  our  observation  which  has  phenomenally  begun 
to  be.  But  we  cannot  construe  it  to  thought  that  the  object 
— that  is,  this  determinate  complement  of  existence — had  really 
no  being  at  any  past  moment ;  because,  in  that  case,  once  think- 
ing it  as  existent,  we  should  again  think  it  as  non-existent, 
which  is  for  us  impossible.     What  then  can  we — must  we — 

»  Lect.  ii.  405-0.  2  Lcct.  ii.  377. 

■  Ibid.  4  Lect.  ii.  378. 


THE  LAW  OF  CA  USA  TION.  67 

do  ?  That  the  phenomenon  presented  to  us  did,  as  a  phenome- 
non, begin  to  be — this  we  know  by  experience ;  but  that  the 
elements — the  constituents  of  its  existence — only  began  when 
the  phenomenon,  which  they  make  up,  came  into  manifested 
being — this  we  are  wholly  unable  to  think.  In  these  circum- 
stances how  do  we  proceed  ?  There  is  for  us  only  one  possible 
way.  We  are  compelled,  to  believe  that  the  object  (that  is 
the  certain  quale  and  quantum  of  being  whose  phenomenal  rise 
into  existence  we  have  witnessed)  did  really  exist  prior  to  this 
rise  under  other  forms  (and  hy  form,  be  it  observed,  I  mean 
any  mode  of  existence  conceivable  by  us  or  not).  But  to  say 
that  a  thing  previously  existed  under  other  forms  is  only  to 
say,  in  other  words,  that  a  thing  had  causes."  '  Hamilton,  it 
may  be  remarked,  insists  that  a  thing  must  have  had  causes, 
or  that  it  must  have  previously  existed  in  other  forms,  using 
in  both  instances  the  plural  number.  But  it  does  not  appear 
whether  he  thought  that  this  was  evident  a,  priori,  and  thus 
formed  a  part  of  the  Principle  or  Law  of  Causation  itself. 
His  examples  of  causation  are  usually  taken  from  chemical 
compounds,  where,  of  course,  there  being  more  than  one 
ingredient,  the  thing  did  previously  exist  in  different  forms 
rather  than  in  a  different  form.  In  popular  language  it 
would  generally  be  said  that  if  the  thing  pre-existed  in  a 
different  form,  there  must  also  be  a  cause  for  the  change  of 

1  Discussions,  p.  621.  As  annihilation  is  conceived  as  "  the  retractation 
of  an  outward  energy  into  power,"  Hamilton  regards  the  quantity  of 
existence  in  this  power  and  in  the  outward  energy  as  the  same,  and  the 
constancy  of  the  quantity  of  existence  in  the  universe  (including  the 
creator)  thus  becomes  the  constancy  of  the  sum  of  actual  and  potential 
existence  taken  together.  "  The  sum  of  being  (actual  and  potential)  now 
extant  in  the  mental  and  material  worlds,  together  with  that  in  their 
creator,  and  the  sum  of  being  (actual  and  potential)  in  the  creator  alone, 
before  and  after  these  worlds  existed,  is  necessarily  thought  as  precisely 
tnc  same"  (Lect.  ii.  539).     This  is  one  of  Hamilton's  latest  writings. 

F    2 


68  SIR    WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 

form ;  and  as  Hamilton  regards  this  cause  of  the  change 
as  one  of  the  forms  in  which  the  thing-  previously  existed,  it 
would  appear  that  there  must  in  all  cases  be  at  least  two  such 
forms.  But  in  this  reasoning  we  are  assuming  the  Principle 
of  Causality,  which  Hamilton  is  seeking  to  define  and  explain. 
Probably,  if  pressed,  he  would  have  given  the  following  ex- 
planation. When  a  thing  is,  in  popular  language,  said  to 
change  its  form,  its  quantum  of  existence  is  always  increased 
or  diminished,  since  if  there  was  no  change  in  the  quantum  of 
existence  there  could  be  no  change  in  the  thing.  But  this 
change  in  the  quantum  of  existence  always  implies  that  some 
other  thing  is  added  to,  or  taken  from,  the  thing  which  is 
said  to  be  changed ;  and  this  other  thing  must  be  regarded  as 
one  of  the  forms  under  which  the  changed  object  previously 
existed.  Thus  when  dew  is  said  to  be  changed  into  vapour, 
there  could  be  no  change,  if  the  quantum  of  existence  in  the 
dew  and  in  the  vapour  was  really  the  same  ;  but  it  is  not  the 
same,  for  in  changing  to  vapour  the  dew  has  absorbed  heat. 
The  quantity  of  existence  in  the  vapour  is  not  the  same  as  in 
the  dew  alone,  but  the  same  as  in  the  dew  and  in  the  absorbed 
heat  taken  together.  The  dew  and  the  heat,  therefore,  are 
equally  forms  in  which  the  vapour  previously  existed.  If  it 
be  conceded  that  a  thing  cannot  change  while  the  quantity  of 
existence  in  it  remains  the  same,  this  reasoning  seems  to  be 
conclusive.  But  then  the  Law  of  Causation  asserts  that  in 
the  absence  of  a  special  interposition  by  the  Creator,  the 
quantity  of  existence  in  the  universe  is  constant;  whence,  if 
the  foregoing  reasoning  be  correct,  it  would  follow  that  all 
change  must  be  regarded  as  impossible,  or  rather  as  mira- 
culous. The  universe  cannot  change,  because  to  do  so  the 
quantity  of  existence  in  it  must  increase  or  diminish;  and  if 
the  universe  does  not  change,  nothing  in  it  can  do  so. 

Such  is  the  Ilamiltonian  theory  of  Causation.     The  Principle 


THE  LA  IV  OF  CAUSATION.  69 

of  Causality  depends,  according1  to  him,  on  our  inability  to 
conceive  an  absolute  commencement  or  an  absolute  termi- 
nation ;  but  this  is  a  mere  negative  inability,  and  the  counter- 
hypothesis  of  an  infinite  non-commencement,  or  an  infinite 
non-termination,  is  equally  inconceivable.  We  have  no  right, 
therefore,  to  regard  this  law  or  Principle  of  Causality  as  pos- 
sessing absolute  certainty  or  unconditional  truth.  It  is  a  prin- 
ciple which  may  be  either  true  or  false,  and  we  cannot  tell 
which.  And,  accordingly,  when  Hamilton  insists  that  abso- 
lute creation  — existence  preceded  by  non-existence  — and 
absolute  annihilation — existence  followed  by  non-existence — 
are  alike  inconceivable,  he  takes  care  to  add,  "  All  this  may 
be  possible,  but  of  it  we  cannot  think  the  possibility.'"  ' 
Indeed,  we  know  that  in  its  full  extent  the  Principle  of 
Causality  is  not  true.  A  free  act  is  an  act  which  did  not  pre- 
exist in  other  forms;  for  the  temporal  antecedents  being  the 
same,  it  may  be  different.  But  if  we  are  not  directly  con- 
scious of  freedom  it  may  be  inferred,  according  to  Hamilton, 
from  our  Moral  Faculty.  We  ought,  therefore  we  can,  was 
the  argument  by  which  Kant  established  the  freedom  of  the 
human  will.  If  the  Law  of  Causation  possesses  a  positive 
necessity,  and  must  consequently  be  regarded  as  absolutely 
true,  free-will  must  be  abandoned  ;  but  since  it  possesses  only 
this  negative  necessity,  and  since  it  is,  in  fact,  equally  incon- 
ceivable that  there  should  never  have  been  at  any  time 
a  free  act  by  &\±y  agent,  the  Law  of  Causation  must  give  way 
to  the  arguments  for  human  free-will.  And  it  is  thus  ol 
real  importance  to  show  that  this  principle  does  not  possess 
a  positive  and  absolute  necessity.  For  if  it  did,  free-will 
would  be  impossible,  and  no  arguments  in  its  favour  could  be 
entertained ;  but  when  the  possibility  of  freedom  is  conceded, 
the  question  of  free-will  or  necessity  is  to  be  decided  by  the 
1  Lect.  ii.  400. 


yo  SIR    WILLIAM  HAMILTOA 

evidence  which  can  be  adduced  in  favour  of  either  alterna- 
tive.1 

Some  of  the  objections  that  have  been  urged  against  this 
theory  of  causation  disappear  as  soon  as  its  uncertain  and 
negative  character  is  adverted  to.  Thus,  when  Hamilton 
describes  the  effect  and  its  causes  as  the  same  thing  in  diffe- 
rent forms,  and  speaks  of  the  quantity  of  existence  in  the 
creator  and  the  universe  together  as  identical  with  that  which 
previously  existed  in  the  creator  alone,  he  has  been  accused  of 
favouring  Pantheism.  But  what  Hamilton  says  is  that  this 
is  our  way  of  conceiving  creation,  but  that  we  have  no  way  of 
knowing  whether  this  conception  is  right  or  wrong;  for  our 
inability  to  conceive  creation  otherwise  than  as  "  the  evolu- 
tion of  a  new  form  of  existence  by  the  fiat  of  the  Deity,"  does 
not  in  the  least  prove  that  this  was  what  really  took  place 
when  the  universe  was  created.  In  fact,  we  know  the  prin- 
ciple to  be  untrue  in  the  case  of  human  free-will,  and  must, 
therefore,  accept  its  other  applications  with  great  reserve  and 
caution.  Again,  he  has  been  accused  of  confounding  actual 
with  potential  existence  ;  but  the  utmost  that  can  be  deduced 
from  his  expressions  is  that  we  conceive  them  as  identical,  and 
not  that  they  are  so  in  fact.  And,  if  we  bear  in  mind  what 
Hamilton  means  by  potential  existence,  there  seems  to  be 
little  ground  lor  quarrelling  with  this  part  of  his  doctrine. 
A  boy  has  sometimes  been  said  to  be  potentially  a  mathe- 
matician, provided  that  by  proper  instruction  rnd  application 
he  may  become  one.  But  this  is  not  the  kind  of  potential 
existence  of  which  Hamilton  is  speaking.  The  forms  under 
which   the  mathematician  previously  existed  arc  not,  in  his 

1  Hamilton  makes  no  reference  to  the  evidence  which  experience  affords 
in  favour  of  the  system  of  Necessity,  or  rather  of  Determinism.  He 
deals  only  with  those  philosophers  who,  regarding  the  Law  of  Causation 
as  an  absolute  truth,  independent  of  experience,  had  applied  it  to  prove 
that  i  lie  freedom  of  the  will  is  impossible. 


THE  LA  W  OF  CA  USA  TION.  ;  i 

opinion,  simply  the  boy,  but  also  the  instruction  and  applica- 
tion— everything',  in  short,  that  was  necessary  for  his  becoming 
a  mathematician;  and  what  Hamilton  says  is,  that  the  quan- 
tity of  existence  in  the  mathematician  is  conceived  as  identical 
with  the  quantity  of  existence  in  the  boy,  and  in  all  the 
conditions  requisite  for  his  becoming  a  mathematician  taken 
together.  All  things  requisite  to  produce  a  phenomenon  are 
on  this  theory  regarded,  when  taken  collectively,  as  possessing 
the  same  quantity  of  existence  with  the  phenomenon  itself; 
and  the  phenomenon  thus  produced  is  regarded  as  potentially 
existing  in  the  sum  of  all  these  requisites.1  Such  at  least 
appears  to  be  his  general  doctrine,  though  in  speaking  ol 
creation  he  describes  the  universe  as  pre-existing  in  the 
Divine  creative  power,  and  not  in  that  power  together  with 
the  determination  to  exert  it.2  Even  here,  however,  some- 
thing may  be  said  in  favour  of  the  theory.  When  God 
creates  any  particular  thing,  which  we  may  call  A,  He 
deprives  Himself  of  the  power  of  creating  that  thing.     He 

1  But  if  some  of  the  requisites  remain,  the  total  phsenomenon  produced 
must  not  be  regarded  as  the  new  phsenomenon  only,  but  the  new  phseno- 
menon together  with  such  of  the  requisites  as  continue  to  exist  unaltered. 
The  quantity  of  existence  in  the  sum  of  the  requisites  is  thus  conceived  as 
identical  with  the  quantity  of  existence  in  the  continuing  requisites,  and 
in  the  new  phsenomenon  taken  together. 

2  I  suppose  because  he  regarded  the  determination  to  create  as  free. 
But  a  free  act  being  inconsistent  with  the  Law  of  Causation,  as  defined  by 
Hamilton,  he  ought  to  have  maintained  that  the  Divine  volition  to  create 
was  conceived  by  us  as  necessarily  determined  ;  and  that  this  volition  (01 
rather  the  conditions  which  determined  it)  must  be  included  among  the 
forms  in  which  the  universe  is  conceived  to  have  existed  previous  to  the 
creation.  It  is  with  reference  to  the  necessity  of  more  than  one  thing 
concurring  to  produce  any  effect  that  Hamilton  says,  "  I  speak  only  of 
second  causes.  Of  the  causation  of  the  Deity  we  can  form  no  possible 
conception  "  (Lect.  ii.  408) ;  but  the  observation  seems  to  me  hardly 
consistent  with  his  statements  regarding  the  mode  in  which  we  conceive 
creation  and  annihilation. 


72  SIR    WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 

can  create  anolher  thing  exactly  like  it,  which  we  may  call 
B,  hut  His  power  of  creating  B  equally  existed  before  He 
created  A,  and  has  not  been  in  any  way  enlarged  by  that 
creation.  It  would  thus  seem  as  if  every  act  of  creation  must 
be  regarded  as'  lessening  the  power  to  create  to  an  extent 
commensurate  with  the  creative  act.  But  the  Hamiltonian 
theory  of  causation  is  perhaps  objectionable  on  a  different 
ground.  The  Divine  power  is  generally  believed  to  be  infi- 
nite, and  as  Hamilton  admits  that  infinite  power  is  incon- 
ceivable, we  cannot  conceive  the  sum  of  existence — that  is  of 
power,  in  the  Deity — at  the  instant  before  the  creation,  in 
order  to  compare  it  with  the  sum  of  existence  in  the  Dtity 
and  the  universe  combined  immediately  afterwards.  And  if 
infinite  power,  or  an  infinite  quantity  of  existence  was  con- 
ceivable, it  would  probably  be  regarded  as  unsusceptible  of 
increase  or  diminution  by  the  addition  or  subtraction  of  finite 
quantities,  and  might  therefore  be  regarded  as  identical  after  an 
absolutely  new  finite  quantity  of  existence  had  been  added  to  it. 
If  so,  the  constancy  of  the  quantity  of  existence — that  quantity 
being  supposed  infinite — would  not  exclude  the  absolute  com- 
mencement or  absolute  termination  of  the  existence  of  finite 
objects.  To  this  Hamilton  would  probably  reply  that,  though 
the  quantity  of  existence  in  the  Deity  and  the  universe,  taken 
together,  may  really  be  infinite,  it  is  necessarily  conceived  by 
us  as  finite.  And  since  the  Infinite  is  confessedly  inconceiv- 
able, this  must  be  admitted,  provided  that  the  quantity  of 
existence  in  the  universe  and  the  Creator,  taken  together,  is  a 
possible  object  of  human  conception,  lint  whether  it  really 
is  bo  must  be  regarded  as  open  to  question. 

Tims  Dean  Mansel  denies  that  we  conceive  Existence  as  a 
quantity  at  all.  We  cannot  conceive  Existence  except  in 
some  particular  form  (this  Hamilton  would  admit),  and  when 
so  conceived  the  form  is  regarded  as  an  essential  pail  of  the 


THE  LA  W  OF  CA  USA  TION.  73 

existence  itself.  Who,  indeed,  would  venture  to  tell  us  how 
many  minds  contain  the  same  quantity  of  existence  with  a 
given  portion  of  the  material  world?  Did  the  mind  of 
Newton  contain  only  the  same  quantity  of  existence  with 
that  of  an  idiot?  and  are  the  quantities  of  existence  in  a 
ton  of  coal  and  in  a  ton  of  gold  equal  ?  Existence  in  the 
abstract — existence  which  is  not  identified  either  with  matter 
or  with  mind — is  inconceivable,  and  cannot,  therefore,  be  con- 
ceived as  having  any  quantity ;  and  it  is  of  this  abstract 
existence  only  that  the  supposed  constancy  of  quantity  can  be 
asserted.  I  have  some  doubts  as  to  whether  this  objection 
applies  to  the  essentials  of  the  theory,  or  only  to  the  language 
in  which  Sir  William  Hamilton  has  expressed  it.  He  was 
fond  of  borrowing  phrases  from  mathematics,  and  often 
employed  them  rather  inaccurately.  That  the  effect  may  in 
some  sense  be  regarded  as  the  equivalent  of  all  the  things  that 
concurred  in  its  production  would  seem  to  be  a  natural  im- 
pression. If  any  of  the  antecedents  had  not  been  present,  it 
would  not  have  occurred,  while  the  popular  belief  is  that  when 
all  are  present  the  effect  could  not  but  have  followed.  There  is 
thus  a  mutual  equivalence  between  the  effect  and  the  sum- 
total  of  its  causes  or  conditions;  and  the  statement  that  the 
complement  or  quantity  of  existence  in  both  is  identical  may 
be  only  an  inaccurate  way  of  expressing  this  equivalence. 
But  I  confess  that  I  have  not  been  able  to  put  the  Hamil- 
tonian  theory  of  causation  into  language  which  will  evade 
Dean  Mansel's  objection,  while,  at  the  same  time,  preserving 
its  essentials  intact. 

Again,  it  has  been  objected  that  Hamilton's  theory  only 
takes  notice  of  what  Aristotle  designated  the  material  cause, 
and  passes  over  the  efficient  cause,  which  is  the  very  thing  to 
which  the  term  "  cause  "  is  exclusively  appropriated  by  the 
vulgar.     This   objection   is,   I  think,  groundless.     Hamilton 


74  SIR    WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 

includes  the  efficient  cause  among  the  forms  under  which  the 
phenomenon  previously  existed.  Thus,  in  the  case  of  vapour, 
already  considered,  he  distinctly  tells  us  that  heat  and  water 
are  tog-ether  the  causes  of  the  phenomenon.1  It  is  no  doubt 
a  departure  from  ordinary  language  to  describe  the  efficient 
cause  of  a  phenomenon  as  one  of  the  forms  under  which  it 
previously  existed ;  but  if  there  is  no  doubt  that  Hamilton 
has  done  so,  he  cannot,  with  justice,  be  accused  of  neglecting 
efficient  causes.  At  the  same  time  his  theory  seems  to  me  to 
have  been  mainly  suggested  by  the  facts  of  chemistry,  from 
which  his  examples  are  usually  selected.  A  chemical  compo- 
site is  identical  with  the  sum  of  its  components,  in  a  sense  in 
which  few  other  effects  are  identical  with  the  sum  of  their 
causes  ;  and  Hamilton  sometimes  speaks  as  if  the  components 
were  the  only  causes  in  such  cases,  overlooking  the  force  which 
was  necessary  to  bring  them  together,  and  combine  them. 
In  other  passages,  however,  the  necessity  of  this  translating 
force  is  recognized. 

It  may  further  be  objected  that,  on  this  theory,  since  an 
absolute  commencement  and  an  infinite  non-commencement 
are  equally  inconceivable,  we  ought,  in  addition  to  the  Principle 
of  Causality,  to  find  in  the  human  mind  a  counter-principle 
asserting  the  impossibility  of  an  infinite  non-commencement; 
but  no  such  counter-principle  is  in  fact  to  be  met  with.  Of 
this  fact  Sir  William  Hamilton  gives  the  following  explana- 
tion : — "  As  not  obtrusive,  the  Infinite  figures  far  less  in  the 
theatre  of  mind,  and  exerts  a  far  inferior  influence  in  the 
modification  of  thought  than  the  Absolute.  It  is,  in  fact,  both 
1  Lect.  ii.  408.  He,  curiously  enough,  adds  that  there  is  a  third 
concause — the  atmosphere — the  fact  being  that  the  presence  of  the  atmo- 
Bphere  retards  the  formation  of  vapour.  He  was  probably  thinking  of 
tlic  cloud  1u  which  he  immediately  afterwards  refers,  rather  than  of  the 
invisible  vapour  diffused  through  the  air  around  us.  The  air  is  certainly 
not  a  rause  of  this  vapour. 


THE  LAW  OF  CA  USA  77  ON.  75 

distant  and  delitescent,  and,  instead  of  meeting'  us  at  every 
turn,  it  requires  some  exertion  on  our  part  to  seek  it  out."  ' 
Conceding  this,  however,  the  origin  of  the  principle  assigned 
by  Sir  William  Hamilton  affords  no  evidence  of  its  truth,  and 
therefore  offers  no  explanation  of  the  fact  that  it  is  so  constantly 
verified  in  our  experience.  According  to  Kant  the  Principle 
of  Causality  is  a  condition  of  experience  itself.  Without  it  there 
would  be  no  distinction  between  experience  and  dreaming ; 
and  since  experience  could  not  exist  without  the  principle,  all 
experience  must  testify  to  its  truth.  With  Hamilton,  on  the 
contrary,  so  long  as  we  may  remain  in  the  region  of  pure 
speculation,  the  Law  of  Causation  is  simply  one  of  two  incon- 
ceivable alternatives,  and  is  not  entitled  to  any  preference  over 
the  rival  hypothesis.  Suggested  to  us  by  an  imbecility  or 
impotence  of  thought,  its  sole  evidence  is,  notwithstanding,  to 
be  found  inexperience;  and  the  origin  of  the  principle,  so  far 
from  enabling  us  to  anticipate  that  experience  would  be  found 
in  harmony  with  it,  might  even  lead  us  to  expect  the  reverse. 
And  as  the  Principle  thus  depends  for  its  evidence  on  experience, 
so  Hamilton  seems  more  than  once  disposed  to  derive  the  Idea  of 
Cause  from  the  same  source.  Thus,  at  the  exposition  of  the 
two-fold  origin  of  the  idea  of  space  in  his  Lectures,  his  editors 
found  the  marginal  jotting,  "  So  Causality  :"  2  nor  do  I  think 
the  oral  interpolation  which  they  here  add  as  the  explanation 
(but  which,  it  seems,  Hamilton  made  use  of  on  a  different  occa- 
sion, and  no  doubt  in  a  different  connexion)  is  the  true  one. 
"  Our  internal  experience,"  says  he,  in  another  place,  "  espe- 
cially in  the  relation  of  our  volitions  to  their  effects  may  be 
useful  in  giving  us  a  clearer  notion  of  causality;  but  it  is  alto- 
gether incompetent  to  account  for  what  in  it  there  is  of  the 
quality  of  necessity/'' 3     But  neither,   I   presume,  could  our 

1  Discussions,  p.  621.  2  Lect.  ii.  114,  note. 

3  Lect.  ii.  392. 


y6  SIR    WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 

external  experience  account  for  the  quality  of  necessity  which 
belongs  to  our  idea  of  space  or  extension,  of  which,  neverthe- 
less, Hamilton  maintains  that  we  have  a  direct  empirical 
apprehension ;  nor  is  it  easy  to  see  how  internal  experience 
could  be  of  use  in  giving-  us  a  clearer  notion  of  causality  unless 
by  directly  apprehending  it.  The  strongest  passage  on  the 
subject,  however,  occurs  in  one  of  Hamilton's  notes  to  Heid, 
where  he  says,  "  the  consciousness  of  our  own  efficiency  "  [in 
volition]  "  illuminates  the  dark  notion  of  causality  founded,  as 
I  conceive,  in  our  impotence  to  conceive  the  possibility  of  an 
absolute  commencement,  and  raises  it  from  the  vague  and 
negative,  into  the  precise  and  positive,  notion  of  power" ' 
Either,  however,  he  was  not  constant  in  his  employment  of  the 
term  "power,"  or  he  afterwards  altered  his  opinion  ;  for  we  find 
him  almost  identifying  causality  with  power  in  hislatest  writing 
on  the  subject.2  Returning  to  his  Notes  to  Reid,  he  again 
alleges  that,  "  for  the  fact  of  liberty  we  have  immediately  or 
mediately  the  evidence  of  consciousness ; " 3  but  the  words 
"  or  mediately  "  evidently  refer  to  the  evidence  afforded  by 
the  Moral  Faculty,  and  we  are  thus  left  in  doubt  as  to  whether 
Hamilton  held  that  we  are  directty  conscious  of  free  volitions. 
Nor  is  this  doubt  cleared  up  by  his  unfinished  Dissertation  on 
Prescience  and  Liberty,  where  he  says  in  a  note,  "  The  fact  of 
liberty  may  be  proved — 1.  From  the  direct  consciousness  of 
liberty  ;  see  Creuzer/'  &c.,4  for  he  may  have  merely  intended 
to  enumerate  the  modes  in  which  Libertarians — in  particular 
Creuzer — attempted  to  prove  the  fact.  In  deriving  the  Idea 
of  Cause  from  internal  experience  Hamilton  would  be  involved 
in  the  following  difficulty.  The  Principle  of  Causality,  as  he 
explains  it,  confessedly  denies  the  possibility  of  an  act  of  free- 
will.     Hence,   if  we  have   a  direct  consciousness   of  free-will, 

1  Reid,  604,  note.  2  Lect.  ii.  538-9. 

3   Reid,  602,  note,  Bee  also  Lect.  i.  33.  *  Eeid.  975.  note. 


THE  LA  W  OF  CA  USA  TION.  77 

the  idea   of  cause  thus  derived  from  internal  experience  not 
only  does  not  agree  with  the  a  priori   notion  of  cause,  but  is 
actually  in  conflict  with  it.     If,  on  the  other  hand,  we  derive, 
from  our  consciousness  of  volition,  an  idea  of  cause  agreeing 
with  the  a  priori  notion,  we  must  be   conscious  that  the  will 
is  not  free  ;  in  which  case  the  argument  for  freedom  derived 
from  the  Moral  Faculty  becomes  unavailing.     This  was  pro- 
bably the  reason  why  Hamilton  never  affirmed  the  two-fold 
origin  of  the  idea  of  cause  as  decidedly  as  the  two-fold  origin 
of  the  idea  of  space.      But  in    opposing    the    theory    which 
asserts  that  the  idea  of  cause  is  derived  from  our  conscious- 
ness of  volition,  he  limits  his  argument  to  showing  that  we 
have  no  apprehension    of  any    causal    relation    between    the 
volition  and  the  subsequent  bodily  movement.     This,  he  says, 
is  impossible,  since  there  are  intermediate  agencies  of  which  we 
are  not   conscious ;   but   he   leaves    untouched    the    question 
whether  we  have  not  a  perception  of  causal  efficiency  in  the 
mental  volition  itself,  merely  remarking  that  this  derivation 
would  not  account   for  the    necessity  which  belongs  to  this 
notion  of  cause.1 

That  a  principle,  whose  truth  is  open  to  so  much  question 
as  this  Law  of  Causation,  cannot  legitimately  lead  us  to  infer 
a  First  Cause  seems  sufficiently  obvious ;  for  even  if  it  was 
impossible  for  us  to  conceive  that  there  was  no  first  or  absolute 
cause,  this  negative  inability  to  conceive  the  absence  of  a 
thing  affords  no  proof  of  its  presence.  And  when  Hamilton 
tells  us  that  "the  affirmation  of  a  God"  is  "a  regressive 
inference  from  the  existence  of  a  particular  class  of  effects  to 

1  It  will  be  recollected  that  in  describing  resistance  to  what  he  calls 
the  "  enorganic  volition  "  to  move,  Hamilton  stated  that  in  it  I  was 
conscious  of  myself  as  a  "  force  in  energy,"  and  of  extra-organic  matter 
as  a  "  counter-force  in  euergy."  A  force  in  energy  is  certainly  a  near 
approach  to  the  vulgar  idea  of  an  efficient  cause.     See  Reid,  866  note. 


78  SIR    WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 

the  existence  of  a  special  character  of  cause,"  '  his  argument 
does  not  turn  on  a  priori,  but  on  a  posteriori  considerations.  It 
is  only  by  experience,  as  Hamilton  frequently  tells  us,  that  we 
can  know  the  particular  causes  of  particular  effects.  "  The 
Deity  is  not  an  object  of  immediate  contemplation.  We  can 
only  know  Him  mediately  through  His  works,  and  are  only 
warranted  in  assuming  His  existence  as  a  certain  kind  of  cause 
necessary  to  account  for  a  certain  state  of  things,  of  whose 
reality  our  faculties  are  supposed  to  inform  us"  2 — these  faculties 
being  undoubtedly  our  faculties  of  external  and  internal  expe- 
rience. But,  on  one  occasion,  Hamilton  seems  inclined  to  em- 
ploy his  Principle  of  Causality  in  arriving  at  the  existence  of 
a  Deity.  In  his  third  Lecture  on  Metaphysics  he  describes  the 
process  of  ascending  from  causes  to  their  effects,  as  one  which 
necessarily  tends  towards  simplicity ;  for  since  the  causes  are 
always  at  least  two  in  number,  and  the  effect  is  identical  with 
the  sum  of  the  causes,  the  effect  may  be  regarded  as  resolved 
at  each  step  into  at  least  two  elements,  each  of  which  must,  of 
course,  be  simpler  than  their  resultant.  His  examples  are,  as 
usual,  taken  from  chemistry,  where  at  each  step  in  the  analysis 
or  decomposition  we  approach  nearer  to  simple  substances. 
Hamilton  seems  to  have  confounded  this  approach  to  simplicity 
with  an  approach  to  unity,  which  in  chemistry  it  certainly  is 
not ;  for  every  material  atom  or  particle  must  be  regarded  as  a 
separately  existing  object,  and  chemical  analysis  tends  to  in- 
crease rather  than  to  diminish  the  number  of  these  atoms, 
since  it  often  shows  us  that  what  we  took  for  a  single  atom  is 
really  a  composite  made  up  of  several  atoms  differing  in  kind. 
This  analysis  of  effects  into  their  causes,  however,  whether  in 

1  Lect.  i.  26.     This  whole  Lecture  shows  the   mistake  which   Mr.  Mill 
has  made  in  thinking  that  Hamilton  could  have  held  that  the  existence 
of   God  was  known    to    us    by   direct   consciousness.      Examination  of 
Hamilton,  \>.   HI!!,  scq. 

3  Lect.  i.  25. 


THE  LA  W  OF  CA  USA  TION.  79 

chemistry  or  in  philosophy  in  general,  can  only  be  carried  to  a 
limited  extent ;  but  then,  says  Hamilton,  we  neither  conceive, 
nor  are  we  able  to  conceive,  that  the  analysis  is  at  an  end,  and 
that  what  we  have  finally  reached  is  not  itself  an  effect.  "  We 
therefore  carry  on  the  analysis  in  imagination ;  and  as  each 
step  in  the  process  carries  us  from  the  more  complex  to  the 
more  simple,  and  consequently  nearer  to  unity,  we  at  last  arrive 
at  that  unity  itself — at  that  ultimate  cause  which,  as  ultimate, 
cannot  be  again  conceived  as  an  effect.  Philosophy  thus,  as 
the  'knowledge  of  effects  in  their  causes,  necessarily  tends 
not  towards  a  plurality  of  ultimate  or  first  causes  but  towards 
one  alone.  This  first  cause — the  creator — it  can  indeed  never 
reach  as  an  object  of  immediate  knowledge ;  but  as  the  con- 
vergence towards  unity  in  the  ascending  series  is  manifest  in 
so  far  as  that  series  is  within  our  view,  and  as  it  is  even  im- 
possible for  the  mind  to  suppose  the  convergence  not  con- 
tinuous  and  complete,  it  follows — unless  all  analogy  be  rejected 
— unless  our  intelligence  be  declared  a  lie — that  we  must 
philosophically  believe  in  that  ultimate  or  primary  unity 
which,  in  our  present  existence,  we  are  not  destined  in  itself 
to  apprehend."  l  This  passage  I  find  difficult  to  reconcile  with 
the  more  formal  expositions  of  Hamilton's  doctrine  of  causa- 
tion. The  mere  negative  inability  to  conceive  the  series 
otherwise  than  as  continuous  and  complete  affords  no  evidence 
of  its  real  character  ;  and  a  positive  deliverance  of  conscious- 
ness to  the  effect  that  the  series  is  in  fact  continuous  and 
complete  would  seem  to  involve  a  Principle  of  Causality  of  a 
more  positive  character  than  that  recognized  by  Hamilton. 
The  argument  from  analogy  can  hardly  be  regarded  as  con- 
clusive ;  and,  indeed,  is  so  evidently  dependent  on  experience 
that  it  is  rather  startling  to  find  it  placed  in  apposition  with  the 
words,  "  unless  our  intelligence  be  declared   a  lie."     And  the 

1  Lect.  i.  60. 


So  SIR    WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 

whole  passage  presents  a  further  difficulty.  The  causes  or 
elements  into  which  any  effect  can  be  resolved  by  philosophical 
analysis  can  never,  as  Hamilton  has  just  told  us,  be  less  than 
two ;  but  how  could  the  process  of  resolving*  everything  we 
meet  with  into  two  elements  or  causes  lead  us  back  to  a  single 
cause  or  element?  To  trace  everything  back  to  the  same 
two  causes,  seems  to  be  the  ne  plus  ultra  of  this  mode  of_ 
analysis.  When  that  was  done,  nothing  further  could  be 
effected  in  the  way  of  reducing  the  ultimate  number  of  causes. 
By  resolving  one  of  the  pair  into  two  elements  we  might  in- 
crease the  number  of  our  causes  to  three,  but  we  could  not 
reduce  it  to  less  than  two.1 

1  But  with  the  latitude  which  Sir  William  Hamilton  allows  himself  in 
the  use  of  the  term  cause,  and  of  the  phrase  "  forms  of  existence,"  he 
might  perhaps  say  that  the  ultimate  pair  of  causes  were  the  Divine 
power  and  the  Divine  determination  to  exert  it.  Still,  I  do  not  see  how 
the  Principle  of  Causality,  as  he  explains  it,  can  be  used  to  prove  the 
existence  of  a  Deity. 


CHAPTER  V. 

THE    INFINITE    AND    ABSOLUTE THE    LAW    OP    SUBSTANCE. 

I  now  proceed  to  Hamilton's  application  of  his  Law  of  the 
Conditioned  to  the  possibility  of  knowing-  the  Absolute  or  the 
Infinite,  and  of  forming-  a  system  of  Rational  Theology,  that 
is,  a  theology  based  on  principles  of  reason,  and  independent 
alike  of  experience  and  of  revelation.  The  Absolute  and 
the  Infinite  are,  in  fact,  the  two  opposite  poles  (both  incon- 
ceivable) between  which  all  positive  thought  lies.  Thus,  in 
the  case  of  the  Principle  of  Causality,  the  two  inconceivables 
were  an  absolute  commencement  and  an  infinite  non-com- 
mencement in  time,  while  with  the  law  of  Ultimate  Incom- 
pressibility  they  were  an  absolute  termination,  and  an  infinite 
continuance  of  existence  in  space.1  These,  accordingly,  were 
special  applications  of  the  notions  of  the  Absolute  and  the 
Infinite,  which  we  now  come  to  deal  with  more  generally. 
The  Absolute  and  the  Infinite  are  included  by  Hamilton 
under  the  common  designation  of  the  Unconditioned — a  term 
which  he  does  not  define,  and  which  has  occasioned  some 
embarrassment  to  his  critic,  Mr.  Mill.  Hamilton,  in  fact, 
seems  to  have  used  the  term  "  condition/'  with  its  various 

1  This  principle  is  not  very  fully  described  by  Hamilton,  and  possibly 
what  he  intended  to  assert  was  that  we  cannot  conceive  a  material  body, 
either  as  expanded  into  an  infinitely  large,  or  compressed  into  an  infinitely 
small,  space.  In  the  one  case  it  would  be  infinitely  rare  ;  in  the  other 
infinitely  dense.  But  apart  from  our  experience  of  expansion  and  con- 
traction, would  we  have  conceived  a  body  as  changing  its  bulk  at  all? 

Q 


SIR   J  VIL  L I  A  M  HA  MIL  TON. 


cognates,  in  a  sort  of  twofold  reference,  both  of  which.,  how- 
ever, are  justified  by  common  language.  Thus  we  say  that 
one  thing  is  a  condition  of  another,  or  that  one  thing  is  con- 
ditioned by  another,  meaning  that  the  two  are  related,  or 
perhaps  specially  related  by  way  of  cansation  ;  for  though  a 
condition  is  not  equivalent  to  a  cause,  the  cause  must  be 
regarded  as  the  sum-total  of  the  conditions.1  Again,  we  say 
that  a  thing  is  in  a  certain  condition,  meaning  that  it  is  in 
some  particular  state  or  mode — as,  for  instance,  we  say  that 
matter  can  exist  in  three  conditions,  the  solid,  the  fluid,  and 
the  gaseous.  This  latter  meaning  of  the  word  condition — 
which  Mr.  Mill  does  not  notice — was,  I  think,  that  which 
was  most  prominently  present  to  the  mind  of  Sir  William 
Hamilton.  "Existence  is  not  cognizable  absolutely,  and  in 
itself,  but  only  in  special  modes," 2  would  thus  seem  to  be 
equivalent  to  the  statement  that  we  know  not  absolute,  but 
only  conditioned,  existence ;  though  probably  Hamilton  would 
have  adduced  the  other  two  respects  in  which  our  knowledge 
of  existence  is  immediately  afterwards  declared  to  be  relative, 
as  affording  a  further  proof,  or  explanation,  of  the  same  state- 
ment. If  I  know  a  thing  only  in  a  certain  condition,  mode, 
or  state,  and  that  thing  is  capable  of  existing  in  other  con- 
ditions, modes,  or  states,  my  knowledge  of  it  is  not  absolute — 
meaning  by  absolute  "finished,  perfected,  completed. "  It 
can  hardly  be  said  to  be  absolute,  even  if  by  that  term  we  mean 
non-relative;  but  as  Hamilton  expressly  says  that  these 
special   modes  of  existence  can  only  be  cognized  in  so  far  as 

1  To  define  a  cause  as  "  the  sum-total  of  the  conditions  from  which  a 
pha3tiomenon  unconditionally  follows  "  is  tautologOUS.  If  the  phsenomenon 
in  question  followed  from  the  antecedents  conditionally,  it  would  only 
follow  when  a  certain  condition  (or  number  of  conditions),  in  addition  to 
these  antecedents, was  supplied;  in  which  case  the  antecedents  mentioned 
could  not  he  the  sum-total  of  its  conditions. 

«  Lect.  i.  L48. 


THE  INFINITE  AND  ABSOLUTE.  S3 

they  are  related  to  our  faculties,  I  need  not  further  discuss  this 
point.  The  statement  that  we  know  nothing'  but  the  Condi- 
tioned, would  thus  seem  to  be  equivalent  to  stating-  that  we 
know  existence  only  in  certain  special  modes  related  to  our 
faculties.1  The  Unconditioned  will  of  course  be  the  opposite 
of  this  Conditioned.  The  Conditioned,  Hamilton  otherwise 
designates  as  the  conditionally  limited,  the  contradictory  of 
which — the  not-conditionally-limited  will  evidently  include 
two  cases,  viz.  the  unconditionally  limited  (or  Absolute),  and 
the  unconditionally  unlimited  (or  Infinite).  I  may  here 
remark  that  when  Hamilton  contends  that  thought  is  only  of 
the  conditioned  because  "to  think  is  to  condition/'2  this 
phrase  need  not  have  occasioned  any  perplexity  to  Mr. 
Mill.  Hamilton  himself  explains  it  immediately  afterwards, 
and  in  his  explanation  brings  in  the  two  elements  already 
referred  to.  "  Thought/''  says  he,  "  cannot  transcend  con- 
sciousness ;  consciousness  is  only  possible  under  the  anti- 
thesis of  a  subject  and  object  of  thought,  known  only  in 
correlation,  and  mutually  limiting  each  other;  while,  inde- 
pendently  of  this,   all   that   we  know  either  of  subject  or 

1  In  the  passage  of  the  Lectures  already  referred  to  (Lect.  i.  148) 
Hamilton  proceeds  : — "  The  modes  thus  relative  to  our  faculties  are 
presented"  (Mr.  Mill  prints  this  word  "assented")  "to,  and  known  by, 
the  mind  only  under  modifications  determined  by  these  faculties  them- 
selves" He  can  hardly,  however,  consistently  with  his  Natural  Realism, 
and  his  defence  of  the  veracity  of  consciousness,  intend  to  convey  that 
these  latter  modifications  are  naturally  regarded  by  us  as  modifications  of 
the  object  presented — though  of  course  unreflecting  or  uncritical  minds 
might  easily  fall  into  that  error.  He  does  not  mean  that  what  is  presented 
to  us  as  object — as  non-ego — is  really  a  composite  made  up  of  some  objec- 
tive and  some  subjective  elements ;  but  that,  along  with  the  presentation 
of  the  object,  there  is  always  a  simultaneous  presentation  of  the  subject, 
the  two  being  mutually  related  to  and  limited  by  each  other.  Both  object 
and  subject  are  thus  known  as  relative,  limited,  conditioned,  existences. 

2  Discussions,  p.  14. 

G   2 


84  SIR    WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 

object — either  of  mind  or  matter — is  only  a  knowledge  in 
each  of  the  particular,  of  the  plural,  of  the  different,  of  the 
modified,  of  the  phsenomenal."  ' 

The  Absolute  has  sometimes  been  understood  in  the  sense 
of  the  non-relative,  but  that  is  not  the  sense  in  which  Hamil- 
ton employs  it  in  this  controversy.  The  non-relative  is,  in 
fact,  nearly  equivalent  to  the  Unconditioned,2  and  Hamilton's 
Absolute  and  Infinite  are  both  equally  non-relative,  the  one 
being  the  unconditionally  limited,  and  the  other  the  zmcon- 
ditionally  unlimited.  Instead  of  "limited,"  he  sometimes 
uses  the  terms  "finished,  perfected,  completed,"  but  the 
meaning  is  nearly  the  same.  Now  it  seems  to  be  conceded 
by  nearly  all  philosophers  that  there  must  be  an  ultimate 
being4  of  some  kind,  and  that  this  ultimate  being  cannot,  in 
His  own  nature,  be  of  the  relative  and  conditioned  character 
which  Hamilton  ascribes  to  all  the  objects  of  human  know- 
ledge, and  of  (positive)  human  thought.  Hamilton,  accord- 
ingly, reasons  as  follows : — We  can  know  and  (positively) 
think  nothing  but  the  conditionally  limited ;  but  the  ultimate 
being  cannot  be  the  conditionally  limited ;  therefore,  He  can- 
not be  an  object  of  knowledge  or  of  positive  thought.  And 
after  thus  laying  down  his  own  theory,  he  proceeds  to  deal 
polemically  with  the  systems  which  represented  the  ultimate 
being  as  an  object  of  knowledge,  of  (positive)  thought,  or  of 
both.  We  can  now  see  how  far  Mr.  Mill  is  correct  in  saying 
that,  in  the  discussion  in  question,  God  is  veiled  under  the 
abstract  names,  the  Absolute  and  the  Infinite,  and,  also,  how 

1   Discussions,  p.  14. 

3  Tin;  non-relative  of  course  means  that  which  is  not  related  to  anything. 
A  tiling  is  not  absolute  in  this  sense,  merely  because  it  is  not  related  to  us. 

3  Accordingly,  Hamilton's  Absolute  is  "that  which  is  out  of  relation, 
&<:,  as  finished,  perfect,  complete,  total."     Discussions,  p.  14,  note. 

*  Or  ultimate  beings.  The  question  of  one  or  more  is  not  material  to 
the  argument  at  this  stage. 


THE  INFINITE  AND  ABSOLUTE.  85 

far  Dean  Mansel  is  correct  in  stating-  that  the  Absolute  and 
the  Infinite  were  regarded  by  Hamilton  not  as  predicates  of 
God,  but  as  predicates  of  a  nonentity.1  If  there  be  a  God,  as 
an  ultimate  being,  He  must  be  unconditioned  ;  and  therefore  the 
question  of  the  cognoscibility  of  God  depends  on  that  of  the 
cognoscibility  of  the  Unconditioned.  But  unless  we  are  to 
give  the  name  God  to  any  ultimate  being,  no  matter  what 
its  attribute?  may  be,  the  Unconditioned  is  not  necessarily 
God,  nor  does  the  cognoscibility  of  the  Unconditioned  involve 
that  of  the  Deity.  Persons  who  are  generally  (and  I  think 
correctly)  described  as  Atheists,  have  believed  in  the  Uncon- 
ditioned, and  have  even  founded  their  so-called  Atheism  on 
their  peculiar  views  as  to  its  character.  But  while  God,  if 
He  exists,  must  be  identified  with  the  Unconditioned,  He 
cannot,  according  to  Sir  William  Hamilton,  be  identified 
with  both  the  Absolute  and  the  Infinite,  since  these  are  con- 
tradictory opposites.  He  must  be  identified  with  one,  and 
with  one  only.  But  then  we  cannot  determine  which.  The 
two  contradictory  opposites  stand  on  the  same  footing.  We 
have  no  means  of  deciding  which  of  them  corresponds  to  the 
real  nature  of  the  Deity,  and,  consequently,  Rational  Theology 
is  impossible.  Such,  I  believe,  to  be  the  substance  of  Hamilton's 
argument;  and,  if  I  understand  it  correctly,  Dean  Mansel  is 
as  much  in  error  in  stating  that  Hamilton  did  not  regard 
either  the  Infinite  or  the  Absolute  as  predicates  of  the  Deity, 
as  Mr.  Mill  is  in  assuming  that  he  regarded  both  of  them  as 
such  predicates.  The  very  point  of  his  theory — like  all  other 
applications  of  the  Law  of  the  Conditioned — is  that  the  Deity 
must  be  one  of  the  two,  and  one  only,  but  that  we  cannot  tell 
which.  Mr.  Mill  is,  perhaps,  justified  in  suggesting  that  the 
Deity  may  be  infinite  in  respect  of  some  attributes,  and  abso- 
lute in  respect  of  others ;  but,  at  all  events,  He  cannot  be  both 
Examination  of  Hamilton,  p.  45  (4th  ed.). 


86  SI  A"    J  VILLI  A  M  HA  MIL  TON. 

absolute  and  infinite  in  respect  of  the  same  attributes;  while 
He  must  he  either  the  one  or  the  other.1  Either  He  is 
limited,  without  being-  limited  by  anything'  else,  or  He  is  in 
His  very  nature  unlimited.  The  only  choice  is  between  self- 
limitation  and  the  absence  of  all  limitation. 

The  phrases,  The  Infinite  and  The  Absolute,  seem  rather  to 
refer  to  the  existence  of  the  ultimate  being  than  to  any  par- 
ticular attributes.  But  as  the  Infinite  must  apparently  be  in 
all  respects  infinite,  and  the  Absolute  in  all  respects  absolute, 
an  inquiry  into  the  attributes  in  which  the  one  (if  it  exists)  is 
infinite,  and  in  which  the  other  (if  it  exists)  is  absolute,  may 
not  be  out  of  place.  Of  course  the  Absolute  cannot  be  repre- 
sented as  absolute  in  all  attributes  positive  and  negative  alike. 
This  would  make  it,  as  Mr.  Mill  says,  a  fasciculus  of  contra- 
dictions, to  which  no  being  could  correspond  as  long  as  the 
Law  of  Contradiction  is  held  to  be  valid.  For  the  same 
reason,  the  Infinite  cannot  be  represented  as  infinite  in  all 
attributes,  positive  and  negative  alike ;  nor  does  Hamilton 
ever  describe  either  of  these  notions  in  this  manner,  whatever 
ground  Dean  Mansel  may  have  given  Mr.  Mill  for  making 
that  charge  against  him.  In  fact,  negative  attributes  are 
only  called  attributes  by  a  kind  of  courtesy.  When  taken  in 
their  strict  meaning,  they  imply  the  absence  of  some  positive 
attribute  :  when  taken  in  a  looser  signification,  they  imply 
that  it  is  deficient  in  quantity.  We  cannot  speak  of  an 
attribute  as  being  infinitely  absent ;  and  though  we  sometimes 
speak  of  its  absolute  absence,  we  are  not  then  using  the  word 
absolute  in  the  sense  in  which  Hamilton  employs  it  in  this 
controversy.  We  merely  mean  to  convey  by  the  use  of  the 
word  absolute,  that  we  are  using  the  term  absence,  with  which 

1  That  is  if  the  attribute  be  a  positive  one.  Negative  attributes  are,  in 
fact,  mere  names  tor  the  absence  or  deficiency  of  positive  attributes,  and 
hence  cannot  be  regarded  as  cither  absolute  or  infinite. 


THE  INFINITE  AND  ABSOLUTE.  87 

it  is  joined,  in  its  proper  signification,  and  not  in  the  looser 
meaning  in  which  it  is  often  employed  to  imply  a  great 
deficiency  in  quantity.  There  is  no  difference  between  saying 
that  a  man  escaped  "  absolutely  unhurt,"  and  that  he  escaped 
"  unhurt/'  except  that  the  latter  form  of  expression  might  be 
deemed  consistent  with  the  subsequent  statement  that  he  had 
sustained  some  very  slight  degree  of  pain  or  injury — a  state- 
ment which  would  be  inadmissible  if  the  word  unhurt  was  taken 
in  its  strict  signification.  Accordingly,  no  philosopher,  so  far 
as  I  am  aware,  ever  represented  his  ultimate  being  as  alike  pos- 
sessed of  all  attributes,  whether  positive  or  negative.  The  cur- 
rent idea  was  that  of  the  ens  realissimum,t\\e  most  perfect  being, 
or  the  sum  of  all  reality — positive  attributes  being,  at  this  stage 
of  abstraction,  identified  with  reality  and  perfection,  and  nega- 
tive attributes  with  unrealit}7  and  imperfection.  It  was  also 
described  as  the  sum  of  all  possibility ;  for  when  we  abstracted 
from  experience,  the  only  test  of  the  possibility  of  a  thing  was 
assumed  to  be  the  positive  character  of  our  conception  of  it. 
This  notion  of  the  ens  realissimum  is  fully  described  in  the 
section  of  Kant's  Transcendental  Dialectic,  entitled,  "  Of  the 
Transcendental  Ideal  (Prototypon  Transcendentale)/'1  Nor 
does  even  Hegel,  in  the  passage  cited  by  Mr.  Mill,2  give  a 
different  description  of  the  Absolute.  "  "What  kind  of  Abso- 
lute Being,"  he  asks,  "  is  that  which  does  not  contain  in  itself 
all  that  is  actual,  even  evil  included  ?  "  The  argument  here 
seems  to  be  as  follows : — The  Absolute  Being  must  con- 
tain in  Himself  all  that  is  actual  (or  positive) ;  but  evil  is  actual 

1  See  Meiklejohn's  Translation  of  the  Critic  of  Pure  Reason,  p.  352. 

2  Examination  of  Hamilton,  p.  60.  The  explanation  here  offered  of 
this  passage  is  equally  applicable  to  the  expressions  cited  by  Mr.  Mill 
from  Mansel,  at  p.  118,  of  his  Examination.  There  is,  however,  no  objec- 
tion to  the  Absolute  including  two  contradictory  opposites  in  its  extension. 
What  renders  a  notion  inconceivable  is  the  attempt  to  include  two  con- 
tradictory opposites  in  its  comprehension. 


88  SIR    WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 

(or  positive) :  therefore,  it  must  be  included  in  our  conception  of 
the  Absolute  Being.  Leibnitz  would  have  replied  to  this,  that 
evil  is  not  anything-  actual  or  positive,  being  only  a  mere  nega- 
tion or  absence  of  the  good;  but  this  seems  to  be  the  only  ground 
on  which  Hegel's  conclusion  could  be  resisted  by  a  philosopher 
who  identified  the  Deity,  or  ultimate  being,  with  the  ens 
realissimum.  Hamilton  was  only  dealing  with  the  notions  of 
the  Absolute  and  the  Infinite  which  had  been  advocated  by 
preceding  philosophers,  and  was  not  in  any  way  bound  to 
combat  the  phantoms  conjured  up  by  Mr.  Mill,  even  if  the 
latter  has  grammatical  usage  in  his  favour.1  But  if  the 
Absolute  and  the  Infinite  need  not  be  absolute  and  infinite  in 
all  attributes  whether  positive  or  negative,  neither  does  the 
notion  of  a  thing  absolute  or  infinite  in  respect  of  any  one 
attribute,  or  in  respect  of  certain  attributes  only,  come  up  to 
our  ideas  of  The  Absolute  or  The  Infinite.  The  Absolute  and 
the  Infinite  are  subdivisions  of  the  Unconditioned,  and  it  is 
not  true  that  everything  that  is  absolute  or  infinite  in  some 
one  attribute  is  unconditioned.  Absolutely  pure  water,2  to 
take  an  example  of  Mr.  Mill's,  is  not  an  unconditioned  or 
ultimate  being  in  any  sense.  It  may  not  be  an  object 
of    human    cognition,    because    we    may    never   have    expe- 

1  One  of  the  great  defects  of  Mr.  Mill's  criticism  is,  that  he  so  fre- 
quently endeavours  to  determine  on  grammatical  or  philological  grounds 
what  Hamilton  and  his  opponents  ought  to  have  meant  by  the  language 
they  employed,  instead  of  seeking  to  discover  in  their  writings  what  they 
really  intended  to  convey. 

2  Examination  of  Hamilton,  p.  48.  But  does  "  absolutely  pure 
water"  mean  anything  more  than  "pure  water"  in  the  strict  sense,  and 
not  merely  in  the  comparative  meaning  of  water  purer  than  usual?  And 
is  purity  itself  (at  least  when  employed  in  relation  to  water)  anything 
more  than  the  absence  of  all  elements  other  than  oxygen  and  hydrogen 
in  the  proper  proportions?  If  so,  the  attribute  is  negative,  and  absolutely 
pure  water  is  not  a  thing  which  is  absolute  in  respect  of  any  (positive) 
attribute. 


THE  INFINITE  AND  ABSOLUTE.  89 

rieneed  water  which  did  not  contain  some  impurity,  how- 
ever slight ;  nor,  perhaps,  is  it  an  object  of  possihle  cognition, 
since  impurity  might  exist  in  such  minute  quantities  as  to 
baffle  not  only  our  senses  but  our  finest  instruments.  But,  be 
this  as  it  may,  the  possibility  of  the  existence,  or  of  the 
eognition,  of  absolutely  pure  water  has  nothing  to  do  with 
the  question  at  issue  between  M.  Cousin  and  Sir  William 
Hamilton.  And  whether  Cousin  would  have  described  his 
ultimate  principle  (or  Deity)  as  in  finite  or  absolute  in  all 
(positive)  attributes  or  not,  he  would  probably  have  had  no 
hesitation  in  describing  Him  as  infinite  or  absolute  in  all  His 
attributes.  None  of  the  attributes  which  the  ultimate  being 
possessed  could  be  regarded  as  conditionally  limited,  and  a 
being  which  was  absolute  or  infinite  in  some  attributes  only, 
and  possessed  other  attributes  in  respect  of  which  he  was  neither 
absolute  nor  infinite,  could  not  be  regarded  as  an  ultimate 
being — as  the  Unconditioned,  the  Infinite,  or  the  Absolute.1 

1  M.  Cousin,  who  may  be  presumed  to  have  understood  his  own  theory 
better  than  Mr.  Mill,  never  professed  to  have  discovered  the  paralogisms 
in  Hamilton's  Discussion  that  Mr.  Mill  detects.  On  the  contrary,  he 
complimented  his  antagonist  on  the  fairness  with  which  his  system  had 
been  expounded  and  combated.  Nor  did  Hamilton  ever  maintain  that 
an  Absolute  Cause  was  a  contradiction  in  terms.  What  he  contended 
was,  that  an  Absolute  Cause — a  thing  which  existed  only  as  a  cause — 
could  not  be  identified  with  the  Absolute.  It  would,  in  fact,  be  in  its 
nature  "  inchoative  and  imperfect,"  and  thus  contradictory  to  the  Absolute 
in  the  sense  of  the  "  finished,  perfected,  completed  "  (Discussions,  p.  35). 
And  when  Mr.  Mill  asks  (Examination  of  Hamilton,  p.  57),  "  Why  is 
M.  Cousin  under  an  obligation  to  think  that  if  the  Absolute,  or,  to  speak 
plainly,  if  God,  is  only  known  to  us  in  the  character  of  a  cause,  He  must 
exist  merely  as  a  cause  ?  " — be  forgets  that  this  is  the  very  question  with 
which  Hamilton  was  pressing  his  adversary.  Cousin  apparently  had 
inferred  from  the  fact  that  God  is  only  known  to  us  in  his  character  of  a 
cause,  that,  therefore,  He  existed  only  in  that  character — that  Absolute 
Cause  was  a  definition  of  the  Absolute  which  explained  its  nature,  and 
might  be  used  as  such  an  explanation  in  a  system  of  Rational  Theology — 


go  SIR    WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 

As,  granting-  the  existence  of  an  ultimate  being,  we  cannot 
determine  whether  He  is  infinite  or  absolute,  we  must, 
according  to  Sir  William  Hamilton,  renounce  all  efforts  to 
obtain  a  definite  knowledge  of  Him  on  a  priori  or  speculative 
grounds.  He  is,  in  fact,  neither  an  object  of  knowledge  nor 
of  positive  thought.  But  three  other  opinions  on  the  subject 
are  possible,  and,  according  to  Hamilton,  have  been  actually 
held.  Kant  was  of  opinion  that  the  Unconditioned  was  a  positive 
and  necessary  thought  or  idea,  but  that  we  had  no  means  of 
ascertaining  whether  any  Being  corresponded  to  it,  and  there- 
fore it  remained  in  our  minds  as  a  regulative  notion,  which 
failed  to  convey  to  us  any  knowledge  of  an  object.  The 
Unconditioned  was  therefore,  in  Kant's  opinion,  conceivable, 
but  not  cognizable.  On  the  other  hand,  Schelling  maintained 
that  the  Unconditioned  was  not  conceivable — that  it  was  not 
an  object  of  thought — but  that  we  could  nevertheless  know  it 
immediately  by  a  kind  of  perception  which  he  designates 
Intellectual  Intuition ;  while  Cousin  maintained  that  it  was 
both  cognizable  and  conceivable,  and  was,  in  fact,  a  necessary 
object  both  of  knowledge  and  of  thought  to  every  member  of 
the  human  race.  Owing  to  the  fact  that  the  Absolute  and 
the  Infinite  are  both  inconceivable,  most  of  these  philosophers 
had  overlooked,  according  to  Hamilton,  that  one  of  these 
notions  was  the  contradictory  of  the  other,  and  they  in  con- 
sequence employed  the  terms  Unconditioned,  Absolute,  and 
Infinite,  as  if  they  were  all  identical  in  meaning.  In  ex- 
pounding   Hamilton's  philosophy,  it  is  unnecessary  to    give 

and  lie  had  even  argued  that  since  God  existed  only  as  Ahsolute  Cause, 
creation  was  necessary.  As  to  Hamilton's  argument  on  the  necessity  of 
creation  {Examination  of  Hamilton,  p.  57,  note),  it  seems  impossible  to 
conceive  thai  in  a  void  time  (or  rather  a  time  occupied  03'  the  Deity  alone), 
A  period  could  arrive  at  which  it  first  became  better  to  create  than  not 
to  create;  but  even  this  would  not  save  M.  Cousin's  doctrine,  which 
affirms  a  necessity  (if  creation  irrespective  of  any  time-conditions. 


THE  INFINITE  AND  ABSOL  UTE.  91 

his  special  refutations  of  Kant,  Schelling,  and  Cousin.  His 
own  theory  may  be  correct,  even  if  some  of  his  arguments 
against  his  opponents  are  objectionable;  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  these  special  arguments  may  in  many  cases  be  admitted 
without  accepting  the  Hamiltonian  theory.  His  main  argu- 
ment, however,  against  all  the  advocates  of  Rational  Theology, 
or  rather  of  Ontology,  is  thus  expressed  :  — "  Those,"  says  he, 
"  who,  with  M.  Cousin,  regard  the  notion  of  the  Unconditioned 
as  a  positive  and  real  knowledge  of  existence  in  its  all- 
comprehensive  unity,  and  who  consecmently  employ  the  terms 
Absolute,  Infinite,  Unconditioned,  as  only  various  expressions 
for  the  same  identity,  are  imperatively  bound  to  prove  that 
their  One  corresponds  either  with  that  Unconditioned  which 
we  have  distinguished  as  the  Absolute,  or  with  that  Uncon- 
ditioned which  we  have  distinguished  as  the  Infinite,  or  that  it 
includes  both,  or  that  it  excludes  both.  This  they  have  not 
done,  and  we  suspect  have  never  attempted  to  do."1  It  will 
be  seen  that  this  argument  does  not  at  all  turn  on  the 
assumption  that  these  philosophers  were  using  the  terms 
Infinite  and  Absolute  in  the  same  sense  in  which  Sir  William 
Hamilton  employed  them.  He  rather  states  the  reverse. 
But  having  shown  that  the  Unconditioned  admits  of  two 
subdivisions,  which  he,  for  the  sake  of  distinction,  calls  the 
Infinite  and  the  Absolute,  he  challenges  them  to  state  under 
which  subdivision  their  Unconditioned  (to  which  they  applied 
the  terms  Infinite  and  Absolute)  is  to  be  placed.  If  they 
cannot  do  this,  Rational  or  Speculative  Theology  is,  as  he 
believes,  extinguished.  Our  knowledge  of  God  and  of  the 
Divine  attributes  must  be  derived  from  experience  (external 
and  internal)  or  from  revelation.  Hamilton  accords  no  pre- 
ference to  one  of  these  sources  over  the  other.  He  merely 
says  that  the  Divine  nature  cannot  be  known  a  priori. 
1  Discussions,  p.  29. 


92  SIR    WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 

Instead  of  arguing-  that  the  Deity  must  possess  this  or  that 
attribute,  we  must  be  content  to  say  that  we  have  this  or 
that  evidence  for  believing  that  He  in  fact  possesses  it ;  and 
if  the  evidence  is  doubtful  or  conflicting,  we  must  modify 
our  assent  accordingly. 

All  this  is  perfectly  consistent  with  a  belief  in  the  existence 
of  God.     The  notion   of  the  Unconditioned  is  not  self-con- 
tradictory, and  the  want  of  self-sufficiency  in  the  Conditioned 
almost  drives    us  to  believe  that  the  Unconditioned   exists. 
Neither  are  the  notions  of  the  Absolute,  or  of  the  Infinite  (as 
defined    by    Hamilton)    self-contradictory.     God   may — nay, 
must — be  either  the  one  or  the  other ;   but  speculative  reason 
gives  us  no  aid  in  determining  which.     I  may  believe  in  the 
existence  of  a  planet  in  addition  to  those  now  recognized  by 
Astronomy,   without  being*  able  to  state  its  magnitude,  its 
distance  from  the  sun,   or  the  shape  and  inclination  of  its 
orbit.     In  like  manner  I  may  believe    in  the    existence  of 
God  without  knowing  any  of  His  attributes,1  or  being  in  a 
position  to   construct  any  science  of  Theology.     And  though 
I  identify  this  Deity  with  the  Unconditioned,  a  science  of 
Theology  is  impossible  so  long  as  I  cannot  identify  Him  with 
either   of  those  subdivisions  which  Hamilton  designates  the 
Infinite  and  the  Absolute.     I  might  even  know  the  existence 
of  a  thing  (that  is,  it  might  be  a  necessary  deduction  from 
other  parts  of  my  knowledge)  without  being  able  to  construct 
a  science  of  the  thing  itself;  just  as  the  existence  of  Neptune 
was  known  before  that  planet  was   actually  discovered.     In 
this  last  observation,  however,  I  go  a  step  beyond  what  Sir 
William  Hamilton  has  expressed;  but  the  knowledge  of  the 

1  Except  of  course  the  attributes  implied  in  the  connotation  of  the  word 
God,  which  are  not  very  clearly  defined;  just  as  in  the  other  case  my 
belief  musf  extend  to  all  the  attributes  implied  in  the  connotation,  or 
meaning,  "I  the  word  planet,  hut  no  farther. 


THE  INFINITE  AND  ABSOLUTE.  93 

existence  of  a  thing-  does  not  seem  necessarily  to  imply  the  know- 
ledge of  any  of  its  attributes,  except  those  which  are  implied 
by  its  name.  Even  this  exception  moreover  may  be  avoided 
by  giving1  it  a  name  of  merely  negative  import;  which  is  the 
case  with  the  names  Unconditioned,  Infinite,  and  Absolute. 

All  this  is  so  consonant  to  the  spirit  of  the  Experience - 
philosophy,  that  we  might  have  expected  to  find  our  author 
safe  from  attacks  on  that  side ;  and  if  Empiricists  have  some- 
times taken  up  the  cudgels  on  behalf  of  the  Rationalists,  the 
explanation  seems  to  be  that  many  of  them  regard  the  Deity 
as  an  ideal,  rather  than  as  a  real,  being,  and  are  in  the  habit 
of  placing  religious  systems  higher  or  lower  in  the  scale, 
according  to  what  they  consider  the  perfection  of  their  re- 
spective ideals,  rather  than  according  to  the  evidence  for  their 
truth.  They  thus  return  to  the  old  ontological  notion  of 
the  most  perfect  being  (though  possibly  they  would  not 
identify  it  with  the  ens  realissimum) ,  not  with  the  view  of 
proving  its  existence,  whether  by  an  analysis  of  the  notion 
itself  or  by  independent  evidence,  but  only  for  the  purpose 
of  using  it  in  Morals  as  a  subjective  standard  of  perfection. 
Mr.  Mill  would  hardly  have  penned  a  well-known  passage 
in  his  Examination  '  (which,  however,  was  written  in  reference 
to  Mansel,  not  Hamilton),  if  he  had  believed  in  a  really 
existing  God,  and  a  really  existing  hell ;  and  his  objection  to 
Mansel's  doctrine  is  not  that  it  is  disproved  either  by  Natural 
Theology,  or  by  revelation,  but  that  it  is  "  morally  per- 
nicious." 2  Those  who  believe  that  God  has  bestowed  on  man 
a  Moral  Faculty  capable  of  discerning  between  right  and 
wrong,  may,  perhaps,  with  reason,  reject  any  proposed 
doctrine  on  the  ground  of  its  moral  perniciousness.  But 
whether  a  theory  is  morally  pernicious  or  not,  is  frequently  a 
matter  of  opinion.     Mr.  Mill  would  have  strenuously  denied 

1  Examination,  pp.  128-9.  2  Examination,  p.  ]13. 


94  SIR   WILLIAM  HA  Mil  TON. 

that  the  doctrine  of  Necessarianism  or  Determinism  was 
"morally  pernicious;"  but  there  are  not  wanting- philosophers 
of  eminence  who  regard  that  theory  as  subversive  of  all  true 
morality.  And  the  days  have,  I  believe,  gone  by  when  a 
mere  moral  system  could  be  successfully  propounded  as  a 
religion.  In  uncultivated  ages  a  great  moralist,  or  a  great 
legislator,  was  often  regarded  by  his  contemporaries  or 
successors  as  a  supernatural  being,  and  his  writings  were 
treasured  as  sacred  books.  But  ancient  Greece  had  attained 
such  a  state  of  civilization  as  to  prevent  the  works  of  Epicurus, 
Zeno,  or  Aristotle,  from  being  thus  regarded,  and  modern 
Europe  is,  in  this  respect,  not  inferior  to  ancient  Greece.  The 
propounder  of  a  new  religion  will,  henceforth,  have  to  inform 
us  on  what  evidence  it  rests,  and  if  he  can  afford  no  other  evi- 
dence of  its  truth  than  that  its  acceptance  would  be  for  the 
benefit  of  mankind  or  would  cultivate  their  moral  sentiments, 
I  venture  to  predict  that  his  religion  will  not  meet  with  general 
acceptance.  Creeds  are  not  among  the  useful  articles  that  can 
be  made  to  order. 

There  is  one  passage,  however,  in  the  course  of  this  Dis- 
cussion, in  which  Hamilton  seems  to  adopt  the  mode  of 
reasoning  afterwards  adopted  by  Mansel,  and  to  contend  that 
the  Absolute  and  the  Infinite  are  inconceivable,  because  self- 
contradictory.  "  The  negation  of  the  commencement  of 
time,"  says  he,  "  involves  the  affirmation  that  an  infinite 
time  has,  at  every  moment,  already  run ;  that  is,  it  implies 
the  contradiction  that  an  infinite  has  been  completed. 
For  the  same  reason  we  are  unable  to  conceive  an  infinite 
progress  of  time;  while  the  infinite  regress  and  infinite  pro- 
inv-s,  taken  together,  involve  the  triple  contradiction  of  an 
infinile  concluded,  of  an  infinite  commencing,  and  of  two  in- 
finites not  exclusive  of  each  other."1  And  among  his  un- 
1    Di.MiisMoiiB,  \).  30.     See,  too,  as  to  the  Unconditioned  Discussions,  p.  17. 


THE  INFINITE  AND  ABSOLUTE.  95 

finished  posthumous  papers  we  find  a  list  of  no  less  than 
fifteen  "  Contradictions  proving1  the  Psychological  Theory  of 
the  Conditioned."  '  But  in  the  former  passage  the  context,  I 
think,  sufficiently  shows  what  Hamilton  intended  to  convey. 
"  Time,"  says  he,  when  introducing  the  subject,  "  is  only 
the  image  or  the  concept  of  a  certain  correlation  of  existences 
■ — of  existence  therefore,  pro  tanto,  as  conditioned.  It  is  thus 
itself  only  a  form  of  the  Conditioned" 2  (The  italics  are 
Hamilton's  own.)  Now,  it  is  natural  to  suppose  that  if  we 
take  a  form  of  the  Conditioned,  and  attempt  to  unite  it  in 
thought  with  the  idea  of  the  Unconditioned — the  Infinite — 
the  result  will  be  the  formation  of  a  self-contradictory  notion; 
but  the  self-contradiction  is  not  to  be  found  in  the  notion  of  the 
Infinite  when  taken  by  itself,  but  only  arises  when  we  endea- 
vour to  join  it  to  the  conditioned  notion  of  time.  The  self- 
contradiction  is  not  found  in  the  notion  of  infinity,  but  in  the 
complex  notion  of  infinite-time.  A  similar  explanation  is,  I 
believe,  applicable  to  most  of  the  "  Contradictions  proving  the 
Psychological  Theory  of  the  Conditioned."  They  are  all,  or 
nearly  all,  contradictions  which  arise  when  we  endeavour  to  join 
the  notion  of  infinity  to  some  other  notion,  which,  according  to 
Hamilton,  is  in  its  very  nature  conditioned.  In  the  Discus- 
sions, it  may  be  remarked,  Hamilton  finds  this  contradiction 
only  in  the  notion  of  an  infinite,  and  not  in  that  of  an  absolute, 
time;  but  in  the  unfinished  paper  already  referred  to,  the 
Absolute  occurs  as  well  as  the  Infinite.  To  represent  the 
notions  of  the  Absolute  and  the  Infinite,  as  in  their  own 
nature  self-contradictory,  would,  as  already  remarked,  be  to 
subvert  the  Hamiltonian  theory  in  toto.  The  Law  of  the 
Conditioned  would,  in  that  case,  be  inapplicable,  and  the 
notions  in  question  would  fall  under  the  Law  of  Contradic- 
tion, whose  necessity,  according  to  Hamilton,  is  of  a  positive 
1  Lect.  ii.  527-8.  2  Discussions,  p.  29. 


96  SIR    WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 

character,  and  whose  truth  is,  for  that  reason,  indisputable. 
We  are  always  entitled  to  affirm  of  a  self-contradictory  notion 
that  no  real  being-  corresponds  to  it. 

In  expounding"  Hamilton's  views  on  the  Infinite  and  Ab- 
solute, we  must  bear  in  mind  the  distinctions  drawn  with 
respect  to  the  former  in  his  letter  to  Dr.  Calderwood.  "  There 
is,"  says  he,  "  a  fundamental  difference  between  The  Infinite 
(to  ev  Kal  7rav),  and  a  relation  to  which  we  may  apply  the 
term  infinite.  Thus  time  and  space  must  be  excluded  from 
the  supposed  notion  of  The  Infinite,  for  The  Infinite,  if  posi- 
tively thought  it  could  be,  must  be  thought  as  under  neither 
space  nor  time/"  '  The  attempt  to  unite  in  thought  this 
notion  of  The  Infinite  with  that  of  either  space  or  time  might 
thus  be  naturally  expected  to  result  in  a  contradiction,  though 
space  and  time  may  with,  truth  (or  at  least  without  self-con- 
tradiction) be  called  infinite  in  the  relative  sense  already  alluded 
to — namely,  greater  than  any  finite.2  Again,  when  Dr.  Calder- 
wood contended  that  the  relative  was  not  incompatible  with 
the  Infinite,  provided  the  relation  was  not  restrictive,  Hamilton 
replied,  "But  restrictive  I  hold  the  relative  always  to  be, 
and  therefore  incompatible  with  The  Infinite  in  the  more 
proper  signification  of  the   term  though  infinity,  in  a  looser 

1  Lect.  ii.  531. 

2  Mr.  Mill  thinks  the  notion  of  Infinite  too  obvions  to  need  ex- 
planation and  yet  he  gives  two  inconsistent  definitions  of  it.  At  p.  48 
of  his  Examination  he  defines  it  as  "  that  to  the  magnitude  of  which 
there  is  no  limit."  This  definition  excludes  both  eternity  a  parte 
ante,  and  eternity  a  parte  post,  since  each  of  these  is  limited  by  the 
present  moment.  It  likewise  excludes  the  infinitely  small.  Again  at  p.  62 
of  his  Examination,  he  defines  Infinite  (meaning  infinitely  large;  he  has 
a  corresponding  definition  of  infinitely  small  at  p.  108)  as  "that  which 
is  greater  than  any  given  quantity,"  or  "greater  than  any  finite."  This 
definition  would  include  t he  infinite  regress  and  infinite  progress  of  time 
which  the  former  definition  excludes.  Mr.  .Mill  does  not  seem  to  have 
noticed  the  distinction  drawn  by  Hamilton  in  his  letter  to  Calderwood. 


THE  INFINITE  AND  ABSOLUTE.  97 

sense,  may  be  applied  to  it ; " '  and  on  the  next  page  be 
applies  tbe  observation  specially  to  space  and  time,  both  of 
which  be  regards  as  restrictive.  The  Infinite  is  that  which 
is  infinite  in  all  relations  and  respects.  It  cannot,  therefore, 
have  a  beginning*  or  an  end,  and  the  notions  of  eternity 
a  parte  ante,  and  eternity  a  parte  post,  are  alike  inconsistent 
with  it.  But  these  may,  notwithstanding,  be  called  infinite 
in  the  relative  or  looser  sense  of  the  term,  for  they  are  both 
greater  than  any  finite  time.  It  is  only  when  Infinity  is 
used  in  the  strict  sense,  for  that  which  is,  in  all  relations  and 
respects,  unlimited,  that  any  conflict  arises  between  the  notion 
of  Tbe  Infinite  and  that  of  Time ;  and  that  a  contradiction 
should  arise  in  this  case  appears  to  be  consistent,  both  with 
the  Law  of  the  Conditioned,  and  with  the  general  system 
of  Sir  William  Hamilton.  Many  of  the  "Contradictions 
proving  the  Psychological  Theory  of  the  Conditioned  "  may, 
I  believe,  be  cleared  up  by  this  distinction. 

While  I  am  confident  that  the  foregoing  remarks  express 
the  views  which  Sir  William  Hamilton  systematically  up- 
held, there  are  one  or  two  passages  in  his  writings  in  which 
he  deals  with  self-contradictory  notions  in  a  less  satisfactory 
manner.  Thus,  on  one  occasion,  he  says,  "It  is  on  the 
inability  of  the  mind  to  conceive  either  the  ultimate  indivi- 
sibility, or  the  endless  divisibility,  of  space  and  time,  that 
the  arguments  of  the  Eleatic  Zeno  against  the  possibility  of 
motion  are  founded — arguments  which  at  least  show  that 
motion,  however  certain  as  a  fact,  cannot  be  conceived 
possible,  as  it  involves  a  contradiction."  2  With  Mr.  Mill  I 
am  unable  to  reconcile  this  passage  with  Hamilton's  repeated 
assertion  of  the  positive  necessity,  and  absolute  truth,  of  the 
Law  of  Contradiction.     I  do  not  think  he  would  have  had 

1  Lect.  ii.  532. 

2  Lect.  ii.  373.     See,  too   Leci.  iv.  71. 


98  SIR    WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 

recourse  to  Mansel's  device  (on  a  different  occasion)  of  saying 
that  the  contradictions  were  not  in  the  object  which  we  are 
called  on  to  conceive,  hut  in  our  mode  of  conceiving1  it.  When 
this  assertion  is  made  with  regard  to  our  ideas  of  the  Absolute 
and  Infinite,  it  seems  to  expose  its  advocate  to  a  two-fold  re- 
joinder. First,  how  do  you  know  that  then;  is  any  object  which 
you  are  called  upon  to  conceive  ?  Secondly,  even  if  you  are 
certain  that  there  is  a  thing  of  which  you  are  trying  to  form 
a  conception,  why  apply  to  it  the  name  of  a  self-contradictory 
conception  to  which  you  are  well  aware  that  neither  it  nor 
any  other  real  thing  can  correspond  ?  This  reasoning,  how- 
ever, is  inapplicable  to  motion,  because  motion  is  admittedly 
a  fact  to  which  our  perceptive  faculties  bear  witness.  There 
is,  therefore,  something  to  be  conceived ;  but  why,  on  any 
principle  of  the  Hamiltonian  philosophy,  may  we  not  form 
a  conception  of  that  fact  without  falling  into  self-contradic- 
tion ?  If  we  conceive  motion  as  a  conditioned — if  we  avoid 
thinking  of  it  either  as  absolute  or  as  infinite — why  should 
we  not  be  able  to  form  as  clear  and  positive  a  notion  of 
it  as  of  any  other  fact  in  our  experience?  Hamilton,  it  will 
be  seen,  prefaces  the  observation  on  which  I  am  commenting 
by  stating'  that  the  arguments  of  Zeno  turned  on  our  inability 
to  conceive  either  the  absolute  or  the  infinite  of  the  divisibi- 
lity of  space.  Possibly,  therefore,  he  meant  to  affirm  nothing 
more  than  that,  although  it  was  certain  that  motion  must  be 
cither  absolute  or  infinite  in  this  respect,  the  absoluto-infinite 
of  motion  was  inconceivable,  because  it,  included  two  con- 
tradictory alternatives.  This  would  indeed  be  putting  a 
great  deal  of  force  on  his  language,  but  without  placing  an 
unnatural  interpretation  on  the  passage  I  do  not  see  how  to 
reconcile  it  with  his  system.1 

1  Zno's  arguments,  whatever  Ih-ir  value   may  be,  npply  only  to  con- 
tinuous   motion,  and   oxneri'^ce  can  never  tell  us  that  the  motion  which 


THE  LA  W  OF  SUBSTANCE.  99 


The  Principle  of  Substance  and  Phenomenon  (it  will  be 
recollected  that  with  Hamilton  these  terms  are  correlatives), 
or  Substance  and  Accident,  is  according-  to  our  author  another 
application  of  the  Law  of  the  Conditioned ;  but  his  explana- 
tion of  this  Principle  is  given  only  in  one  of  the  unfinished 
Dissertations  to  the  edition  of  Reid.  It  is  as  follows : — "  1 
am  aware  of  a  phenomenon — a  phenomenon,  be  it  of  mind  or 
of  matter — that  is,  I  am  aware  of  a  certain  relative,  conse- 
quently a  conditioned,  existence.  This  existence  is  only 
Known,  and  only  knowable,  as  in  relation.  Mind  and  matter 
exist  for  us  only  as  they  are  known  by  us,  and  they  are  so 
known  only  as  they  have  certain  qualities  relative  to  certain 
faculties  of  knowledge  in  us,  and  we  certain  faculties  of  know- 
ledge relative  to  certain  qualities  in  them.  All  our  know- 
ledge of  mind  and  matter  is  thus  relative — that  is,  conditioned 
— and  so  far  in  conformity  with  the  principle,  that  we  are  con- 
scious only  of  existence  as  conditioned.  But  further.  I  am 
aware  of  a  certain  phenomenon,  be  it  of  mind  or  matter. 
This  phenomenon — a  manifestation  of  what  exists  for  me 
only  as  known  by  me,  and  of  what,  as  known  by  me,  exists 
only  in  relativity  to  my  faculties — how  is  it  that  I  cannot 
even  conceive  it  to  exist  solely  in  the  relativity,  in  which  solely 
it  is  known — that  I  cannot  suppose  it  to  be  a  mere  pheno- 
menon, an  appearance  of  nothing  but  itself  as  appearing — 
but  am  compelled  by  a  necessity  of  my  nature  to  think  that, 
out  of  this  relativity,  it  has  an  absolute  or  irrelative  existence, 
i.  e.  an  existence"    [which]    "as  absolute  or  irrelative"   [is] 

we  see  or  feel  is  absolutely  continuous.  The  sensible  effect  would  be  the 
same  if  there  were  alternate  moments  of  motion  and  rest,  provided  that 
these  intervals  succeeded  each  other  with  sufficient  rapidity.  Achilles 
might  thus  pass  the  tortoise  during  one  of  its  moments  of  rest.  Even, 
therefore,  were  we  to  admit  the  reasoning  involved  in  the  fallacy  of  Acliilh  s 
and  the  Tortoise,  it  would  not  conflict  with  the  fact  of  motion  as  revealed 
by  the  senses. 

H    2 


ioo  SIR    WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 

"unknown  and  incomprehensible?  Why,  in  short,  am  I  con- 
strained to  suppose  that  it  is  the  known  phenomenon  of  an 
unknown  Substance?  Philosophers  answer  and  say,  it  is  an 
ultimate  law  of  mind.  I  answer,  and  say,  it  is  a  particular 
case  of  the  general  law  which  bears"  [declares?]  "that  not 
only  the  unconditioned  simply,  but  even  the  unconditioned  of 
the  conditioned  is  unthinkable.  Take  an  object.  Strip  it  by 
abstraction  of  all  its  qualities — of  all  its  phsenomena— of  all  its 
relativities ;  reduce  it  to  a  mere  unconditioned,  irrelative,  ab- 
solute, entity — a  mere  substance — and  now  try  to  think  this 
substance.  You  cannot  For  either  in  your  attempt  to  think, 
you  clothe  it  again  with  qualities,  and  thus  think  it  as  a 
conditioned ;  or  you  find  that  it  cannot  be  thought,  except 
as  a  negation  of  the  thinkable.  This  is  an  instance  of  the 
unconditioned  simply,  and  an  ordinary  application  of  the  law. 
Take  now,  of  the  same  object,  a  quality  or  phsenomenon.  A 
phsenomenon  is  a  relative — ergo,  a  conditioned — ergo,  a  think- 
able. But  try  to  think  this  relative  as  absolutely  relative — 
this  conditioned  as  unconditionally  conditioned — this  pheno- 
menon as  a  phsenomenon  and  nothing  more.  You  cannot; 
for  either  you  do  not  realize  it  in  thought  at  all,  or  you  sup- 
pose it  to  be  the  phsenomenon  of  something  that  does  not 
appear;  you  give  it  a  basis  out  of  itself;  you  think  it  not 
as  the  absolutely,  but  as  the  relatively,  relative — not  as  the 
unconditionally,  but  as  the  conditionally,  conditioned — in 
other  words,  you  conceive  it  as  the  Accident  of  a  Subject  or 
Substance.  This  is  an  instance  of  the  conditioned,  and  con- 
st itutes  the  special  case — the  particular  law — of  Substance  and 
Phsenomenon."  '  Even  absolute  relativity,  as  he  elsewhere 
says,  is  thus  unthinkable.  We  cannot  conceive  any  given 
object  as  consisting  solely  of  relations.  We  seem  compelled 
to  think   that  it  would  continue  to  exist  after  it  ceased  to 

1  Reid,  935. 


THE  LA  W  OF  SUBSTANCE.  101 

stand  in  any  relation  to  us — that  it  could  exist  without  being 
perceived,  and  even  though  there  was  no  one  to  perceive  it. 
But  this  unperceived  existence  could  only  belong  to  the  sub- 
stratum which  is  independent  of  us,  since  all  the  qualities  of 
the  thing  perceived  are  relative  to  us.  Such  seems  to  be 
Hamilton's  theory  of  the  Law  of  Substance,  which,  however, 
is  not  very  easily  reconciled  with  his  Natural  Realism.  I 
may  add  that  in  one  passage  at  least,  Hamilton  seems,  like 
Mansel,  to  affirm  that  we  have  a  direct  perception  of  our- 
selves as  substances.  "As  clearly/'  says  he,  'f  as  I  am  con- 
scious of  existing,  so  clearly  am  I  conscious  at  every  moment 
of  my  existence  (and  never  more  so  than  when  the  most 
heterogeneous  mental  modifications  are  in  a  state  of  rapid 
succession),  that  the  conscious  ego  is  not  itself  a  mere  modifi- 
cation, nor  a  series  of  modifications,  of  any  other  subject,  but 
that  it  is  itself  something  different  from  all  its  modifications, 
and  a  self-subsistent  entity." '  He  likewise  insists  more 
strongly  on  the  truth  of  the  Principle  of  Substance  than  he  would 
be  justified  in  doing  if  it  is  a  mere  exemplification  of  the  Law 
of  the  Conditioned,  and  thus  asserts  one  of  two  inconceivable 
contradictories  between  which  we  have  no  means  of  deciding.2 
On  the  whole  he  does  not  appear  to  have  thoroughly  worked 
out  this  part  of  his  theory  ;  but  his  observations  may  not  on 
that  account  be  less  useful  as  suggestions  for  future  inquirers. 

3  Lect.  i.  373.  *  See,  for  instance,  Lect.  i.  155. 


102  SIR    WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 


CHAPTER   VI. 

THE    GENERAL    PSYCHOLOGY    OF    HAMILTON. 

Having  thus  stated  the  principal  theories  of  Sir  William 
Hamilton,  which  may  be  regarded  as  original  (inasmuch  as 
even  where  he  has  been  partially  anticipated  his  method  of 
treatment  is  new),  I  proceed  to  give  a  short  sketch  of  the 
Hamiltonian  Psychology. 

Hamilton  adopted  the  Kantian  division  of  our  mental  states 
into  Cognitions,  Feelings  or  Emotions,  and  Conations,  as  he 
terms  them,  including  the  phamomena  of  Desire  and  Will. 
Whether  it  would  have  been  better  to  have  classed  the 
Desires  with  the  Feelings  or  Emotions,  reserving  the  third  of 
these  heads  for  Volitions  only,  may  perhaps  be  doubted. 
Hamilton,  however,  has  written  but  little  on  the  second  of 
these  divisions  of  the  mental  phenomena,  and  hardly  anything 
on  the  third,  so  that  his  researches  may  almost  be  said  to 
have  been  limited  to  Cognitions.  In  treatmg  of  any  of  these 
classes  of  mental  phenomena,  we  may,  according  to  Hamilton, 
have  three  objects  in  view,  namely,  to  investigate  the  facts 
themselves,  to  discover  their  laws,  and  to  follow  them  into 
their  results ;  and  we  thus  obtain  three  branches  of  Philosophy, 
namely,  Phenomenology,  Nomology,  and  Ontology.  It 
seems,  however,  impossible  to  separate  the  study  of  the  facts 
from  that  of  the  laws  which  govern  them,  and  Hamilton's 
own  Lectures  may  be  regarded  as  a  mixture  of  what  he  calls 
Pha ■nomenology   and    Nomology.     Ontology    he    apparently 


GENERAL  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  HAMILTON.    103 


regarded  as  impossible — at  least  in  the  old  sense — for 
Hamilton's  description  of  it  is  wide  enough  to  include 
Natural  Theology  when  rested  on  the  Design  argument  and 
other  proofs  derived  from  experience.  Of  this  subject,  how- 
ever, he  has  not  formally  treated.1  Consciousness  is,  according 
to  Hamilton,  the  essential  condition  alike  of  the  phenomena 
of  Cognition,  Feeling,  and  Conation.  There  is  no  cognition 
no  feeling  and  no  conation  of  which  we  are  not  conscious,  and 
whenever  we  are  conscious,  it  is  always  of  a  cognition,  a  feeling, 
or  a  conation.  "When  we  are  considering  cognitions,  feelings, 
and  conations  relatively  to  the  conscious  mind,  we  call  them 
states  of  consciousness  :  when  we  wish  to  treat  of  them  each 
for  itself,  we  call  them  cognitions,  feelings,  or  conations,  as 
the  case  may  be.  Attention  again,  according  to  Hamilton,  is 
nothing  more  than  consciousness,  or  rather  concentrated  con- 
sciousness ;  but  as  in  all  distinct  consciousness  there  is  some 
degree  of  concentration,  so  in  all  distinct  consciousness  there 
is  some  degree  of  attention.2  Neither  consciousness  nor 
attention,  therefore,  can  be  referred  to  any  special  faculty. 
They  belong  to  all  mental  modifications  alike,  and  are  common 
to  cognitions,  feelings  and  conations.  Man  is  always  con- 
scious. In  the  soundest  sleep  he  is  dreaming,  and  if  he  is 
unable  to  recollect  his  dreams  on  awaking,  it  is  only  because 
he  has  forgotten  them.  In  proof  of  this,  Sir  William  Hamilton 
relies  on  several  experimental  observations ;  but  perhaps  it  is 
also  manifest  a  priori.  Consciousness  is  to  the  mind  what 
extension  is  to  matter.  It  is  a  sort  of  primary  quality,  and  it 
is  not  possible  to  conceive  mind  without  consciousness.     Con- 

1  It  is  touched  on  more  than  once,  however.  See  especially  the  second 
of  his  Lectures  on  Metaphysics. 

2  In  a  general  sketch  of  this  kind  I  do  not  think  it  necessary  to  give 
specific  references,  except  when  I  quote  the  words  of  the  author.  This 
last  statement  is  taken  from  Lect.  i.  248. 


104  SIR    WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 

sciousness,  however,  is  only  possible  through  discrimination, 
and  therefore  involves  at  least  two  simultaneous  objects  of 
perception  or  thought ;  but  it  is  not  limited  to  two,  and  is 
capable  of  embracing-  six  or  seven — not  that  all  these  are 
surveyed  with  vivacity,  but  only  without  absolute  confusion. 
It  is,  however,  as  we  have  already  seen,  a  mistake  to  limit  the 
province  of  consciousness  to  the  mind,  as  most  philosophers 
have  hitherto  done ;  for  we  may  also  be  conscious  of  states  of 
matter,  and  are,  in  fact,  conscious  of  these  in  external  percep- 
tion. And  this  has  been  admitted  by  those  philosophers  who 
maintained  that  the  idea  or  representative  object  of  which 
(according  to  them)  we  are  conscious  in  perception  is  not  a 
modification  of  the  mind.  Consciousness  is  an  immediate 
knowledge,  but  it  is  likewise  co-extensive  with  knowledge  in 
general,  for  every  act  of  mediate  knowledge  is  also  an  act  of 
immediate  knowledge.  I  remember,  for  instance,  that  I  saw 
St.  Paul's  Cathedral  yesterday.  This  is  a  mediate  knowledge 
of  the  cathedral ;  but  it  is  an  immediate  knowledge  of  my 
present  mental  representation  of  the  cathedral,  and  of  the 
judgment  or  belief  that  connects  the  present  with  the  past. 
In  all  mediate  cognition,  as  already  remarked,  there  is  an 
immediate  as  well  as  a  mediate  object,  and  the  immediate 
object  is  in  all  cases  a  present  apprehension  of  consciousness. 
There  is  thus  no  conflict  between  Hamilton's  statement  that 
consciousness  is  an  immediate  knowledge,  and  his  other  state- 
ment that  it  is  co-extensive  with  all  knowledge,  whether 
immediate  or  mediate.  It  is  indeed  not  only  co-extensive 
with  all  knowledge,  but  with  all  knowledge,  feeling  and 
conation;  for  the  feelings  or  conations  would  not  be  mine 
unless  1  had  an  immediate  knowledge  or  perception  of  them. 
I  cud  not  know  without  knowing  that  1  know,  feel  without 
knowing  that  1  feel,  or  will  without  knowing  that  I  will;  or 
vice  versa.     Our  mental   ads  and   the  consciousness  of  them 


GENERAL  PSYCHOLOGY  OE  HAMILTON.    105 

are  really  identical — they  are  the  same  things  regarded  from 
different  points  of  view.  I  know,  and  /  know  that  I  know, 
are  merely  two  modes  of  describing-  the  same  mental  fact  or 
phenomenon. 

Consciousness,  being-  thus  the  source  and  condition  of  all 
our  knowledge,  must  be  accepted  as  veracious  in  every  sound 
system  of  philosophy.  If  different  portions  of  our  immediate 
knowledge  were  found  to  be  in  conflict  with  each  other,  philo- 
sophy would  be  impossible,  for  we  would  have  no  means  of 
determining  which  was  right  and  which  was  wrong.  Nay, 
even  to  affirm  that  one  was  wrong  would  be  to  affirm  the 
Law  of  Contradiction,  which  rests  on  no  higher  basis  than 
the  veracity  of  our  consciousness  ;  and  to  assume  that  one  was 
right  would  be  to  affirm  the  Law  of  Excluded  Middle,  which 
has  the  same  origin.1  In  the  event  of  a  conflict  between  an 
immediate  and  a  mediate  cognition,  it  would  be  absurd  to 
give  the  preference  to  the  latter.  For,  first,  every  mediate 
cognition  is  an  immediate  cognition;  and,  secondly,  it  repre- 
sents, or  relates  to,  some  other  immediate  cognition.  Thus,  in 
case  of  my  recollection  of  St.  Paul's  Cathedral,  the  present 
representation  in  memory  is  an  immediate  cognition,  and  it 
represents,  or  relates  to,  a  former  immediate  cognition,  namely, 
my  perception  of  the  cathedral  when  I  saw  it  last.  I  cannot 
set  it  up  as  veracious,  therefore,  without  postulating  two 
immediate  cognitions,  and  also  a  relation  between  them;  for 
if  this  relation  be  unfaithfully  depicted,  the  mediate  knowledge 
in  question  is  likewise  unreliable.  In  connexion  with  this 
subject,  however,  Hamilton  draws  the  following  distinction. 
The  facts  of  consciousness,  he  tells  us,  are  of  two  kinds — 

1  Hamilton,  however,  in  practice  sometimes  seems  to  ascribe  to  these 
principles  a  higher  authority  than  that  which  he  accords  to  the  ordinary 
facts  of  consciousness.  This  turns  on  the  distinction  between  two  kinds 
of  facts  of  consciousness  to  be  noticed  presently. 


106  SIR    WILLIAM  HA  MIL  TON. 

"  First,  the  facts  given  in  the  act  of  consciousness  itself;  and, 
second,  the  facts  which  consciousness  does  not  at  once  give, 
but  to  the  reality  of  which  it  only  bears  evidence.  And,"  he 
proceeds,  "  as  simplification  is  always  a  matter  of  importance, 
we  may  throw  out  of  account  altogether  the  former  class  of 
these  facts,  for  of  such  no  doubt  can  be  or  has  been  enter- 
tained. It  is  only  the  authority  of  these  facts  as  evidence  of 
something  beyond  themselves — that  is,  only  the  second  class 
of  facts — which  become  matter  of  discussion :  it  is  not 
the  reality  of  consciousness  which  we  have  to  prove,  but  its 
veracity." ' 

This  distinction  is  hardly  dra.wn  with  Sir  W.  Hamilton's 
usual  precision.  Of  course,  no  philosopher  can  deny  generally 
that  there  are  any  facts  of  consciousness ;  but,  owing  to  the 
difficulty  of  making  careful  observations  on  the  mental 
phenomena,  there  is  often  a  doubt  as  to  whether  an  alleged 
fact  of  consciousness  is  really  such  or  not.  Philosophers  are 
very  far  from  being  agreed  as  to  what  the  facts  of  conscious- 
ness are,  even  if  by  facts  of  consciousness  we  mean  those 
which  may  now  be  found  in  ordinary  men  ;  while  the  difference 
is  greater  if  we  limit  the  phrase,  "  facts  of  consciousness,"  to 
those  which  are  original  or  primitive.  Again,  from  Hamil- 
ton's language,  it  might  be  supposed  that  the  second  division 
referred  not  to  the  direct  presentations  of  consciousness,  but 
to  something  admittedly  beyond  its  sphere,  but  which  it 
nevertheless  in  some  inexplicable  manner  suggested,  repre- 
sented, or  bore  testimony  to.  In  this  case,  if  the  perception  of 
the  externa]  world  is  to  be  referred  to  the  second  division — and 

1  Lect.  i.  275-0.  Hamilton  had  expressed  the  distinction  in  a  less 
objectionable  way  a  few  pages  earlier.  "  The  facts  of  consciousness,"  says 
lie,  "arc  to  be  considered  in  two  points  of  view — either  as  evidencing  their 
own  ideal  or  phenomenal  existence,  or  as  evidencing  the  objective  existence 
of  something  else  beyond  them."    Lect.  i.  271. 


GENERAL  PS  YCHOL  OG  Y  OF  HA  MIL  TON.    1 07 


Hamilton  undoubtedly  meant  so  to  refer  it — the  doctrine 
preached  would  be  that  of  Cosmothetic  Idealism,  not  Natural 
Realism.  Nothing1  on  such  a  theory  is  given  in  the  fact  of  con- 
sciousness but  the  mental  state  or  modification  ;  but  then  con- 
sciousness suggests — represents — bears  evidence — that  there 
is  a  reality  beyond  that  mental  state  or  modification,  which 
may  be  termed  an  external  world.  Probably  what  Hamilton 
intended  to  say  was  as  follows  : — The  external  world,  as  a 
thing  existing  out  of  and  independently  of  our  consciousness, 
cannot  be  regarded  as  a  part  of  the  facts  of  consciousness. 
Though  it  is  presented,  not  represented,  in  the  fact  of  con- 
sciousness, it  is  possible  (without  self-contradiction)  to  admit 
the  fact  and  yet  to  deny  that  the  external  world  really  exists; 
for  why  may  not  presentation  be  illusive  as  well  as  represen- 
tation ?  It  may,  therefore,  be  said  that  the  external  world  is 
not  given — contained — in  the  facts  of  consciousness,  though 
it  is  given — presented — by  them.  But  the  language  in  which 
Hamilton  describes  the  second  class  of  facts  of  consciousness 
still  appears  objectionable.  It  is  so  more  especially,  if  we  are 
conscious  of  sensation  (as  Hamilton  elsewhere  maintains,)  not 
as  an  affection  of  the  mind  alone,  but  of  that  composite  of 
mind  and  matter  the  animated  nervous  organism.  The  state 
of  this  organism  wrould  in  this  case  appear  to  be  a  part  of  the 
facts  of  consciousness  themselves,  and  not  something  outside 
them,  to  which  they  only  bear  testimony.  The  use  which 
Hamilton  makes  of  the  distinction  between  these  two  classes  of 
facts  of  consciousness,  however,  is  important.  A  philosopher 
may  stop  at  the  facts  of  consciousness  considered  as  mere  states 
of  the  mind  or  ego,  and  refuse  to  go  any  farther;  but  if  he  does 
go  any  farther,  and  declares  his  belief  in  anything  objective  or 
substantial,  he  thereby  accepts  the  testimony  of  consciousness 
to  something  more  than  "  its  own  phaenomenal  or  ideal  exist- 
ence."    This  testimony  is  either   direct  or  indirect,  but  the 


1 08  SIR    I VI L  L I  A  M  HA  MIL  TON. 

indirect  depends  on  the  direct,  and  is  inferior  to  it  in  point  of 
certainty.  The  philosopher  in  question  must  therefore  accept, 
in  part  at  least,  the  direct  testimony  of  consciousness,  and, 
accepting'  it  in  part,  he  is  bound  in  consistency  to  accept  it  as 
a  whole.  Every  consistent  scheme  of  philosophy  that  goes  a 
step  beyond  Nihilism  must  accept  everything  as  true  that 
consciousness  bears  direct  testimony  to  ;  and  as  consciousness 
bears  this  direct  testimony  to  the  perception  and  existence  of 
the  external  world  (this,  Hamilton  thinks,  is  conceded  by  his 
opponents),  this  testimony  must  in  consistency  be  accepted 
as  veracious.1  Consciousness  is  to  the  philosopher  what 
the  Bible  is  to  the  theologian.  As  errors  in  theology  have 
usually  arisen  from  not  accepting  the  testimony,  the  whole 
testimonj',  and  nothing  but  the  testimony,  of  the  Bible,  so  all 
errors  in  philosophy  have  arisen  from  not  accepting  the 
testimony,  the  whole  testimony,  and  nothing  but  the  testimony, 
of  consciousness ;  and  as  we  must  appeal  to  the  Bible  in  cor- 
rection of  the  former,  so  we  must  appeal  to  consciousness  in 
correction  of  the  latter.  Hamilton  has  not  perhaps  taken 
sufficient  notice  of  the  fact  that,  as  the  testimony  of  the  Bible 
is  liable  to  be  corrupted  by  errors  of  transcription  or  trans- 
lation, by  interpolations  and  by  the  acceptance  of  apocryphal 
books  as  genuine,  so  the  testimony  of  consciousness  is  still 
more  liable  to  be  corrupted  by  similar  influences. 

Such  is  Hamilton's  account  of  Consciousness  and  Attention. 

1  I  cannot  think  that  Hamilton  ever  intended  to  prove  the  veracity  of 
consciousness.  Consciousness  must  be  accepted  as  veracious,  lie  says,  until 
we  see  some  reason  for  denying  its  veracity.  If  we  attempt  to  represent 
n  us  untruthful,  we  can  only  do  so  by  making  some  supposition  which 
siims  In  carry  its  improbability  on  the  face  of  it.  One  of  these  sup- 
positions is  that  of  nature  acting  not  only  in  vain,  but  in  counter-action  of 
herself.  Another  is  that  man  is  the  dupe  of  a  perfidious  creator.  None 
of  then  arc  of  such  a  character  as  to  commend  themselves  (in  the  absence 
of  evidence)  to  any  philosopher. 


GENERAL  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  HAMLLTON.    109 

As  to  the  relation  between  Consciousness  and  Memory,  he  is 
less  consistent.  He  begins  by  laying-  down  in  general  terras 
that  memory  is  a  condition  of  all  consciousness ;  for  the  notion 
of  ego,  or  self,  which  is  involved  in  all  consciousness,  "  arises 
from  the  recognized  permanence  and  identity  of  the  thinking 
subject,  in  contrast  to  the  recognized  succession  and  variety 
of  its  modifications.  But  this  recognition  is  possible  only 
through  memory."1  This  doctrine  is  not  peculiar  to  Hamil- 
ton, but  it  seems  open  to  some  objections.  Let  us  go  back  to 
the  first  time  that  I  recognize  the  permanence  and  identity  of 
the  subject  in  this  succession  of  its  modifications.  To  recog- 
nize the  two  modifications  as  different  and  successive,  it  may 
be  said  that  I  must  recollect  the  former  when  the  latter  is 
present;  but  in  the  former  there  was  no  ego  or  self,  since  by 
hypothesis  that  notion  arose  for  the  first  time  on  comparing 
the  former  (as  represented  in  the  memory)  with  the  latter  (as 
actually  present).  I  was  therefore  not  conscious  of  the  former 
state,  and  hence  I  must  recollect  that  of  which  I  was  not 
conscious  when  it  was  present.  Again,  how  could  I  even 
inquire  whether  the  subject  in  these  two  successive  states  was 
identical  or  otherwise,  unless  I  knew  that  there  was  a  subject 
in  the  former  as  well  as  in  the  latter ;  and  if  there  was  a  subject 
in  the  former  state,  what  could  that  subject  be  but  the  ego  ? 
Many  philosophers  seem  to  me  to  have  confounded  personality 
with  personal  identity  (which  latter  cognition,  like  all  other 
instances  of  perceived  identity,  could,  as  I  believe,  only  arise 
after  we  had  experienced  two  states  of  consciousness,  each  of 
which  had  an  ego  or  person  in  it),  and  to  have  assumed  that, 
previous  to  the  states  of  consciousness  of  which  the  proper 
expression  is  "  I  know,"  there  were  other  mental  states 
capable  of  being  recollected,  which  could  only  be  correctly 
described  by  some  such  phrase  as  "  Somebody  knows,"  or 
1  Lect.  i.  205. 


no  SIR    WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 

<e  There  is  knowledge."  Apart  from  the  prevalent  confusion 
between  personality  and  personal  identity,  I  see  no  reason  to  be- 
lieve that  there  ever  was  such  a  state ;  but  it  seems  doubly  incon- 
sistent for  a  philosopher  who  holds  that  there  was  such  a  state, 
to  withhold  from  it  the  title  of  "state  of  consciousness,'''  while 
at  the  same  time  contending-  that  consciousness  is  the  sole 
field  of  philosophy.  However,  even  if  it  were  conceded  that 
memory  is,  in  this  sense,  a  condition  of  all  consciousness,  it  does 
not  follow  that  every  state  of  consciousness  is  followed  by 
memory ;  for  according-  to  Hamilton,  we  can  be  conscious  of 
six  or. seven  objects  at  once,  and  if  we  recollected  one  of  these 
when  we  passed  into  the  next  succeeding  state  of  consciousness, 
it  would  be  sufficient  to  enable  us  to  represent  the  two  suc- 
cessive states  as  successive  modes  of  the  same  ego  or  self. 
Hamilton,  however,  in  some  passages  affirms  in  the  strongest 
manner  that  every  act  of  consciousness  is  followed  by  memory, 
and  further  that  every  act  of  memory  is  preceded  by  a  state 
of  consciousness  —  which  latter  statement  I  am  unable  to 
reconcile  with  his  assertion  that  memory  is  a  condition  of  all 
consciousness,  inasmuch  as  it  is  only  through  memory  that 
we  attain  the  notion  of  ego  or  self,  which  is  involved  in  all 
consciousness.  "  Of  consciousness  "  says  he,  "  however  faint, 
there  must  be  some  memory,  however  short."  "  It  can  easily 
be  shown  that  the  degree  of  memory  is  directly  in  proportion 
to  the  degree  of  consciousness,  and  consequently  that  an 
absolute  negation  of  memory  is  an  absolute  negation  of 
consciousness."  '  Again,  "  It  is  a  law  of  mind  that  the  in- 
tensity of  present  consciousness  determines  the  vivacity  of  the 

1  Lect,  i.  355.  It  is  curious  to  find  the  editor  and  successor  of  Stewart 
using  this  argument  against  that  author,  without  observing  that  Stewart 
denied  thai  there  was  any  such  relation  between  consciousness  and  memory, 
and  founded  the  doctrine  which  Hamilton  is  combating  on  this  denial.  See 
Stewart's  Works,  ii.  134  (Hamilton's  edition). 


GENERA  L  PS  YCHOL  OG  Y  OF  HA  MIL  TON.    1 1 1 

luture  memory.  Memory  and  consciousness  are  thus  in  the 
direct  ratio  of  each  other.  On  the  one  hand,  looking  from 
cause  to  effect — vivid  consciousness,  long  memory ;  faint 
consciousness,  short  memory  ;  no  consciousness,  no  memory  ; 
and  on  the  other,  looking-  from  effect  to  cause,  long-  memory 
vivid  consciousness ;  short  memory,  faint  consciousness ;  no 
memory,  no  consciousness."  '  But  distinct  as  these  declara- 
tions are,  I  meet  with  others  of  an  equally  positive  character 
which  I  am  unable  to  reconcile  with  them.  When  combating 
Locke's  theory,  that  in  sound  sleep  we  do  not  think  at  all, 
Hamilton  says,  "  As  to  the  objection  of  Locke  and  others, 
that  as  we  have  often  no  recollection  of  dreaming,  we  have 
therefore  never  dreamt,  it  is  sufficient  to  say  that  the  as- 
sumption in  this  argument — that  consciousness  and  the 
recollection  of  consciousness  are  convertible — is  disproved  in 
the  most  emphatic  way  by  experience."  2  And  he  then  goes 
on  to  state  the  facts  of  somnambulism,  of  which  he  says, 
"  we  have  no  recollection  when  we  awake  of  what  has  occurred 
during  its  continuance.  Consciousness  is  thus  cut  in  two; 
memory  does  not  connect  the  train  of  consciousness  in  the 
one  state  with  the  train  of  consciousness  in  the  other."3  But 
this  ''  forgetfulness  is  not  a  decisive  criterion  of  somnam- 
bulism. Persons  whom  there  is  no  reason  to  suspect  of  this 
affection,  often  manifest  during  sleep  the  strongest  indications 
of  dreaming,  and  yet  when  they  awaken  in  the  morning  retain 
no  memory  of  what  they  may  have  done  or  said  during  the 
night."  4  Moreover  something  similar  to  this  "  rapid  oblivion 
of  our  sleeping  consciousness,  happens  to  us  occasionally  even 
when  awake.  When  our  mind  is  not  intently  occupied  with 
any  subject,  or  more  frequently  when  fatigued,  a  thought 
suggests  itself.     We  turn  it   lazily  over  and  fix  our  eyes  on 

1  Lect.  i.  368.  2  Lect.  i.  319. 

3  Lect.  i.  320.  4  Lect.  i.  322. 


1 1 2  SIR    J  VIL  LI  AM  HA  MIL  TON. 

vacancy.  Interrupted  by  the  question  what  we  are  thinking  of 
we  attempt  to  answer,  but  the  thought  is  gone.  We  canuot 
recall  it  and  say  that  we  were  thinking  of  nothing."  '  In  this 
last  instance  perhaps  it  might  be  said  that  there  was  a  very 
short  memory  of  the  thought,  and  that  the  faintness  of  the 
preceding  consciousness  accounted  for  the  shortness  of  the 
memory.  But  this  explanation  is  inapplicable  to  the  pbaeno- 
mena  of  somnambulism,  for  in  that  state  Hamilton  affirms 
that  "  the  various  mental  faculties  are  in  a  higher  degree  of 
power  than  in  the  natural,"  and  that  we  must  ascribe  to  it, 
"  not  only  consciousness  but  an  exalted  consciousness."  *  As 
the  passages  I  have  cited  are  taken  from  two  lectures  which 
Hamilton  delivered  year  after  year  in  immediate  succession 
to  the  same  audiences,  it  may  be  assumed  that  he  had  some 
plausible  mode  of  reconciling  them,  but  I  have  not  been  able 
to  discover  it.  If  the  cases  referred  to  in  the  17th  lecture  are 
rather  instances  of  very  short  and  very  faint  memory,  than 
of  no  memory  at  all,  Stewart  might  surely  be  allowed  to  offer 
the  same  explanation  of  those  dealt  with  in  the  18th  lecture. 

In  connexion  with  consciousness  Hamilton  has  introduced 
into  English  philosophy  (though  there  were  not  wanting 
some  earlier  indications  of  it)  a  doctrine  of  considerable  im- 
portance— that  of  latent  mental  modifications,  sometimes 
described  as  unconscious  cerebration.  This  doctrine  may  be 
illustrated  by  the  minima  of  sense.  The  minimum  visibile  is 
probably  not  a  quantity  of  space  (whether  absolute  or  rela- 
tive) but  a  quantity  of  light.  This,  however,  is  not  material 
to  the  present  argument.  A  field  seems  to  me  at  a  distance 
to  be  an  uniform  green.  Coming  closer,  I  see  for  the  first 
time  yellow  buttercups  and  white  daisies.  Returning  to  the 
place  from  whence  it  looks  an  uniform  green,  it  is  evident  that, 
if  a  number  of  I  lie  buttercups  or  daisies  were  placed  together, 

1  Lett.  i.  324.  :  Loot.  i.  320. 


GENERA  L  PS  YCHOL  OG  Y  OF  HA  MIL  TON.    1 1 3 

I  would  see  a  yellow  or  a  white  patch  in  the  green  field, 
although  none  of  them  are  visible  when  taken  separately. 
But  each  of  them  evidently  contributes  to  the  effect  which 
is  produced  when  they  are  placed  together;  for  if  we  place 
together  the  smallest  number  that  will  render  the  yellow  or 
white  patch  visible,  it  will  disappear  on  the  removal  of  a 
single  one.  This  would  be  more  evident  if  we  took  objects  of 
larger  size,  since  then,  perhaps,  two  together  would  be  visible 
where  one  was  not.  When  one  of  these  is  present,  though  we 
are  not  conscious  of  any  visible  effect  produced  by  it,  the 
mind  is  in  a  different  state  from  what  it  would  be  in  if  that 
one  was  absent ;  for  it  will  now  be  rendered  conscious  by  an 
object  which  would  not  otherwise  be  capable  of  exciting  it  to 
consciousness.  A  force  of  one  ton  applied  to  raise  a  body 
weighing  two  tons  produces  no  visible  effect,  but  the  body  is 
notwithstanding  in  a  different  state  from  what  it  was  before. 
It  can  now  be  raised  by  a  smaller  force  than  would  otherwise 
be  required  for  that  purpose.  So  a  thing  which  produces  no 
separate  impression  on  our  consciousness,  may  nevertheless 
render  us  capable  of  being  affected  by  causes  that  would  not 
otherwise  affect  us.  Some  minimum  of  time,  moreover,  seems 
to  be  essential  to  every  act  of  consciousness;  and  whatever 
produces  a  nervous  impression,  lasting  for  a  time  shorter  than 
this  minimum,  cannot  produce  any  special  state  of  conscious- 
ness. But  a  repetition  of  such  impressions  will  produce  what 
none  of  them  singly  is  capable  of  producing — a  great  num- 
ber of  undulations  being  often  necessary  to  produce  a  sensation 
of  sound,  and  a  still  greater  number  to  produce  a  sensation 
of  colour.  In  these  instances  there  is  no  reason  to  believe  that 
the  last  of  these  undulations  was  more  efficacious  than  the 
first.  They  were  all  similar  in  character  and  each  produced 
its  separate  effect ;  but  it  required  the  combination  of  a  num- 
ber of  these  separate  effects  to  produce  any  consciousness  at  all, 

I 


1 1 4  SIR    WIL  LI  A  M  HA  MIL  TON. 

while  a  further  combination  would  perhaps  change  that  state 
of  consciousness  into  another.  All  states  of  consciousness 
may  therefore  be  regarded  as  made  up  of  a  number  of  latent 
mental  modifications.  Consciousness  and  latency  are,  in  f;<-t, 
separated  by  no  well-marked  line.  When  we  pass  gradu«..iy 
from  latency  to  consciousness,  the  consciousness  which  first 
appears  is  so  faint  as  almost  to  escape  our  observation.  When 
we  pass  in  like  manner  from  consciousness  to  latency,  the  former 
fades  away  so  gradually  that  it  is  usually  impossible  to  fix  the 
precise  instant  at  which  it  disappears.  Of  course,  I  speak  of  the 
consciousness  of  some  particular  feeling  or  state  ;  for,  according 
to  Hamilton,  we  are  always  conscious.  But  when  one  feeling 
or  state  of  mind  is  gradually  replaced  by  another  (the  two 
being  simultaneously  present  for  a  time)  it  is  often  difficult 
to  fix  the  moment  when  the  former  is  finally  lost ;  and  if  we 
turn  our  fading  attention  back  upon  it,  we  may  be  at  a  loss 
to  determine  whether  what  we  are  then  conscious  of  is  a  con- 
tinuance of  the  old  feeling,  or  a  representation  of  it  in  the 
memory.  Light  is  very  distinct  from  darkness  :  but  who  will 
undertake  to  fix  the  moment  when  the  one  passes  into  the 
other  during  our  mornings  or  our  evenings  ?  And  though,  of 
course,  light  could  not  be  made  up  of  any  quantity  of  abso- 
lute darkness,  all  darkness  of  which  we  have  experience  is 
probably  but  a  diminished  quantity  of  light  which,  if  suffi- 
ciently multiplied,  would  reproduce  the  brightest  sunshine. 
This,  in  Hamilton's  opinion,  is  the  character  of  all  our  mental 
slates. 

It  has  been  objected  to  this  argument  that  a  certain  quan- 
tity of  the  cause  may  be  necessary  to  produce  any  of  the 
effect,1  and  that,  therefore,  though  the  minimum  viubile  pro- 
duces consciousness,  an  object  less  than  the  minimum  visible 
may  produce  no  mental  effect  at  all.  This  is  perhaps  sup- 
1  Mill's  Examination,  p.  34G. 


GENERAL  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  HAMILTON.    115 

posable;  but  I  doubt  if  there  is  any  instance  in  nature  in 
which  an  agent,  which  in  small  quantities  produces  no  effect 
whatever,  begins  to  produce  an  effect  when  the  quantity  is 
increased.  An  increase  in  the  quantity  of  the  cause  indeed 
sometimes  alters  the  kind  of  effect,  as  when  by  increasing  the 
temperature  to  a  certain  point,  water  begins  for  the  first 
time  to  boil;  but  the  heat  was  producing  an  effect  on  the 
water  all  through,  which  was  previously  evinced  by  its  change 
of  volume  and  its  increased  evaporation.  The  same  thing 
takes  place,  according  to  Hamilton,  when  a  distant  object  acts 
on  the  sense  of  sight.  Every  portion  of  it,  however  minute, 
produces  an  effect;  but  when  the  quantity  is  increased  to  a 
certain  definite  amount,  there  is  a  change  in  the  kind  of  effect 
— it  passes  from  latency  into  consciousness.  It  may  be  said, 
perhaps,  that  the  latent  effect  is  produced  not  on  the  mind 
but  on  the  nerves.  This  may  be  so.  The  difference  between 
the  two  theories  is  very  slight,  and  there  seems  to  be  no  ex- 
perimental test  for  distinguishing  between  them  :  nor  is  there 
any  reason  why  we  may  not  suppose  the  effect  to  be  produced 
on  both. 

There  are  various  degrees  of  latency.  The  thousandth  part 
of  a  minimum  visibile  cannot  be  supposed  to  produce  as  much 
effect  as  one  half  of  it ;  and  the  general  fact  of  latency  is  by  no 
means  confined  to  our  sensations.  On  the  contrary,  every  act 
of  memory  consists  in  bringing  some  state  or  feeling  from 
latency  into  clear  consciousness.  The  effect  required  for  this 
purpose  will  be  greater  or  less  according  to  the  degree  of 
latency  of  the  thought  which  we  seek  to  recall.  No  state 
of  consciousness,  in  fact,  is  ever  wholly  obliterated.  It 
has  only  become  latent.  What  appeared  to  have  been 
utterly  forgotten  is  often  unexpectedly  recalled  during  the 
peculiar  exaltations  of  consciousness  which  take  place  in 
certain    diseases.     Every    mental    energy   once    commenced 

1  2 


1 1 6  SIR    WIL  L I  A  M  HA  MIL  TON. 

continues  throughout  our  whole  lives — at  first  consciously, 
then  in  a  state  of  latency,  then,  perhaps,  again  recalled  to 
consciousness,  and  then  again  latent.1  In  explaining  the 
theory  of  the  mind  latent  modifications  meet  us  at  every  turn. 
Memory  proper — the  Conservative  Faculty,  as  Hamilton  calls 
it — is  in  fact  the  power  of  preserving  mental  states  or  modifi- 
cations in  the  mind,  but  out  of  consciousness. 

'  This  leads  us  to  Hamilton's  enumeration  of  the  faculties  of 
cognition  or  knowledge,  which  are:  1.  Perception,  divided 
into  External  and  Internal.  2.  Memory,  or  the  Conservative 
Faculty.  3.  The  Reproductive  Faculty.  4.  The  Represen- 
tative Faculty  or  Imagination.  5.  The  Elaborative  or  Dis- 
cursive Faculty,  the  science  of  whose  operations  is  Logic. 
And  6.  The  Regulative  Faculty,  which,  however,  is  a  mere 
name  for  the  entire  collection  of  principles  or  laws,  which  as  uni- 
versal and  necessary  must,  according  to  Hamilton,  be  a  priori, 
or  derived  from  the  mind  itself.  These  laws  or  principles, 
however,  Hamilton,  unlike  Kant,  does  not  seek  to  enumerate 
in  full.  In  treating  of  External  Perception  the  question  ot 
Natural  Realism  naturally  crops  up,  and  with  it  the  distinction 
being  the  primary  and  secondary  qualities  of  matter.  In 
Hamilton's  Lectures  extension  and  solidity  are  described  as 
primary  qualities,  all  others  being  classed  as  secondary  :  but 
in  the  Dissertations  to  Reid  he  divides  the  qualities  of  matter 
into  three  classes,  viz  ,  the  primary,  which  are  all  reducible  to 
occupation  of  space ;  the  secundo-primary,  which  are  likewise 
all  reducible  to  resistance  to  our  locomotive  volition ;  and  the 

1  Mr.  Mill  remarks  of  this  doctrine  that,  if  so,  I  must  still  be  desiring  and 
willing  to  rise  from  my  bed  yesterday  morning  (Examination  of  Hamilton, 
p.  343,  note).  Hamilton  perhaps  would  have  done  well  to  limit  his  theory 
to  tli"  persistence  of  sensible  impressions.  When  reproduced  by  the 
imagination  these,  according  to  Hamilton,  are  manifested  through  the 
organ  which  was  originally  affected  by  them  and  may  apparently  be 
regarded  as  Breaker  forms  of  the  original  sensations. 


GENERAL  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  HAMILTON.    117 

secondary,  embracing'  the  remainder.  He  likewise  distin- 
guishes between  sensation  and  perception  (in  the  stricter 
meaning  of  these  terms),  the  sensation  (proper)  being  the 
pleasurable  or  painful  feeling  which  we  experience  in  the 
exercise  of  the  senses,  and  the  perception  (proper)  being  the 
knowledge  of  objects  which  we  gain  by  this  exercise.  The 
law  which  connects  these  two  is  that  they  are  always  co-exis- 
tent, but  in  the  inverse  ratio  of  each  other :  which  is  an 
instance  of  the  more  general  law  that  knowledge  and  feeling 
always  co-exist,  but  are  in  the  like  inverse  ratio.  The  phrase 
"  inverse  ratio,"  however,  is  not  to* be  taken  strictly.  "It 
cannot  be  said,"  says  Hamilton,  f'that  the  minimum  of  sen- 
sation infers  the  maximum  of  perception,  for  perception  always 
supposes  a  certain  quantum  of  sensation.  But  this  is  unde- 
niable that  above  a  certain  limit,  perception  declines  in  propor- 
tion as  sensation  rises/''  '  This  would  seem  to  imply  that 
below  this  limit  we  would  have  a  sensation  without  a  percep- 
tion, in  which  case  Hamilton's  statement  that  they  always 
co-exist  would  be  erroneous.  The  inconsistency  is,  perhaps, 
removed  by  the  corresponding  passage  in  the  Dissertations  to 
Reid :  "  Every  perception  proper  has  a  sensation  proper  as  its 
condition ;  but  every  sensation  has  not  a  perception  proper  as 
its  conditionate,  unless  (what  I  think  ought  to  be  done)  we 
view  the  general  consciousness  of  the  locality  of  a  sensorial 
affection  as  a  perception  proper.  In  this  case  the  two  appre- 
hensions "  [sensation  proper  and  perception  proper]  "  will  be 
always  co-existent."  2  Adopting  this  explanation  of  their  in- 
variable co-existence,  however,  it  can  hardly  be  said  that  the 
one  always  increases  in  quantity  as  the  other  diminishes.  Like 
many  of  Hamilton's  laws,  this  one  would  therefore  seem  to 
require  more  accurate  expression.  It  may  be  remarked  that 
the  strength  of  a  sensation  is  not  always  to  be  estimated  by 
1  Lect.  ii.  102.  2  Eeid,  880  (a). 


1 1 8  SIR    WILLIAM  HA  MIL  TON. 

the  amount  of  pleasure  or  pain  which  it  produces.  There  are 
sensations  which  are  pleasurable  in  a  moderate  degree,  but 
painful  when  they  rise  very  high ;  and  in  passing  from  the 
pleasurable  to  the  painful  stage,  there  must  be  a  point  at  which 
the  sensation,  though  by  no  means  feeble  in  quantity,  is  almost 
indifferent.  If  this  is  the  point  at  which  perception  attains 
its  maximum,  it  might  be  true  that  the  perception  varied 
inversely  with  the  amount  of  pleasure  and  pain  which  was 
felt,  though  not,  properly  speaking,  with  the  amount  of  sensa- 
tion. I  do  not,  however,  find  any  such  explanation  as  this  in 
Hamilton,  though  the  fact  of  sensations  passing  from  the 
pleasurable  to  the  painful  by  an  increase  of  quantity  is  noticed.1 
Sir  W.  Hamilton's  doctrine,  that  all  the  senses  are  modifications 
of  touch,  has  been  already  noticed.  He  thinks,  however,  that 
a  larger  number  of  senses  should  be  distinguished  than  is 
usually  done,  many  of  the  sensations  and  perceptions  usually 
referred  to  the  sense  of  touch  being  different  from  each  other, 
not  merelv  in  degree  but  in  kind.  They  have  nothing  in 
common  except  that  there  is  no  special  organ  to  refer  them 
to.2 

The  Conservative,  Reproductive  and  Representative  Faculties 
are  closely  connected  together.     The  only  proof  we  can  give 

1  It  may  perhaps  be  said  that  in  such  cases  the  same  cause  produces 
two  distinct  sensations  according  to  the  quantity  employed — the  sensation 
produced  by  a  small  quantity  being  a  pleasurable,  and  that  by  a  large 
quantity  a  painful,  one  :  and  that  at  the  indifference  point  there  is  in 
reality  no  sensation  at  all,  or  rather  a  sort  of  fluctuation  between  very 
small  quantities  of  the  two.  "Whether  this  explanation  would  save  the 
law  in  question  or  not,  I  must  leave  to  the  reader. 

Q  I  need  scarcely  notice  Hamilton's  argument  to  prove  that  in  the 
perception  of  Bensible  objects  we  begin  with  the  wholes  rather  than  the 
parts.  On  principles  of  Natural  Realism  the  natural  inference  seems  to 
be  that  we  begin  with  the  organic  affection,  This  perhaps  always  con- 
tains several  sensitive  minima,  but  frequently  not  enough  of  them  to  give 
m    what  is  called  a  whole,  or  entire,  sensible  object. 


GENERAL  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  HAMILTON.    119 

tbat  anything1  has  been  preserved  in  the  memory  is  that  it  ean 
be  reproduced,  and  when  reproduced  it  is  always  represented. 
Some  minds,  however,  are  remarkable  for  the  length  of  time 
after  which  portions  of  their  former  knowledge  can  be  repro- 
duced; others  for  the  readiness  with  which  reproduction  is 
effected ;  and  others  again  for  the  vividness  of  the  reproduced 
ideas.  The  three  faculties  may  therefore  be  distinguished. 
It  is  in  this  connexion  tnat  Hamilton  treats  of  Association  of 
Ideas.  He  seems  to  regard  its  functions  as  limited  to  the 
phenomena  of  reproduction,  but  over  these  its  control  is  abso- 
lute. No  idea  is  ever  reproduced  otherwise  than  through  the 
agency  of  the  principle  of  association.  Whenever  an  idea  is 
reproduced,  it  is  because  there  has  been  in  the  mind,  imme- 
diately before  it  appears,  some  other  idea  which  is  associated 
with  it.  Here,  of  course,  I  am  taking  the  word  idea  in  its 
widest  sense.  Reproduction  may  be  caused  by  the  presence 
in  the  mind  of  a  sensation,  a  perception,  an  emotion,  or  a  voli- 
tion as  well  as  of  an  image  or  concept.  Every  present  state 
of  consciousness  tends  to  vivify  and  call  into  consciousness  all 
latent  modifications  which  are  associated  with  it,  and  when- 
ever a  former  mental  state  is  reproduced,  it  is  because  it  has 
been  thus  vivified.  It  may,  however,  be  vivified  not  merely 
by  the  presence  of  a  state  of  consciousness  associated  with  it, 
but  by  the  presence  of  a  latent  mental  modification  associated 
with  it.  Suppose  two  latent  modifications,  a  and  b,  are  simul- 
taneously present  and  intimately  associated  with  each  other, 
a  being  more  latent  than  b.  A  thought  now  enters  the  mind 
which  is  associated  with  a  but  has  no  direct  association  with 
b.  a  receives  an  accession  of  strength  which  renders  it  less 
latent  than  before,  but  is  insufficient  to  force  it  into  con- 
sciousness, It  will  now  act  with  this  increased  strength  on 
its  associate  b,  and  the  latter  having  been  less  latent  than  a 
may  appear    above  the  surface.     In  this  way  an  idea  often 


120  SIR   WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 

seems  immediately  to  excite  another  whose  association  with  it 
is  only  mediate  or  indirect,  the  intermediate  link,  or  links,  not 
having-  risen  above  the  state  of  latency.  The  idea  which  at 
this  instant  occupies  my  consciousness  may  be  regarded  as  a 
sort  of  centre  of  disturbance.  It  gives  an  impetus  to  all  the 
latent  modifications  that  are  in  immediate  contact  with  it  on 
any  side.  These  communicate  the  impulse  to  the  latent 
modifications  in  contact  with  them,  and  the  disturbance 
spreads  outward  in  wider  and  feebler  circles.  But  the  depres- 
sion even  of  a  feeble  wave  may  cause  an  object,  which  was 
but  a  very  short  distance  below  the  surface,  to  appear  above 
it ;  and  the  objects  which  appear  successively  above  the  sur- 
face may  not  be  on  the  same  side  of  the  centre  of  disturbance, 
but  perhaps  in  quite  opposite  directions.  Again,  several 
states  of  mind  are  often  simultaneously  present  to  our  con- 
sciousness. These  are  so  many  different  centres  of  disturbance, 
and  when  the  waves  propagated  from  two  or  more  of  these 
centres  meet,  there  may  be  an  exaggerated  depression  which 
will  cause  something  to  appear  above  the  surface  that  neither 
of  the  disturbances  by  itself  was  capable  of  exciting.  Similar 
effects  arise  when  the  exciting  mental  states  are  not  simul- 
taneous but  successive — when,  for  instance,  a  new  sensible 
impression  occurs  in  the  midst  of  a  train  of  thought.  It,  in 
that  case,  becomes  a  new  centre  of  disturbance,  whose  effects 
are  soon  blended  with  the  expiring  waves  of  the  old  one.1  It 
may  be  further  remarked  that  when  a  state  of  consciousness, 
which  we  may  call  x,  calls  up  the  idea  of  y,  it  frequently 

1  These  similes  are,  of  course,  in  one  respect  inappropriate.  The 
impulses  are  communicated  to  the  water,  and  that  which  appears  above 
the  surface  is  not  the  water  but  something  in  it.  No  such  distinction 
exists  in  the  case  of  the  process  we  are  describing.  That  which  appears 
above  the  surface  has  itself  received  an  impulse  (mediately  or  imme- 
diately), and  is  of  the  same  nature  with  everything  else  that  has 
received  it. 


GENERAL  PS  YCHOL  OG  Y  OF  HAMIL  TON    1 2 1 

continues  to  exist  along1  with  it,  and  it  may  even  outlast  it  and 
call  up  a  new  idea  z,  which  is  associated  not  with  y  but  with 
x.  This  occurs,  for  instance,  in  what  is  called  intentional 
memory.  We  know  that  the  idea  we  are  seeking-  for  is  asso- 
ciated with  or.  By  keeping  x  steadily  before  the  mind,  we  know 
that  it  will  call  up  a  great  number  of  other  ideas,  all  of  which 
are  associated  with  it,  and  among  these  we  expect  that  the 
one  we  are  in  search  of  will  appear.  Accordingly  we  keep  x 
in  the  mind  as  long  as  we  can,  withdrawing  as  far  as  possible 
our  attention  from  everything  that  it  calls  up  as  soon  as  we  are 
satisfied  that  it  is  not  the  right  thing ;  and  the  right  thing 
usually  appears  in  the  long-run.  On  other  occasions  it  be- 
comes necessary,  in  the  acquisition  of  various  dexterities,  that 
a  train  of  associated  thoughts  should  pass  through  our  minds 
with  great  rapidity.  Here,  as  a  certain  minimum  of  time  is 
essential  to  consciousness,  when  the  train  becomes  sufficiently 
rapid  some  of  the  members  must  drop  into  latency.  This 
occurs  not  when  the  dexterity  is  imperfect  but  when  it  is 
perfect ;  and  the  members  of  the  train  are  never  more  influen- 
tial in  practice  than  after  we  have  ceased  to  have  a  separate 
consciousness  of  them. 

But  what  is  it  that  thus  associates  one  idea  with  another,  and 
enables  the  former  ever  afterwards  to  recall — or  rather  tend  to 
recall — the  latter  ?  In  his  Lectures,  Hamilton  reduces  the  laws 
of  association  to  one — the  Law  of  Redintegration — which  is 
thus  enounced  :  "Those  thoughts  suggest  each  other  which  had 
previously  constituted  parts  of  the  same  entire  or  total  act  of 
cognition."  '  It  has  two  branches ;  for  "  to  the  same  entire 
or  total  act  belong  as  integral  or  constituent  parts,  in  the  first 
place,  those  thoughts  which  arose  at  the  same  time  or  in  imme- 
diate consecution  ;  and  in  the  second,  those  thoughts  which  are 
bound  up  into  one  by  their  mutual  affinity." 2  These  two  subor- 
1  Lect.  ii.  238.  2  Ibid. 


122  SIR    WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 

dinate  laws  are  accordingly  designated  the  Law  of  Simultaneity 
and  the  Law  of  Affinity.  In  the  Dissertations  to  Reid,  how- 
ever, Hamilton  says  that  the  Law  of  Redintegration  is  insuffi- 
cient to  explain  the  whole  phenomenon,  without  the  aid  of 
what  he  terms  the  Law  of  Repetition.  The  latter  law  is  thus 
enounced  :  "  Thoughts  co-identical  in  modification,  hut  differ- 
ing in  time,  tend  to  suggest  each  other;  "  1  while  the  Law  of 
Redintegration  is  thus  worded:  "Thoughts  once  co-identical 
in  time  are,  however  different  as  mental  modes,  again  sugges- 
tive of  each  other,  and  that  in  the  mutual  order  which  they 
originally  held."2  There  is,  however,  here  no  real  conflict. 
What  Hamilton  calls  the  Law  of  Redintegration  in  his  edition 
of  Reid  is  evidently  the  same  law  that  he  terms  the  Law  of 
Simultaneity  in  his  Lectures  while  the  Law  of  Repetition  is 
identical  with,  or  rather  included  under,  the  Law  of  Affinity. 
The  same  two  laws  thus  appear  in  both  places,  the  only  dif- 
ference being  that  in  the  Lectures  Hamilton  includes  both 
of  them  under  a  higher  law,  which  in  his  edition  of  Reid 
is  left  unnoticed,  or  rather  is  replaced  by  one  of  a  still 
higher  and  more  abstract  character — the  Law  of  Associa- 
bility.  It  has  been  observed  already  that  Hamilton  was 
not  quite  constant  in  his  employment  of  philosophical  terms.3 
It  is  to  be  added,  however,  that  Hamilton  distinguishes 
in  his  edition  of  Reid  between  what  he  calls  logical  or 
objective,  and  psychological  or  subjective  trains  of  thought. 
It   is  over  the  latter  only   that  the  principle  of  association 

1  Reid,  912  (b).  2  Reid,  913  (a). 

a  I  am  not  sure,  however,  that  the  Law  of  Repetition  might  not  have 
been  dispensed  with.  "When  for  instance,  I  feel  a  peculiar  kind  of  pain 
and  recollect  that  I  felt  it  before,  I  always  remember  some  of  the  circum- 
stances connected  with  the  former  pain,  thus  showing  the  influence  of  the 
Law  of  Simultaneity.  "  It  is  only  similarity  in  the  midst  of  difference," 
nays  Hamilton,  "that  associates"  [Reid,  915  (a)] ;  and  as  soon  as  the 
element  of  difference  is  introduced  we  get  beyond  the  Law  of  Repetition. 


GENERAL  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  HAMILTON.    123 

rules  supreme.     It  is  not  by  means  of  association  of  ideas  that 
we  pass  from  the  premisses  of  a  syllogism  to  its  conclusion; 
for  this  is  a  necessary  sequence,  and  association  is  incompetent 
to  account  for  the  phenomenon  of  necessity.     In  like  manner 
it  is  not  by  the  aid  of  this  principle  that  we  pass  from  one  of 
two  relatives  to  the  other,  for  in  the  thought  of  either  relative 
that  of  the  other  is  necessarily  implied.  There  is  indeed  an  am- 
biguity in  the  language  often  employed  on  this  subject  which  it 
is  necessary  to  clear  up.  Premiss  and  Conclusion,  for  instance,  is 
in  one  sense  a  Law  of  Association  (being  a  special  branch  of  the 
Law  of  Affinity).     Thus,  one  (or  both)  of  the  premisses  from 
which    I    formerly    deduced   a   certain  conclusion,   occurring 
to   my  mind    simply    as    a  judgment   or    proposition,    may 
recall  that  conclusion   under  the  influence  of  the  Principle 
of  Association  ;    but   if  both    premisses  are    present   to    my 
consciousness,    and   I  think   of  them    as  premisses,    it   is  not 
the  Principle  of  Association    that   calls    up    the    conclusion. 
That    is    the    act    of  the  Elaborative    Faculty,    and    an    act 
which  would  equally  take  place  if  I  had   never  drawn  that 
conclusion  from  the  same  premisses   before — an    act  similar 
to    that  which    took    place  when    I    first    inferred  it.      And 
this  conclusion  is  not  one   of  many  mental  states  which  the 
thought  of  the   two   premisses  might  recall  as  more  or  less 
connected  with  them.     It  follows   invariably  and  necessarily, 
provided,  of  course,   that  I   think  of  the  premisses  as  pre- 
misses.   A  train  of  reasoning  can  indeed  be  carried  on  to  a  great 
length  with  little    or  no  aid  from  the  principle  of  Associa- 
tion, assuming  that  the  various  premisses   employed  in  the 
argument  are  brought  before  the  mind  in  some  other  way; 
as,   for  instance,   in   reading  an  argumentative    book.     The 
suggestion  of  the  things  signified  by  the  signs  or  words  em- 
ployed, seems  to  be,  in  that  case,  all  that  is  properly  ascribed 
to  association. 


1 24  SIR    WIL  L I  A  M  HA  MIL  TON. 

Besides  forming-  the  main  subject  of  Logic,  the  considera- 
tion of  the  Elaborative  Faculty  introduces  us  to  the  nature 
of  the  process  of  absti-action   and  the  disputes  between  the 
Nominalists   and  Gonceptualists  on   the   subject  of  General 
Notions  or  Ideas.     According-  to  Hamilton  abstraction  con- 
sists in  converging  our  attention  on  some  parts  of  an  object 
(or  of  a  number  of  objects  present  to  the  mind  simultaneously) 
whilst  not  attending  to  the  remaining  parts.     All  objects  are 
at  first  presented  to  us  vaguely  and  in  confusion.    The  maxim, 
Divide    et    impera,    is    applicable    to   them    all,    and   without 
this  convergence  of  attention  on  portions  of  them  we  can  get 
no  clear  notions  at  all.     Abstraction  is  as  necessary  for  the 
formation  of  the  notion  of  the  individual  as  of  the  class;  for 
in  the  early  confused  state  of  knowledge,  children  are  apt  to 
confound  individuals  not  only  in  name  but  in  reality.     It  is 
by  concentrating  attention  on   the  points  of  difference  that 
children  come  to  distinguish  one  person  from  another,  as  by 
concentrating  attention   on   the  points   of  resemblance   they 
come  to  regard  both  as  men.1     But  the  parts  on  which  atten- 
tion can  thus  be  converged  are  of  two  kinds.     They  may  be 
integrant  parts  of  the  thing,  like  the  arms  and  legs  of  a  man, 
or  they  may  be  modes  or  qualities,  such  as  his  figure,  size, 
and  colour.      Hence  there  are  two  kinds  of  abstraction,  which 
Hamilton  designates  Partial    or    Concrete   Abstraction,  and 
Modal   Abstraction.      The  latter  kind  of    abstraction,  espe- 
cially, seems  to  be  intimately  connected  with  generalization. 
The  general  idea,  or  concept,  is  not  properly  an  idea,  but  that 
part  of  a  perception,  or  idea,  on  which  our  attention  is  con- 

1  Hamilton  often  speaks  of  abstraction  as  a  negative,  not  a  positive  state 
of  mind,  consisting  merely  in  non-attention  to  certain  parts  of  an  object. 
But  non-attention  to  these  parts  necessarily  implies  that  our  attention  is 
converged  on  the  other  parts. 

"  Pluribua  intentus,  minor  est  ad  singula  sensus  " 
and  vice  vcr.sd. 


GENERA  L  PS  YCHOL  OGY  OF  HA  MIL  TON.    1 2  5 

centrated.  It  is  a  mode  of  considering"  ideas — a  point  of 
view  from  which  they  may  be  regarded.  Hence  it  cannot  be 
pictured  in  the  mind  by  itself,  for  it  is  impossible  to  realize  a 
way  of  regarding  things,  except  in  connexion  with  some  of 
the  things  so  regarded.  The  term  Man  indicates  a  way  of 
regarding  John  Smith,  Tom  Brown,  and  every  other  indivi- 
dual to  whom  that  term  is  applicable,  and  it  cannot  be  depicted 
in  imagination  apart  from  some  of  these  individuals.  It 
results,  in  fact,  from  a  comparison  between  a  number  of  sensible 
impressions  by  which  we  separate  the  points  in  which  they 
resemble  each  other  from  those  in  which  they  differ;  but  this 
act  of  comparison  cannot  take  place  unless  we  have  something 
(or  rather,  some  things),  to  compare.  We  can  associate 
this  mode  of  regarding  things  with  a  name,  so  that  when- 
ever the  name  is  pronounced  we  are  reminded  of  the  point 
of  view  from  which  they  are  to  be  considered  ;  but  it  is  this 
mode  of  regarding  things  that  gives  meaning  and  significance 
to  the  name  and  not  vice  versa.  No  name  can  enable  us  to 
regard  things  from  a  point  of  view  which  would  otherwise  be 
impossible.  General  names,  however,  have  this  advantage, 
that  they  are  associated  with  the  things  to  be  compared,  as  well 
as  with  our  mode  of  comparing  them,  and  they  thus  recall 
both  at  once  when  it  is  requisite  to  do  so.  They  recall,  in 
fact,  both  their  denotations  and  their  connotations.  Thus  the 
name  Man  usually  recalls  at  once  one  or  more  individual 
men,  and  at  the  same  time  reminds  us  that  our  attention  is  to 
be  converged  on  the  points  in  which  these  individuals  agree, 
to  the  exclusion  of  those  in  which  they  differ.1  But  the  con- 
cept can  exist  without  the  general  name,  whereas  without  the 
concept,   the  general   name  would  sink  into  a  proper  name, 

1  Or  rather  on  some  of  the  points  in  Avhich  they  agree ;  for  the  men  we 
call  up  in  imagination  usually  agree  in  more  points  than  those  which  are 
connoted  by  the  name  Man. 


1 26  SIR   WILLI  A  M  HA  MIL  TON. 

ambiguously  applied  to  more  than  one  individual.  The  word 
Man,  in  fact,  would,  in  that  case,  mean  John  when  applied  to 
John,  and  Peter  when  applied  to  Peter;  and  being  thus 
subject  to  greater  ambiguities  and  inconveniences  than  ordi- 
nary proper  names,  it  would  very  soon  sink  into  disuse. 
When  the  true  character  of  the  concept  is  thus  explained, 
Hamilton  thinks  the  dispute  between  Nominalism  and  Con- 
ceptualism  is  at  an  end.  When  the  Conceptualists  affirmed 
the  existence  of  General  Ideas,  they  were  supposed  by  their 
opponents  to  mean  General  Intuitions,  or  General  Images 
(Imaginations),  which  do  not  exist.  When  the  Nomi- 
nalists denied  the  existence  of  General  Ideas,  their  opponents 
understood  them  as  denying  that  there  were  any  General 
Concepts,  in  which  case  all  generalization  would  be  impos- 
sible. Both  were  really  agreed  that  there  are  no  General 
Intuitions  or  Images,  but  that  there  are  General  Concepts. 
That  some  of  the  disputes  between  the  Nominalists  and  the 
Conceptualists  turned  on  the  ambiguity  thus  signalised  by 
Sir  William  Hamilton,  cannot,  I  think,  be  doubted;  but  it 
may  be  questioned  whether  all  of  them  did  so.  There  is,  in  fact, 
no  controversy  with  regard  to  which  it  is  more  difficult  to 
ascertain  what  was  the  precise  point  in  dispute.  Some  Nomi- 
nalists (for  instance,  Berkeley)  denied  the  possibility  of  the 
process  which  Hamilton  terms  Modal  Abstraction;  but  the 
existence  of  that  process  has  been  admitted  by  so  many  pro- 
fessed  Nominalists,  that  it  would  almost  seem  a  paradox  to 
say  that  its  possibility  was  the  principal  subject  in  dispute, 
ll  this  distinction  were  adopted,  Hamilton  should  be  classed 
as  a  Conceptualist.  His  own  statement  of  the  question,  in 
his  Lectures  is  this:  Can  we  form  an  adequate  idea  of 
that  which  is  denoted  by  an  abstract,  or  abstract  and  general, 
term  ?  '  Hut  as  he  apparently  answers  this  question  in  the 
1  Lect.  ii.  296.     Jiut  is  there  not  at  least  as  good  reason  for  putting  the 


GENERAL  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  HAMLLTON.    127 

negative,  we  can  hardly  suppose  that  he  thought  it  was  really 
the  point  in  dispute,  since  he  elsewhere  represents  the  de- 
ferences hetween  the  contestants  as  purely  verbal.  How- 
ever, the  question,  as  thus  stated,  is  by  no  means  free  from 
ambiguity.  For  what  is  meant  by  the  word  "  idea,"  and  what 
is  meant  by  the  word  "adequate"?  If  the  idea  of  a  class 
is  required  to  be  adequate  not  only  to  the  class,  but  to  every 
sub-class  and  even  to  every  individual  comprised  in  it,  such 
an  idea  is  doubtless  impossible;  nor,  probably,  had  Locke  any 
intention  of  asserting  the  contrary,  in  the  passage  of  his  Essay 
so  often  cited  on  the  subject.  But  if  we  regard,  the  idea  of  a 
class  as  adequate  whenever  it  is  sufficient  to  distinguish  that 
class  from  every  other  class,  whether  higher,  lower,  or  co-ordi- 
nate, then  there  is  no  reason  why  we  should  not  have  an  ade- 
quate idea  of  that  which  is  denoted,  by  a  general  term.  If  my 
idea  of  a  triangle  was  adequate  to  the  sub-class  right-angled 
triangle,  this  would  not  be  a  perfection  but  a  blemish.  Con- 
sidered as  a  representation  of  the  class  which  it  was  intended 
to  represent,  it  would  be,  not  adequate  but,  redundant.  Pro- 
bably, no  one  ever  has  an  adequate — meaning  by  that  term  a 
complete,  or  perfect — idea  of  the  extension  of  a  general  term; 
but  there  is  no  reason  why  he  should  not  have  an  adequate 
idea  of  its  comprehension.  Hamilton's  discussion  of  the 
entire  subject  is,  however,  confessedly  incomplete,  since  he 
does  not  even  attempt  to  carry  out  in  full  the  design  which 
he  states  when  introducing  the  subject.1  He  seems  to  have 
finally  decided  on  devoting  most  of  the  time  at  his  disposal  to 
a  refutation  of  the  theory  of  Brown,  and  we  are  thus  pre- 

question  in  tbe  form  :  Can  we  form  an  adequate  idea  of  that  which  is 
«>«noted  by  a  general  term?  Possibly  Hamilton  intended  to  include  this, 
for  he  does  not  seem  to  have  employed  the  word  rfenote  in  the  limited 
signification — as  contra-distinguished  from  the  word  connote — in  which  it 
is  used  by  Mr.  Mill. 
1  Lect.  ii.  296. 


128  SIR    WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 


sented  with  the  negative  rather  than  the  positive  side  of  his 
doctrine.1 

Connected  with  this  subject  is  Hamilton's  Theory  of 
Judgments/  which  has  also  been  severely  criticised.  It 
is  certainly  wanting  in  that  clearness  and  precision  which 
we  usually  meet  with  in  his  writings,  but  his  critics 
will  find  it  no  easy  task  to  convict  our  author  of  any 
positive  error.  The  theory  is  developed  at  greater  length  in 
the  Lectures  on  Logic  than  in  those  on  Metaphysics,  and  in 
both  cases  the  exposition  includes  numerous  quotations  from 
other  authors,  in  making  which  Hamilton  does  not  seem  to 
have  paused  to  point  out  that  they  were  not  always  using 
psychological  terms  in  his  own  restricted  meaning.  Nay, 
in  some  instances,  when  commenting  on  these  passages,  he 
seems  to  have  slided  into  employing  these  terms  in  the  vaguer 
sense  of  the  authors  whom  he  is  citing.  Thus,  in  the  Lectures 
on  Metaphysics,  he  quotes  with  approbation  from  Crousaz, 
"  Every  time  we  judge,  we  compare  a  total  conception  with  a 
partial,  and  we  recognize  that  the  latter  really  forms  a  part 
of  the  former;"  3  in  commenting  on  which  Hamilton  remarks 
"  Judgment  is  conversant  with  two  notions,  one  of  which  is 
contained  in  the  other."4  (The  italics  are  mine.)  Now 
undoubtedly  if  the  words  "  conception "  (or  concept)  and 
"  notion  M  are  here  taken  in  their  strict  sense,  these  descriptions 

1  From  the  pleasure  which  Hamilton  expresses  in  one  of  his  letters  to 
Cousin  at  finding  that  Abelard  was  a  Conceptualist,  it  would  seem  that  at 
that  time  he  preferred  the  Coneeptualistie  doctrine.  See  Professor 
Witch's  Memoir  of  Hamilton,  p.  199. 

2  Judgment  according  to  Hamilton  is  involved  in  every  act  of  conscious- 
ness, since  there  is  always  a  contrast  and  discrimination  of  two  things 
at  least.  The  remarks  in  the  text  are  confined  to  those  judgments 
which  may  be  translated  into  propositions  with  a  suhject  and  predicate 
or  to  what  Dean  Mansel  terms  logical  (as  opposed  to  psychological)  judg- 
ments. 

a  Lect.  Li.  336.  4  Lect.  ii.  337. 


GENERA  L  PS  YCHOL  OGY  OF  HA  MIL  TON.    1 25 

are  objectionable.  The  conception  or  notion  ruminant,  f'oi 
instance,  is  not  contained  in  the  conception  or  notion  cloven- 
footed,  or  vice  versa:  and  when  I  judge  that  all  ruminating 
animals  are  cloven-footed,  the  subject  is  not  a  total  conception 
which  I  compare  with  a  partial  conception  (the  predicate),  nor 
do  I  find  that  the  conception  cloven-footed  is  really  a  part  of 
the  conception  ruminant  or  ruminating  animal.1  Thus  under- 
stood, the  description  of  Crousaz  would  in  fact  only  be  correct 
if  all  judgments  were  what  Kant  termed  Analytical  or  Expli- 
cative judgments.  But  Hamilton  did  not,  nor  probably  did 
Crousaz,  intend  to  convey  this  meaning.  For  Hamilton 
expressly  tells  us  that  this  relation  of  whole  and  part  may 
exist  between  the  extensions,  as  well  as  between  the  compre- 
hensions, of  the  two  conceptions  or  notions,  and  he  even 
thinks  he  has  made  a  valuable  addition  to  the  science  of 
Logic,  by  distinguishing  between  reasoning  in  comprehension 
and  reasoning  in  extension.  Now  if  the  words  conception 
and  notion  are  understood  strictly,  it  is  absurd  to  speak  of  two 
notions  or  conceptions  standing  to  each  other  in  the  relation  of 
whole  and  part,  because  their  extensions  do  so.  The  notion 
Black  is  not  a  part  of  the  notion  Man,  nor  is  the  notion  Man 
a  part  of  the  notion  Black,  because  these  two  notions  happen 
to  have,  to  a  certain  extent,  a  common  extension.  Considered 
merely  as  notions,  there  is  no  other  relation  between  the  notion 

1  Unless  we  use  the  terms  "  conception  "  and  "  notion  "  to  include  all 
(known)  properties  of  the  class  and  not  merely  those  which  are  connoted 
by  class-name — which  certainly  was  not  Hamilton's  ordinary  use  of 
terms  in  question.  In  this  extended  meaning,  cloven-feet  being  a  (known) 
property  of  the  class  ruminant,  forms  a  part  of  the  notion  or  conception 
ruminant,  and  rumination  being  a  (known)  property  of  the  class  cloven- 
footed,  forms  a  part  of  the  notion  or  conception  cloven-footed.  Ruminan 
and  cloven-footed  are  in  fact,  on  this  theory,  two  names  for  the  same  notion 
or  conception.  This  use  of  language,  however,  seems  to  me  very  con 
fusing  and  productive  of  no  benefit. 


1 30  SIR    WILL  I  A  M  HA  MIL  TON. 

Black  and  the  notion  Man,  than  between  the  notion  Green 
and  the  notion  Man,  nor  could  the  mere  comparison  of  notions 
or  conceptions  lead  us  to  form  any  judgment  as  to  the  con- 
nexion of  the  former  pair  which  was  not  equally  applicable  to 
the  latter.  Hamilton,  therefore,  must  be  understood  in  these 
and  similar  passages  as  using  the  words  Conception,  Notion, 
Thought,  &c,  in  a  signification  wide  enough  to  include  the 
extension  as  well  as  the  comprehension  of  the  terms  which 
form  the  predicate  and  subject  of  a  proposition  :  and  of  course 
when  he  speaks  of  comparing  concepts  or  notions,  we  must 
equally  understand  him  as  referring  to  the  comparison  of  their 
extensions,  no  less  than  of  their  comprehensions.  The  former 
comparison  may  have  originally  been  the  work  of  experience, 
but  when  the  requisite  experience  has  once  been  attained,  it 
may  not  be  necessary  to  go  beyond  the  comprehension  and 
extension  of  the  terms  (as  recalled  to  the  mind  by  the 
enouncement  of  the  proposition),  to  enable  us  to  judge  that 
the  proposition  is  true.  To  this,  perhaps,  I  ought  to  add  that 
judgment  does  not  of  itself  imply  belief.  A  judgment  must 
be  present  to  the  mind  in  order  to  be  doubted  or  disbelieved. 
Logic,  as  Mr  Mill  has  well  remarked,  does  not  concern  itself 
with  the  act  of  belief  but  with  that  which  is  believed,1  or 
rather  perhaps  he  should  have  said,  with  that  which  is  proposed 
or  tendered  for  belief.  That  which  is  proposed  for  belief  is  a 
judgment  or  proposition:  and  even  if  it  be  true  that  when 
believed,  it  is  believed  on  the  evidence  of  experience,  the 
judgment  itself,  as  distinguished  from  the  belief  in  it,  may  be 
the  result  of  a  mere  comparison  of  concepts  (in  the  strict 
si  use)  by  the  Elaborative  Faculty.  I  doubt,  however,  whether 
Hamilton  would  have  given  this  explanation  of  some  of  the 
expressions   I   have  cited   from  him.     The  real  source  of  the 

1  Lopic  i.  96  (8th  edition).    The  observation  is  hardly  consistent  with 

BDinc  of  his  criticisms  on  the  Hamiltonian  theory  of  judgment. 


GENERA  L  PS  YCHOLOG  Y  OF  HA  MIL  TON.    1 3 1 

difficulty  in  Following  his  exposition  is,  I  believe,  that  he  has 
entirely  omitted  to  signalize  the  distinction  between  Ana- 
lytical and  Synthetical  Judgments  in  connexion  with  it 
(he  has  noticed  it  elsewhere),  and  this  omission  taken  in 
connexion  with  the  loose  employment  of  the  terms  con- 
ception or  concept  and  notion  has  left  his  expressions  open 
to  much  misconstruction.1 

The  sole  operation  of  the  Elaborative  Faculty  is  comparison. 
When  this  comparison  is  made  between  two  concepts,  the 
result  is  a  Judgment.  Of  concepts,  considered  in  pairs,  the 
great  division  is  into  Congruent  or  Agreeing  (that  is  concepts 
which  can  be  united  in  thought)  and  ConHictive,  or 
those  which  cannot.  Hamilton  gives  this  as  a  division  of 
concepts  "considered  under  their  comprehension/''  so  that, 
apparently,  he  could  not  refer  to  the  extension  of  the  concepts 
to  determine  whether  they  were  congruent  or  connective : 
and  as  the  two  sub-classes  include  the  whole  class  to  be 
divided,  all  concepts  which  are  not  connective  must  be  treated 
as  congruent.  The  conflict  between  the  different  elements  of 
a  concept,  however,  may  be  only  mediate,  and  may  therefore 
require  considerable  pains  to  detect.  On  this  division  depends 
Hamilton's  fuller  expression  of  the  Theory  of  Judgments.  To 
judge  is,  according  to  him,  "to  recognize  the  relation  of  con- 
gruence or  confliction   in  which  two  concepts,  two  individual 

1  Hamilton  evidently  was  not  quite  satisfied  with  his  own  language  on 
the  subject.  Thus  Lect.  iii.  140,  he  makes  applicability  to  an  indefinite 
plurality  of  objects  (extension)  a  characteristic  of  every  concept,  and  speaks 
of  extensive  quantity  as  essential  to  it.  But  in  a  note  he  suggests  as  a 
"  better  (?)  "  division,  "1.  B3-  relation  to  themselves,  the}' "  [concepts] 
"  have  the  quantity  of  comprehension  ;  2.  By  relation  to  their  objects,  they 
have  the  quantity  of  extension,"  &c;  thus  apparently  describing  the  former 
quantity  alone  as  intrinsic  and  essential,  and  the  latter  as  accidental  and 
dependent  on  the  constitution  of  the  objective  world.  See  also  the  passage, 
Lect.  iii.  218,  which  is  quoted  at  pp.  147-8  of  this  book. 

K  2 


132  SIR    WILLIAM' HAMILTON. 

things,  or  a  concept  and  an  individual  compared  together, 
stand  to  each  other;"1  and  of  course  in  the  more  important 
cases,  the  relation  is  recognized  as  existing  between  two  con- 
cepts. When  the  relation  thus  recognized  between  the  subject 
and  the  predicate  is  one  of  congruence,  we  unite  the  two  into 
a  single  thought,  and  this  thought  is  a  judgment.  We 
cannot  unite  the  two  concepts  into  a  single  concept  or  notion 
without  making  them  the  subject  and  predicate  of  a  judgment, 
nor  can  we  make  them  the  subject  and  predicate  of  a  judg- 
ment without  uniting  them  into  a  single  notion.  Congruent 
concepts  being  those  which  are  capable  of  being  so  united, 
become  the  subject  and  predicate  of  an  affirmative  judgment 
when  we  bring  them  together,  while  connective  concepts 
equally  fall  into  the  position  of  subject  and  predicate  in  a 
neg-ative  judgment.  A  further  explication  of  the  process, 
however,  would  here  be  desirable;  for,  to  deal  with  affirmative 
judgments  only,  it  is  evident  that  the  concepts  described  by 
Hamilton  as  congruent  may  be  of  two  different  kinds.  They 
may  be  such  as  we  must  necessarily  unite  in  thought,  or  such 
as  we  may  or  may  not  unite  according  to  circumstances.-2 
Man  and  Animal  are  concepts  of  the  former  kind.  The  com- 
prehension of  the  concept  Animal  being  part  of  the  com- 
prehension of  the  concept  Man,  we  see  at  once  that  the  latter 
concept  is  inseparable  from  the  former.  They  are  so  con- 
gruent that  we  cannot  help  judging  and  believing  that  all 
men  are  animals.  But  the  concept  Man  and  the  concept 
Ten-feet-high  are  congruent  in  a  different  sense.  They  are 
cajjable  of  being  united  in  thought,  but  we  are  not  under  any 

1  Lect.  iii.  225-G. 

1  This  distinction  is  indeed  essential  to  a  philosophy  which,  like  Hamil- 
ton's, distinguishes  between  a  priori  and  «  posteriori — necessary  and 
empirical  judgments.  And  as  we  shall  see,  it  is  recognized  by  Hamilton 
in  his  divisions  of  concepts,  though  he  does  not  cany  it  on  to  his  theory 
of  judgments. 


GENERAL  PS  YCHOL  OG  Y  OF  HA  MIL  TON.    133 

necessity  of  uniting"  them  :  or  if  it  be  said  that  whenever  con- 
cepts capable  of  being"  united  in  thought  are  brought  together 
in  the  mind,  we  in  fact  unite  them  and  form  a  judgment;  we 
are  at  all  events  under  no  necessity  of  believing  the  judgment 
so  formed,  and  may  indeed  doubt  or  disbelieve  it.  If  we 
judged  universally  that  all  men  are  ten  feet  high  or  that  all 
objects  ten  feet  high  are  men,  these  judgments  would  be 
disbelieved  as  inconsistent  with  the  most  ordinary  experience. 
But  if  we  judged  that  some  men  are  ten  feet  high,  there  are 
recorded  instances  of  giants  approaching  sufficiently  near  to 
that  standard  to  render  the  proposition  credible,  and  theproper 
position  of  the  mind  in  regard  to  it  would  probably  be  one 
of  doubt.  Hamilton  however  has  omitted  to  notice  this 
distinction  in  his  theory  of  judgments,  and  often  speaks  as  if 
the  recognition  of  the  congruence  of  two  concepts  (that  is,  of 
their  capability  of  being  united  in  thought)  was  sufficient  not 
only  for  the  formation  of  the  judgment,  but  also  for  our  belief 
in  it.  He  had  three  courses  open  to  him,  none  of  which  he 
seems  to  have  definitely  adopted.  First,  he  might  have  defined 
congruent  concepts  not  as  those  which  may,  but  as  those  which 
must,  be  united  in  thought :  in  which  case,  however,  he  could 
not  divide  all  concepts  into  the  two  classes  congruent  and 
conflictive  without  denying  the  possibility  of  synthetical  or 
ampliative  judgments  a  posteriori.  Secondly,  he  might  have 
expressly  told  us  that  he  was  merely  considering  judgments 
or  propositions  in  themselves,  as  distinguished  from  the  belief 
in  them,  and  that  the  recognition  of  the  congruence  of  two 
concepts  was  sufficient  for  the  formation  of  a  judgment, 
though  not  for  our  acceptance  of  it  as  true.  Or  lastly,  he 
might  have  stated  that  in  order  to  form  a  judgment,  the  two 
concepts  compared  must  be  congruent  in  their  extensions,  and 
that  this  congruence  of  extensions  required  that  they  should 
be  capable  of  being  united  not  merely  in  thought  but  also  in 


134  SIR   WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 

presentation.  The  last  solution  I  suspect  approaches  most 
nearly  to  Hamilton's  real  opinions.  But,  in  fact,  the  division 
of  concepts  into  congruent  and  conflictive  is  objectionable. 
There  are  three  classes  of  concepts  not  two,  viz.  those  which 
must  be  united  in  thought,  those  which  cannot,  and  those 
which  may  or  may  not,  according  to  circumstances.1  With 
regard  to  this  latter  class  a  partial  uniting  and  partial  dis- 
uniting often  takes  place  simultaneously.  We  judge  simul- 
taneously that  Some  Men  are  Black  and  Some  Men  are  not 
Black;  and  if  we  are  to  base  the  distinction  of  judgments 
into  affirmative  and  negative  upon  the  division  of  concepts  into 
congruent  and  conflictive,  we  must  apparently  describe  the 
concepts  Man  and  Black  as  both  congruent  and  conflictive. 

Elsewhere,  as  we  have  seen,  he  describes  the  relation  be- 
tween the  concepts  which  form  the  subject  and  predicate  of  a 
judgment  as  one  of  whole  and  part,  and  hence  he  has  some- 
times been  understood  as  asserting  that  two  concepts  were 
only  congruent  when  one  formed  a  part  of  the  other.  But  in 
the  face  of  his  explicit  statements  that  this  relation  of  whole  and 
part  may  exist  between  the  extensions  of  the  two  concepts,  this 
interpretation  seems  inadmissible.  That  the  relation  of  whole 
and  part  exists  between  the  extensions  of  the  subject  and  pre- 
dicate of  an  affirmative  proposition  is  undeniable,  at  least, 
if  we  use  the  word  "  part  "  in  a  sense  wide  enough  to  take  in 
the  case  of  two  co-extensive  or  coincident  wholes.  Every  B 
is  C,  asserts  that  the  extension  of  B  is  a  part  of  the  extension 
of  C.  Thus  explained  the  theory  appears  unobjectionable.  The 
difficulty  is  to  reconcile  it  with  the  previous  theory  of  con- 
gruence.    \i  the   comprehensions  of  two  concepts  are  quite 

1  Accordingly,  before  dividing  concepts  into  congruent  and  conflic- 
tive, Hamilton  divides  them  into  Identical  (or  ratlier  Cognate)  and 
Different;  bnl  be  seems  to  have  forgotten  the  former  division  when  he 
came  to  treat,  of  judgments,  though  it  is  on  it  that  Analytical  Judgments 
should  apparently  have  been  based.     See  p.  144. 


GENERAL  PS  YCHOL OG  Y  OF  HAMIL  TON.    135 

distinct  from,  but  not  inconsistent  with,  each  other,  are  these 
concepts  to  be  classed  as  congruent  or  as  connective,  accord- 
ing" as  we  find  by  experience  that  the  extension  of  one  does  or 
does  not  form  a  part  of  the  extension  of  the  other?  Possibly 
Hamilton  might  have  replied  that  in  the  extension  of  a  concept 
he  included  its  imaginary,  as  well  as  its  real,  extension — that 
under  the  concept  Serpent,  for  instance,  he  included  dragons 
as  well  as  really  existing  serpents — and  that  any  two  concepts 
that  could  be  united  in  thought  must  possess  an  imaginary,  if 
not  a  real,  extension  in  common.  He  sometimes  speaks, 
however,  as  if  the  relation  of  whole  and  part  in  extension 
always  corresponded  (though,  of  course,  inversely)  with  the 
same  relation  in  comprehension.  He  speaks  as  if  the  truth 
of  the  proposition  Every  B  is  C  implied  that  the  comprehension 
of  the  concept  B  contains  or  includes  the  comprehension  of  the 
concept  C.  Thus  Man  is  Two-legged  means,  according  to 
Hamilton,  either  that  (the  concept)  Man  includes  the  attri- 
bute Two-legged,  or  that  (the  class)  Man  is  included  in  the 
class  Two-legged  (or  as  in  this  case  he  prefers  to  write  it,  the 
class   Biped),1  aud   he  employs  this  instance  to  explain  the 

1  Hamilton's  distinction  between  judgments  in  comprehension,  and 
judgments  in  extension  seems  of  little  importance.  Every  judgment  can, 
as  he  tells  us,  be  read  in  both  ways.  But  when  the  predicate  is  an  adjective, 
our  attention  is  more  immediately  directed  to  its  comprehension  as  an 
attribute  belonging  to,  or  as  Hamilton  would  say,  contained  or  included 
in,  the  subject ;  while  when  the  predicate  is  a  substantive,  our  attention 
is  chiefly  directed  to  its  extension,  as  a  class  containing  or  including  the 
subject  under  it.  In  the  English  language  the  subject  is  always  a 
substantive,  and  thus  its  extension,  rather  than  its  comprehension,  would 
seem  to  be  always  the  primary  object  of  attention  ;  but  Hamilton  seems 
to  think  that  in  this  respect  it  follows  the  predicate,  so  that  when  the 
predicate  is  an  adjective,  the  judgment  primarily  expresses  the  relation 
between  the  comprehensions  of  the  two  concepts,  while  when  the  predicate 
is  a  substantive,  the  judgment  primarily  expresses  the  relation  between 
their  extensions.     And  he  sometimes  describes  this  relation  in  both  cases 


136  SIR    WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 

nature  not  of  Analytical  or  Explicative  Judgments  in  particu- 
lar, but  of  judgments  in  general.  We  can  hardly  suppose  that 
in  this  and  similar  passages,  he  employs  the  term  concept  and 
its  equivalents  in  the  vague  sense  in  which  they  refer  to  the 
extension  as  well  as  the  comprehension  of  the  general  name, 
for  he  is  speaking  of  the  relations  which  exist  between  the 
comprehensions  of  the  subject  and  the  predicate.1  There  is 
indeed  one  mode  of  interpretation  in  which  we  may  regard 
the  comprehensions  of  the  subjects  and  predicates  of  all 
affirmative  propositions  as  standing  to  each  other  in  the 
relation  of  whole  and  part.  We  may  understand  All  Men  are 
Mortal  as  a  short  expression  for  All  Men  are  Mortal-men,  and 
All  B  is  C  as  a  short  expression  for  All  B  is  C-B.  In  this 
case  the  comprehension  of  the  predicate  is  always  a  whole  of 
which  the  comprehension  of  the  subject  is  a  part,  an.d,  under- 
standing part  in  the  wide  sense  already  mentioned,  the  corre- 
sponding relations  as  regards  extension  would  also  hold  good. 
This,  however,  cannot  be  Hamilton's  meaning,  for  he  states 
that  in  comprehension  the  subject  is  the  whole  and  the  pre- 
dicate the  part.  I  cannot,  therefore,  profess  to  have  given  a 
complete  explanation,  or  complete  defence,  of  the  theory. 
There  can  be  no  doubt,  however,  that  if  Hamilton  had  written 
a  formal  treatise  on  Logic  after  he  had  adopted  the  theory 
of  the  Quantification  of  the  Predicate,  this  part  of  his  exposi- 
tion would  have  been  largely  altered.  As  regards  extension,  at 
least  this  latter  theory  abolishes  the  relation  of  whole  and  part, 


as  one  of  whole  and  part,  though,  of  course,  the  wholes  and  parts  are 
inverted  when  we  pass  from  comprehension  to  extension  or  vice  versd. 

1  Nay,  the  quantity  of  extension  is  sometimes  even  made  to  depend  on 
th.it  of  comprehension.  See  Lect.  iii.,  218.  But  perhaps  Hamilton  is 
there  Bpeaking  of  the  comprehension  and  extension  of  a  single  concept, 
rather  than  <>f  the  mutual  relations  of  two  concepts  in  comprehension 
and  extension. 


GENERAL  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  HAMILTON.    137 

and  replaces  it  by  one  of  equation,  or  rather  identification. 
The  subject  will  be  dealt  with  in  the  next  chapter. 

In  Hamilton's  discussion  of  the  Feeling's  or  Emotions  the 
only  point  specially  worthy  of  notice  is  his  Theory  of  Pleasure 
and  Pain.  Pleasure,  according  to  him,  always  accompanies 
the  exercise  of  a  perfect  energy,  while  pain  similarly  attends 
on  an  imperfect  one.  Instead  of  "  energy/'  we  might  perhaps 
substitute  "  state  of  consciousness  j"  for  Hamilton  tells  us 
that  he  uses  the  former  term  to  include  mixed  states  of  action 
and  passion,  while  he  is  of  opinion  that  no  state  of  conscious- 
ness is  purely  passive.  The  imperfection  of  an  energy  is  two- 
fold— it  may  be  repressed  or  over-strained — it  may  be  in 
excess  or  in  defect — and  this  again  may  be  an  excess  or  defect 
either  in  degree  or  in  duration.  Nay,  since  the  mind  is  capa- 
ble of  exerting  more  than  one  energy,  and  of  attending-  to  more 
than  one  object,  at  the  same  time,  a  third  kind  of  imperfection 
is  possible.  The  mind  may  either  attempt  to  embrace  too 
many  things  at  once,  or  the  objects  of  consciousness  may  be 
too  few  to  occupy  it  fully.  In  either  of  these  cases  the  result- 
ing feeling-  is  painful.  But  in  all  cases  when  the  energy  is 
spontaneous  and  unimpeded  it  is  pleasurable.  When  forced 
or  impeded  it  is  painful. 

This  theory,  like  many  others,  has  been  made  the  subject  of 
adverse  criticism.  What,  it  is  asked,  is  the  test  of  the  per- 
fection of  an  energy  ?  And  if  no  test  can  be  assigned  except 
the  resulting  pleasure,  then  it  is  said  that  the  law  in  question 
is  a  merely  verbal  one.  Pleasure  is  the  concomitant  (or  the 
effect)  of  a  perfect  energy,  simply  because  we  only  call  the 
energy  perfect  when  pleasure  results  from  it ;  and  pain  is 
likewise  the  concomitant  of  an  imperfect  energy,  merely  be- 
cause when  the  energy  results  in  pain  we  choose  to  call  it  im- 
perfect. But  there  seem  to  be  some  consequences  of  the 
theory  by  which  its  truth  may  be  tested,  and  an  examination 


138  SIR    WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 


of  these  results  will  be  found,  on  the  whole,  favourable  to  it. 
First  it  follows  from  the  theory,  that  every  pleasurable  feeling" 
or  state  of  consciousness  will  become  painful  if  its  intensity  is 
sufficiently  increased,  or  its  duration  sufficiently  prolonged. 
This  appears  to  be  the  case  ;  and  it  will  also  be  admitted  that 
when  we  are  bent  on  any  particular  kind  of  enjoyment  the 
constant  intrusion  of  fresh  ideas  is  a  source  of  annoyance,  even 
though  we  might  have  derived  pleasure  from  them  under 
different  circumstances.  An  excess  in  the  extensive  quantity 
of  our  mental  energies  is  thus  disagreeable.  Secondly,  it 
follows  that  every  pleasurable  feeling  may  be  so  weakened,  or 
so  shortened  in  duration,  as  to  be  productive  of  pain  instead  of 
pleasure.  Where,  however,  it  is  weakened,  it  will  only  produce 
this  painful  feeling  provided  it  continues  to  be  the  principal 
object  on  which  our  attention  is  concentrated ;  for  if  it  is 
allowed  to  slip  into  the  background  while  a  new  and  interest- 
ing object  occupies  the  foreground,  the  resulting  feeling  will, 
on  the  whole,  be  one  of  pleasure.  In  general  the  extensive 
quantity  of  our  mental  energies  must  always  be  taken  into 
account,  as  well  as  their  intensive  and  protensive  quantities. 
With  this  qualification  our  second  consequence  seems  to  be 
verified  by  experience.  The  abrupt  termination  of  a  plea- 
surable feeling,  while  still  tolerably  intense,  is  always  painful, 
though  the  feeling  which  causes  the  interruption  may  not  be 
so  in  its  own  character  :  and  there  is  hardly,  for  instance,  an 
agreeable  article  of  food  which  may  not  be  rendered  unpleasant 
by  simply  diluting  if  with  a  sufficient  quantity  of  a  tasteless 
fluid  like  water.1  A  third  consequence  of  the  theory  is  that 
many    painful    feelings  will  become  pleasurable    when    their 

1  Brevity,  it  lias  been  remarked,  is  the  soul  of  wit ;  and  how  often  is 
the  pleasure  which  we  derive  from  some  terse  and  powerful  sentence, 
changed  t<>  disgusi  no  reading  a  lengthy  paraphrase.  These  facts  admit 
<>f  t  lir  same  explanation. 


GENERAL  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  HAMILTON.   139 

intensity  is  sufficiently  lessened,  or  their  duration  sufficiently 
diminished ;  that  many  others  will  become  pleasurable  when 
their  intensity  or  duration  is  sufficiently  increased  ;  and  that 
all  painful  feelings  will  fall  either  into  the  former  or  the 
latter  of  these  classes.  Here  again  a  good  deal  may  be  said 
for  the  theory,  though  much  remains  to  be  done  before  all 
pains  can  be  brought  under  either  of  our  classes.  It  is  to  be 
recollected,  however,  that  some  of  our  feelings  have  got  no 
names  unless  they  exist  in  a  degree  which  is  painful — a 
fact  which  sometimes  gives  the  Hamiltonian  theory  an  ap- 
pearance of  paradox.  It  would  sound  very  startling  to  allege,  for 
instance,  that  a  toothache  might  be  so  diminished  in  intensity 
as  to  produce  pleasure  instead  of  pain  ;  yet  I  am  not  sure  that 
we  do  not  feel  a  pleasurable  sensation  in  the  tooth  just  as  the 
toothache  is  ceasing.  A  pleasure  of  this  kind  is  sometimes  re- 
ferred to  contrast,  or  relied  on  to  prove  that  pleasure  is  the  mere 
negation  or  the  absence  of  pain  ;  but  it  may  also  be  accounted 
for,  by  supposing  that  the  sensation  which  had  been  painful 
passes  through  a  pleasurable  stage  before  finally  vanishing.1  It 
may  be  said,  indeed,  that  on  Hamilton's  theory  it  ought  to 
pass  through  a  second  painful  stage  before  its  disappearance. 
But  this  is  only  true,  as  already  remarked,  when  it  continues 
to  be  the  principal  object  of  attention.  The  feebleness  of  an 
energy  produces  no  painful  results,  if  other  energies  of  a  more 
vigorous  character  are  simultaneously  present.  It  may  be 
observed  that,  if  true,  the  Hamiltonian  theory  would  afford  a 
scientific  basis  for  the  precepts  frequently  laid  down  by  practical 

1  After  severe  pain  or  any  great  over-straining  of  our  powers,  their 
spontaneous  degree  of  energy — that  degree  which  alone  produces  pleasure 
— will  be  unusually  low.  The  pleasurable  degree  of  a  sensation  or  other 
feeling  will  in  such  cases  be  not  far  removed  from  the  vanishing  point. 
If  it  falls  lower  than  this — when  on  Hamilton's  theory  it  should  again 
become  disagreeable — it  very  soon  sinks  into  latency. 


HO  SIR   WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 

Moralists.  It  would  prove  that  moderation  is  the  true  road  to 
earthly  happiness,  and  that  if  pleasure  is  pursued  too  ardently 
and  too  exclusively  it  will  not  be  attained.  Work,  but  not 
over-work,  would  seem  to  be  the  most  pleasurable  condition  for 
mankind.  These  observations  will,  I  trust,  satisfy  the  reader 
that  the  theory  in  question,  whether  true  or  not,  is  not  merely 
verbal  or  unimportant. 


CHAPTER   VII. 

LOGIC. 

In  dealing  with  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  theory  of  judgments  I 
have,  to  a  certain  extent,  anticipated  his  views  on  the  subject 
of  Logic.  He  adopted  a  strictly  formal  view  of  the  nature  of 
that  science  which  he  defines  as  "  the  science  of  the  laws 
of  thought,  as  thought,"  or  the  science  of  "  the  formal  laws 
of  thought" — those  laws  of  thought  which  are  alike  appli- 
cable to  all  the  products  of  the  thinking  faculty,  which  are  not 
limited  to  any  special  subject-matter,  and  which  are  universal 
and  necessary.  Thought,  which  forms  the  subject-matter  of 
the  science,  is  to  be  distinguished  both  from  the  presentations 
of  the  senses  and  the  representations  of  the  imagination.  It 
is  a  general  name  for  the  products  of  the  Elaborative  Faculty, 
as  described  in  the  Lectures  on  Metaphysics — a  faculty  whose 
sole  function  is  comparison,  and  whose  three  great  products 
are  Conceptions  (or  rather  Concepts),  Judgments  and  Reason- 
ings. As  the  mental  operations  can  seldom  be  wholly  sepa- 
rated from  each  other,  an  act  of  thought  in  which  no  other 
faculty  has  intervened  may,  perhaps,  be  impossible,  and  the 
laws  and  limitations  of  other  mental  faculties  operate  con- 
jointly with  the  laws  of  thought  in  almost  all  the  products  of 
that  faculty  :  but  though  some  account  of  these  may  be  taken 
in  what  is  termed  Modified  Logic,  in  Pure  Logic  we  must 
abstract  from  them  altogether.  A  concept  is  a  general  notion, 
the  nature  of  which  had  been  already  explained  in  the  Lectures 


142  SIR    WILLI  A  M  HA  MIL  TON. 


on  Metaphysics ;  a  judgment,  as  we  have  also  seen,  expresses 
a  relation  of  congruence  or  confliction  between  two  concepts  \ 
and  a  reasoning  again  arises  from  a  combination  of  two 
judgments.  Such  are  the  products  of  thought  with  which 
Logic  deals,  and  the  formal  laws  which  govern  the  several 
operations  of  thought  are  the  principles  of  Identity,  Contra- 
diction (or  Non-contradiction),  and  Excluded  Middle,  which 
Hamilton  regards  as  three  different  phases  of  the  same  funda- 
mental law.  To  these,  in  his  Lectures  on  Logic,  he  adds  the 
principle  of  Sufficient  Reason,  or  of  Reason  and  Consequent — 
to  which  he  attributes  the  form  of  the  Hypothetical  Syllogism.1 
In  his  Discussions,  however,  he  states  that  the  only  principle 
of  Sufficient  Reason  which  should  be  employed  in  Logic  is 
derived  from  the  other  three,  to  which  we  may  therefore  con- 
fine our  attention.2  They  apply  alike  to  concepts,  judgments, 
and  reasonings,  but  their  application  to  the  two  former  is  not 
so  obvious,  and  it  cannot  be  said  that  Hamilton  has  fully 
explained  it.  The  principles  of  Contradiction  and  Excluded 
Middle  can,  it  is  true,  be  easily  applied  to  concepts,  but  their 
use  is  merely  negative.  They  declare  the  invalidity  of  an 
alleged  concept  which  comprises  both  or  neither  of  two  con- 
tradictory attributes,  but  as  regards  the  formation  of  concepts 
they  do  not  offer  us  any  assistance.  The  principle  of  Identity, 
according  to  Hamilton,  "  expresses  the  relation  of  total  same- 
ness in  which  a  concept  stands  to  all,  and  the  relation  of 
partial  sameness  in  which  it  stands  to  each,  of  its  constituent 
characters.  In  other  words  it  declares  the  impossibility  of 
thinking  the  concept  and  its  characters  as  reciprocally  un-. 
like."3  This,  again,  does  not  explain  the  formation  of  con- 
cepts. In  fact  it  seems  only  applicable  In  judgments,  in  which 
we  affirm  the  existence  of  a  relation  of  total  or  partial  saine- 

1  Lect.  iii.  337.  2   Discussions,  160,  note,  603. 

»  Lect.  iii.  80. 


LOGIC.  143 

ness  between  the  concept  and  its  characters.  And  accord- 
ingly Hamilton,  after  giving-  the  symbolical  expression  of  the 
law  (A  =  A),  goes  on,  "The  law  has  likewise  been  expressed 
by  the  following  formula — In  the  predicate  the  whole  is  con- 
tained explicitly,  which  in  the  subject  is  contained  implicitly." 
This  latter  expression  is  clearly  referable  not  to  concepts,  but 
to  judgments,  and  is  moreover  limited  to  analytical  or  expli- 
cative judgments:  and  therefore  we  need  not  be  surprised 
to  find  our  author  adding,  "  The  logical  importance  of  the 
law  of  Identity  lies  in  this — that  it  is  the  principle  of  all 
logical  affirmation  and  definition  •"  affirmations  and  defini- 
tions being,  of  course,  judgments,  not  concepts.  In  like 
manner  he  says  of  the  law  of  Contradiction  (No  A  is  non-A), 
"  The  logical  import  of  this  law  lies  in  its  being  the  principle 
of  all  logical  negation  and  distinction";1  and  the  law 
of  Excluded  Middle  (whatever  is  not  A  is  non-A),  he 
remarks  is  "the  principle  of  disjunctive  judgments."2     All 

1  Leot.  iii.  82.  The  symbolical  expression  of  this  law  is  printed 
A  =  non-A  =  0,  and  Mr.  Mill  comments  on  this  misapplication  of 
mathematical  formuhe  {Examination,  485).  I  should  have  thought 
that  the  misprint  was  obvious  to  any  commentator.  The  true  expression 
of  course  is  A  +  non-A  =  0,  which  is  identical  in  meaning  with  the 
alternative  form  A  —  A  =  .0 

2  Lect.  iii.  84.  Hamilton  gives  no  symbolical  xpression  for  the  law  of 
Excluded  Middle.  That  which  naturally  occurs  to  us  is,  A  -f-  non-A  =  oo 
(or  A  —  A  =  oo )  which  is  mathematically  untrue,  and  also  apparently 
conflicts  with  the  symbolical  expression  of  the  Law  of  Contradiction,  viz., 
A  +  non-A  =  0,  or  A  —  A  =  0.  This  latter  conflict,  however,  is  only 
apparent,  and  arises  from  the  fact  that  the  latter  forrnulse  relate  to  compre- 
hension, and  the  former  to  extension — quantities  whose  variations  are 
usually  of  an  inverse  character.  But  the  fact  that  both  these  quantities 
must  be  regarded  in  Logic,  renders  the  application  of  Algebraical  formulae 
to  that  science  difficult,  if  not  impossible.  If  A  stands  for  an  attribute  or 
collection  of  attributes,  the  equations  into  which  it  enters  will  be  very 
different  from  those  which  affect  it  when  it  stands  for  a  class  or  collection 
of  objects. 


144  SIR    WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 

these  passages  occur  when  our  author  is  explaining-  the  rela- 
tion of  these  principles  to  concepts,  and  he  has  not,  I  believe, 
anywhere  endeavoured  to  show  that  the  formation  of  con- 
cepts is  affected  by  the  laws  of  Identity,  Contradiction,  and 
Excluded  Middle,  otherwise  than  negatively — unless,  indeed, 
with  Dean  Mansel,  he  regarded  all  analytical  or  explicative 
judgments  as  reducible  to  concepts — all  veritable  judgments 
being  thus  synthetical  or  ampliative.  A  circumstance 
already  alluded  to  might  almost  lead  us  to  think  that  such 
was  his  real  opinion.  In  the  twelfth  of  his  Lectures  on  Logic 
he  begins  by  giving  two  distinct  divisions  of  concepts,  viz. 
into  Identical  (or  rather  Similar  or  Cognate)  and  Different, 
and  into  Congruent  and  Conflictive;  but  when  he  proceeds 
to  define  a  Judgment  in  the  thirteenth  Lecture,  he  explains 
it  as  the  recognition  of  a  relation  of  congruence  or  conflic- 
tion  only,  without  taking  any  notice  of  the  other  relation  of 
cognateness  or  difference.  If  this  similarity  or  cognateness 
is  the  same  with  the  partial  identity  which  he  has  elsewhere 
noticed  as  existing  between  a  concept  and  each  of  its  characters 
(which  it  appears  to  be),  all  affirmative  analytical  judgments 
express  a  relation  of  cognateness  instead  of  a  relation  of  con- 
gruence: and  in  describing  affirmative  judgments  as  recogni- 
tions of  congruence  only,  Hamilton  seems  to  be  confining  his 
attention  to  those  which  are  synthetical  or  ampliative.  Other 
passages  of  his  descriptions,  however,  are,  as  we  have  seen, 
not  only  applicable  to  analytical  judgments,  but  apply  to 
them  so  exclusively  that  we  might  imagine  that  they  were 
the  only  kind  of  judgments  which  he  recognized.  A  different 
explanation  of  the  application  of  the  laws  of  Identity,  Contra- 
diction, and  Excluded  Middle  to  concepts  may  perhaps  be 
derived  from  the  following  passage:  "  A  concept  is  a  judg- 
ment: for  on  the  one  hand  it  is  nothing  but  the  result  of  a 
foregone  judgment;  or  series  of  judgments,  fixed  and  recorded 


LOGIC.  145 

in  a  word — a  sign — and  it  is  only  amplified  by  the  annexation 
of  a  new  attribute  through  a  continuance  of  the  same  process. 
On  the  other  hand,  as  a  concept  is  thus  the  synthesis  or  com- 
plexion, and  the  record  I  may  add,  of  one  or  more  prior  acts 
of  judgment,  it  can,  it  is  evident,  be  analyzed  into  these 
again.  Every  concept  is,  in  fact,  a  judgment,  or  a  fasciculus 
of  judgments — these  judgments  only  not  explicitly  developed 
in  thought,  or  formally  expressed  in  terms.'"  1  This  observa- 
tion may  justify  the  statement  that  the  laws  of  Identity, 
Contradiction,  and  Excluded  Middle,  are  the  fundamental 
laws  of  all  three  operations  of  thought ;  but  then  it  is  only 
through  their  application  to  judgments  that  we  can  bring 
concepts  under  their  authority. 

The  theory  of  judgments  has  been  already  examined,  but 
the  question  remains,  How  can  these  three  laws  of  thought  be 
applied  to  them  ?  The  law  of  Identity,  we  have  been  told,  is 
the  principle  of  all  logical  affirmation,  but  it  applies  only  to 
analytical  judgments.  The  law  of  Contradiction,  we  have 
heard,  is  the  principle  of  all  logical  negation.  Its  application 
is  equally  limited.  The  law  of  Excluded  Middle  has  been 
described  as  the  principle  of  disjunctive  judgments,  but  it 
clearly  applies  only  to  those  disjunctive  judgments  which  are 

1  Lect.  iii.  117.  This  description  seems  to  me  unsatisfactory.  Take- 
the  concept  Man,  which  is  generally  represented  as  equivalent  to  the  com- 
bination Rational-Animal.  According  to  Hamilton,  this  concept  is  the 
result  and  record  of  a  judgment  in  which  we  affirmed  a  relation  between 
the  concepts  Rational  and  Animal;  and  that  relation  is  now  implicitly 
contained  in  the  concept  Rational-Animal  (or  Man),  and  can  be  extracted 
from  it  by  analysis.  What  then  was  the  relation  in  question  ?  Was  it, 
All  Rationals  are  Animals,  Some  Rationals  are  Animals,  All  Animals  are 
Rational,  or  Some  Animals  are  Rational?  Any  one  of  these  four  judg- 
ments would  have  led  us  to  form  the  concept  or  combination  Rational- 
Animal,  and  that  concept  would  be  exactly  the  same  in  whichever  of 
these  modes  it  was  formed.  How,  then,  can  we,  by  a  mere  analysis  of  the 
concept  as  it  now  exists  in  the  mind,  discover  any  of  these  judgments  in  it? 

L 


146  SIR    WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 

analytical.  It  shows  the  truth  of  a  disjunctive  judgment  of 
the  form  Every  B  is  either  C  or  non-C,  but  it  has  no  bearing 
on  the  truth  or  falsity  of  a  disjunctive  judgment  of  the  form 
Every  B  is  either  C  or  D,  where  D  is  a  term  really  distinct 
from  non-C.  It  is  true  that  these  laws  appear  to  have  a  wider 
scope  in  the  case  of  judgments  than  of  concepts.  Besides  their 
negative  use  in  excluding  absurd  or  self-contradictory  judg- 
ments, they  have  a  positive  use  in  showing  the  truth  of  ana- 
lytical judgments.  But  what  of  the  most  important  class  of 
judgments — the  synthetical  or  ampliative  ?  Are  we  to  exclude 
these  from  our  catalogue  of  "  logical  affirmations  "  and  "  logical 
negations"  ?  or  can  they  be  brought  in  some  indirect  manner 
under  the  primary  logical  laws?  This  difficulty  was  not  un- 
noticed by  Sir  William  Hamilton.  In  one  of  his  latest  writings, 
when  pointing  out  the  defects  of  these  laws  (which,  as  already 
remarked,  he  regards  as  different  phases  of  the  same  law),  as  a 
criterion  of  truth,  he  says,  "  1 .  It  is  negative,  not  positive.  It 
may  refute,  but  it  is  incompetent  to  establish.  It  may  show 
what  is  not,  but  never  of  itself  what  is.1  It  is  exclusively  logical 
or  formal,  not  metaphysical  or  real.  It  proceeds  on  a  necessity 
of  thought,  but  never  issues  in  an  ontology  or  knowledge  of 
existence."  Again,  "  3.  It  is  explicative,  not  ampliative.  It 
analyzes  what  is  given,  but  does  not  originate  information  or 
add  anything,  through  itself,  to  our  stock  of  knowledge. 
4.  But,  what  is  its  principal  defect,  it  is  partial,  not  thorough- 
going. It  leaves  many  of  the  most  important  problems  of 
our  knowledge  out  of  its  determination,  and  is  therefore 
all  too  narrow  in  its  application  as  an  universal  criterion  or 
instrument  of  judgment/'2  And  in  another  passage  he  says 
that    thought    under  this    condition  of   non-contradiction  is 

1  This  would  seem  even  to  go  beyond  what  I  have  said  in  the  text,  and 
to  deny  its  use  in  showing  the  truth  of  ailirmative  analytical  judgments. 
'  Lect.  ii.  521. 


LOGIC.  147 

*'  merely  explicative  or  analytic, '* '  and  cannot  therefore  (we 
may  presume)  give  rise  to  synthetical  judgments.  Both  these 
passages,  however,  were  written  long  after  the  Lectures  on 
Logic ;  and  the  distinction  between  analytical  and  synthetical 
judgments  not  having  been  noticed  in  these  Lectures,  the 
difficulty  does  not  appear  to  have  then  presented  itself  to  the 
author ;  while  we  can  hardly  expect  to  find  a  satisfactory 
solution  of  it  in  the  subsequent  fragmentary  notices,  which  in 
their  existing  shape  were  probably  not  intended  either  for 
delivery  or  publication.  One  solution,  indeed,  readily  suggests 
itself.  The  only  logical  judgments,  it  may  be  said,  are 
analytical  judgments,  and  these  result  directly  from  the  three 
primary  laws  of  thought.  In  all  synthetical  judgments  some 
other  faculty  intervenes,  and,  as  regards  their  formation,  they 
are  not  within  the  province  of  Pure  Logic.  But  Pure  Logic 
must  nevertheless  deal  with  them  in  their  character  of  products* 
because  they  furnish  materials  for  the  third  great  operation  of 
thought — reasoning;  and  the  reasonings  for  which  they 
supply  the  premisses,  depend  as  exclusively  on  the  primary 
laws  of  thought  as  if  the  premisses  were  analytical.  Non- logi- 
cal judgments  must  therefore  be  taken  into  account  in  Logic, 
because  they  supply  materials  for  logical  reasonings  ;  but  non- 
logical  (or  inconclusive)  reasonings  should  be  omitted  from 
Logic,  because  they  do  not  furnish  materials  for  any  higher 
operation  of  thought.  I  have  not,  however,  found  this  ex- 
planation in  Sir  William  Hamilton's  writings,  while  there  are 
several  passages,  especially  in  his  Lectures  on  Logic,  which 
would  seem  to  imply  that  all  judgments  are  analytical  or 
explicative,  and  thus  come  directly  under  the  primary  laws 
of  thought.  For  instance,  when  comparing  the  compre- 
hension and  extension  of  concepts,  he  says,  "  The  quantity 
of  extension  is  a  creation  of  the  mind  itself,  and  only  created 
1  Discussions,  603. 
L    2 


148  SIR    WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 

through,  as  abstracted  from,  the  quantity  of  comprehension ; 
whereas  the  quantity  of  comprehension  is  at  once  given 
in  the  very  nature  of  things.  The  former  quantity  is  thus 
secondary  and  factitious,  the  latter  primary  and  natural."1  If 
this  be  so,  it  is  only  when  the  comprehension  of  one  notion 
includes  that  of  another,  that  we  can  judge  that  the  extension 
of  the  former  is  contained  in  that  of  the  latter;  and  therefore 
it  is  only  in  the  case  of  analytical  judgments  that  we  can 
affirm  the  total  or  partial  coincidence  of  the  extensions  of  the 
subject  and  predicate.  This  would  exclude  affirmative  syn- 
thetical judgments  altogether,  unless  we  suppose  that  Hamil- 
ton was  speaking  of  the  relations  between  the  two  quantities 
only  in  so  far  as  they  can  be  determined  by  pure  thought, 
without  any  reference  to  experience. 

Another  solution,  however,  is  suggested  in  Hamilton's 
Lectures,  and  has  been  apparently  adopted  by  Dean  Mansel, 
whose  exposition  of  a  similar  theory  of  Pure  Logic,  in  the 
sixth  chapter  of  his  Prolegomena  Logica,  will  be  found  in 
some  respects  superior  to  that  of  his  master.  (Hamilton  has 
referred  to  this  work  in  terms  of  approval.)  "  If  two 
notions/'  says  Hamilton,  "  be  judged  congruent — in  other 
words,  be  conceived  as  one" — (and  he  has  just  told  us  that  this 
occurs  in  every  judgment)  "this  their  unity  can  only  be 
realized  in  consciousness,  inasmuch  as  one  of  these  notions  is 
viewed  as  an  attribute,  or  determination,  of  the  other.  For, 
on  the  one  hand,  it  is  impossible  for  us  to  think  as  one,  two 
attributes — that  is,  two  things  viewed  as  determining,  and 
yet    neither    determining   or    qualifying    the   other;   nor,   on 

1  Lect.  iii.  218.  The  dependence  of  the  quantity  of  extension  on  that 
of  comprehension  is,  however,  a  common  doctrine  of  logicians  who 
have  frequently  assumed  in  their  expositions  that  all  judgments  are 
analytical.  Hamilton  may  not  impossibly  have  taken  this  doctrine  from 
them  without  sufficient  examination, and  without  being  himself  influenced 
by  it  in  any  other  portion  of  his  philosophy. 


LOGIC.  149 

the  other  hand,  two  subjects  — that  is,  two  things  thought  ;is 
determined,  and  yet  neither  of  them   determined  or  qualified 
by   the   other.     For  example,  we   cannot  think  of  the  two 
attributes  electrical  and  polar  as  a  single   notion,  unless  we 
convert  one  of  these  attributes  into  a  subject  to  be  determined 
or  qualified  by  the  other ;  but  if  we  do — if  we  say,  what  is 
electrical  is  polar,  we  at  once  reduce  the  duality  to  unity — we 
judge  that  polar  is  one  of  the  constituent  characters  of  the 
notion  electrical,  or  that  what  is  electrical  is  contained  under 
the  class  of  things  marked  out  by   the  common  character  of 
polarity."  '    It  is  true  that  the  alternative  in  this  last  sentence 
may  suffice  to  distinguish   Hamilton's  doctrine  from  that  of 
Mansel,    though,  if  the  relation    between  the    quantities   of 
extension  is  determined  by  that    which  exists  between  the 
quantities  of  comprehension,  it  would  not  do  so.     To  under- 
stand the  passage  rightly,  however,  I  think  we   must  regard 
the  word  notion  as  used  in  the  vague  signification  already 
alluded  to,     If  that  word  is  employed  in  its  strict  sense,  it 
is  obvious  that  my  notion  of  electrical  or  electricity  could  not 
have  any  constituent  character  which   I  was  not  previously 
aware  of.     Its  constituent  characters  are  its  comprehension  ; 
and  if  polarity  is  not  included  in  this  comprehension,  it  is  not 
one  of  the  constituent  characters  of  the  notion  electrical.    But 
the  meaning  seems  to  be,  that  we  first  recognize  polarity  as 
one   of  the  constituent  characters   of  the   thing  (or  class  of 
things)   electrical  or  electricity  :  and   then,  since  we  always 
endeavour  to   make  our  notions  or  concepts  correspond  with 
the  things  to  which  they  are  applicable,  we  reform  or  enlarge 
our   notion   of  electrical  or  electricity   by    adding  to   it  the 
attribute  or  notion  of  polarity.     What  was   formerly  thought 
as  electrical  is  now  thought  as  polar-electrical ;  and  the  judg- 
ment what  is  electrical  is  polar  has  been  transformed  into  what 
1  Lect.  iii.  227. 


150  SIR   WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 

is  polar-eleclrical  is  polar,  the  truth  of  which  latter  judg- 
ment is  at  once  made  manifest  by  the  law  of  Identity.  In 
fact,  by  this  amplification  of  the  concept  electrical  (and 
concepts  may  retain  their  names  notwithstanding"  the  en- 
largement of  their  comprehensions)  the  synthetical  judgment 
has  been  converted  into  an  analytical  one.  Synthetical  judg- 
ments are  thus  only  analytical  judgments  in  the  making,  and 
fehe  ultimate  end  of  all  processes  of  reasoning  is  the  reforma- 
tion and  amplification  of  our  concepts.1  If  it  is  objected  to  this, 
tha1»  when  the  judgment  was  first  formed,  its  truth  must  have 
been  arrived  at  in  some  other  way  than  by  the  law  of 
Identity,  the  answer  would  probably  be,  that  the  process  by 
which  it  was  arrived  at  was  not  one  of  pure  thought,  and  that 
as  soon  as  the  judgment  what  is  electrical  is  polar  came  to 
express  a  veritable  operation  of  thought,  its  truth  became 
manifest  by  means  of  the  law  of  Identity  alone.  This  theory, 
however,  not  having  been  explicitly  enounced  by  Hamilton, 
need  not  be  further  discussed  here.  I  will  only  say,  that 
granting  that  the  two  notions  must  become  combined,  in  the 
manner  stated,  in  order  to  constitute  a  judgment,  the  combina- 
tion may  take  place  in  a  different  way,  which  would  leave  the 
distinction  between  analytical  and  synthetical  judgments 
unaffected.  If  instead  of  the  subject  becoming  amplified  by 
the  addition  of  the  predicate,  the  predicate  itself  remaining 
unaltered,  the  subject  remained  unaltered  while  the  predicate 
was  amplified  by  the  addition  of  the  subject,  the  judgment 
would  still  be  synthetical,  and  the  law  of  Identity  would  not 
suffice  to  establish  its  truth.  What  is  polar-eleclrical  is  polar 
is  a  judgment  which  falls  under  that  law  ;  but  what  is  electrical 

1  Neither  Hamilton  nor  Mansel  have  gone  so  far  as  this  in  any  of  their 
published  writings,  and  the  last  sentence  is  borrowed  partly  from  Mr. 
Lewes,  and  partly  from  Archbishop  Thomson,  the  latter  of  whom  has,  to 
;i  large  extent,  adopted  the  Haniiltonian  view  of  Logic. 


LOGIC. 


151 


is  polar-elect 'rival  does  not,  except  negatively.  Yet  in  each  of 
these  judgments  the  duality  of  the  two  notions  electrical  and 
polar  is  equally  reduced  to  unity. 

The  theory  of  the  Quantification  of  the  Predicate  belongs 
rather  to  reasonings  than  to  judgments,  because  its  principal 
effects  appear  in  the  doctrine  of  the  Syllogism.  This,  however, 
is  the  most  convenient  place  for  giving  some  account  of  it. 

In  the  four  forms  of  categorical  judgments  or  propositions 
ordinarily  recognized  by  logicians,  which  are  denoted  by  the 
letters  A,  E,  I,  and  O,  the  subjects  are  quantified,  but  the 
predicates  are  not ;  and  the  latter  might  therefore  appear  to  be 
at  first  sight  susceptible  of  being  understood  with  two  different 
quantities,  and  thus  in  two  different  senses.  For  instance, 
All  B  is  C  may  be  understood  to  mean  either  All  B  is  all  C  or 
All  B  is  some  C  ;  and  No  B  is  C  may  be  understood  to  mean 
either  No  B  is  any  C  or  No  B  is  some  C.1  Logicians  had  in 
general  laid  down  that  All  B  is  C  meant  All  B  is  some  C,  and 
that  No  B  is  C  meant  No  B  is  any  C.  But  this,  Hamilton 
thinks,  may  not  have  been  the  meaning  intended  by  the 
persons  who  used  these  forms  of  expression ;  while  even  if  it 
was,  they  should  not  be  debarred  from  the  use  of  other  forms 
of  expression  which  would  convey  a  different  meaning.  A  man 
may  judge,  or  wish  to  assert,  that  two  classes  are  co-extensive. 
Why  not  then  permit  him  to  affirm  that  All  B  is  all  C  ?  Or, 
instead  of  denying  that  any  B  is  a  C,  he  may  only  wish  to 
deny  that  any  B  is  some  C;  instead  of  denying,  for  instance, 
that  any  man  is  an  animal,  he  may  wish  to  deny  that  any  man 
is  some  kind  of  animal — that  any  man  is  a  quadruped.  Then 
why  not  permit  him  to  say  that  No  man  is  some  animal  ? 
Carrying  out  this   idea,  Sir  William    Hamilton  proposed  to 

1  But  surely  no  one  would  say  No  B  is  C  if  he  only  meant,  or  only 
believed,  that  No  B  is  some  C.  No  Man  is  immortal,  seems  to  me  to  be 
quite  as  unambiguous  a  statement  as,  No  man  is  any  immortal. 


1 5  2  SIR    WILLI  A  M  HA  MIL  TON. 

increase  the  number  of  propositional  forms  from  four  to  eight, 
which  are  thus  expressed  symbolically  : — 


(1)  All  B  is  all  C               denoted 

by  the  letter  U 

(2)  All  B  is  some  C 

A 

(3)  Some  B  is  all  C 

Y 

(4)  Some  B  is  some  C                  „ 

I 

(5)  No  B  is  any  0 

E 

(6)  No  B  is  some  C                     „ 

n 

(7)  Some  B  is  not  any  C             „ 

0 

(8)  Some  B  is  not  some  C           „ 

„                 a 

Of  these  the  affirmatives,  in  fact,  express  equations,  and  the 
negatives  inequalities.  Thus  U  may  be  written  All  B  =  all  C, 
and  A  may  be  written  All  B  =  some  C.1  All  propositions 
become  simply  convertible ;  for  the  conversion  of  affirmatives 
consists  in  merely  writing  the  same  equation  in  a  different 
way,  and  inequalities  are  also  convertible,  since  if  B  is  not 
equal  to  C,  it  follows  that  C  is  not  equal  to  B.  And  since 
they  are  simply  convertible,  they  all  reappear  in  their  original 
shape  after  reconversion.  Thus  A  is  convertible  into  Y,  and 
this  Y  can  be  reconverted  into  an  original  A,  and  then 
again  into  Y,  and  so  on  as  often  as  we  choose  to  repeat  the 
process.  When  the  predicates  are  thus  quantified,  the  exten- 
sions of  the  subject  and  predicate  no  longer  stand  to  each  other 
in  the  relation  of  whole  and  part.  They  are  always  (in  affirma- 
tive propositions)  equal,  or  rather  identical.  This  alteration 
gives  a  completely  new  direction  to  the  doctrine  of  the  Syllo- 
gism. The  number  of  legitimate  modes  in  each  figure2  is  aug- 
mented to  thirty-six,  of  which  twelve  are  affirmative  and  twenty- 

1  Tliese  equations  seem  to  express  relations  of  extension  only,  whereas 
tin'  formula  of  the  law  of  Contradiction  lor  instance  is  only  true  of  com- 
prehensions.    See  note,  p.  143. 

-   Hamilt however,  rejects  the  fourth  figure  on  the  ground  that  it.  is 

in'  rely  the  first  figure  with  tin;  premisses  transpost-d,  and  the  immediate 
conclusion  converted.  Thus  ElO  of  the  fourth  figure  is  but  a  bad  way 
of  writing  ±Et)  of'the  first. 


LOGIC.  153 

four  negative.  The  latter  may  be  derived  from  the  former  by 
changing  the  affirmative  copula  of  each  premiss  successively 
into  a  negative  copula,  and  making  the  same  change  in  the 
conclusion.1  The  twelve  affirmative  modes  are  derived  from 
the  sixteen  pairs  of  affirmative  premisses  by  rejecting  those  in 
which  an  undistributed  middle  occurs,  and  supplying  the 
proper  conclusion  to  the  remaining  pairs.  The  pair  of  pre- 
misses II  involves  an  undistributed  middle  in  every  figure. 
The  pairs  IA,  YA  and  YI  do  so  in  the  first  figure,  and  those 
which  do  so  in  the  other  three  figures  will  be  found  by  per- 
forming the  conversion  or  conversions  necessary  to  change  the 
illegitimate  pairs  IA,  YA  and  YI  from  the  first  into  the 
other  figures.  For  every  syllogism  in  the  first  figure,  whether 
good  or  bad,  has  its  exact  counterpart  in  each  of  the  other 
three.  By  simply  converting  the  major  premiss  we  obtain  a 
precisely  equivalent  syllogism  in  the  second  figure;  by  simply 
converting  the  minor  premiss  we  obtain  one  in  the  third ;  and 
by  simply  converting  both  premisses  one  in  the  fourth.  The 
real  number  of  valid  modes  would  thus  seem  to  be  thirty-six 
rather  than  144,  though  there  are  four  ways  of  stating  each 
of  these  thirty- six  ;  and  the  letters  standing  for  the  syllogism 
will  sometimes  differ  with  the  mode  of  stating  it.  Thus 
AAA  of  the  first  figure — the  Barbara  of  the  Aristotelians — 
becomes  YAA  in  the  second,  AYA  in  the  third,  and  YYA  in 
the  fourth,  figures  respectively.  The  whole  scheme  is  worked 
out  by  a  series  of  operations  resembling  those  of  algebra.  It 
will  be  seen,  however,  that  two  of  the  new  prepositional  forms, 
Y  and  rj,  are  merely  two  new  modes  of  expressing  the  old  ones 
A  and  O.  We  can  convert  A  into  Y,  and  Y  again  into  A, 
thus  proving  the  virtual  identity  of  the  two  ;  and,  indeed,  no 

1  Where  both  premisses  are  negative.no  conclusion  can  be  drawn;  as 
is  also  the  case  where  the  middle  term  is  undistributed.  To  this  extent 
the  Hamiltonian  Logic  agrees  with  the  Aristotelian. 


154  SIR   WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 

one  could  doubt  that  All  B  =  some  C  and  some  C  =  all  B 
represent  the  very  same  equation  written  in  two  different 
ways.  The  same  observation  applies  to  77  and  O ;  and  on  the 
identity  of  these  two  forms  with  the  other  two  recognized  by 
all  logicians,  two  counter-arguments  for  and  against  their 
admissibility  into  Logic  are  based.  The  Hamiltonian  asks, 
Why  not  permit  me  to  make  in  one  form  the  very  same 
assertion  that  I  must  confessedly  be  allowed  to  make  in 
another  ?  The  Aristotelian  asks,  Why,  when  I  am  trying  to 
reduce  all  propositions  to  the  smallest  number  of  simple  forms, 
should  I  admit  two  new  ones  which  assert  nothing  that 
cannot  be  equally  asserted  by  the  old  ones  in  common  use? 
And  here  a  very  curious  cross-argument  might  arise.  The 
Hamiltonian  might  say,  You  ought  to  admit  the  two  new 
forms,  because  they  enable  you  to  bring  at  once  under  the 
Dictum  de  omni  et  de  nullo,  syllogisms  which  you  are  only 
able  to  reduce  to  that  principle  by  the  tedious  and  roundabout 
process  of  reductlo  ad  impossibile.  The  Aristotelian  could 
answer,  You  ought  not  to  admit  them,  because  you  reduce 
all  syllogisms  to  a  series  of  simple  equations,  and  every  con- 
sequence that  arises  from  such  equations  when  written  in  one 
order  equally  follows  from  them  when  written  in  the  other. 
No  algebraist  was  ever  yet  assisted  in  solving  a  problem 
by  writing  his  fundamental  equation  mx  =  ny  instead  of 
ny  =  mx.  As  soon  as  one  quantity  is  expressed  in  terms  of 
the  other,  no  further  transformation  of  the  equation  is  re- 
quired ;  and  this  is  done  when  we  put  the  proposition,  as 
expressed  in  ordinary  speech,  into  either  of  these  logical  forms. 
It  is  obvious  to  remark  that  this  quantification  of  the 
predicate  is  only  applicable  to  its  extensive  quantity,  though 
Hamilton's  language  might  sometimes  lead  the  careless  reader 
to  suppose  the  contrary.  Every  concept  employed  in  a 
logical    proposition    is    taken    in    its    whole    comprehension. 


LOGIC.  155 

When  I  say  Negroes  are  some  Men,  I  mean  that  Negroes  are 
some  of  the  beings  which  possess  all  the  attributes  included 
in  the  comprehension  of  the  concept  Man  ;  and  if  I  said  that 
Negroes  are  all  Men,  the  word  'f  all "  would  not  be  used  to 
imply  that  Negroes  possessed  all  the  attributes  included  in 
the  comprehension  of  the  concept  Man  (which  would  be 
equally  asserted  if  the  predicate  was  quantified  particularly  or 
left  unquantified),  but  to  imply  that  Negroes  included  the 
whole  extension  of  the  concept  Man.  If  I  meant  to  affirm  of 
Negroes  a  part  of  the  comprehension  of  the  concept  Man  only, 
I  would  not  employ  the  term  Man,  but  some  other  term  or 
terms  connoting  the  particular  part  of  the  comprehension 
which  I  desired  to  predicate.  I  would  say,  for  instance,  that 
Negroes  were  bipeds,  or  mammals,  or  vertebrates,  or  animals, 
or  organized  beings,  as  the  case  might  be ;  but  if  I  said  they 
were  men,  I  could  only  be  understood  as  asserting  that  the 
whole  comprehension  of  the  concept  Man  was  to  be  found  in 
them.  When,  therefore,  we  find  Hamilton  using  such  ex- 
pressions as,  All  Man  is  some  Animal,  we  must  not  suppose 
that  by  the  use  of  the  singular  number  and  the  capital  letter 
he  means  to  direct  attention  to  the  comprehension  instead  of 
the  extension — to  the  concept  in  the  mind  instead  of  the  class 
of  things  which  come  under  it.  In  fact,  if  the  signs  of 
quantity  could  be  taken  in  connexion  with  comprehension, 
the  proper  expression  for  the  last-mentioned  proposition  would 
be,  All  Animal  is  some  Man — meaning  that  the  whole  com- 
prehension of  the  concept  Animal  is  included  in,  and  forms  a 
part  of,  the  comprehension  of  the  concept  Man.  Sir  William 
Hamilton  has  never  given  this  meaning  to  his  quantified 
propositioual  forms,  and  it  would  be  a  very  wide  departure 
from  common  language  to  do  so.  All  Man  is  some  Animal 
with  him  means  (as  in  more  than  one  passage  he  has  stated) 
All  (class)  Man  is  some  (class)  Animal,  not  All  (concept)  Man 


156  SIR   WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 

is  some  (concept)  Animal.  The  theory  of  the  quantification 
of  the  predicate  is  for  this  reason  somewhat  difficult  to  re- 
concile with  the  passages  in  Hamilton's  works,  in  which  he 
describes  judgments  as  arising1  from  the  comparison  of  con- 
cepts, and  as  consisting  in  the  recognition  of  a  relation  of 
congruency,  or  even  of  whole  and  part,  between  them.  It  is 
to  be  recollected,  however,  that  all  these  passages  were 
written  before  the  theory  of  the  quantification  of  the  predicate 
was  formally  enounced  by  the  author,  and  I  have  little  doubt 
that  had  he  been  able  to  revise  his  Lectures  on  Logic,  his 
theory  of  Judgments  would  have  been  entirely  rewritten. 

It  should  be  added  that  in  his  Propositional  Forms,  Sir 
William  Hamilton  thinks  "some"  should  be  used  in  the 
sense  of  some  only  instead  of  some  at  least?  For  if  All  Bs 
are  Cs,  they  must  either  be  all  Cs  or  some  Cs  only ;  and  since 
in  the  former  case  I  ought  to  quantify  the  predicate  univer- 
sally, the  particular  quantification  ought  to  be  limited  to  the 
case  in  which  All  Bs  are  some  Cs  only.  Whenever  we  think 
of  the  class  as  a  whole,  we  should  employ  the  term  All ;  and 
therefore  when  we  employ  the  term  Some,  it  is  implied  that 
we  are  not  thinking  of  the  whole,  but  of  a  part  as  contra- 
distinguished from  the  whole — that  is,  of  a  part  only.  This, 
as  Sir  William  Hamilton  points  out,  is  not  the  meaning 
which  logicians  generally  attach  to  the  word  "some;"  and 
for  this  reason  the  Propositional  Form,  which  Hamilton  calls 

A,  for  instance,  does  not  precisely  correspond  to  that  which 
the  Aristotelians  denote  by  the  same  letter.  The  proposition 
All  B  is  C  with  the  Aristotelians  is  consistent  with  the  co- 
extensiveness  of  the  two  classes  B  and  C,  though  it  does  not 
assert  it.     It  is  thus  consistent  with  the  proposition  All  C  is 

B,  or  with  the  U  of  Hamilton.  But  Hamilton's  proposition 
All  B  is  some  C  means  that  All  B  is  some  C  only — that  C  is  a 

1  Discussions,  p.  090,  text  and  note. 


LOGIC.  157 

larger  class  in  which  B  is  included — and  it  is  therefore  incon- 
sistent with  the  Aristotelian  All  C  is  B,  as  well  as  with  both 
the  Hamiltonian  propositions  All  C  is  all  B,  and  All  C  is  some 
B.  Thus  A  and  A  converse,  with  Hamilton,  cannot  both  be 
simultaneously  true.  Again,  if  we  take  the  form  O,  Some  B  is 
not  any  C  would,  if  some  is  taken  to  mean  some  only,  imply 
that  there  are  other  Bs  which  are  Cs — an  assertion  which  is  not 
implied  by  the  Aristotelian  form,  Some  B  is  not  C,  though  it 
is  consistent  with  it.  Accordingly  Hamilton  recognizes  an 
inference  from  O  to  I,  and  vice  versa,  which  he  terms  Inte- 
gration. But,  curiously  enough,  the  two  systems  coincide 
with  respect  to  the  form  I.  Some  B  only  is  C,  would  indeed 
imply  that  there  are  other  Bs  which  are  not  Cs  ;  but  the 
Hamiltonian  form  is,  Some  B  (only)  is  some  C  (only),  which 
is  quite  consistent  with  the  other  Bs  being  other  Cs.  The 
second  only  thus  in  fact  neutralizes  the  effect  of  the  first.1 
Hamilton,  however,  has  not  worked  out  the  results  of  the 
quantification  of  the  predicate  from  this  point  of  view,  nor 
has  he  given  a  complete  sketch  of  the  alterations  which  would 
be  introduced  into  the  rules  of  Logic  by  employing  some  in 
the  sense  of  some  only.  Indeed  this  meaning  of  some  does 
not  occur  in  his  Lectures  on  Logic. 

I  have  already  noticed  some  of  the  grounds  assigned  for 
the  rejection  of  the  new  forms  Y  and  rj.  I  may  add  that  U 
and  (o  have  not  escaped  criticism.  Of  at  it  has  been  said  that 
it  really  asserts  nothing,  for  though  some  Bs  are  not  some 
Cs,  still  the  very  Bs,  of  which  we  are  thinking,  may  be  other 
Cs,  and  the  two  classes,  B  and  C,  may  even  be  co-extensive. 
Such  a  proposition,  moreover,  appears  to  be  meaningless 
when  considered  in  comprehension.     It  neither  affirms  nor 

1  Hamilton,  however,  has  not  observed  this  fact,  which  seems  to  interfere 
with  his  new  inference  of  Integration  when  drawn  from  I  to  0  instead  of 
from  0  to  I. 


1 5  3  SIR    WILLI  A  M  HA  MIL  TON. 

denies  that  the  some  Bs  which  form  its  subject  possess  the 
attributes  included  in  the  comprehension  of  the  concept  C. 
Judgments — according1  at  least  to  Hamilton's  earlier  theory — 
arise  from  recognizing-  the  congruent  or  connective  character 
of  the  concepts  which  form  the  subject  and  predicate :  but 
the  judgment,  Some  B  is  not  some  C,  does  not  give  us  the 
smallest  information  as  to  whether  the  concepts  B  and  C  are 
congruent  or  connective.  This  last  objection  would,  indeed, 
be  removed  by  employing  the  word  "some"  in  the  sense  of 
some  only,  as  Hamilton  proposes.  If  it  is  some  Bs  only  that 
are  not  identical  with  the  particular  part  of  C  of  which  we 
are  thinking,  there  must  be  other  Bs  which  are  identical  with 
{or  contained  in)  that  part  of  C.  But  a  new  objection  now 
arises,  namely,  that  what  is  really  asserted  by  co  (on  this  inter- 
pretation of  it),  is  that  Some  (other)  Bs  are  some  Cs,  and  that 
co  is  therefore  no  more  than  a  different  way  of  writing  I. 
Again,  U  has  been  objected  to  on  the  ground  that  it  is  a  com- 
pound, not  a  simple  proposition  ;  that  it  includes  two  dis- 
tinct assertions,  which  may  be  made  the  foundation  of  two 
different  trains  of  reasoning — that  All  men  are  all  rational 
animals,  for  instance,  is  the  precise  equivalent  of  the  two  pro- 
positions, All  men  are  rational  animals,  and  All  rational  animals 
are  men.  Hamilton's  answer  to  this  objection  is  not  very 
satisfactory.  Applying  his  own  system  of  quantification,  he 
substitutes  for  the  two  propositions  in  question,  All  men  are 
some  rational  animals,  and  All  rational  animals  are  some  men 
(of  course  his  opponent  could  not  quantify  either  of  the  pre- 
dicates with  the  word  All,  for  that  would  be  to  admit  the 
propositional  form  U)  and  then  taking  some  in  the  sense  of 
some  only,  he  shows  that  the  two  alleged  components  of  his 
proposition  U  are  in  fact  inconsistent  with  each  other,  and 
cannot  he  united  in  thought.1     But  as  the  Aristotelian  does 

1  This   seems  to  bo  involved  in  his  answer  to  Mr.  De  Morgan,   Discus- 


LOGIC.  159 

not  use  the  word  some  in  the  sense  of  some  only,  but  of  some 
at  least,  the  two  propositions  in  question  would,  notwith- 
standing' the  employment  of  that  word  in  quantifying  their 
predicates,  be  quite  consistent  with  each  other,  and  they  seem 
to  make  up  between  them  the  whole  of  what  is  asserted 
by  Hamilton's  U.  I  do  not  think  that  Hamilton  has  any- 
where asserted  that  All  B  is  some  C  ceases  to  be  a  simple 
proposition  when  we  use  some  in  the  sense  of  some  at  least.1 
In  fact  there  would  be  much  more  reason  for  maintaining 
that  it  becomes  a  compound  proposition  if  we  use  some 
in  the  sense  of  some  only.  But  even  conceding  that  All  B 
is  (some)  C,  as  employed  by  the  Aristotelians,  is  a  compound 
proposition,  this  would  not  remove  the  present  objection;  for 
if  U  is  made  up  of  two  compound  propositions,  it  is  even  more 
objectionable  than  if  it  was  made  up  of  two  simple  ones.2 

sions,  p.  688;  but  possibly  Hamilton  intended  this  answer  as  a  mere 
argumentum  ad  hominem.  Mansel  adopts  a  similar  mode  of  reasoning 
Prolegomena  Logica,  p.  268. 

1  Perhaps  he  would  have  sought  to  evade  the  difficulty  thus.  The 
Aristotelian  proposition,  All  B  is  some  C  (at  least)  is  equivalent  to  the  two 
Hamiltonian  propositions,  All  B  may  be  all  C  and  All  B  may  be  some  C 
(only;.  The  former  of  these  is  U  and  the  latter  A  ;  for  "  may  be"  must 
be  treated  in  Logic  as  an  affirmative  copula.  The  Aristotelian  A  is  thus  a 
compound,  the  Hamiltonian  U  being  one  of  its  components,  and  conse- 
quently any  attempt  to  deduce  the  Hamiltonian  U  from  two  Aristotelian 
As  (with  the  terms  transposed)  involves  a  circular  argument. 

2  Hamilton  asks  why  should  All  B  is  all  C  be  treated  as  a  compound 
proposition  when  it  is  admitted  that  All  B  is  some  C  is  not  so?  The 
Aristotelian,  I  believe,  could  answer  the  question.  As  All  B  is  all  C  is 
made  up  of  All  B  is  C  and  All  C  is  B.  so  All  B  is  some  C  is  made  up  of 
All  B  is  C  and  Some  0  is  B.  But  while  the  former  pair  are  two  distinct 
propositions  not  inferrible  from  each  other,  one  of  the  latter  pair  can  be 
derived  from  the  other  by  conversion,  and  therefore  the  two  component 
propositions  are  not  distinct  and  independent.  To  justify  this  answer,  how- 
ever, it  should  be  laid  down  that  the  predicate  of  a  proposition  never  has 
any  quantity — that  is,  while  it  remains  a  predicate — and  that  it  acquires 
a  quantity  for  the  first  time  when  it  is  transformed  into  a  subject  by 


160  SIR   WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 

Hamilton  believed  that  this  theory  of  the  quantification  of 
the  predicate  involved  the  true  explanation  of  the  logical 
nature  of  an  Inductive  argument.  The  form  of  a  logical 
Induction  is  in  his  opinion  as  follows : — 

x,  y,  z,  &c.  (enumerating  the  individuals)  are  Cs, 
x,  y,  z,  &c.  (enumerating  the  individuals)  are  all  Bs, 
Therefore  All  Bs  are  Cs. 

That  this  reasoning  is  valid  cannot  be  doubted,  though  it 
could  hardly  occur  in  practice,  owing  to  the  difficulty  of 
making  an  individual  enumeration  of  all  the  Bs.  Nor  if  it 
did  occur,  would  it  be  of  much  value,  since  the  conclusion 
would  be  little  more  than  a  short  way  of  writing  the  major 
premiss.  The  use  of  a  proposition  of  the  form  All  Bs  are 
Cs,  is  in  general  to  tell  us  that  something  that  we  have  not 
already  ascertained  to  be  a  C  is  so — which  it  does  when  we 
have  first  satisfied  ourselves  that  the  thing  in  question  is  a 
B,  which  fact  is  not  always  obvious.  But  if  we  arrived  at 
the  proposition  All  Bs  are  Cs,  by  the  reasoning  here  set  out, 
we  could  never  discover  as  a  new  fact  that  anything  was  a 
B ;  for  a  knowledge  of  every  individual  B  is  presupposed  by 
the  reasoning.  Neither  from  our  recognition  that  a  given 
thing  was  a  B,  could  we  be  led  as  a  new  fact  to  conclude  that 
it  was  a  C ;  for  we  could  not  draw  that  conclusion  until  we 
were  not  only  individually  acquainted  with  every  one  of  the 
Bs,  but  had  likewise  ascertained  that  each  of  them  was  a  C.1 
conversion.  The  quantity  which  is  thus  acquired  is  particular  when  the 
convertend  is  affirmative,  and  universal  when  it  is  negative.  This,  I 
believe,  is  the  true  meaning  of  the  assertion  that  the  predicate  of  an 
affirmative  judgment  is  particular,  and  that  of  a  negative  universal — 
assertions  which  can  only  ho  understood  in  connexion  with  conversion. 

1  Suppose,  in  fact,  that  this  (so-called)  induction  was  followed  by  a 
deduction — 

All  Bs  are  some  Cs, 
0  is  a  B, 
0  is  a  C. 
It  is   here   plain  that  0  must   have  been  one  of   the  individuals  included 


LOGIC.  161 

That  the  inductions  of  the  Physical  or  Empirical  Sciences 
are  not  reducible  to  the  Hamiltonian  form,  our  author  seems 
to  admit;  and  it  can  hardly  be  said  that  the  form  in  ques- 
tion is  in  common  use.  Its  only  use  would  therefore  seem  to 
consist  in  pointing-  out  the  insufficiency  of  the  Aristotelian 
table  of  Syllogisms  (and  consequently  of  the  Aristotelian  list 
of  forms  of  propositions)  by  giving-  an  instance  of  a  valid 
mode  of  reasoning  which  cannot  be  reduced  to  them.  But 
the  Aristotelian  would  probably  reduce  it  to  a  Syllogism  in 
Barbara  by  writing  the  minor  premiss,  All  B  is  x,  y,  z}  &c. 
Whether  this  reduction  is  satisfactory  I  must  leave  to  the 
reader.1 

The  reduction  of  all  judgments  or  propositions  to  equations 
(or  rather  identifications)  between  the  subject  and  predicate 

in  our  x,  y,  z,  &c,  since  otherwise  it  would  not  be  true  that  x,  y,  z,  &c. 
are  all  the  Bs.     The  entire  reasoning  would  therefore  run  as  follows : — 

x,  y,  z,  13,  &c.  are  some  Cs, 
x,  y,  z,  /3,  &c.  are  all  Bs. 
.".  All  Bs  are  some  Cs. 
/3  is  a  B, 
.'.  j8  is  a  C. 
And  we  have  got  back  to  (a  part  of)  what  was  stated,  not  in  general  terms 
or  even  specifically,  but  individually,  in  the  major  premiss  of  the  induc- 
tion.    Whatever  be  the  force  of  the  objection  to  the   Syllogism  in  general 
as  containing  a  Petitio  Principii,  there  can  be  no  doubt  of  the  futility  of 
this  kind  of  argument.     In  fact  the  major  premiss  of  the  induction  sums 
up  a  number  of  singular  propositions,  the  truth  of  each  of  which  must 
have  been  separately  inquired  into  and  ascertained,   and  one  of  these 
singular  propositions  must  have  been  /3  is  a  C,  which  is  the  judgment 
or  proposition  finally  arrived  at  by  this  pretended  process  of  reasoning. 
1  The  best  mode  of  reducing  it  would  perhaps  be  as  follows  : — 
Every  B  is  either  x  or  y  or  z,  &c, 
x  and  y  and  z,  &c.  are  Cs, 
.•.  Every  B  is  a  C- 
This   is   a   kind  of   disjunctive   reasoning  of  which  the  Aristotelian 
logicians  seem  to  have  given  a  sufficient  account. 

M 


1 62  SIR    WILLIAM  HAMILTON. 

renders  the  application  of  the  laws  of  Identity,  Contradiction, 
and  Excluded  Middle  to  the  Syllogism  more  easy  than  under 
the  Aristotelian  system.  The  same  result  is  still  more  evi- 
dent in  the  case  of  immediate  inferences,  such  as  conversion  ; 
and  therefore  as  regards  the  third  logical  operation — inference 
or  reasoning- — we  do  not  meet  with  the  same  difficulties  that 
were  experienced  in  the  case  of  concepts  and  judgments.  No 
reasonings  being  admitted  except  those  which  are  formally 
conclusive,  thought  is  here  really  analytical  or  explicative. 
The  conclusion  contains  nothing  that  is  not  contained  in  the 
premisses — not,  indeed,  in  the  major  premiss,  as  some  oppo- 
nents of  the  Syllogism  allege,  but  in  the  two  premisses  taken 
together — and  the  laws  of  Identity,  Contradiction,  and  Ex- 
cluded Middle,  being  the  fundamental  laws  of  explication  or 
analysis,  seem  sufficient  to  account  for  the  whole  process. 

Such  is  the  Hamiltonian  Logic.  Its  deficiencies,  as  already 
remarked,  seem  chiefly  attributable  to  the  fact  that  its  author 
had  not  fully  elaborated  his  logical  theory  when  he  wrote  his 
Lectures  on  Logic,  and  that  his  subsequent  writings  on  the 
subject  took  the  shape  of  fragments — some  of  them  post- 
humous—instead of  a  connected  treatise.  It  has  been  rarely 
accepted  in  its  entirety,  but  a  large  number  of  subsequent 
logicians  have  availed  themselves  of  considerable  portions  of 
it.  Thus  Archbishop  Thomson  accepts  Hamilton's  addi- 
tional affirmative  forms  of  Propositions  U  and  Y,  while  re- 
ject ing  the  negative  forms  tj  and  <o,  and  he  has,  in  consequence, 
developed  a  Syllogistic  scheme  differing  both  from  that  of 
the  Aristotelians  and  that  of  Hamilton.  No  part  of  Hamil- 
ton's system  required  the  revising  hand  of  the  master  more 
than  his  Logic.  If  he  had  signalized  the  distinction  between 
Analytical  and  Synthetical  judgments,  which  in  his  later 
writings  at  least  was  clearly  recognized,  and  at  the  same  time 
consistently    carried   out   his   statement  that   comprehension 


LOGIC.  163 

and  extension  are  not  two  co-ordinate  properties  of  the  con- 
cept, but  that  comprehension  is  the  primary  one  on  which 
extension  depends — that  it  is,  in  fact,  the  concept  itself, 
while  extension  (at  least  real  extension)  is  a  contingent  attri- 
bute of  it — the  Hamiltonian  Logic  must  to  a  great  extent 
have  taken  a  new  form,  and  the  exposition  of  the  theory  of 
judgments  would  have  been  cleared  of  the  ambiguities,  diffi- 
culties, and  inaccuracies  which  it  now  presents.  It  is,  indeed, 
to  Hamilton's  life,  rather  than  to  his  philosophy,  that  we  must 
look  for  the  explanation  of  these  defects. 

It  will  be  seen  from  the  foregoing  sketch  that  incomplete- 
ness is  one  of  the  characteristics  of  the  Hamiltonian  Philosophy 
generally.  For  this,  perhaps,  the  author  was  not  to  blame ; 
and  an  incomplete  system,  provided  it  contains  numerous 
points  of  interest  and  importance,  is  often  more  useful  in 
arousing  speculation  than  a  complete  one.  When  a  system  is 
completed  its  weak  points  are  usually  more  or  less  concealed. 
Readers  are  either  captivated  by  its  symmetry,  and  accept  it 
as  a  whole ;  or  else,  satisfied  that  as  a  whole  it  is  erroneous, 
they  reject  it,  without  waiting  to  discover  and  signalize 
the  joints  in  its  harness.  In  an  incomplete  system,  on  the 
other  hand,  defects  and  inconsistencies  generally  appear 
on  the  surface  :  but  if  it  has  a  real  value  which  impresses 
itself  on  the  student,  the  faculty  of  thought  will  be  stimu- 
lated either  to  reconcile  these  inconsistencies  and  complete 
the  system,  or  else  to  use  the  valuable  materials  collected  by 
the  author  in  the  construction  of  a  new  system  presumably 
different  from  his  own.  Accordingly,  I  believe  that  no 
philosophic  writer  of  the  present  century  has  had  the  same 
influence  in  cultivating  metaphysical  speculation  as  Sir 
William  Hamilton,  nor  perhaps  is  there  any  other  in  whose 
works  so  many  important  philosophical  problems  have  been 
mooted,  if  not  solved.     " Prudens  interrogation  says  Bacon, 

m  2 


1 64  SIR    WIL  LI  AM  HA  MIL  TON. 

"est  dlm'ullum  scientia;"  and  if  Hamilton  does  not  always 
propound  his  theories  in  the  form  of  interrogations,  they  are 
not  (even  when  erroneous)  less  valuable  as  steps  towards  a 
final  solution.  No  Idealist,  for  instance,  will  deny  that 
philosophy  has  gained  much  by  having-  the  problem  of  the 
external  world  set  before  us  in  the  manner  in  which  Sir 
William  Hamilton  has  stated  it.  Everything  seems  now 
prepared  for  a  final  issue,  and  even  if  that  issue  should  prove 
unfavourable  to  Natural  Realism,  to  Sir  William  Hamilton 
will  belong  the  credit  of  having  compelled  philosophers  to 
decide  it,  and  of  having  stated  the  case  on  which  their  decision 
was  given.  A  philosopher  who  has  left  behind  him  nothing 
but  well-stated  problems  may  have  rendered  the  world  a  greater 
service  than  one  who  has  only  attempted  to  furnish  solutions, 
to  say  nothing  of  one  who  has  confined  himself  to  descrip- 
tion and  illustration.  This,  I  think,  was  Hamilton's  greatest 
merit,1  and  in  dealing  with  his  several  theories  I  have  gene- 
rally aimed  at  stating  them  rather  in  the  form  of  hypotheses, 
pointing  out  some  of  the  arguments  in  favour  of  each  hypo- 
thesis and  some  of  the  objections  against  it.  And  perhaps 
if  the  theories  put  forward  by  the  various  schools  of  Psycho- 
logy were  regarded  as  hypotheses,  and  if  inquirers  attempted 
to  trace  out  the  consequences  of  two  or  more  rival  hypotheses 
— not  for  the  purpose  of  refutation,  but  of  bona, fide  investi- 
gation— pointing  out  everything  favourable  and  unfavourable 
to  each,  but  without  decidedly  committing  themselves  to 
either,  a  final  decision  on  their  validity  might  be  sooner 
arrived  at.  Physical  investigators  often  do  this.  Why 
should  not  Psychologists? 

1  Hamilton  himself  regards  the  pursuit  of  truth,  as  a  mental  exercise, 
more  valuable  than  the  truth  itself  when  discovered.  See  the  first  of  his 
Lectures  on  Metaphysics.  To  have  induced  many  inquirers  to  join  in  tliis 
pursuit  would  therefore  be,  in  his  opinion,  the  highest  success  that  a 
philosopher  could  aim  at. 


APPENDIX. 


Hamiltonian  Liteeattjee. 

Such  has  been  the  impulse  which  Hamilton  has  given  to  speculative 
thought  in  this  country  that  to  enumerate  the  various  works  in  which 
some  portions  of  his  system  have  been  vindicated  or  criticized — adopted  or 
rejected— would  require  an  erudition  almost  equal  to  his  own.  The 
reader,  however,  who  desires  to  pursue  the  theories  which  he  advocated  to 
their  latest  developments,  and  to  study  the  principal  animadversions 
which  have  been  made  on  them  will  obtain  some  information  from  the 
following  list,  which  makes  no  pretension  to  completeness. 

The  great  criticism  on  the  Hamiltonian  system  is  the  late  Mr.  J.  S. 
Mill's  Examination  of  Sir  William  Hamilton's  Philosophy.  The 
first  edition  of  this  work  appeared  in  1865.  The  fourth  edition — the 
last  during  the  author's  lifetime — was  published  in  1872.  The  later 
editions  are  much  enlarged  and  improved,  and  contain  answers  to  a 
number  of  writers  who  had  defended  Sir  William  Hamilton  against  the 
attacks  made  upon  him  in  the  first  edition.  This  book  has  been  frequently 
referred  to  in  the  text,  even  in  some  passages  where  Mr.  Mill  was  not 
named. 

Sir  William  Hamilton's  most  illustrious  disciple  was  the  late  Dean 
Mansel,  who,  however,  sought  to  unite  with  the  Hamiltonian  System 
some  Kantian  elements.  His  notes  to  his  edition  of  Aldrich's  Logic  and 
his  Prolegomena  Logica  (1851;  but  a  considerably  enlarged  edition 
appeared  in  1860)  chiefly  expand  Hamilton's  views  on  the  subject  of 
Logic.  The  latter,  however,  contains  an  able  discussion  on  the  subject  of 
Necessary  Truths,  including  Hamilton's  doctrine  of  Causality.  Dean 
Mansel's  Bampton  Lectures  on  The  Limits  of  Religious  Thought  (1858) 
are  intended  as  a  development  of  the  Hamiltonian  doctrine  of  the  Absolute 
and  Infinite.  Much  of  the  Hamiltonian  system  is  incorporated  in  his  Meta- 
physics ;  and  after  the  appearance  of  Mr.  Mill's  Examination  he  published 
The  Philosophy  of  the  Conditioned,  which  was  intended  as  a  reply  to  it. 
He  subsequently  published  an  article  on  the  same  subject  in  the  Content- 


1 66  APPENDIX. 

porary  Review  for  September,  1867,  which  was  answered  by  Mr.  Mill  in 
the  last  edition  of  his  Examination. 

In  addition  to  a  vast  number  of  reviews  (many  of  which  are  referred  to 
in  the  note),  Mr.  Mill,  in  the  later  editions  of  his  Examination,  mentions 
the  following  works  as  called  forth  by  his  controversy  with  Sir  William 
Hamilton  in  addition  to  Mansel's  Philosophy  of  the  Conditioned.  (1) 
The  Battle  of  the  Two  Philosophies,  by  an  Inquirer.  (2)  An  Examina- 
tion of  J.  S.  Mill's  Philosophy,  by  Dr.  M'Cosh,  who  afterwards  contri- 
buted an  article  on  the  same  subject  to  The  British  and  Foreign 
Evangelical  Review  for  April,  1868.  (3)  A  Criticism  of  John  Stuart 
Mill's  Pure  Idealism,  by  Mr.  H.  F.  O'Hanlon.  (4)  A  Commentary  on 
Kant's  Critick  of  the  Pure  Reason,  by  the  Rev.  J.  P.  Mahaffy.  This 
work  is  a  translation  of  Professor  Kuno  Fischer's  Commentary,  with  an 
Introduction  by  Professor  Mahaffy,  in  which  the  Hamilton-Mill  con- 
troversy is  dealt  with.  (5)  Recent  British  Philosophy,  by  Professor 
Masson.  The  last  edition  of  this  work,  dated  1877,  is  somewhat  enlarged. 
He  also  refers  to  Mr.  Alexander's  Mill  and  Carlyle,  but  that  work  seems 
to  relate  more  especially  to  Mr.  Mill's  own  philosophy,  an  observation 
also  partly  applicable  to  the  works  of  Mr.  O'Hanlon  and  Professor 
Mahaffy.  Mr.  Mill  also  notices  some  criticisms  comprised  in  Professor 
Veitch's  Memoir  of  Sir  William  Hamilton}     To  these  I  may  add — 

Sir  William  Hamilton:  being  the  Philosophy  of  Perception;  an 
Analysis,  by  Dr.  J.  Hutchinson  Stirling. 

Inquisitio  Philosophica  :  an  Examination  of  the  Principles  of  Kant 
and  Hamilton,  by  Mr.  M.  P.  Bolton.  Both  these  works  appeared  in 
Mr.  Mill's  life-time,  and  are  referred  to  by  him  in  the  Preface  to  the  later 
editions  of  his  Examination. 


1  He  mentions  also  the  following  reviews  : — Mill  v.  Hamilton,  by  Dr. 
H.  B.  Smith,  in  the  American  Presbyterian  and  Theological  Review 
for  January,  1866.  A  review  of  Mr.  O'Hanlon's  work  in  Blackwood's 
Maqazine  for  January,  1866.  A  review  of  Mdl's  Examination  in  (lie 
Jjuhlin  Review  for  October,  1865,  signed  R.  E.  G.  Another  in  the  Edin- 
burgh Review  for  July,  1866.  Another  in  the  North  British  Review 
lor  September,  1865,  ascribed  to  Professor  Frascr.  One  entitled  Mill  v. 
Hamilton  in  the  Fortnightly  Review  lor  July  15,  1865,  by  Mr.  Herbert 
Spencer.  One  in  the  Westminster  "Review  for  January,  L866,  ascribed 
to  the  late  Mr.  George  Grote.  One  in  the  North  American  Review  for 
•lulv,  1866,  and  one  by  Dr.  Ward  in  the  Dublin  Review  for  October, 
1871.       Mr.  Mill  also  refers  to  Dr.  Ward's  work  on  Nature  and  Grace. 


APPENDIX.  167 


Kant's  Critical  Philosophy  for  English  Readers,  by  the  Rev.  Pro- 
fessor Mahaffy.  In  the  first  part  of  this  work,  which  appeared  during 
Mr.  Mill's  life-time,  but  was  riot  noticed  by  him,  Professor  Mahaffy 
resumes  the  controversy  from  bis  former  work,  and  replies  to  Mr.  Mill's 
strictures.      There  are  some  further  observations  in  the  second  part. 

Notes  on  Mill's  Examination  of  Hamilton  s  Philosophy,  by  Thornas 
Edwards.  This  work  was  published  in  Calcutta,  thus  affording  evidence 
of  the  wide-spread  interest  occasioned  by  the  controversy.  It  appeared 
in  1878. 

Religious  Progress,  Ly  the  Rev.  Dr.  M'lvor.  In  the  notes  to  this 
volume  a  more  extreme  theory  of  Natural  Realism  than  that  of  Hamilton 
is  expounded,  and  the  theories  of  Hamilton  and  Mansel  are  criticized.  It 
appeared  in  1871.  I  have  myself  advocated  a  modified  doctrine  of  Natural 
Realism  in  a  work  on  Space  and  Vision  (1872). 

Mill  v.  Hamilton,  by  T.  Collyns  Simon — an  idealist  of  the  Beidceleian 
type. 

Among  the  logical  treatises  most  largely  influenced  by  Sir  William 
Hamilton,  and  also  containing  criticisms  on  his  theory  of  Logic,  I  should 
notice  Archbishop  Thomson's  well-known  Outline  of  the  Laivs  of  Thought. 
Also  Professor  Spencer  Baynes's  Essay  on  the  Nero  Analytic  of  Logical 
Eo?'ms.  Of  course  almost  every  subsequent  writer  on  Logic  has  had 
occasion  to  refer  more  or  less  to  the  Hamiltonian  doctrine.  Some  criticisms 
on  it  will  be  found  in  my  own  Introduction  to  Logic  (1880). 

I  should  not  conclude  this  Appendix  without  noticing  a  pamphlet  on 
Sir  William  Hamilton  by  Dr.  Thomas  Maguire,  which  was  published 
several  years  before  Mi-.  Mill's  Examination;  nor  ought  I  to  omit  Dr. 
Calderwood's  Philosophy  of  the  Infinite,  published  in  Hamilton's  life- 
time. 


GLOSSARY  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL  TERMS. 

Absolute.  This  word  has  more  than  one  meaning.  Sir  William 
Hamilton  proposes  to  use  it  in  the  sense  of  that  which  is  finished, 
perfected,  or  completed  ;  in  contrast  to  the  Infinite,  which  can  never  be 
completed.  He  notices  as  another  meaning,  the  opposite  of  the  Rela- 
tive, viz.,  that  which  does,  or  at  least  can,  exist  out  of  relation,  whether 
to  the  thinking  mind  or  to  anything  else.  Other  philosophers  used  the 
terms  Absolute,  Infinite,  and  Unconditioned,  as  identical  in  meaning, 
and  as  referring  to  the  ultimate  being  or  first  cause.  This  employ- 
ment of  the  term  Hamilton  thinks  objectionable,  though  in  arguing 
against  his  opponents  he  finds  himself  occasionally  compelled  to  adopt 
it.     In  this  third  sense  Absolute  is  opposed  to  Conditioned. 

Absolute  (Identity).  Sir  William  Hamilton  gives  this  name  to  the 
system  which  holds  that  the  thing  which  we  perceive  and  the  mind 
which  perceives  it  are  both  fundamentally  the  same  thing,  and  that 
the  distinction  which  consciousness  draws  between  them  is  illusory. 
This  thing  is  not  regarded  as  either  Mind  or  Matter,  but  as  that 
which  sometimes  appears  as  Mind  and  sometimes  as  Matter,  both 
appearances  being  in  fact  delusive. 

Abstraction.  The  act  by  which  our  attention  is  converged  on  certain 
parts  of  an  object  (or  on  the  common  parts  of  several  objects),  to  the 
exclusion  of  the  rest ;  or  by  which  certain  parts  of  an  object  are  left 
unattended  to,  the  remainder  occupying  the  mind  exclusively.  These 
parts  may  be  of  two  kinds,  viz.,  integrant  parts  which  are  capable  of 
being  perceived  or  imagined  separately,  as  the  arms  and  legs  of  a  man, 
which  may  be  perceived  or  imagined  apart  from  the  rest  of  his  body  ; 
or  else  subjective  parts  (or  modes)  which  can  be  considered  separately 
though  they  cannot  be  perceived  or  imagined  by  themselves,  as  the 
shape,  size,  colour,  or  weight  of  a  man.  Hence  Abstraction  is  divided 
into  Partial  or  Concrete  Abstraction,  and  Modal  Abstraction.  It 
is  by  Abstraction — especially  Modal  Abstraction — that  concepts, 
notions,  or  general  ideas  are  formed.     Sec  Attention. 

Accident.     This  word  is  occasionally  used  by  Hamilton  in  the  sense  ->i 


GLOSSARY  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL  TERMS.   169 

quality,  attribute,  or  property,  as  distinguished  from  subject  or  sub- 
stance. Every  subject  or  substance  has  accidents,  and  every  accident 
belongs  to  a  subject  or  substance  ;  but  it  is  only  the  accidents  of  which 
consciousness  takes  direct  cognisance.  Accident  is  here  used  inter- 
changeably with  phamomenon. 

Affinity.  The  law  of  Affinity  is  the  law  by  which  similar  or  contrasted 
ideas  become  associated  together  and  thus  capable  of  reproducing 
each  other.  It  occurs  in  Hamilton's  Lectures,  and  seems  to  include 
what  in  his  Reid  he  calls  the  law  of  Repetition.     See  Association. 

Ampliative  (or  Synthetical).  These  terms  are  applied  to  judgments 
or  propositions  in  which  the  comprehension,  or  connotation,  of  the 
predicate  is  not  altogether  included  in  the  comprehension,  or  conno- 
tation, of  the  subject.  (Instead  of  comprehension  or  connotation, 
Hamilton  sometimes  uses  the  word  intension,  as  affording  a  more  direct 
contrast  to  extension).  Such  judgments  are  opposed  to  Analytical  or 
Explicative  judgments  or  propositions  in  which  the  comprehension  or 
connotation  of  the  predicate  is  identical  with,  or  contained  in,  that  of 
the  subject.  Thus  assuming  that  the  comprehension,  connotation,  or 
intension  of  the  concept  Man,  or  of  the  name  Man,  is  Rational- Animal, 
All  men  are  rational,  All  men  are  animals,  and  All  men  are  rational 
animals,  are  Analytical  or  Explicative  judgments  or  propositions; 
while  All  men  are  bipeds,  and  All  men  are  mortal,  are  Ampliative  or 
Synthetical.  A  judgment  or  proposition  may  be  Ampliative  or  Syn- 
thetical although  a  part  of  the  connotation  of  the  predicate  is  included 
in  (or  identical  with)  that  of  the  subject,  provided  another  part  is  not 
so.  Thus  All  men  are  two-legged  animals,  is  an  Ampliative  or  Syn- 
thetical judgment  or  proposition,  because  although  the  comprehension 
of  the  term  Man  includes  the  comprehension  of  the  term  Animal,  it 
does  not,  on  the  above  assumption,  include  that  of  the  term  Two-legged. 

Analytical  (or  Explicative).     See  Ampliative. 

Appeehension.  This  word  is  used  by  Sir  William  Hamilton  for  a  direct 
and  immediate  presentation,  perception,  or  intuition  of  an  object,  in 
contrast  to  any  mediate  cognition,  or  mediate  belief,  in  it,  whether 
arrived  at  by  means  of  imagination  or  of  inference. 

Association  (of  Ideas).  Association  of  ideas  is  that  mental  principle 
which  enables  one  mental  state  to  recall  another  to  the  memory. 
Thus  the  thought  of  Waterloo  recalls  to  my  memory  at  once  the 
thoughts  Napoleon  and  Wellington,  together  with  several  others.  In 
this  case  the  thoughts  Napoleon  and  Wellington  are  both  said  to  be 
associated  with  the  thought  Waterloo  ;  and  it  is  very  possible  that 
the  thoughts  Napoleon  and  Wellington  may  also  be  directly  associated 


170    GLOSSARY  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL  TERMS. 

with  each  other,  so  that  either  will  bring  its  companion  into  our 
memory  without  referring  to  Waterloo  at  all.  What  ideas  will  be 
associated  in  this  manner  depends  very  much  on  the  experience  and 
habits  of  thought  of  the  individual,  but  in  all  minds  some  ideas 
are  associated  with  others.  In  the  phrase  Association  of  Ideas  the 
word  ideas  must  be  taken  in  its  widest  sense,  as  comprehending  all 
states  of  consciousness. 

Attention.  Attention,  according  to  Hamilton,  is  not  any  special  faculty, 
or  special  act,  but  merely  concentrated  or  vivid  consciousness.  We 
can  be  conscious  of  probably  six  objects  at  once,  and  if  so,  whenever 
we  are  conscious  of  less  than  that  number,  we  may  be  said  to  be 
attending  to  what  we  are  conscious  of.  The  term,  however,  is  some- 
times limited  to  cases  in  which  consciousness  is  converged  on  two,  or 
at  most  three,  objects,  in  which  case  it  will  be  more  vivid  than  when 
extended  to  four  or  five.  It  is  closely  connected  with  Abstraction, 
already  considered ;  for  Abstraction  may  be  described  either  as  Atten- 
tion directed  to  particular  parts  of  an  object,  or  as  Non-attention  to  the 
other  parts  of  it. 

Atteibute.  This  word  is  equivalent  to  quality  or  property.  See 
Accident. 

Belief.  This  word  frequently  occurs  in  Hamilton,  and  not  always  in 
the  same  sense.  Any  inexplicable  conviction — any  conviction  for 
which  we  can  assign  no  reason — is  ofted  referred  hy  him  to  Belief  or 
Feeling,  as  opposed  to  Knowledge  or  Cognition.  On  the  other  hand, 
when  a  conviction  falls  short  of  certainty  it  is  sometimes  called  Belief, 
while  when  we  feel  perfectly  certain  we  are  said  to  know  or  cognise 
the  object.  Again,  when  we  are  only  convinced  of  the  existence  of  a 
thing,  but  have  no  knowledge  of  its  properties  (beyond  those  which 
are  implied  in  its  name),  we  ai-e  sometimes  said  to  believe  in  it,  while 
when  our  acquaintance  with  its  properties  is  more  extensive  we  are 
said  to  know  Sr  cognise  it,  Thus  we  believe  in  a  thing  if  we  are  con- 
vinced that  it  is,  but  only  know  it  when  we  know  how  or  why  it  is — 
to  adopt  the  Greek  phrases,  we  may  believe  the  to  oti,  but  only  know 
when  we  also  attain  the  to  Sioti.  Belief,  in  Hamilton's  writings,  is 
always  opposed  to  knowledge,  but  the  distinction  seems  in  different 
passages  to  take  these  three  shapes.     See  too  Cognition. 

Cause,  Causality,  Cause  and  Effect.  Hamilton  intends  to  employ 
these  terms  in  the  ordinary  sense,  and  to  offer  explanations  of  them 
as  so  used  :  and  when  he  explains  the  cause  (or  rather  causes)  of  a 
thing  as  the  forms  in  which  it  previously  existed,  he  does  not  mean  to 
employ  the  word  Cause  in  a  new  signification,  but  to  give  a  scientific) 


GLOSSARY  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL   TERMS.    171 

explanation  of  its  ordinary  use.  Apart  from  his  peculiar  theory  of 
causation,  cause  is  with  him  a  name  for  anything  without  which  the 
effect  would  not  take  place. 

Cognition.  This  term  Hamilton  often  employs  as  the  equivalent  of 
Knowledge,  using  the  words  cognise  for  know,  and  cognisable  (Mr. 
Mill  writes  this  word  cognoscibJe)  for  that  which  can  he  Known. 
When  dividing  all  mental  states,  however,  into  Cognitions,  Feelings, 
and  Conations,  Hamilton  uses  the  word  Cognition  in  its  widest  sense, 
to  include  all  the  products  of  intuition  and  thought — of  the  senses 
and  the  intellect — thus  including  both  Knowledge  proper  and  Belief. 
In  fact  belief  'is  not  often  opposed  to  cognition,  though  it  frequently  is 
to  knowledge. 

Common  Sense.  This  phrase,  which  belongs  to  Keid  rather  than  to 
Hamilton,  embraces  the  primary,  original,  or  ultimate  facts  of  con- 
sciousness, on  which  all  the  others  depend. 

Comparison.     See  Elaborative  (Faculty). 

Comprehension  and  Connotation.  When  we  form  a  concept  (see 
Conception)  the  parts  of  the  object  or  objects  on  which  attention  is 
converged  are  called  the  Comprehension  of  the  concept.  This  com- 
prehension is  merely  another  name  for  the  concept  itself.  When  we 
say  that  the  comprehension  of  the  concept  Man  consists  of 
the  two  elements  Rational  and  Animal,  we  mean  no  more 
than  that  the  concept  itself  consists  of  these  two  elements.  But 
in  speaking  of  the  comprehension  of  a  concept  we  generally 
imply  that  the  concept  is  a  complex  one  which  may  be  resolved 
into  parts,  which  these  parts  constitute  its  comprehension; 
as  will  be  seen  in  the  above  instance.  Instead  of  comprehension, 
Hamilton  sometimes  uses  the  words  intension  or  depth,  as  opposed  to 
extension  or  breadth,  which  latter  terms  apply  to  the  number  of 
individuals  which  correspond  to  the  concept.  When  a  term  stands 
for  a  concept  (or  for  the  collection  of  things  corresponding  to  a 
concept)  Mr.  Mill  calls  the  comprehension  of  the  concept,  the  con- 
notation of  the  term,  and  the  extension  of  the  concept,  the  denotation 
of  the  term.  Connotation  is  thus  related  to  comprehension  in  the 
same  way  that  a  proposition  is  related  to  a  judgment — the  latter  term 
in  each  instance  referring  to  the  thought  in  the  mind,  and  the  former 
to  its  expression  in  language.  Hamilton  does  not  employ  the  terms 
connote  or  connotation,  and  therefore  probably  does  not  intend  to  use 
the  terms  denote  or  denotation,  in  the  limited  sense  of  Mr.  Mill. 
Conation.  Hamilton  uses  this  word  as  a  general  term  to  include  both 
Desire  and  Will  (or  Volition). 


172    GLOSSARY  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL   TERMS. 

Conception,  Concept,  &e.  The  word  Conception  standing  both  for  a 
mental  operation  and  its  product,  Hamilton  proposes  to  use  the  word 
Concept  tor  the  latter,  thus  confining  Conception  to  the  operation 
alone.  The  word  Conception,  however,  is  often  used  not  only  for  the 
act  of  forming  a  concept  but  for  the  act  of  individualizing  it,  or  calling 
up  in  imagination  an  object  which  exemplifies  it.  This  seems  to  be 
in  fact  the  ordinary  application  of  the  verb  to  conceive  as  well  as  of  the 
adjectives  conceivable  and  inconceivable.  A  concept  or  notion  arises 
from  considering  or  attending  to  some  parts  of  an  object,  or  of 
several  resembling  objects,  to  the  exclusion  of  the  remaining  parts, 
especially  if  these  parts  are  subjective  parts  rather  than  integrant 
parts  (see  Abstraction).  When  we  consider  separately  the  (subjec- 
tive) parts  in  which  two  or  more  objects  resemble  each  other,  to  the 
exclusion  of  those  in  which  they  differ,  we  form  a  general  concept, 
general  notion,  or  general  idea,  which  includes  the  points  of  agree- 
ment to  the  exclusion  of  the  points  of  difference.  Thus  in  forming 
tbe  general  concept  of  a  square,  I  take  several  square  objects  and 
withdrawing  my  attention  from  the  materials  of  which  they  are 
composed,  the  positions  which  they  occupy,  and  even  their  magni- 
tudes, and  attending  only  to  their  figure,  I  form  a  notion  of  that  in 
which  alone  they  agree,  and  am  thus  enabled  to  regard  any  of  them  (or 
any  similar  figure  that  I  may  meet  with  thereafter)  as  a  square.  But 
it  is  impossible  to  realize  this  concept  or  notion  of  a  square  without 
having  some  square  object  (or  objects)  present  either  to  the  senses  or 
to  the  imagination.  A  concept  is  often  described  as  a  collection  of 
attributes,  but  it  may  consist  (as  in  this  example)  of  a  single  attribute. 
Sir  William  Hamilton  believes  that  we  can  form  concepts  without  the 
aid  of  language.  He  appears,  however,  to  have  sometimes  used  the 
words  concept  and  notion  in  a  wider  and  vaguer  signification,  as 
noticed  in  the  text.  Concepts  are  divided  on  several  principles  ;  for 
instance,  into  Identical  or  Cognate,  and  Different ;  but  Hamilton 
thinks  the  most  important  division  is  into  Congruent  or  Agreeing, 
viz.,  those  which  can  be  united  in  thought,  and  Conflictive,  viz., 
those  which  cannot,  on  which  division  his  theory  of  judgments  is 
based.  It  will  be  seen  that  these  are  rather  divisions  of  pairs  of 
concepts  than  of  concepts  taken  singly.  The  dispute  between  the  Con- 
ceptualists  and  Nominalists  has  been  dealt  with  in  the  text.  Some 
philosophers  seem  to  have  denied  the  existence  of  concepts  altogether, 
and  to  have  described  all  who  believed  in  their  existence  as  Con- 
ceptualists.  According  to  them  nothing  exists,  either  in  the  mind  or 
out  of  it,  except  individual  objects  and  names.     These  philosophers 


GLOSSARY  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL    TERMS.    173 

were  sometimes  called  Nominalists,  and  sometimes  Ultra-Nomi- 
nalists. Names  were,  according  to  them,  transferred  from  one  object  to 
another  under  the  influence  of  the  principle  of  association  when  the 
objects  in  question  resembled  each  other,  and  thus  what  was  origi- 
nally a  proper  name  came  to  denote,  not  one,  but  several  individuals 
which  resembled  each  other:  and  a  name  which  had  been  thus  trans- 
ferred was  called  a  general  name.  They  do  not  seem  to  have 
regarded  it  as  having  any  connotation,  the  only  property  which  dis- 
tinguished it  from  a  proper  name  being  according  to  them  that  it 
denoted  several  resembling  intuitions.  Hamilton  on  the  other 
hand  appears  to  regard  even  proper  names  as  standing  for  concepts 
not  intuitions.  His  doctrine  is  therefore  the  extreme  opposite  to 
that  of  these  Ultra-Nominalists. 

Condition,  Conditioned,  &c.  These  terms  though  frequently  used  by 
Hamilton  are  not  veiy  carefully  denned.  Condition  appears  to  be 
nearly  equivalent  to  both  mode  and  relation,  mode  being  again  con- 
vertible with  quality,  property,  or  attribute,  The  law  of  the  Con- 
ditioned, as  enounced  by  Hamilton,  affirms  that  all  positive  thought 
lies  between  two  inconceivable  extremes,  of  which,  since  they  are 
mutually  contradictory,  one  must  be  true  and  the  other  false,  though 
we  cannot  determine  which.  One  of  these  extremes  always  belongs  to 
what  he  terms  the  Absolute  (see  Absolute),  and  the  other  to  what 
he  terms  the  Infinite  (see  Infinite). 

Congruent,  Conflictive,  Cognate.     See  Conception. 

Conservative.  The  Conservative  Faculty,  according  to  Hamilton,  is 
the  Memory  in  the  strict  signification  of  that  term — the  faculty 
which  preserves  ideas  or  other  mental  states,  and  renders  them 
capable  of  being  recalled  to  consciousness,  though  it  requiivs  a 
different  faculty — the  Reproductive — to  recall  them. 

Consciousness.  A  general  designation  for  all  the  mental  states  that  we 
can  become  cognisant  of,  when  considered  in  relation  to  the  mind 
that  knows  them.  It  includes  the  three  sub-classes,  Cognitions 
Feelings,  and  Conations.  When  we  are  aware  of  the  presence  of  any 
state  of  mind,  we  are  said  to  be  conscious  of  it.  But  Hamilton 
extends  the  meaning  of  the  term  consciousness  to  include  everything 
that  we  know  with  the  same  directness  and  immediateness  as  our 
mental  states  ;  and  as  he  believes  that  certain  states  of  matter  are  per- 
ceived as  directly  and  immediately  as  our  pleasures  and  pains,  he 
maintains  that  we  are  conscious  of  these  states  of  matter  as  well  as  of 
states  of  mind. 

Contradiction.     The  law  of  Contradiction  is  that  no  subject  (or  thing) 


174   GLOSSARY  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL   TERMS. 

can  have  contradictor}'  predicates,  or  more  accurately,  that  the  predi- 
cate cannot  contradict  the  subject.  Symbolically  it  may  be  ex- 
pressed, No  B  is  non-B.  But  Hamilton  sometimes  uses  the  expres- 
sion to  include  the  two  co-ordinate  laws  of  Identity  and  Excluded 
Middle,  the  former  of  which  is  expressed  Every  B  is  B,  and  the 
latter  Whatever  is  not  B  is  non-B.  He  also  calls  it  the  law  of  Non- 
contradiction, because  (considei-ed  as  a  precept)  it  prohibits  contradic- 
tion, and  informs  us  that  a  self-contradictory  thought  is  illegitimate. 

Conversion.  The  logical  process  by  which,  from  a  given  proposition  or 
judgment,  we  deduce  another  having  the  same  terms,  but  in  a  trans- 
posed order,  as  when  from  B  is  C  we  infer  that  C  is  B.  This  con- 
version is  called  simple  conversion  when  the  quantities  of  both  terms 
are  unaltered  after  transposition,  as  when  in  Hamilton's  system  from 
All  B  is  some  C  we  infer  that  Some  C  is  all  B  (Some  C  is  B  or  Some 
C  is  some  B  would  not  be  the  simple  converse  of  All  B  is  Some  C, 
but  what  logicians  called  its  converse  per  accidens).  When  a. propo- 
sition admits  of  being  simply  converted,  the  original  proposition  will 
always  reappear  on  a  second  simple  conversion.  By  reducing  all 
propositions  to  equations  and  inequalities,  Hamilton  rendered  them  all 
simply  convertible. 

Cosmothetic  (Idealism).  Cosmothetic  Idealism,  or  Hypothetical 
Realism,  is  the  theory  which  admits  the  existence  of  matter  (or  of  the 
external  world)  but  denies  the  immediate  perception  of  it.  As  on 
this  theory  we  do  not  immediately  perceive  the  external  world,  the 
question  arises,  What  is  it  that  we  do  perceive  ?  And  hence  arise 
three  sub-divisions  of  Cosmothetic  Idealists,  viz.:  1.  Those  who 
maintain  that  what  we  perceive  is  not  a  modification  of  our  minds 
but  of  something  else  ;  2.  Those  who  hold  that  it  is  a  modification 
of  our  minds,  but  one  which  continues  to  exist  when  we  cease  to  be 
conscious  of  it;  and  3.  Those  who  hold  that  it  is  a  mere  state  of  con- 
sciousness whose  essence  consists  in  being  felt.  Hamilton  sometimes 
classes  the  second  and  third  of  these  sub-divisions  together,  thus 
dividing  theclass  into  two  sub-classes  instead  of  three.  The  doctrine  of 
( iosmothetic  Idealism  is  what  Hamilton  specially  refers  to  as  the  Ideal 
tin  ory,  the  representative  theory  of  perception,  or  the  representative 
hypothesis;  and  one  main  object  of  his  reasonings  concerning  the 
external  world  is  to  show  that  the  Cosmothetic  Idealist  has  no  right 
to  believe  in  its  existence,  and  only  attains  it  by  means  of  a  para- 
logrom. 

Denote,  Denotation.    See  Conception  and  Connotation. 

DlOTDM.     Aristotle's  Dictum,  on   which    he   founded   the    theory  of  the 


GLOSSARY  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL   TERMS.    175 

Syllogism,  is  that  whatever  is  affirmed  or  denied  of  a  whole  class 
may  he  affirmed  or  denied  of  anything  contained  in  the  class.  This 
is  known  as  the  Dictum  de  omni  et  de  nullo. 

Ego,  Non-ego.  Hamilton  uses  the  Latin  ego  in  preference  to  the 
English  /  or  myself,  because  the  former  is  not  liable  to  be  con- 
founded (in  oral  delivery)  with  the  eye,  and  can  be  used  either  in 
the  nominative  or  the  objective  case.  The  non-ego,  of  course,  means 
anything  that  is  not  the  ego,  and  would  therefore  include  any  other 
mind  than  my  own  ;  but  with  Hamilton  the  non-ego  is  often  used 
as  the  equivalent  of  matter. 

Elaboeative  (Faculty).  The  Elaborative  Faculty  is  Hamilton's  desig- 
nation for  the  faculty  of  thought  or  comparison,  also  known  a.s  the 
discursive  faculty.  This  is  the  faculty  which  gives  rise  to  concepts 
(hence  abstraction  is  one  of  its  operations),  judgments,  and  reasonings, 
all  of  which  are  so  many  modes  of  comparison.  Logic  is  the  science 
of  its  operations.  Concepts  are  formed  by  comparing  intuitions, 
judgments  by  comparing  concepts,  and  reasonings  by  comparing 
judgments  Under  the  head  of  comparison,  Hamilton  includes 
the  conditions  or  pre-requisites  of  the  act  of  comparison,  and  also 
its  results.  All  our  perceptions  of  relations  are  due  to  this  faculty, 
every  relation  being  the  result  of  a  comparison,  and  every  act  of 
comparison  implying  the  perception  of  a  relation. 

Empiricism.  Empirical.  Experience.  Empiricism  is  the  system 
which  explains  all  the  phaenomena  of  the  human  mind  by  means  of 
Experience.  But  the  term  Experience  itself  has  been  differently 
understood,  standing  sometimes  for  sensations  or  other  rude  materials 
of  knowledge,  and  sometimes  for  the  knowledge  derived  from  them, 
and  into  which  they  enter  :  while  again,  other  writers  appear  to  limit 
its  meaning  to  what  has  been  termed  external  experience.  With 
these  latter  philosophers  Empiricism  becomes  Sensualism  or  Sensa- 
tionalism. The  fundamental  principle  of  Empiricism  seems  to  be 
that  there  are  no  judgments  or  propositions  which  axe  from  the  first 
universal  and  necessary,  while  it  is  also  maintained  that  all  our 
earlier  judgments  or  propositions  are  singular — relating  to  individual 
objects  only — and  that  the  great  instrument  for  generalizing  these  is 
induction  (see  Induction).  When  Empiricists  include  mental  expe- 
rience in  their  sources  of  knowledge,  there  is  some  risk  of  verbal 
questions  arising  between  them  and  philosophers  of  the  school  of 
Hamilton.  I  make  for  example  a  number  of  unsuccessful  efforts  to 
imagine  two  right  lines  enclosing  a  space,  and  at  the  end  of  the 
process    conclude   that  it  is  impossible   for  them    to   do   so.     One 


176    GLOSSARY  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL    TERMS. 

philosopher  says  that  this  is  the  result  of  an  universal  and  necessary 
law  of  mind.  Another  says  that  it  is  a  generalization  of  my  mental 
experience  on  the  subject.  These  statements  seem  to  be  two  ways  of 
expressing  the  same  fact,  provided  that  the  mental  experience  is 
admitted  to  be  original,  and  not  dependent  on  association  of  ideas  or 
acquired  knowledge  and  habits  of  thought.  The  word  Empirical  is 
sometimes  used  by  Kant,  not  for  that  which  is  derived  from  experience, 
but  for  that  which  is  applicable  to  (or  involved  in)  experience,  though, 
perhaps,  itself  a  priori.  This  employment  of  the  term  does  not,  I 
believe,  occur  to  Hamilton. 

Eneegy.     This  word  in  Hamilton  is  nearly  equivalent  to  action. 

Ens.  A  wide  term  for  anything  that  exists,  and  hence  nearly  equivalent 
to  existence.  Thus  Hamilton  in  one  place  says  that  ens  is  the 
primum  cognitum,  or  first  thing  known,  which  he  elsewhere  says 
of  existence,  since  all  thought  and  all  knowledge  implies  the  know- 
ledge, or  thought,  of  existence. 

Excluded  (Middle).  The  law  of  Excluded  Middle  is,  that  whatever 
is  not  B  is  non-B,  where  B  is  any  concept  whatever.  The  meaning 
of  the  phrase  Excluded  Middle  is,  that  any  third,  or  intermediate, 
alternative  is  excluded  or  inadmissible.  If  the  thing  is  not  B,  it 
is  non-B.  There  is  no  possibility  of  its  being  neither.  It  likewise 
cannot  be  both ;  but  this  results,  not  from  the  law  of  Excluded 
Middle,  but  from  that  of  Contradiction.  No  B  is  non-B,  implies 
that  nothing  is  both  B  and  non-B.  Hamilton  describes  the  law 
of  Excluded  Middle  as  the  principle  of  disjunctive  judgments;  but 
if  the  proposition  Everything  is  either  B  or  non-B,  implies  that 
nothing  is  both  B  and  non-B,  the  principle  of  Contradiction,  is 
involved  in  it  as  well  as  that  of  Excluded  Middle.  Hamilton,  how- 
ever, regards  the  two  principles  as  different  phases  of  the  same  law. 
See  Contradiction. 

Existence.  In  some  passages  Hamilton  seems  to  identify  existence 
with  substance,  at  least  when  he  speaks  of  absolute  existence, 
existence  in  itself,  &c.  Attributes,  qualities,  phenomena,  &c, 
which  alone  are  known  to  us,  are  thus  characterised  as  modes,  or 
forms  of  existence.  That  we  cannot  conceive  existence  as  absolutely 
commencing  or  terminating,  is  nearly  equivalent  to  saying  that  we 
cannot  conceive  substance  as  beginning  or  ceasing  to  exist ;  and  thus 
the  permanence  (both  anterior  and  posterior)  of  substance,  or  rather  of 
substances,  lies  at  the  basis  of  his  assertion  that  we  cannot  regard 
the  quantity  of  existence  as  either  increased  or  diminished.  See 
Substance. 


GLOSSARY  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL   TERMS.    177 

Extension,  Extensive.  According  to  Hamilton  we  perceive  or  cognise 
what  is  usually  called  space  or  extension,  both  a  priori  and  a  pos- 
teriori, and  he  proposes  to  distinguish  them  by  calling  the  a  priori 
idea,  space,  and  the  a  posteriori  idea,  extension.  TVe  have  also  to 
consider  the  extension  of  a  concept  or  a  name.  This  is  merely  the 
number  of  individual  objects  which  correspond  to  the  concept,  or  to 
whom  the  name  is  applicable.  Hamilton  often  speaks  as  if  this 
extension  was  essential  to  the  concept,  and  might  be  discovered  by 
mere  analysis  of,  or  reflection  on,  the  concept  as  it  exists  in  the  mind  ; 
but  it  can  hardly  be  said  that  he  includes  the  property  of  having  an 
extension  in  the  meaning  of  the  word  concept,  or  that  he  would 
withhold  the  term  concept  from  our  ideas  of  a  dragon  or  a  griffin, 
which  have  no  (real)  extension.  See  Conception,  Comprehension,  and 
Ampliative.  The  extension  of  a  term  is  sometimes  called  its  deno- 
tation. The  extensive  quantity  of  a  thing  or  collection  of  things, 
is  its  magnitude  measured  by  bulk  or  number,  and  is  thus  distin- 
guished from  intensive  quantity  or  decree,  and  from  protensive 
quantity  or  duration. 

Faculty.  A  faculty,  according  to  Hamilton,  is  not  any  thing  in  the 
mind,  or  any  separable  portion  of  the  mind,  but  is  a  general  name 
for  the  mind  when  acting  in  a  particular  way.  Similar  mental 
acts  are  referred  to  the  same  faculty  ;  dissimilar  acts  to  different 
faculties.  His  enumeration  of  faculties  are  — the  Perceptive  (which 
has  two  branches,  External  and  Internal),  the  Conservative,  the 
Reproductive,  the  Representative,  the  Elaborative,  and  the  Regu- 
lative. These,  however,  are  properly  the  Cognitive  Faculties,  and 
do  not  include  the  Emotions  and  the  Will  (Feeling  and  Conation). 
Consciousness  is  not  a  faculty,  but  includes  all  the  faculties.  They 
all  operate  only  in  so  far  as  we  are  conscious  of  them. 

Feeling.  Hamilton  uses  this  word  to  denote  those  states  of  mind 
which  are  pleasurable  or  painful,  and  mainly  consist  in  pleasure  and 
pain.  Feeling  is  purely  subjective,  in  contrast  with  cognition  or 
knowledge,  which  is  objective.  But  here  we  must  recollect  the  dis- 
tinction which  Hamilton  draws  between  the  subjectivo-object  and 
the  objectivo-object.  Feeling  is  subjectivo-subjective.  There  is  no 
object  of  any  kind  in  pure  feeling ;  while  in  cognition,  though  some- 
times there  is  no  objectivo-object,  there  is  at  least  a  subjectivo- 
object.  Knowledge  and  feeling,  however,  always  co-exist,  (though 
the  one  rises  higher  as  the  other  sinks  lower,)  and  in  actual  ex- 
perience we  never  meet  with  a  state  of  pure  feeling  without  know- 
ledge, or  of  pure  knowledge  without  feeling.  Feelings  are  subdivided 
into  Sentiments  and  Sensations. 


i;8    GLOSSARY  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL   TERMS. 

Figure.     The  figure  of  a  Syllogism  is  determined   by  the  arrangement 
of  the  Micdle  Term  as  predicate  or  subject  in  its  premisses.     Thus  if 
the  Middle  Term  is  the  subject  of  the  major  premiss,  and  the  predicate 
of  the  minor  premiss  the  Syllogism  is  said  to  be  in  the  first  figure 
See  Major. 

Fokce.  'this  word  with  Sir  W.  Hamilton  implies  not  merely  something 
that  accelerates  or  retards  motion  (whether  of  our  own  bodies  or  of 
extra-organic  matter),  but  a  certain  nisus  or  effort  of  which  we  are 
conscious.  The  same  observation  applies  to  Resistance.  An  in- 
terplanetary medium  which  slightly  retarded  the  motions  of  the 
earth  and  planets,  would  not  be  regarded  as  offering  resistance  if  it 
produced  no  conscious  effect  on  our  muscular  system.  Resistance  is, 
in  fact,  conscious  resistance  to  our  locomotive  volition,  and  to  our 
organism  when  in  mofion  under  the  influence  of  that  volition.  This 
employment  of  the  terms  force  and  resistance  is  not  peculiar  to 
Hamilton,  but  it  may  be  worth  while  to  point  out  that  their  use  in 
Physics  and  Psychology  do  not  always  correspond.  .Hamilton  also 
occasionally  employs  the  term,  force  for  a  positive  principle  or  positive 
necessity  in  contrast  to  an  impotence  or  imbecility. 

Fokii.  Hamilton  uses  this  word  in  the  Kantian  sense,  for  an  universal 
and  necessary  element  in  certain  facts  of  consciousness  without 
which  the  others  could  not  exist.  Thus  space  in  the  Kantian  system 
is  the  form  of  external  sensation,  and  time  is  the  form  of  sensation, 
both  external  and  internal,  because  without  space  the  external  sensa- 
tion would  sink  into  an  internal  sensation,  and  without  time  the  latter 
would  disappear  also.  But  Hamilton  is  less  careful  than  Kant  as 
to  the  terms  which  he  employs  in  connexion  with  the  word  form, 
and  seems  hardly  to  distinguish  between  Forms  of  sense,  Forms  of 
imagination,  and  Forms  of  thought.  In  fact,  he  describes  space  in 
each  of  these  three  ways  in  different  passages  of  his  writings.  The 
Forms  of  all  the  faculties  being  universal  and  necessary,  are  referred 
by  him  to  the  intellect,  or  regulative  faculty.  In  Logic  the  use  of 
the  word  Form  is,  in  some  cases  at  least,  different.  Thus,  when  we 
speak  of  the  Forms  of  Propositions,  we  do  not  mean  the  universal  and 
necessary  part  of  propositions,  but  the  heads  or  classes  under  which 
propositions  may  be  arranged.  The  former  use  of  the  word  Form  is 
borrowed  from  Aristotle,  with  whom  Matter  meant  everything  that 
is  not  Form;  but  Hamilton  usually  employs  matter  and  its  correla- 
tives only  for  that  which  occupies  space,  and  constitutes  the  external 
world.  When  Hamilton  describes  the  cause  of  a  thing  as  the  form 
(or  forms)  in  which  it  previously  existed,  he  employs  the  word  nearly 
in  the  same  meaning  as  state  or  mode. 


GLOSSARY  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL    TERMS.    179 

Generalization,  General  Notions.     See  Abstraction,  Conception. 

Idea.  This  word  rarely  occurs  in  Hamilton's  writings,  and  tlien  usually 
in  a  very  wide  sense,  including  intuitions,  representations,  concepts, 
and  almost  every  other  state  of  consciousness,  as  in  the  phrase 
Association  of  Ideas. 

Idealism.  The  doctrine  which  denies  the  existence  of  the  external 
world  or  matter,  and  maintains  that  nothing  exists,  or  is  known, 
except  minds.  This  doctrine  Hamilton  sometimes  designates  Abso- 
lute Idealism,  giving  the  name  of  Cosmothetic  Idealism  to  the 
doctrine  which  denies  the  immediate  knowledge  of  the  external 
world,  but  holds  that  it  exists,  and  can  be  mediately  known  or  in- 
ferred.    See  Cosmothetic  {Idealism). 

Ideal  Theory.  The  theory  which  maintains  that  we  do  not  perceive 
external  or  material  objects  themselves,  but  only  certain  ideas  of 
them.  The  word  idea  is  here  used  in  a  narrower  sense  than  by 
Hamilton. 

Identity.  The  law  of  Identity  affirms  the  complete  identity  between 
a  concept  and  its  entire  comprehension,  and  the  partial  identity 
between  it  and  any  part  of  its  comprehension.  The  symbolical  ex- 
pression of  this  law  is  B  =  B.  This  law,  together  with  those  of 
Contradiction  and  Excluded  Middle,  constitute  the  fundamental 
laws,  or  rather  law,  of  Logic  ;  for  Hamilton,  as  already  stated,  regards 
them  as  three  phases  of  the  same  law.  Personal  identity ;  Hamilton 
thinks,  is  first  perceived  when  we  compare  a  past  state  of  conscious- 
ness, represented  in  the  memory',  with  a  present  state;  and  it  is  in 
this  perception  of  personal  identity  that  we  first  recognize  the  ego  or 
self.     As  to  Absolute  Identity,  see  Absolute. 

Imagination.  Hamilton  calls  this  faculty  the  Representative  Faculty, 
and  its  products  are  what  are  properly  termed  representations — a 
word  which  some  philosophers  use  as  widely  as  idea.  The  Repre- 
sentative Faculty  is  more  strictly  what  is  called  the  Reproductive 
Imagination,  what  is  known  as  the  Productive  or  Creative  Imagina- 
tion involving  (according  to  Hamilton)  the  operations  both  of  the 
Representative  and  of  the  Elaborative  Faculties.  Re-presenta- 
tion is  opposed  by  Hamilton  to  presentation,  the  thing  being 
presented  when  it  first  enters  the  mind  (by  means  of  the  senses), 
and  re-presented  when  it  is  afterwards  called  up  by  the  imagination. 
The  imagination,  he  believes,  employs  the  same  sensitive  organ  in 
representing  that  was  originally  employed  in  presenting,  the  differ- 
ence being  that  in  one  case  it  is  excited  by  external,  and  in  the  other 
by  internal,  influences.  Mr.  Mill  (following  Hume),  often  uses  idea 
in  the  sense  of  Hamilton's  representation.  Representations  must, 
N    2 


180    GLOSSARY  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL   TERMS. 

in  Hamilton's  system,  be  distinguished  both   from  intuitions  and 
concepts.     See  the  next  head. 

Immediate  oe  Intuitive  (Knowledge).  Immediate  or  intuitive  know- 
ledge or  cognition  is  distinguished  by  Hamilton  from  mediate  or 
representative  knowledge  or  cognition.  Here  the  word  represen- 
tative is  used  in  a  wider  sense  than  in  connexion  with  the  imagination 
(just  considered)  since,  whenever  we  do  not  know  or  perceive  the  thing 
itself  (whether  a  state  of  mind  or  of  mattei-),  but  only  something  else 
from  which  it  can  be  inferred  or  deduced,  our  knowledge  is  said  to  be 
representative.  Thus  I  have  only  a  representative  knowledge  of  a 
distant  object  (so  long  as  it  continues  at  a  distance),  though,  what  I 
immediately  know  when  contemplating  it,  may  be  a  state  of  matter 
rather  than  of  mind.  Using  the  word  object  so  as  to  include  our 
states  of  mind,  as  well  as  the  states  of  the  material  world,  the  great 
distinction  between  these  two  kinds  of  knowledge  is,  that  in  intuitive 
or  immediate  knowledge,  there  is  but  a  single  object  which  is  directly 
cognized,  whereas  in  representative  or  mediate  knowledge  there 
are  two  objects,  one  of  which  is  directly  cognized,  while  the  other 
is  cognized  only  indirectly,  and  through  it.  There  seems  to  be  a 
corresponding  distinction  between  immediate  and  mediate  belief; 
indeed  Hamilton  often  uses  the  word  cognition,  to  include  both 
knowledge  and  belief. 

Incompeessibilitt  (Ultimate).  The  Law  of  Ultimate  Incompressibility, 
according  to  Hamilton,  is  that  law,  by  which  a  material  object  is 
incapable  of  extrusion  from  space,  or  of  being  compressed  into 
nothing.  It  is  distinct  from  Eesistance,  because  it  relates  only  to  a 
compressing  (not  to  a  translating)  force,  and  because  it  alleges  that 
the  resistance  thus  opposed  to  the  compressing  force  would  ulti- 
mately become  insuperable,  no  matter  how  the  force  might  be 
increased. 

Inconceivable.  That  which  cannot  be  conceived  (see  Conception, 
Concept)  :  but  the  verb  to  conceive  is  used  not  only  in  the  sense  of 
forming  a  concept,  but  also  in  the  sense  of  picturing  in  the  imagi- 
nation an  object  corresponding  to  the  concept  when  formed.  There 
are  therefore  at  least  two  kinds  of  inconceivables,  viz.,  when  the 
proposed  concept  cannot  be  formed  (being  inconsistent  with  the  laws 
of  thought)  and  when,  though  it  can  be  formed,  no  corresponding 
object  can  be  perceived  or  imagined.  Thus  that  which  is  neither 
white  nor  non-white  is  an  inconceivable  of  the  former  kind,  while  a 
space  enclosed  by  two  right  lines  is  an  instance  of  the  latter.  Ha- 
milton again  derives  the  latter  kind  of  inconceivableness  from  two 
sources,  a  positive  and  a  negative  one;  for  I  may  fail  to  imagine  an 


GL  OSS  A  RY  OF  PHIL  OSOPHICA  L   TERMS.    1 8 1 

object  corresponding  to  a  concept  (or  to  a  combination  of  two  concepts) 
because  some  law  of  my  nature  forces  me  to  imagine  the  opposite,  or 
because  owing  to  the  limitations  of  my  faculties  I  cannot  imagine 
either  of  two  things  one  or  other  of  which  must  be  real  (see  Con- 
ditioned). Mr.  Mill  charges  Hamilton  with  using  the  term  Incon- 
ceivable in  other  senses,  but  I  think  unjustly.  Whatever  is  conceived 
must  of  course  come  under  a  concept  as  well  as  be  present  to  the  mind 
in  an  intuition  or  representation  (as  already  explained).  Both 
imagination  and  thought  are  thus  requisite  to  the  act  of  conception. 

Induction.  The  mental  operation  by  which  from  a  number  of  individual 
instances,  we  arrive  at  a  general  law.  The  process,  according  to  Hamil- 
ton, is  only  logically  valid  when  all  the  instances  included  in  the  law 
are  enumerated.  This  being  seldom,  if  ever,  possible,  the  conclusion 
of  an  Induction  is  usually  liable  to  more  or  less  uncertainty,  and 
Induction  is  therefore  incapable  of  giving  us  necessary  (general) 
truths. 

Infinite.  The  unlimited :  meaning  in  its  strict  sense  that  which  is 
unconditionally  unlimited,  or,  in  all  respects  and  relations,  unlimited. 
Negative  attributes  being  limitations,  no  negative  attribute  can  belong 
to  the  Infinite.  In  a  looser  sense  the  word  is  used  for  that  which  is 
greater  than  any  finite.  The  Infinite  and  the  Absolute  are  with 
Hamilton  two  subdivisions  of  the  Unconditioned.     See  Absolute. 

Intellect,  Intelligence.  These  words  do  not  occur  in  Hamilton's 
list  of  Faculties,  but  his  use  of  them  seems  to  correspond  very  nearly 
with  the  Regulative  Faculty,  with  the  occasional  addition  of  the  Ela- 
borative  Faculty  :  which  see. 

Intension.  See  Comprehension.  Intensive  quantity  (as  opposed  to 
extensive  quantity)  is  a  phrase  which  Hamilton  often  employs  in  the 
sense  of  degree  and  especially  degree  of  vividness. 

Internal.  Internal  sense,  or  Internal  perception,  is  the  faculty  which 
perceives  or  apprehends  the  states  of  our  own  minds,  such  as  pleasure 
and  pain,  in  contrast  to  the  states  of  the  external  world.  The  faculty 
of  Perception  includes  the  two  subdivisions  External  Perception  and 
Internal  Perception. 

Intuition.  Intuition  or  Presentation  is  opposed  to  thought  and  its 
various  products  (see  Elaborative  Faculty),  and  embraces  the 
products  of  the  Facult}'  of  Perception,  whether  External  or  Internal. 
It  is  an  immediate  knowledge  or  cognition  of  something  in  space, 
in  time,  or  in  both.  Its  object  is  sometimes  said  to  be  individual, 
which  is  so  far  true  that  the  object  of  an  intuition  can  never  be 
general;  but  on  the  one  hand  an  intuition,  such  as  that  of  the  table 
before  me,  often  consists  of  many  separable  parts,  and  on  the  other 


1 82    GLOSSARY  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL  TERMS. 

band,  in  order  to  recognize  an  individual  object  as  the  same  that  we 
previously  knew,  we  must  have  at  least  two  intuitions  (a  present  and 
a  past  one)  and  institute  a  comparison  between  them.  Occupation  of 
a  definite  portion  of  space,  or  time,  or  b  th,  seems  to  be  the  most 
definite  characteristic  of  an  intuition,  while  a  concept  is  something  that 
(usually  at  least)  equally  belongs  to  more  than  one  intuition,  each  of  these 
intuitions  having  its  own  position  in  space  and  time.  Hamilton,  how- 
ever, distinguishes  an  intuition  or  presentation  from  a  representation 
as  well  as  from  a  concept.     (See  Imagination  and  Conception.) 

Judgment.  In  one  meaning  of  the  word,  any  apprehended  relation 
between  two  states  of  consciousness  is  a  judgment ;  but  as  the  appre- 
hension of  a  discrimination  and  relation  between  two  such  states  is 
essential  to  all  consciousness,  every  act  of  consciousness  thus  implies 
a  judgment.  In  its  narrower  meaning,  a  judgment  is  a  relation 
between  two  concepts  which  form  its  subject  and  predicate.  In  this 
sense  it  is  the  second  operation  of  the  Elaborative  Faculty  with  which 
Logic  deals,  viz.,  the  mental  process  corresponding  to  a  proposition. 
It  is  in  this  latter  sense  that  judgments  are  divided  into  Analytical  or 
Explicative  and  Synthetical  or  Ampliative,  as  already  mentioned. 
The  two  meanings  of  the  word  judgment  are  sometimes  distinguished 
as  Psychological  judgments  and  Logical  judgments.  The  best  verbal 
expression  for  the  former  kind  of  judgment,  according  to  Hamilton,  is, 
This  is  here,  or,  That  is  there. 

Knowledge.     See  Cognition. 

Latent  (.Modifications).  A  latent  state  or  modification  of  the  mind  is 
one  of  which  we  are  not  conscious  at  the  moment,  but  which  is  never- 
theless capable  of  producing  effects  on  consciousness.  It  would  seem 
to  be  of  two  kinds,  viz.  that  which  is  not  at  present  producing  any 
effect  on  consciousness,  but  is  capable  of  producing  effects  hereafter, 
(for  instance,  when  recalled  to  the  mind  by  an  act  of  memory),  and  that 
which  is  producing  a  present  effect  on  consciousness,  though  it  is  itself 
latent.  But  Hamilton  is  of  opinion  that  all  latent  modifications  are 
of  this  latter  kind,  every  mental  activity  that  we  have  once  experienced 
continuing  to  exist  in  a  state  of  latency  (but  occasionally  rising  again 
into  consciousness)  during  the  whole  remainder  of  our  lives. 

Law.  Hamilton  uses  this  word  both  for  the  expression  of  the  universal 
and  necessary  facts  of  consciousness  (see  Form)  and  also  for  the 
generalized  facts  of  our  internal  experience.  It  is  used  in  the  latter 
meaning,  for  instance,  when  Hamilton  tells  us  that  the  law  which 
connects  sensation  and  perception  is  that  they  always  co-exist,  but  are 
in  the  inverse  ratio  of  each  other:  while  it  is  used  in  the  former 
meaning  in  such  expressions  as  the  law  of  contradiction.    When  used 


GLOSSARY  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL   TERMS.    183 

so  ;t.s  to  imply  necessity,  this  necessity  may  be  either  of  a  positive  or 
a  negative  character.     (See  Necessity.) 

Limit.  Hamilton  seems  occasionally  to  employ  this  verb  and  its  cognates 
in  the  sense  of  to  mark  out  or  define;  as  when,  in  law,  an  estate  is 
said  to  be  limited  to  a  man  and  his  heirs,  that  being  in  fact  what 
would  be  popularly  called  an  unlimited  estate. 

Locomotive.  The  Locomotive  Faculty  does  not  occur  in  Hamilton's  list 
of  faculties,  and  is  in  fact  only  a  name  for  the  power  of  setting  our 
muscles  in  motion  by  means  of  will  or  volition.  In  so  doing,  Hamil- 
ton thinks  there  is  a  consciousness  of  effort,  distinct  botb  from  the 
'  volition  to  move  and  the  sensations  which  accompany  the  movement, 
(these  are  called  muscular  sensations,  and  are  usually  referred  to  what 
is  called  the  Muscular  Sense,  though  sometimes  included  under  the 
sense  of  Touch).  Volition  being  always  directed  to  an  end,  the  greater 
or  less  amount  of  effort  necessary  under  different  circumstances  to 
accomplish  this  end,  would,  apart  from  any  accompanying  sensations 
(according  to  Hamilton),  reveal  to  us  the  fact  that  our  locomotive 
energy  was  resisted ;  and  it  is  by  this  resistance  to  our  locomotive 
energy  that  the  existence  of  an  extra-organic  world  is  first  revealed 
to  us.  This  doctrine  only  appears  in  Hamilton's  Dissertations  to 
Keid.  The  volition  to  move  presupposes  the  notions  of  space  and 
motion  in  space,  but  Hamilton  has  not  directly  described  the  latter 
of  these  notions  as  a  priori. 

Logic.  With  Hamilton,  Logic  is  the  science  of  the  formal  laws  of  thought, 
or  the  science  of  the  laws  of  thought  as  thought.  It  is  thus  the 
science  of  the  laws  and  products  of  the  Elaborative  Faculty  :  which 
see.  It  does  not  concern  itself  with  any  inference  or  evidence  which 
is  not  absolutely  conclusive. 

Major,  Minor,  Middle.  The  words  major  and  minor  are  applied  in 
Logic  to  both  propositions  and  terms.  In  a  syllogism  the  major  term 
is  the  predicate  of  the  conclusion,  the  minor  term  is  the  subject  of 
the  conclusion  and  the  term  which  occurs  in  the  premisses,  but  not  in 
the  conclusion,  is  called  the  middle  term.  The  major  premiss  is  the 
premiss  which  contains  the  major  term  and  the  middle  term  :  the 
minor  premiss  is  that  which  contains  the  minor  term  and  the  middle 
term.  The  word  middle  is  applied  only  to  the  term,  and  not  to  any 
proposition.  An  undistributed  middle  is  the  fault  which  occurs  in  a 
syllogism  where  the  middle  term  is  particular  (see  Particular)  in 
both  premisses.     Thus  in  the  syllogism 

Some  B  is  (some)  C, 

Some  C  is  (some)  D, 

Therefore  some  D  is  (some)  B. 


1 84   GLOSSARY  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL  TERMS. 

B  is  the  major  term,  C  is  the  middle  term  and  D  is  the  minor  term  ; 
some  B  is  (some)  C  is  the  major  premiss  :  some  C  is  (some)  D  is 
the  minor  premiss  :  some  D  is  (some)  B  is  the  conclusion  ;  and  the 
syllogism  is  invalid  on  account  of  the  fault  known  as  undistributed 
middle,  the  middle  term  C  being  particular  in  both  premisses. 

Materialism.  The  theory  of  perception  according  to  which  the  perceiver 
and  the  perceived  are  alike  material — mind  being  only  a  kind  of  matter 
or  a  product  of  matter. 

Matter.     See  Form. 

Metaphysics.  This  term  is  employed  for  both  Psychology  and  Ontology, 
but  is  more  properly  applicable  to  the  latter,  according  to  Hamilton. 

Mode.  This  word  is  usually  equivalent  to  state,  and  nearly  coincides  in 
meaning  with  accident,  attribute,  quality,  &c,  as  contradistinguished 
from  substance  or  subject.  In  Logic  it  has  a  different  meaning, 
namely,  a  particular  arrangement  of  premisses  and  conclusion  ;  as  the 
mode  UAA  signifies  a  syllogism  in  which  the  major  premiss  is  U,  the 
minor  premiss  A  and  the  conclusion  A  (the  meanings  of  which  vowels 
appear  by  Hamilton's  Table  of  Prepositional  Forms).  Popularly 
it  is  used  as  equivalent  to  way  or  method  ;  but  not  by  Hamilton. 

Natural  (Realism  or  Dualism).  Natural  Realism  or  Natural 
Dualism  is  Hamilton's  name  for  the  doctrine  which  maintains  that 
in  perception  we  are  conscious  at  once  of  mind  and  of  matter — of  the 
ego  and  of  the  external  world.  Realism,  as  thus  used,  implies  a 
belief  in  the  external  world,  and  accordingly  the  Cosmothetic  Idealists 
are  also  described  as  Hypothetical  Realists.  This  use  of  the  word  is 
quite  distinct  from  that  in  which  Realism  is  opposed  to  Nominalism. 
Realists,  in  that  sense,  were  those  who  believed  that  there  were  real 
things  which  corresponded  to  our  general  ideas  or  concepts — these 
real  things  not  being  the  individual  things  contained  in  the  exten- 
sion of  the  concept,  but  universals.  They  seem  to  have  been  what 
Plato  called  Ideas,  so  that  in  this  meaning  of  Realism  and  the 
Platonic  meaning  of  Idea,  Realism  and  Idealism  would  coincide 
instead  of  being  opposed.  The  old  use  of  the  word  Realism  only 
occurs  in  a  few  historical  passages  in  Hamilton.  It  is  not,  of  course, 
to  be  identified  with  Dualism. 

Necessity.  Besides  the  use  of  this  term  to  imply  what  we  cannot  avoid 
thinking  or  judging,  the  word  Necessity  is  often  applied  to  the 
doctrine  which  denies  the  freedom  of  the  human  will,  and  even  to  that 
form  of  the  doctrine  which  con  lines  itself  to  asserting  that  volitions 
have  invariable  antecedents  which  would  enable  any  person  who 
knew  nil  the  antecedents  to  predict  the  volitions  with  perfect  accuracy. 
Hamilton's  divisions  of   Necessity   are   given  in  the  text.     That  to 


GLOSSARY  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL   TERMS.    185 


which  he  attaches  most  importance  is  the  division  into  positive  and 
negative  necessity.  Necessity  is  his  great  test  for  distinguishing 
the  original  furniture  of  the  mind  from  the  subsequent  acquisitions 
of  experience. 

Negative.  Every  concept  has  its  negative,  the  one  being  expressed  as 
B,  the  other  as  non-B.  The  same  observation  is  true  of  every  attribute 
or  name.  But  concepts  and  attributes  are  often  described  as  negative 
when  they  are  such  as  we  cannot  conceive  either  at  all  or  in  the 
required  combination.  Negative  in  this  latter  sense  is  equivalent  to 
inconceivable,  and  positive  to  conceivable.  Passing  on  to  judgments 
or  propositions,  a  negative  judgment  strictly  speaking  is  that  whose 
copula  is  is  not  instead  of  is,  as  Man  is  not  a  quadruped.  But  a  law 
or  principle  is  sometimes  described  as  negative,  not  because  it  is 
expressed  by  a  negative  judgment  or  proposition,  but  because  its 
necessity  is  of  a  negative  kind  as  already  explained.  These  various 
meanings  or  applications  of  the  term  negative  often  require  to  be 
borne  in  mind.  The  principle  of  Contradiction — No  B  is  non-B — is 
expressed  by  a  negative  judgment,  but  it  possesses  the  highest  kind 
of  positive  necessity:  and  instances  of  the  opposite  kind  could  easily 
be  given. 

Nihilism.  The  doctrine  which  recognizes  nothing  but  passing  mental 
modifications,  and  denies  the  independent  existence  of  mind  and 
matter  as  well  as  of  any  higher  substance. 

Nominalism.     See  Conception,  Concept. 

Nomology.  The  Science  of  Laws  as  opposed  to  phenomena.  Thus, 
Logic  is  the  Nomology  of  the  Elaborative  Faculty. 

Non-ego.     See  Ego. 

Notion.  Usually  employed  by  Hamilton  in  the  same  meaning  as  con- 
cept, but  he  sometimes  uses  it  in  a  wider  signification.  A  combina- 
tion of  attributes  (whether  positive  or  negative)  which  violates  the 
laws  of  thought  (or  any  other  necessary  mental  law)  may  be  called  a 
notion,  but  not  a  concept.  Thus  we  may  speak  of  the  notion,  but  not 
the  concept,  of  a  square-circle. 

Object,  Objectite.  Anything  which  can  be  separately  considered  and 
regarded  apart  from  the  conscious  mind  is  in  Hamilton's  language 
an  object.  It  may  be  only  a  state  of  the  mind,  in  which  case  it  is 
called  a  subject-object  or  subjectivo-object,  or  it  may  be  a  state  of 
matter  or  of  the  external  world,  in  which  case  it  may  be  called  an 
object-object  or  objectivo-object.  In  the  case  of  subject-objects,  there 
is  no  real  distinction  between  the  mental  act  or  operation  and  its 
object,  the  act  of  imagining  a  centaur  being,  in  fact,  the  same  thing 
with  the  representation  (or  imagination)  of  a  centaur;  but  in  the 


1 86    GLOSSARY  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL   TERMS. 

case  of  an  object-object,  the  operation  and  tbe  object  are  quite  distinct, 
the  one  being  mental  and  the  other  material.  In  immediate  know- 
ledge there  is  only  one  object,  which  may  be  either  a  subject-object 
or  an  object-object ;  but  in  mediate  knowledge  there  are  two  objects, 
an  immediate  object  which  is  alwaj's  a  subject-object  and  a  mediate 
object  which  is  usually  an  object-object.  Thus  when  I  imagine 
London  Bridge  in  its  absence,  the  immediate  object  of  the  act  of 
imagination  is  my  present  mental  representation  of  the  bridge,  and 
the  mediate  object  is  the  bridge  itself  as  I  formerly  saw  it.  There  is 
another  use  of  the  term,  however,  owing  to  which  Hamilton's  lan- 
guage is  sometimes  ambiguous.  The  object  of  a  mental  act  or  state 
sometimes  means  not  that  which  is  cognized  in  the  act  or  state, 
but  that  which  causes  or  produces  the  cognition  ;  and  thus  understood 
the  immediate  object  means  that  which  immediately  causes  or  pro- 
duces the  mental  state,  while  the  mediate  or  remote  object  means 
that  which  ultimately  causes  or  produces  it,  by  affecting  the  imme- 
diate cause.  In  this  way  the  vibrations  of  tbe  air  in  contact  with 
the  ear  may  be  said  to  be  the  immediate  object  of  the  sense  of  hear- 
ing, even  by  those  who  maintain  that  we  are  not  immediately  cog- 
nizant (or  conscious)  of  these  vibrations;  while  the  mediate  or  remote 
object  would  be  the  sounding  body  at  a  distance  which  sets  the  air  in 
vibration,  and  thus  causes  the  immediate  cause  of  the  sensations  of 
sound,  of  which  latter  alone  I  am  on  this  theory  conscious.  It  is  not 
easy  to  determine  whether  in  some  passages  Hamilton  intends  using 
the  phrase  immediate  object  in  this  latter  sense  or  in  the  sense  of  that 
which  is  immediately  cognized,  and  some  obscurity  is  thus  thrown  over 
his  Natural  Realism.  The  word  objective  is  free  from  this  ambiguity  ; 
but  it  may  mean  either  subjectivo-objective  or  objectivo-objective> 
the  former  meaning  being  more  common  with  the  earlier  English 
writers,  and  the  latter  meaning  with  the  later.  Reid  used  tbe  word 
object  in  the  sense  of  objectivo-object  exclusively  (I  believe)  and  Mill 
seems  to  understand  it  in  the  same  sense  whenever  it  occurs  in  the 
pagea  of  Hamilton. 
Ontology.  The  science  of  being  as  being,  as  distinct  from  the  knowledge 
of  any  of  its  phenomenal  manifestations.  Thus  a  science  of  the 
A 1  solute  or  of  the  Infinite  would  be  an  Ontology.  Such  sciences 
Hamilton  thinks  impossible,  yet  as  he  gives  Ontology,  or  Inferential 
Psychology,  a  place  in  his  division  of  Philosophy,  it  may  be  assumed 
that  be  believed  that  in  some  instances  we  could  proceed  beyond  the 
facta  of  consciousness  by  way  of  legitimate  inference.  Natural 
Theology  would  probably  come  under  this  head.  With  the  earlier 
philosophers   Ontology    usually   included     Rational    Psychology   or 


GLOSSARY  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL   TERMS.    187 

Pneumatology,  Rational  Cosmology  and  Rational  Theology,  the  word 
Hational  being  used  to  indicate  that  all  these  sciences  were  based  on 
grounds  independent  of  experience. 

Operation.  This  term,  like  the  words  act  and  energy,  seems  to  be  often 
used  by  Hamilton  to  include  mixed  states  of  action  and  passion. 
(We  are  never,  he  thinks,  conscious  of  pure  passivity.)  Thus  he 
speaks  of  perception  as  an  operation-,  though  the  mind  is,  for  the  most 
part,  passive  in  perception. 

Organ,  Organism.  These  words  seem  to  be  sometimes  used  for  the 
whole  of  the  human  body,  while  at  other  times  they  are  limited  to 
the  nervous  system. 

Parcimony.  The  law  which  forbids  us  to  assume  more  causes  or 
principles  than  are  necessary  to  account  for  the  facts  to  he  explained 
is  termed  by  Sir  W.  Hamilton  the  law  of  ■parcimony.  It  not  only 
forbids  us  to  assume  more  causes  than  are  necessary,  but  also  to  assume 
more  onerous  causes  than,  are  required.  This  latter  phrase  appears 
to  mean  that  we  must  not  assume  a  positive  force  or  power  to  explain 
what  can  be  accounted  for  by  a  mere  negative  inability.  He  adds 
two  laws,  described  as  the  laws  of  Integrity  and  Harmony,  which, 
however,  seem  less  important. 

Particular.  Hamilton  uses  this  word  in  the  meaning  of  some,  but 
generally  more  than  one.  His  use  is  not  to  be  confounded  with  that 
of  many  recent  writers,  like  Mr.  Mill,  who  use  particular  in  the 
sense  of  individual  (whence,  I  suppose,  an  individual  is  now  some- 
times called  &  party).  A  particular  proposition,  with'Hainilton,  is 
one  of  the  form  Some  Bs  are  Cs,  not  of  the  form  This  B  is  C — which 
would  be  a  singular  proposition.  Hamilton  uses  the  word  some, 
however,  in  the  sense  of  some  only. 

Perception.  In  its  wider  sense,  perception  is  nearly  equivalent  to 
intuition  or  presentation.  The  faculty  of  perception  is  that  by  which 
ideas  first  enter  the  mind,  and  it  has  two  branches,  External  Percep- 
tion and  Internal  Perception — the  former  again  including  the  five- 
senses.  In  a  narrower  sense  perception  is  opposed  to  sensation,  and 
is  limited  to  the  objective  (as  sensation  is  to  the  subjective)  character- 
istics of  the  products  of  the  faculty  of  perception.  In  this  sense  it 
seems  to  be  exclusively  applied  to  external  perception,  and  what 
Hamilton  speaks  of  as  the  various  theories  of  perception  are  in  fact 
theories  of  external  perception  only.  The  characteristic  property  of 
perception,  in  this  narrower  sense,  is  the  reference  to  space — at  least  in 
the  form  of  locality.  The  primary  qualities  of  matter  belong  to  per- 
ception, and  the  secondary  to  sensation  (the  secundo-primary  being 
attained  by  the  locomotive  faculty).     In  popular  language  we  often 


1 88    GLOSSARY  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL   TERMS. 

speak  of  perceiving  a  relation  between  two  things,  or  perceiving  the 
truth  of  a  proposition,  and  by  some  writers  perception  is  used  in  as 
wide  and  vague  a  sense  as  idea.  The  reader  must  bear  in  mind  that 
Hamilton  never  adopts  these  latter  meanings  of  the  term.  The  word 
percept  seldom  if  ever  occurs  in  Hamilton.  Had  he  employed  it 
(like  concept)  he  would  have  avoided  some  of  the  ambiguities  attach- 
ing to  the  phrase  object  of  perception. 

Phenomenon.  Or  appearance.  Used  by  Hamilton  for  a  mode,  state, 
quality,  attribute,  accident,  or  property,  either  of  mind  or  of  matter. 
Kant  uses  the  term  in  contrast  to  noumenon — the  thing  as  it  really 
is;  whereas  phsenomenon  with  him  means  the  thing  as  it  appears 
to  us.  The  word  noumenon  is  not  employed  by  Hamilton  ;  and  he 
opposes  the  term  phcenomenon  not  to  noumenon  but  to  substance: 
e.  g.  he  describes  the  principle  of  Substance  as  the  law  of  substance 
and  phsenomenon. 

Philosophy.  Hamilton  uses  this  word  as  nearly  identical  with  what  is 
often  called  Mental  Philosophy.     See  Metaphysics. 

Posterioei.     See  Priori. 

Potential,  Potentiality.  That  which  is  capable  of  becoming  some- 
thing else,  is  sometimes  said  to  be  potentially  that  something  else. 
Thus  if  B  may  become  C,  it  is  said  to  be  potentially  C.  But  this 
potentiality  is  two-fold,  for  the  thing  may  be  capable  of  being  changed 
into  C  by  the  operation  of  something  else  (which  we  may  call  D),  or 
it  may  be  capable  of  changing  itself  (unaided)  into  C.  In  the  former 
case,  however,  the  proper  expression  would  seem  to  be  that  B  and  D 
together  are  potentially  C;  and  this,  I  think,  is  the  way  in  which 
Hamilton  uses  the  word  potential,  and  its  cognates. 

Peedicate.  Every  judgment  or  proposition  contains  the  two  elements, 
viz.  something  about  which  an  assertion  is  made  and  something  that 
is  asserted  of  it.  That  about  which  the  assertion  is  made  is  called 
the  subject  (it  might  perhaps  have  been  better  designated  the  object), 
and  that  which  is  asserted  of  it,  is  the  predicate.  Thus  in  the  pro- 
position Every  man  is  mortal,  man  (or  every  man)  is  the  subject  of 
the  proposition,  and  mortal  is  the  predicate.  The  word  is  (or  is  not) 
which  connects  them  is  known  as  the  copula.  A  proposition  thus 
consists  of  a  subject,  a  predicate,  and  a  copula,  as  does  also  a  judgment. 
(1  have,  however,  here  assumed  the  proposition  to  be  what  is  called  a 
categorical  proposition.     See  Proposition.) 

Puemi88,  ok  Pjikmise.  A  judgment  or  proposition  when  employed  in  a 
Syllogism — every  syllogism  consisting  of  two  premisses  and  a  con- 
clusion. These  premisses  arc  called  the  major  premiss  and  the  minoi 
premiss,  as  already  mentioned. 


GLOSSARY  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL   TERMS.    189 


Pbesentation,  Peesentative.  Presentation  is  nearly  equivalent  to 
intuition  and  perception,  which  see.  Intuitive  or  immediate  know- 
ledge is  also  described  as  presentative  knowledge.  We  are  not 
therefore,  however,  to  conclude  that  all  presentative  knowledge  con- 
sists of  presentations.  That  which  is  immediately  known  must,  accord- 
ing to  Hamilton,  he  present  to  the  mind,  both  in  time  and  (if  it  be  a 
material  object)  in  space.  Hence  probably  the  derivation  of  the  term 
presentation. 

Pbimaey  (Quality).  Hamilton  divides  the  qualities  of  matter,  as  known 
to  us,  into  primary,  secundo-primary,  and  secondary.  The  primary 
are  all  resolvable  into,  and  deducible  from,  the  fundamental  element, 
occupation  of  space  ;  and  space  being  a  priori  as  well  as  empirical, 
they  are  to  a  great  extent  a  priori,  and  dependent  on  the  intellect 
alone.  We  perceive  them  in  our  organism.  The  secundo-primary 
qualities  are  all  reducible  to  resistance  to  our  locomotive  volition,  and 
are  perceived  by  means  of  the  locomotive  faculty.  They  alone  are 
immediately  perceived,  according  to  Hamilton,  in  extra-organic  bodies. 
The  (secondary  qualities,  like  the  primary,  are  affections  of  our  organism, 
but  when  taken  alone  do  not  include  any  direct  reference  to  space,  and 
are  perceived  in  the  organism  rather  as  a  sensitive  or  animated,  than 
as  an  extended  or  material,  organism. 

Peinciple.  This  word  is  nearly  identical  with  law.  But  an  ultimate 
principle  seems  to  be  occasionally  used  for  an  ultimate  being. 

(A)  Peioei.  A  general  name  for  that  which  is  derived  from  the  nature  of 
the  mind  itself  independently  of  experience;  in  contrast  to  a  poste- 
riori, or  empirical,  meaning  that  which  comes  from  experience. 

Proposition.  The  expression,  in  words,  of  a  judgment.  Propositions 
are  divided  on  various  principles  ;  into  affirmative  and  negative  :  into 
categorical,  hypothetical,  and  disjunctive  (the  categorical  is  of  the 
form  B  is  C,  the  hypothetical  of  the  form,  If  B  is  C  then  D  is  F,  and 
the  disjunctive  is  of  the  form  Either  B  is  C  or  D  is  F  ;  but  Hamilton 
seems  to  limit  it  to  the  form,  B  is  either  C  or  D) :  into  universal,  par- 
ticular, and  singular,  &c.  This  latter  division  being  based  entirely 
on  the  quantity  of  the  subject,  is  superseded  by  Hamilton's  quan- 
tification of  the  predicate,  and  appears  in  a  differeut  shape  in  his 
system.     His  list  of  Propositional  Forms  is  given  in  the  text. 

Psychology.     The  Science  of  Mind. 

Quantification.  Expressing  in  words  the  quantity  of  a  thing.  Thus 
the  quantification  of  the  predicate,  means  expressing  in  words  the 
quantity  of  the  predicate. 

Quantity.  This  word  seems  to  be  sometimes  used  for  that  which  possesses 
quantity  (quantum),  as  well  for  quantity  itself  (quantitas).     Quantity 


190   GLOSSARY  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL   TERMS. 

is  of  three  kinds,  extensive  (magnitude  or  number),  protensive  (mea- 
sured by  time),  and  intensive  (measured  by  vividness,  or  degree  of 
vivacity). 

Realism.     See  Natural  {Realism). 

Reason.  This  term  does  not  very  frequently  occur  in  Hamilton.  It  is 
usually  equivalent  to  the  Elaborative  Faculty  together  with  the  Re- 
gulative Faculty.  Reasoning  refers  to  the  Elaborative  Faculty  alone. 
Understanding  seems  also  to  refer  chiefly  to  the  Elaborative  Faculty. 

Redintegration.  A  law  of  Association.  Hamilton  seems  to  give  this 
name  to  one  law  of  Association  in  his  Lectures  and  to  a  different 
law  in  his  Edition  of  Reid,  as  explained  in  the  text.  The  name  ot 
the  law  is  derived  from  the  tendency  of  association  to  re-unite  what 
had  once  been  united,  by  recalling  the  rest  when  any  portion  of  it  is 
present. 

Regulative  (Faculty).  Hamilton  gives  this  name  to  the  Mind  con- 
sidered as  the  source  of  universal  and  necessary  truths.  It  is  not, 
properly  speaking,  a  faculty,  but  a  collection  of  a  priori  laws  or 
principles. 

Relation,  Relative.  These  terms  would  hardly  need  explanation,  were 
it  not  that  some  writers  have  used  the  term  relative  in  the  sense  of 
relative  to  us,  and  even  interpret  relative  to  us  as  equivalent  to  existing 
only  as  a  state  of  consciousness  in  us,  or  as  the  cause  of  such  a  state 
of  consciousness.  This  is  not  Hamilton's  use  of  the  terms.  When  he 
intends  by  relative,  relative  to  us,  the  words  to  us  are,  I  believe, 
always  added.  Hamilton  holds  that  every  relation  is  restrictive  or 
limitative,  and  hence  incompatible  with  the  Infinite.  See  Infinite  ; 
Conditioned. 

Repetition.     See  Association. 

Representative  (Faculty),  Representation.  See  Imagination.  The 
representative  theory  of  perception,  or  representative  hypothesis  has 
been  explained  under  the  head  Cosmothetic  {Idealism). 

Reproductive  or  Resuscitative  (Faculty).  The  active  faculty  of 
memory — that  which  recals  a  mental  state  which  we  once  felt  before, 
as  distinct  from  the  Conservative  Faculty,  which  keeps  it  latently  in 
the  mind  ready  to  be  recalled  on  the  proper  occasions. 

RETENTION.     See  Conservative  {Faculty). 

Self.     See  Ego.     Not-self  is,  of  course,  equivalent  to  Non-ego. 

Sensation.     See  Perception. 

Space.     See  Extension. 

Species.  This  word  is  used  in  two  senses;  first,  for  a  class  of  things 
which  is  not  the  highest,  but  has  another  class  above  it,  as  man  is  a 
species  of  animal ;  and  secondly,  nearly  in  the  widest  sense  of  idea,  for 


GLOSSARY  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL   TERMS.    191 

a  mental  modification  of  any  kind,  which  was  called  a  .sensible  species 
when  it  belonged  to  the  senses,  and  an  intelligible  species  when  it 
referred  to  the  intellect.  Sensible  species  included  visible,  tangible, 
&c,  species.  In  this  latter  sense  the  word  occurs  in  Hamilton  only 
in  a  historical  reference. 

Subject,  Subjective.  Besides  its  use  in  contrast  to  the  word  object  (in 
which  case  the  subject  is  the  mind),  this  word  is  used  in  two  other 
references.  In  a  judgment  or  proposition,  that  respecting  which  the 
assertion  is  made  is  called  the  subject,  and  that  which  is  asserted  of 
it  is  called  the  predicate  ;  and  again,  subject  is  sometimes  used  in  the 
same  signification  as  substance,  and  is  thus  applicable  alike  to  matter 
and  mind.  See  Object,  Objective.  Subjective  parts  are  sometimes 
used  for  the  parts  of  which  the  comprehension  of  a  concept  is  made 
up  in  contrast  to  integrant  parts. 

Substance.  Is  used  by  Hamilton  for  the  thing  as  it  really  is  (which  is 
unknown  to  us),  in  contrast  to  its  states  or  modes  which  are  known 
to  us.  These  states  or  modes,  however,  are  not  to  be  regarded  as 
entities  inherent  in  the  substance,  but  as  determinations  of  it. 

Suggestion.  Hamilton  uses  this  term  occasionally  for  Reproduction. 
Reid  used  it  to  indicate  anything  that  is  not  directly  attained  by 
consciousness  but  is  called  up  by  that  which  is  directly  attained. 

Syllogism.  Three  judgments  or  propositions,  so  arranged  that  one  follows, 
or  is  alleged  to  follow,  from  the  other  two.  These  two  are  called 
the  premisses,  and  that  which  follows  from  them  is  called  the  con- 
clusion. Ordinarily  there  must  be  but  three  terms  in  the  three 
propositions,  which  have  been  already  described  as  the  major,  the 
minor,  and  the  middle,  terms.  The  syllogism  is  a  valid  syllogism,  if 
the  conclusion  really  follows  from  the  premisses,  and  invalid  if  it  does 
not.  In  Hamilton's  s3*stem,  if  the  two  premisses  contain  but  three 
terms  there  will  always  be  some  conclusion,  unless  both  premisses 
are  negative  or  the  middle  term  is  undistributed.  See  Major,  Minor, 
Middle. 

Synthetical.     See  Ampliative. 

Thought.     See  Conception;  Elaborative  {Faculty);  Intuition. 

Unconditioned.  The  opposite  of  the  Conditioned.  It  includes  two 
sub-divisions  which  are  opposed  as  contradictories,  viz.  the  uncon- 
ditionally limited  or  Absolute,  and  the  unconditionally  unlimited  or 
Infinite.     See  Absolute  ;  Infinite. 

Universal,  Univebsalitt.  Any  general  notion  or  concept  is  often 
spoken  of  as  an  universal,  and  the  corresponding  term  as  an  universal 
term.  This  kind  of  universality  must  not  be  confounded  with  the 
universality  which  (with  necessity)  constitutes  Hamilton's  test  of  an 


192    GLOSSARY  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL   TERMS. 


a  priori  or  ultimate  mental  element ;  otherwise  every  general  notion 
or  concept  would  be  a  priori.     An  universal  proposition  is  one  in 
which  the  subject  is  taken  in  its  entire  extension,  as  All  men  are 
mortal,  No  man  is  a  quadruped.     (The  quantification  of  the  predicate, 
however,  partly  abolishes  this  use  of  the  word  universal).     In   these 
cases  the  subject  is  said  to  be  taken  universally,  which  is  different 
from  saying  that  it  is  an  universal  term.     An  universal  term  might 
be  taken  particularly,  as  Some  men  are  black.    Man  or  men  is  here  an 
universal  term,  though  taken  particularly.     The  universalit}'  ascribed 
to  an  ultimate  or  a  priori  truth  is  two-fold.     1.  It  admits  of  no  excep- 
tions.    2.  It  is  believed  by  all  men.     Thus  Every  event  has  a  cause  is 
true  of  all  events  without  exception,  and  all  men  (on  this  theory) 
believe  it  to  be  true. 
Whole.     There  are  many  kinds  of  wholes  and  parts.     A  sensible  object, 
such  as  an  individual  man,  is  a  whole,  and  even  a  whole  which   may 
be  regarded  as  made  up  either  of  integrant,  or  of  subjective,  parts ; 
i.e.  as  either  made  up  of  arms,  legs,  head,  &c,  or  of  size,  figure,  colour, 
weight,   &c.     Besides  this,  a  class  or  collection  of  objects  may  be 
regarded  as  a  whole,  of  which   the  various  sub-classes  or  individual 
objects  comprised  in  it  constitute  the  parts,  and  a  concept  may  be 
regarded  as  a  whole,  of  which  the  various  attributes  comprised  in  its 
comprehension  make  up  the  parts.     Thus  (the  class)  Man  is  a  whole 
made  up  of  Caucasians,  Negroes,  Red  Indians,  &c,  and  (the  concept) 
Man  is  a  whole,  made  up  of  the  attributes  (or  collections  of  attributes) 
Rational,  Animal,  &c.     These  latter  wholes  are  spoken  of  as  the  wholes 
of  comprehension  and  of  extension  respectively  ;  and  Hamilton  some- 
times speaks  as  if  the  concept  was  the  whole  in  each  case,  and  as  if  it 
might  be  said  (though  from  different  points  of  view)  to  consist  of  either 
of  these  kinds  of  parts.    Previous  to  his  adoption  of  the  quantification 
of  the  predicate  he  described  every  judgment  or  proposition  as  ex- 
pressing a  relation  of  whole  and  part  between  the  subject  and  the 
predicate,  either  as  regards  comprehension  or  as  regards  extension  ; 
but  that  theory  does  away  with  the  relation  of  whole  and  part,  at 
least  in  the  case  of  extension,  since  in  every  affirmative  judgment  the 
quantified  predicate  and  subject  are   declared  to  be  equal  as  regards 
the  quantity  of  extension. 

THE  END. 


ENGLISH    PHILOSOPHERS. 

Edited    by    IWAN    MULLER,    A.M., 

Nkw  College,  Oxford. 


The  objects  of  the  proposed  Series  are : — 

(i)  To  present,  in  a  connected  and  historical  form,  a  view 
of  the  contributions  made  to  Philosophy  by  English  thinkers, 
together  with  such  biographical  details  as  their  life  and  times 
may  render  expedient. 

(2)  To  adapt  the  work  in  price  and  method  of  treatment  to 
the  requirements  of  general  readers,  English  and  American,  no 
less  than  to  those  of  students. 

(3)  To  issue  each  volume  of  the  Series  as  a  complete  and 
integral  work,  entirely  independent  of  the  rest,  except  in  form 
and  general  method  of  treatment. 

To  each  Philosopher  will  be  assigned  a  separate  volume,  giv- 
ing as  comprehensive  and  detailed  a  statement  of  his  views  and 
contributions  to  Philosophy  as  possible,  explanatory  rather  than 
critical,  opening  with  a  brief  biographical  sketch,  and  concluding 
with  a  short  general  summary,  and  a  bibliographical  appendix. 

EDITOR'S  PREFACE. 

The  appearance  of  the  first  installment  of  the  Series  of  English  Phil- 
osophers affords  the  editor  an  opportunity  of  defining  the  position  and  aim 
of  this  and  the  succeeding  volumes.  We  live  in  an  age  of  series ;  Art, 
Science,  Letters,  are  each  represented  by  one  or  more  ;  it  is  the  object  of 
the  present  series  to  add  Philosophy  to  the  list  of  subjects  which  are  daily  be- 
coming more  and  more  popular.  Had  it  been  our  aim  to  produce  a  History 
of  Philosophy  in  the  interests  of  any  one  school  of  thought,  co-operation 
would  have  been  well-nigh  impracticable.  Such,  however,  is  not  our  object. 
We  seek  to  lay  before  the  reader  what  each  English  Philosopher  thought 
and  wrote  about  the  problems  with  which  he  dealt,  not  what  we  may  think 
he  ought  to  have  thought  and  written.  Criticism  will  be  suggested  rather 
than  indulged  in,  and  these  volumes  will  be  expositions  rather  than  reviews. 
The  size  and  number  of  the  volumes  compiled  by  each  leading  Philosopher  are 
chiefly  due  to  the  necessity,  which  Philosophers  have  generally  considered 
imperative,  of  demolishing    all  previous  systems  of   Philosophy  before  they 


ENGLISH  PHILOSOPHERS. 


commence  the  work  of  constructing  their  own.  Of  this  work  of  destruction 
little  will  be  found  in  these  volumes  ;  we  propose  to  lay  stress  on  what  a 
Philosopher  did  rather  than  on  what  he  undid.  In  the  summary  will  be 
found  a  general  survey  of  the  main  criticisms  that  have  been  passed  upon 
the  views  of  the  Philosopher  who  forms  the  subject  of  the  book,  and  in  the 
bibliographic  appendix  the  reader  will  be  directed  to  sources  of  more  detailed 
criticism  than  the  size  and  nature  of  the  volumes  in  the  series  would  j  ermit. 
The  lives  of  Philosophers  are  not,  as  a  rule,  eventful,  and  the  biogiaphies  will 
consequently  be  brief.  It  is  hoped  that  the  Series,  when  complete,  will 
supply  a  comprehensive  History  of  English  Philosophy.  It  will  include  an 
Introduction  to  the  Study  of  Philosophy,  by  Professor  PI.  Sidgwick. 

It  remains  for  the  Editor  to  thank  those  ladies  and  gentlemen  who  have 
so  kindly  promised  their  assistance  to  the  work.  The  volumes  will  appear  in 
rapid  succession,  definite  arrangements  having  been  already  made  for  the 
following : 

ADAM   SMITH,  J.   Farrer,   M.A.,  Author  of  "  Primitive  Manners 
and  Customs." 

BACON,   Professor   Fowler. 

BERKELEY,   Professor  T.  H.  Green. 

HAMILTON,   Professor  Monk. 

J.  S.   MILL,   Miss  Helen  Taylor. 

MANSEL,  The   Rev.   H.  J.   Huckin,  D.D. 

BENTHAM,  Mr.  G.   E.  Buckle. 

AUSTIN,  Mr.    Harry  Johnson. 

SHAFTESBURY  and  HUTCHESON,   Professor  Fowler. 

INTRODUCTION  TO  THE  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY,  Pro- 
fessor H.    Sidgwick. 

HOBBES,  A.    H.   Gosset,  B.A.,   Fellow  of  New  College,  Oxford. 

HARTLEY  and  JAMES  MILL,  E.   S.    Bower,  B.A.,  late   Scholar 
of  New  College,  Oxford. 
Arrangements   are    in   progress   for  volumes  on   Locke,   Hume,   Paley, 

Reid,  &c. ,  and  will  shortly  be  announced. 


The  volumes  will  be  printed  in  handsome  octavo  form,  and  will  sell  for 
about  $1.25  each. 

G.  P.   PUTNAM'S   SONS,  New  York. 


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ENGLISH   THOUGHT  IN   THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY. 
By   Leslie    Stephen,    author  of  "  Hours   in   a   Library,"   etc.,  etc. 
Second  and  revised  edition.     2  vols.,  large  octavo,  cloth  extra,  .    <jj>S  00 
Thus  the  progress  of  intellect  necessarily  involves  a  conflict.     It  implies 
destruction  as  correlative  to  growth.     The  history  of  thought  is,  in  great 
part,  a  history  of  gradual  emancipation  of  the  mind  from  the  errors  spontan- 
eously generated   by  its  first   child-like  attempts  at   speculation.       Doctrines 
which  once  appeared  to  be  simply  expressions  of  immediate  observation  have 
contained  a  hypothetical  element,  gradually  dissolved   by  contact   with  facts. 
■ — Extract  front  Aut/ior's  Introduction. 

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121110,  cloth, $1  75 

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to  his  library  of  text  books  and  manuals.  One  may  be  thoroughly  familiar  with  the  multitude 
of  successive  authors  whose  productions  form  the  vast  treasury  of  English  literature,  and 
wholly  lack  an  understanding  of  the  conditions  which  surround  them,  the  influence  which 
directed  them,  and  the  relations  which  they  hold  to  one  another.  A  knowledge  of  forces,  as 
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political  economy.      Translated  by  Emily  J.    Leonard,  with  an  Intro- 
duction by  the  Hon.  David  A.   Wells.     Octavo,  cloth  extra,   .   $3  50 
This  important  work,  by  one  of  the  ablest  economists  of  this  country, 
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Europe  from  the  times  of  the  Greeks  and  Romans  to  the  present  generation, 
and  of  the  causes  which  have  produced  the  successive  modifications  in  civil, 
industrial,  and  commercial  ideas,  and  in  governmental  policy. 

The  principal  subjects  considered  with  reference  to  their  economic  effects, 
are:  the  institutions  of  Athens  and  of  Sparta;  Rome  under  the  republic  and 
under  the  empire;  the  advent  of  Christianity;  the  disintegration  of  the 
Roman  empire  ;  the  legislation  of  Justinian  and  of  Charlemagne  ;  the  feudal 
system  ;  the  crusades  ;  the  Jews  of  the  middle  ages  ;  sumptuary  laws  ;  trade 
corporations ;  the  Italian  republics  ;  the  invention  of  printing  and  of  gunpow- 
der ;  the  Protestant  Reformation  ;  the  secularization  of  church  property ; 
the  discovery  of  the  New  World;  Colonial  systems;  financial  reforms;  the 
mercantile  system  ;  protection  and  free  trade  ;  the  rise  of  credit  and  the  in- 
stitution of  banks ;  the  labors  of  the  economists  of  the  eighteenth  century  ;  the 
Independence  of  the  United  States  ;  the  French  Revolution  ;  the  Continental 
blockade  ;  the  discoveries  of  Watt  and  Arkwiight  ;  the  suspension  of  specie 
payments  by  the  Bank  of  England  ;  public  debts  ;  the  labors  of  the  nine- 
teenth century  economist,  and  the  social  systems  of  St.  Simon,  Fourier,  and 
Owen;  the  industrial  affranchisement  since  1789;  and  the  changes  in  the 
commercial  relations  of  countries  since  the  commencement  of  the  nineteenth 
century. 


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Whig 


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HART  (Prof.  James  Morgan)  German  Universities.  A  Record 
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On  Teaching:  Its  End  and  Means.     i2mo,  cloth,    .     1  25 

"A  book  of  practical  value;  Multum  in  parvo.  Should  be  in  the  hands  of 
every  teacher  and  parent." — Syracuse  Journal. 

PUTNAM.  The  Best  Reading.  A  Classified  Bibliography 
for  Easy  Reference.  With  hints  on  the  Selection  of  Books ; 
on  the  Formation  of  Libraries,  public  and  private  ;  on  Courses  of 
Reading,  etc.  A  Guide  for  the  Librarian,  Bookbuyer,  and  Book- 
seller. The  Classified  Lists,  arranged  under  about  500  subject  head- 
ings, include  all  the  most  desirable  books  now  to  be  obtained,  either 
in  Great  Britain  or  the  United  States,  with  the  prices  annexed.  New 
Edition,  corrected  and  enlarged.     121110,  paper,  1.25  ;  cloth,       1   75 

"  The  best  work  of  its  kind  we  have  seen."—  College  Courant. 
"  We  know  of  no  manual  that  can  take  its  place  as  a  guide  to  the  selection  of  a 
library." — N.  )'.  Independent. 

ARMITAGE  (E.  S.)     The  Childhood  of  the  English  Nation  ; 
or,  The  Beginnings  of  English  History.    121110,  cloth,   1  25 
"  It  would  be  quite  impossible  for  us  to  praise  this  little  book  beyond  its  de- 
serts,    [t  does  admirably  what  it  attempts.    *    *    *    One  of  the  very  best  of  the  recent 
histories  tor  both  young  and  old."—  Christian  Register. 

"The  author  has  thought  mil    her  subject  honestly  and  thoroughly,  and   has 
■■  eo  us  the  result  in  a  clear  and  attractive  shape  " — Saturday  Review- 


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